A survey on the relatonshp between ownershp structure and dvdend polcy n Tehran stock exchange Dr. Hossen Mrzae Abstract The man purpose n ths artcle s to study the relatonshp between Ownershp Structure and Dvdend Polcy of Companes Lsted at Tehran Also the effect of proft growth rate and dvdend polcy varables of the prevous year was controlled and multple lnear regressons were used. The fndngs of studyng 88 companes durng the tme perod between 2004 and 2009 showed that Jont ownershp affects the rato of dvdends of frms accepted n Tehran Stock Exchange postvely and Insttuton ownershp affects t negatvely. However, there are some reasons whch show there does not meanngful relatonshp between Management Ownershp and the amount of Ownershp Concentraton wth dvdend polcy. Keywords Dvdend polcy, Ownershp Structure, Ownershp Concentraton, Stockholders' composton JEL Classfcaton: G10. G21. G32. M41. M48. D I. INTRODUCTION IVIDEND polcy s one of the topcal ssues n fnancal management because the dvdend shows the man cash pays of companes and t s consdered as one of the most mportant alternatves and decson whch managers confront. The manager should decde how much of the proft of the company should be dstrbuted and how much of t should be nvested n the form of accumulated proft n the company. Although payng the dvdend drectly affects the stockholders, t affects the ablty of the frm n accumulaton proft n order to use the growth opportuntes [2]. Addtonally, ths polcy n stock Exchange ncludes data content and ts change conveys some data to stockholders. Each nvestor purchases the stock of a company whose dvdend dstrbuton polcy nterests hm/her. The amount of stock proft proposed by board of drectors usually ncludes some nformaton about the expectatons of managers about future proftablty of the company. Dvdend polcy s also one of tems whch are affected by agency conflcts [9]. On the whole, there are two dfferent vewponts about the relatonshp between dvdend and agency conflcts. In frst theory, dvdend s the resoluton to reduce agency conflcts between managers and stockholders and the second Theory Dr. Hossen Mrzae s at Department of Economcs, Payame Noor Unversty, Post Box: 19395-4697, Lashkarak Hghway, Nakhl Street, Tehran 19569, Iran. (e-mal:mrzae_h@pnu.ac.r). consders the dvdend as an alternatve for agency problems [14]. On the other hand, theoretcal bases and expermental researches' fndngs show that there exsts a meanngful relatonshp between ownershp structure and agency costs [18]. Regardng the relatonshp between dvdend polcy and agency costs, we expect ownershp structure to be effcent on dvdend polcy too. Regardng the mportance of dvdend polcy and recognzng effectve factors on t n Tehran stock exchange (Iran), ths research tres to study ths relatonshp. II. LITERATURE REVIEW A. DIVIDEND POLICY On the whole, the relatonshp between dvdend and earnng per share shows the Dvdend polcy of a company [4]-[16]. Dvdend polcy s one of the most mportant ssues n fnancal supply of companes' lterature. A lot of researchers have suppled theoretcal bascs and expermental proofs related wth proft dstrbuton polcy crtera. However, proft dstrbuton ssue s stll not solved and there s no partcular gudelne about optmal Dvdend polcy [17]. However, jonts tock companes usually admt a certan polcy about proft dstrbuton. Several dfferent factors such as polces used n other smlar companes, prevous dvdend polcy, legal lmtatons and proftablty consstency are consdered when ths polcy s formng. Besdes the exstence of several polces, often companes use some polces such as dvdng fxed, dvdng a fxed percentage of proft, dvdng the fxed proft besdes vared margn and surplus Dvdend [2]. B. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE The stockholders' composton and the amount of Ownershp Concentraton are consdered as the two man aspects of frms' ownershp structure. 1) STOCKHOLDERS' COMPOSITION Smlar to the research carred out by [15], the stockholders' composton s assessed through the followng four varables: foregn ownershp, jont ownershp, manageral ownershp and structural ownershp. Foregn ownershp: t s equal to the percentage of reserved stock by foregners of the whole stocks of the company whch conssts of: foregn partners, foregn fnancal enttes, foregn 327
