Who Pays Maine Use Tax?

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Who Pays Maine Use Tax? David Gunter Maine Revenue Services Disclaimer: This presentation does not represent the views of Maine Revenue Services or the state of Maine.

Maine use tax background 5% rate Optional lookup table on income tax return =.08% of Maine Adjusted Gross Income for purchases under $1,000; was. 04% of MAGI before 2008 Over 85% who paid use tax used the table between 2003-2007, now slightly above 75%

Fraction pay use tax Resident, Exemption>0, Maine Address, MAGI>0 0.14 0.12 Use Tax Compliance Program Lookup table doubles 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0.05.1.15.2.25.0634 Fraction who pay use tax by MAGI, 2008.0818.0975.114.125 0<12 12<24 24<36 36<48 48<60 60<80 80<100 100<150 150<200 200+ MAGI category ($1,000).136.156.192.218.252

Maine use tax background (cont) Many taxpayers pay use tax at some point in time Balanced panel 2003-09: 12.3% 16.3% annual payment rates but 26.3% paid in at least one year

Use tax payment is persistent Distribution of number years pay use tax after the first year use tax payment is observed, balanced panel 2003-09 Number of years paid use tax after first observed payment, through 2009 Year first observed use tax 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2003 0.106 0.084 0.072 0.081 0.105 0.148 0.405 2004 0.276 0.143 0.117 0.121 0.136 0.208 2005 0.320 0.175 0.140 0.128 0.238 2006 0.348 0.188 0.155 0.309 2007 0.506 0.225 0.270 2008 0.598 0.402

Question What are the characteristics of taxpayers who pay use tax and what does that tell us about tax compliance?

Motivation Academic Tax Compliance Literature Do intrinsic motives influence tax compliance? Very weak extrinsic compliance motives for use tax compliance Intrinsic motives used by many to explain high level of U.S. tax compliance Existing research primarily uses survey and experimental evidence Disagreement in literature How do tax preparers influence tax compliance? When no ambiguity, evidence suggests that preparers increase compliance What about situation where little ambiguity but near zero chance of evasion detection? Framing Effects: How does income tax balance at filing or filing method (paper vs. electronic) influence taxpayer decisions?

Motivation (cont) Tax Administration/Policy If intrinsic motives matter, work to foster these motivations Large psychology literature about extrinsic motives crowding out instrinsic motives; some economists (Feld and Frey) have extended this idea to tax compliance But results too speculative, tax too small to put large weight on the results Evidence that form design matters Evidence on the influence of preparers on use tax payment, but no implications for how to influence preparer behavior

Overview of results Large (relative to income) charitable donors who itemize much more likely to pay use tax Self-prepared returns much more likely to pay use tax compared to returns with a paid preparer Very unlikely to be a selection effect, e.g. differences in payment rates are not caused by nonrandom assignment of taxpayers to preparers Income tax balance at filing negatively associated with probability of paying use tax Significant differences in payment probability for selfprepared returns by filing method (paper, I-file, E-file)

Baseline estimates: Linear probability model Use tax payment (0/1) modeled as linear function of : Linear spline in income with 10 notch points and separate intercepts; income groups interacted with dependent exemption dummy variable Filing status Dependent exemptions (0, 1, more than 1) Schedule C return with receipts >$10k (0/1) State or local government employee (0/1) Head or spouse is 65+ Zip code fixed effects And the characteristics that I am about to discuss

Baseline estimates: Linear probability model (cont) Estimation using population of Maine resident income tax returns that Claim at least one exemption Have positive Maine Adjusted Gross Income Have a Maine address

Charitable contribution estimates, 2008 Share of returns Pay use tax Probability pay use tax, rela1ve to itemizer with no charitable contribu1ons Unadjusted difference Regression- adjusted difference Do not itemize 64.6% 9.0% - 0.8% 1.4% Itemize, no charitable contribu1ons 8.6% 9.9% Posi1ve contribu1on/fagi: First quar1le 6.7% 15.5% 5.6% 2.0% Second quar1le 6.7% 15.4% 5.6% 2.4% Third quar1le 6.7% 16.8% 6.9% 3.7% Fourth quar1le 6.7% 19.5% 9.6% 7.4%

Challenges to interpretation Do estimates reflect variation in compliance motivation by charitable giving? Charitable donors overcome free rider incentives in charitable donation context and tax compliance Charitable donors have civic/social values that positively influence compliance Or are there other reasons that charitable donors, conditional on observables, are more likely to pay use tax? Awareness of the law Use tax liability Perceptions of the enforcement regime

Paid preparer estimates, 2008 Probability pay use tax, rela1ve to self- prepared return Share of returns Pay use tax Self- prepared return 45.5% 15.0% Unadjusted difference Regression- adjusted difference Use paid preparer 54.5% 8.0% - 7.0% - 8.4%

