How are preferences revealed?

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Transcription:

How are preferences revealed? John Beshears, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian Harvard University James Choi Yale University June 2009

Revealed preferences: The choices that people make Normative preferences: The choices that they should make 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 2

Revealed Preferences Normative Preferences One example: In 401(k) s with employer stock as an option, approximately a third of retirement savings is invested in employer stock. This choice reveals many things, among them, confusion about the risk characteristics of employer stock. On average, US workers report that their employer s stock is less risky than a diversified mutual fund. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 3

$100 bills on the sidewalk Choi, Laibson, Madrian (2004) Employer 401(k) match is an instantaneous, riskless return Particularly appealing if you are over 59½ years old Can withdraw money from 401(k) without penalty On average, half of employees over 59½ years old are not fully exploiting their employer match Educational intervention has no effect 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 4

Education and Disclosure Choi, Laibson, Madrian (2007) Experimental study with 400 subjects Subjects are Harvard staff members Subjects read prospectuses of four S&P 500 index funds Subjects allocate $10,000 across the four index funds Subjects get to keep their gains net of fees 5

Data from Harvard Staff $581 $516 $451 $385 Control Treatment $518 Fees salient $494 Fees from random allocation $431 $320 6 $255 3% of Harvard staff in Control Treatment put all $$$ in low-cost fund

Data from Harvard Staff $581 $516 $451 $385 Control Treatment $518 Fees salient $494 Fees from random allocation $431 $320 7 $255 3% of Harvard staff in Control Treatment put all $$$ in low-cost fund 9% of Harvard staff in Fee Treatment put all $$$ in low-cost fund

When are revealed preferences likely to deviate from normative preferences? 1. Passive choice: 2. Complexity: 3. Limited personal experience: 4. Third-party marketing: 5. Intertemporal choice: 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 8

1. Passive choice Decision-makers have an overwhelming tendency to adopt defaults. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 9

Madrian and Shea (2001) Choi, Laibson, Madrian, Metrick (2004) 100% 80% 60% 40% 401(k) participation by tenure at firm Automatic enrollment Standard enrollment 20% 0% 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 Tenure at company (months)

Employees enrolled under automatic enrollment cluster at default contribution rate. Fraction of Participants at different contribution rates: Default contribution rate under automatic enrollment 67% 37% 3% 1% 20% 17% 7% 14% 14% 6% 9% 4% 1% 2% 3% 5% 6% 7% 10% 11% 16% Contribution Rate Before Auto Enrollment After Auto Enrollment

2. Complexity Three channels of distortion: Complexity delays choice, increasing the fraction of consumers who adopt default options (O Donoghue and Rabin, 2004). Complexity biases choice, since people tend to avoid complex options (Shafir and Tversky, 1994; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2006). Complexity adds noise to choice, since complex options are not as transparent and well-understood as simple options. Hence, some consumers will choose a complex option because they misestimate its value (Gabaix, Laibson, and Li, 2006). 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 12

Simplification Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian (2006) Fraction Ever Participating in Plan 13 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2005 2004 2003 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 Time since baseline (months)

3. Limited personal experience People learn primarily through direct personal experience, not through indirect passive channels. For example, the lessons of Enron, Worldcom, and Global Crossing were not heeded by workers outside of these firms (Choi et al 2005). Even new workers at other firms failed to avoid employer stock. Even new workers at other Houston firms failed to avoid from employer stock. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 14

Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2006) Cash advance Late fee Limit fee 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 15

4. Third-party marketing Explicit Persuasion Implicit Persuasion Shrouding (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006) Examples of shrouded attributes: Cost of printer ink Bank account fees Credit card fees Mutual fund fees 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 16

5. Intertemporal choice Which set of preferences is valid? Today s decision to exercise tomorrow? Or my decision tomorrow, not to exercise after all? Good intentions inconsistent with subsequent actions Diet Savings Human capital investment Safe sex Medical adherence 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 17

Choosing fruit vs. chocolate Read and van Leeuwen (1998) Choosing Today Eating Next Week Time If you were deciding today, would you choose fruit or chocolate for next week?

Patient choices for the future: Choosing Today Today, subjects typically choose fruit for next week. 74% choose fruit Eating Next Week Time

Impatient choices for today: Choosing and Eating Simultaneously Time If you were deciding today, would you choose fruit or chocolate for today?

Time Inconsistent Preferences: Choosing and Eating Simultaneously Time 70% choose chocolate

The desire for instant gratification Read, Loewenstein & Kalyanaraman (1999) Choose among 24 movie videos Some are low brow : Four Weddings and a Funeral Some are high brow : Schindler s List Picking for tonight: 66% of subjects choose low brow. Picking for night two weeks away: 29% choose low brow.