natonaltes and those who do not nhabt n Iran. Ths varable has been used n researches done by [15]-[6] n the same way. Snce there was not a man foregner ownershp n companes studed and thus the lack of presentng a vald pattern, no test was done about ths ownershp and no vews are presented. Jont ownershp: t s equal to the percentage of reserved stock by cooperatve frm members out of the whole stocks of the company and conssts of dfferent types of cooperatve companes, except those whch were presented prevously. Ths varable has been used n researches done by [15]-[6] n the same way. Manageral ownershp: t s equal to the percentage of reserved stock by famly members of the board of drectors. Ths varable has been used n researches done by [15]-[6] n the same way. On the whole there are two theores about manageral ownershp effect on Dvdend polcy. Frst theory reasons that ncreasng the dvdend reduces agency problems and the conflct resulted from free cash flows, because payng to stockholders decreases management control and t decreases the authorty of the managers [11]. Internal nvestors (such as managers), tend not to dvde the stock proft because they want to preserve ther control over the cash flows whch are beng consdered as dstrbutonal [13]. Thus, t s expected that there s a reverse relatonshp between manageral ownershp amount and dvded proft. On the other hand, n second theory they reason that manageral ownershp may cause the convergence of the profts of manager and stockholders and reduce the problems of free cash flows and thus, manageral ownershp causes more proft dstrbuton [20]. Insttuton Ownershp: t s equal to the percentage of reserved stock by governmental and publc companes of the whole stocks of the company. These companes nclude: nsurance companes, fnancal enttes, banks, governmental companes and other parts of government. Ths varable has been used n researches done by [15]-[6] n the same way. On the whole, there are two conflctng vewponts about the relatonshp between structural ownershp, and dvdend polcy: Reverse relatonshp (negatve): when there s a conflct n revenue, the controllng actvty of foregn or external actvty s consdered as an mportant controllng element. Insttuton nvestors are consdered to be a group of foregn supervsors. If great nsttutons nvestor act as supervsng agences and dvdend s pad to reduce agency expendtures, there should exst an alternatve relatonshp between dvdend polcy and Insttuton Ownershp. Ths relatonshp creates a negatve relatonshp between the percentage of stock owned by Insttuton Ownershp and dvdend polcy [5]-[20]. Addtonally, based on message delvery hypothess, those managers who are more aware of market convey ther expectatons of the future profts of the company by payng the proft to the market. The reasonng states that Dvdend and Insttuton Investors may be consdered as alternatve message delverng tools. The presence of great stockholders reduces the need to use Dvdend as a message of sutable performance, because the stockholders can themselves act as more vald messages. The presence of structural owners may communcate to market that agency costs are reduced regardng the supervson actvtes of these groups of stockholders [3]. Drect relatonshp (postve): the stmulus of Insttuton Investors of gettng benefts from supervsng actvtes forces ths group of nvestors to gnore drect supervson by themselves. These nvestors force companes to ncrease the dstrbuted proft nstead of drect supervson. In other words, structural nvestors prefer to dstrbute free cash flows n the form of dstrbuted proft n order to reduce agency costs related to free cash flows [20]. Accordng to agency theory, when there s a conflct between the benefts of manager and stockholder, regular proft dstrbuton can reduce agency conflcts and through ths the range of future probable msuse of resources by management decreases. Accordng to these assumptons and regardng the fact that accumulated proft s an nternal fnancal supply resource, payng dstrbuton proft forces the companes to get help from external or foregn markets when they need fnancal support. The role of Insttuton Ownershp n ths hypothess s derved from the preferences of Insttuton Investors based on the dstrbuton of cash flows n order to reduce agency expendtures. Regardng the effectve poston of Insttuton Investors, t s expected that ths group of owners affect fnancal polces of the company ncludng proft Dvdend polcy. Therefore, Insttuton Ownershp may dsagree wth the tendency of managers to accumulate more free cashes and regardng ther votng authorty they may force managers to dstrbute the proft [3]. 2) OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION Regardng the relatonshp between Ownershp Concentraton and Dvdend polcy, there are two hypotheses: the frst theory s based on the fact that those companes wth less foregn numbers and percentage of stockholders do not tend to dstrbute proft. Because regardng the agency cost hypothess when ownershp and the percentage of foregn stockholders are more dspersed, the expected cash proft of stocks by stockholders s ncreased [10]. Furthermore, there s no necessty to dstrbute more proft n frms wth a lot of Ownershp Concentraton to mprove fnancal order or balancng the profts between managers and stockholders. Because when there s no agency conflcts, stockholders have suffcent assurance that company's cash flows are used properly. Thus, t s expected that less proft s dstrbuted and as a result of t ownershp centralzaton and proft dstrbuton are reversed [9]. The fndngs of researches carred out by [12]-[9] approve ths hypothess. In second hypothess t s argued that payng the dstrbutve proft s consdered to be an alternaton for supervson [19]. On the other hand, great stockholders (centralzed companes) have enough strength to force the companes to dstrbute surplus cash flows n order to reduce agency costs. Accordngly, t s expected that the relatonshp between 328