Challenge to interpretation Selection effect: taxpayers who hire preparers prioritize minimizing tax liability Investigate two ways: Examine effect of switching between preparer and self-prepared Examine the distribution of the fraction of preparer s clients who pay use tax

Switching between preparer and self-prepared Analysis based on taxpayers who filed with positive AGI in every year 2003-2009. Assumption: Switching to or from a preparer is unrelated to a change in the taxpayer s predisposition to paying use tax Baseline Group: Taxpayer who did not hire a preparer in 2008 or 2009 If paid use tax in 2008, 78.8% probability paid use tax in 2009 If did not pay use tax in 2008, 4.4% probability paid use tax in 2009

Switching between preparer and self-prepared (cont) Probability of paying use tax in 2009 rela6ve to baseline group Hired a paid preparer in: Paid use tax in 2008? 2008 2009 Any year 2003-07 Yes No No Yes No - 0.446-0.010 No Yes Yes - 0.281-0.016 Yes No Maybe - 0.214 0.013 Yes Yes Maybe - 0.027-0.027

Use tax payment rates by preparer Examine the distribution of the fraction of returns with use tax payment by preparer What does this distribution like if Preparers do not influence use tax payment Conditional on observables and hiring a preparer, taxpayers are randomly assigned to preparers with respect to their predisposition to pay use tax What does this distribution actually look like?

Use tax payment rates by preparer (cont) Limit sample to preparers with 15-50 resident returns Estimate probability of each return paying use tax Create 450 replicate samples where each taxpayer pays use tax with this estimated probability; calculate fraction of each preparer s clients who pay use tax Actual distribution: Almost half of preparers do not have a single client who pays use tax, many other have just a few clients that pay For 5.6% of preparers, the fraction of clients who pay use tax is 60 percentage points higher than predicted Simulated distribution: Does not have these tails!

Distribution of predicted and actual use tax payment rates by preparer Actual Simulated Density 0 5 10 15 Density 0 5 10 15 0.2.4.6.8 1 Use tax payment rate 0.2.4.6.8 1 Simulated payment rate Actual, positive only Simulated, positive only Density 0 5 10 Density 0 5 10 0.2.4.6.8 1 Use tax payment rate 0.2.4.6.8 1 Simulated payment rate

Framing effects: Income tax balance Use Tax Payment Rate by Income Tax Balance Estimates are relative to taxpayer with refund of less than $100 Amount owe/refund Refund due Owe income tax $1-$100 0.007 $101-$500 0.007-0.003 $501-$1,000 0.013-0.007 Greater than $1,000 0.030-0.026

Framing effects: Filing Method Look at self-prepared returns only I-File= File on Maine Revenue Services web page

Use tax payment rate on income tax return (Full-year Residents, Self-prepared, Positive MAGI, Claim an Exemption) 25.0% 22.6% 23.1% 22.5% 21.4% 20.9% 20.0% 19.3% 17.4% 16.7% 18.0% 19.3% 18.5% 17.6% 17.3% 17.3% 15.0% 15.2% 12.0% 10.9% 12.4% 11.7% 10.0% 9.3% 8.9% 8.5% 5.0% 0.0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Paper E-file I-File Telefile

8.0% Probability of paying use tax On I-File return relative to paper filers (Full-year Residents, Self-prepared, Positive MAGI, Claim an Exemption) 7.5% 7.6% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 5.1% 5.1% 5.0% 5.5% 5.2% 6.0% 4.0% 4.1% 3.6% 3.3% 3.0% 2.6% 2.8% 2.0% 1.4% 1.0% 0.0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Unadjusted Reg adj

0.0% Probability of paying use tax on E-File returns relative to paper filers (Full-year Residents, Self-prepared, Positive MAGI, Claim an Exemption) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-1.0% -2.0% -3.0% -4.0% -3.2% -3.8% -5.0% -6.0% -5.8% -6.0% -7.0% -6.8% -7.0% -6.7% -6.9% -8.0% -9.0% -8.1% -8.3% -8.5% -7.7% -8.8% -7.8% -10.0% Unadjusted Reg adj

Switching filing method Balanced panel 2003-09, self-prepared each year If the taxpayer paid use tax in the previous year, then: Maintaining the same filing method maximizes the probability of use payment Switching from paper to E-file associated with 16 percentage point drop in use tax payment probability (77% pay overall)

Switching filing method (cont) If the taxpayer did not pay use tax in the previous year, then: Always at least one alternative filing method that increases the probability of paying use tax For example, if I-file in the previous year and did not pay, then E-file and/or paper would increase probability of paying use tax) Bottom line: Changing filing method increases your probability of changing whether or not you pay use tax Suggests form design matters

Conclusion Generalizability? Average positive use tax is about $50, 90 th percentile is $95 Form design matters is probably most generalizable result Would be nice if I had measures of true use tax liability or awareness of use tax obligations along several of the taxpayer attributes examined, such as charitable contributions