A Behavioral Approach to Revealed Preference: Choices partially reveal both normative preferences and decision-making biases. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 23

How can we measure normative preferences using behavioral data? 1. Structural estimation 2. Active decisions 3. Asymptotic choice 4. Aggregated revealed preferences 5. Reported preferences 6. Expert opinion/informed preferences 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 24

1. Structural Estimation Econometrically estimate a model that includes both psychological biases and normative preferences 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 25

Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2004) Use MSM to estimate discounting parameters, including present bias: Substantial illiquid retirement wealth: W/Y = 3.9. Extensive credit card borrowing in US: 68% didn t pay their credit card in full last month Average credit card interest rate is 14% Credit card debt averages 13% of annual income Consumption-income comovement: Marginal Propensity to Consume = 0.25 (i.e. consumption tracks income) 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 26

LRT Simulation Model Stochastic Income Lifecycle variation in labor supply (e.g. retirement) Social Security system Life-cycle variation in household dependents Bequests Illiquid asset Liquid asset Credit card debt Numerical solution (backwards induction) of 90 period lifecycle problem. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 27

LRT Results: U t = u t + β [δu t+1 + δ 2 u t+2 + δ 3 u t+3 +...] β = 0.70 (s.e. 0.11) δ = 0.96 (s.e. 0.01) Null hypothesis of β = 1 rejected (t-stat of 3). Specification test accepted. Moments: Empirical Simulated (Hyperbolic) %Visa: 68% 63% Visa/Y: 13% 17% MPC: 23% 31% f(w/y): 2.6 2.7 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 28

2. Active Decisions If passivity, inertia, and procrastination are problems, then forcing agents to make active choices will reveal their normative preferences. Tools for active decision-making: Deadlines Forced choices (with compliance incentives) Tied choices At least for savings behavior, Choi et al (2006) find that active savings choices produce distributions of outcomes that are identical after three months to the distributions that would normally take workers three years to converge to. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 29

401(k) participation rate increases under active decisions Active decision cohort Standard enrollment cohort 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 30

3. Asymptotic Choice In standard 401(k) plans, short-run passivity gives way to long-run action. At six months of tenure, enrollment rates range from 20%-50%. At four years of tenure, enrollment rates range from 50%-80%. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 31

Employees move slowly from an old match threshold to a new match threshold. 401(k) contribution rate response to match threshold change: Company G 50% Jan-97 Fraction of Participants 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Mar-96 Oct-96 May-97 Dec-97 Jul-98 Feb-99 Sep-99 1-4% 5-6% 7-8% 9-10% 11-15% 16-25% 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 32

4. Aggregated Revealed Preferences Median and average savings rates and asset allocations are quite sensible. For example, the dollar weighted average allocation to equities is 68% (Investment Company Institute 2006). At TIAA-CREF, the dollar weighted average allocation to equities is 58%. However, individual portfolios vary widely. Benartzi and Thaler (2002) find that most retirement plan participants prefer the median asset allocation to their own asset allocation. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 33

5. Reported Preferences Reported preferences have the liability that talk is cheap and often designed to please the interviewer. On the other hand, reported preferences can express long-term goals that may be undermined by short-term self-defeating behaviors (like procrastination or inertia). Reported preferences also enable us to engage a host of well-being measures, including life satisfaction measures and moment based measures. 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 34

Procrastination and Under-saving Choi, Laibson, Madrian, Metrick (2002) Survey Mailed to a random sample of employees Matched to administrative data on actual savings behavior

Typical breakdown among 100 employees Out of every 100 surveyed employees 68 self-report saving too little 24 plan to raise savings rate in next 2 months 36 3 actually follow through

Self-reports after a financial education seminar Seminar attendees Non-attendees Percent planning to make change Percent actually made change Percent actually made change Will enroll in 401(k) 100% 14% 7% 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 37

Do workers like automatic enrollment? 97% of employees in auto-enrollment firms approve of autoenrollment. Even among workers who opt out of automatic enrollment, approval is 79%. 38

6. Expert Opinion/Informed Preferences Naturally, we may wish to place special emphasis on the views of experts or educated consumers. Examples include: Expert systems (like ESPlanner, Financial Systems) Expert advisors (CFP, financial economists) Normative models (lifecycle asset allocation models) Focus groups with an educational component 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 39

Conclusion: Choices reveal both normative preferences and decision-making biases. Hence, revealed preferences are not the same as normative preferences. Tools for measuring normative preferences 1. Structural estimation 2. Active decisions 3. Asymptotic choice 4. Aggregated revealed preferences 5. Reported preferences 6. Expert opinion/informed preferences 9/21/2009 How are preferences revealed? 40