Ownershp Concentraton and proft dstrbuton should be harmonous [9]. III. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES [19] studed the effect of growth factors, beta and agency costs on Dvdend polcy. The fndngs of hs research, usng regresson shows that Dvdend polcy (the rato of dvdend pay) has a negatve and meanngful relatonshp wth past and future sales growth rate, beta coeffcent and the percentage of stocks owned by nteror members of the organzaton (manageral ownershp) and t has a postve and meanngful relatonshp wth the number of stockholders. [20] studed the effect of ownershp structure on Dvdend polcy of Japanese companes. The fndngs resulted from regresson for the data related to the years between 1992 and 2000 show that the effect of manageral ownershp and bank ownershp on the yeld of Dvdend especally for frms wth low growth rate has been postve. [17] studed Dvdend polcy and effectve factors on t n Tunsan The fndngs of that research showed that ts proftablty and consstency drectly affect pad dstrbutve proft and cash transformaton of stock market affects pad dstrbutve proft conversely. However, ownershp concentraton and fnancal leverage do not affect the amount of dstrbutve proft. [8] studed the relatonshp between Insttuton Ownershp and Dvdend polcy. The fndngs of studyng Amercan ndustral companes durng the tme perod between 1980 and 2002 show that the amount of proft pad has a drect relatonshp wth Insttuton ownershp. Also [14] studed the effect of ownershp structure on Dvdend polcy of Tunsan companes. Research fndngs show that companes wth more centralzed ownershp dstrbute more proft. There s a negatve and meanngful relatonshp between Insttuton ownershp and Dvdend level and the relatonshp between Dvdend polcy and governmental ownershp s postve. IV. METHODOLOGY Ths research s appled and the desgn for t s quasexpermental and s carred out by usng a post-event approach. We use ths approach when the data are extracted from an envronment naturally or from an event whch has occurred wthout the drect nterference of the researcher. A. HYPOTHESES H1: There s a meanngful relatonshp between Insttuton Ownershp and Dvdend polcy n lsted Frms of Tehran H2: There s a meanngful relatonshp between Jont Ownershp and Dvdend polcy n lsted Frms of Tehran H3: There s a meanngful relatonshp between Manageral Ownershp and Dvdend polcy n lsted Frms of Tehran H4: There s a meanngful relatonshp between ownershp concentraton and Dvdend polcy n lsted Frms of Tehran B. VARIABLES In ths research, Ownershp Structure s ndependent varable and Dvdend polcy s the dependent varable. Also proft growth and the are consdered as controllng varables. 1) INDEPENDENT VARIABLE The ndependent varable n ths research s the ownershp structure of companes. Ownershp structure s assessed through the two methods of stockholders' composton and the amount of ownershp concentraton. Stockholders' composton, lke [15] research s assessed through four varables of Insttuton ownershp, jont ownershp, manageral ownershp and foregn ownershp. Also the" percentage of frst controllng stock "s consdered as a base for measurng the amount of ownershp concentraton. By "percentage of frst controllng stock", we mean ownershp percentage of a set of stockholders who possess the hghest percentage of controllng stock as an economcal group. The less amount of ths percentage shows dsperse of ownershp [10]. 2) DEPENDENT VARIABLE The dependent varable n ths research s the company's Dvdend polcy. The relatonshp between Dvdend and earnngs per share shows the company's Dvdend polcy [4]- [16]. Furthermore, the most common crteron s selected from among all present polces of proft dstrbuton, the Dvdend per share rato on the earnng per share they are used n researches done by [19] and [7]. [12]-[9] beleve that the presence of unprecedented tems may reduce the usefulness ths relatonshp to measure Dvdend polcy. Thus, n ths research we have used the Dvdend pay-out rato on proft resulted from common actvtes for measurng the company's Dvdend polcy. 3) CONTROLLING VARIABLES In order to control other probable factors affectng the company's Dvdend polcy whch are not consdered along wth ndependent varables, proft growth and prevous year's Dvdend polcy are consdered as controllng varables. Based on message delvery theory, the companes ncrease the Dvdend pey-out when they expect proftablty ncrease. Also accordng to random step theory, the best estmaton of company's future Dvdend polcy s the present status of the company. Thus, we expect that the companes' Dvdend polcy should have a meanngful relatonshp wth proft growth (proftablty ncrease) [10]. C. SAMPLE Locaton range for the research s frms accepted n Tehran Stock Exchange and tme range s the years between 2004 and 2009. In ths research systematc deleton method has been used to choose our statstcal samples. In order to choose our statstcal samples, those frms havng the followng characterstcs have been chosen as our statstcal samples and other were omtted: a) Snce the nature of actvty s dfferent for the nvestment 329
frms, nsurance, leasng, and banks, the actvty of frms selected should be producton. b) To choose a convergent sample, frms should have been chosen before the year 2004 n Tehran Stock Exchange and ts stocks should have been purchased from the start of the year 2004. c) In order to select actve frms, the exchanges of these frms should have been actve durng the years between 2004 and 2009 and there should not be any stops more than three months n ther actvtes. d) In order to be compared properly and avod dvergences, the fscal year should end on 29th of Esfand (March 21st.) and durng the years between 2004 and 2009 they shouldn't have changed ther fscal year. e) Fnancal statements and descrptve notes about them should be accessble. Regardng the thngs mentoned above, 88 companes were selected as our statstcal sample for tme perod between 2004 and 2009. D. PATTERNS USED IN THIS RESEARCH The statstcal method used n ths research s multple lner regresson. In order to dentfy the meanngfulness of the regresson pattern Fsher's F has been utlzed. To study the meanngfulness of ndependent varables' coeffcent n each pattern, student t wth 95% assurance level has been used. To test the data to be normal, we have used Kolmogorov-Smrnov (K-S) test. The statstcal results ganed by Durbn-Watson resulted from software n all tests show that there s not any problem of co-effcency. To do ths, EXCELL and SPSS software have been used. Regardng the above mentoned ssues about varables descrbed, research patterns nclude pattern related to the frst hypothess to the pattern related to hypothess four. There are four multple regresson patterns whch are commonly shown as follows: Y β INSO G D + ε Y Y Y = 0 1 2 3 1 = β 0 1JO 2G 3D 1 + = β 0 1MO 2G 3D 1 + = β 0 1OC 2G 3D 1 + H 0 : β 1 = β 2 =0 H : β 1 1 β =0 2 In ths formula; dependent varable nclude; Dvdend Polcy (Y). Also ndependent varables nclude; INSO: nsttuton ownershp, JO: jont ownershp, MO: manageral ownershp and CR: ownershp concentraton. Controlled nclude; G: proft growth, D-1:. The constant co-effcent of β and ε error co-effcent whch s calculated for each perod separately, has a normal dstrbuton and s ndependent of regresson factors. If the presupposton Ho dsapproved, H1 wll be accepted. Ths means that, there s a meanngful relatonshp between dependent and ndependent varables beng tested. V. FINDINGS AND RESULTS To test the normalty of the data, (K-S) test has been used. Regardng the results n table (1), by comparng the meanngfulness level of varables studed for our sample frms, and snce the amount of meanngfulness level s more than 0/05 and there exsts the assurance level of %95 (wth %5 error level), the presupposton Ho s accepted and varables studed, beneft from a normal dstrbuton. TABLE I KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST INSO JO MO OC D D-1 G Kolmogorov-Smrnov z 0.588 0.917 1.471 1.235 0.777 0.741 1.031 Sg 0.280 0.370 0.582 0.094 0.582 0.642 0.238 Frst Hypothess: As t s shown n the followng fgure (Table 2), the varables of Insttuton Ownershp, proft growth and (<0.05) have a meanngful relatonshp wth the company's Dvdend per Share rato. Insttuton ownershp has a converse relatonshp wth the Dvdend per Share rato and controllng varables of proft growth and the prevous year's Dvdend polcy have a drect relatonshp wth the Dvdend per Share rato. The amount of beta shows that the effect of the prevous Insttuton Ownershp -0.233 0.261 0.415 year's Dvdend per Share polcy over the current year's Dvdend per Share polcy s more than other varables under our nvestgaton. Regardng the amount of F, the balanced regresson pattern s meanngful and Insttuton ownershp and controllng varables have a meanngful effect on the current year's Dvdend polcy together and regardng the determnaton coeffcent, these varables explan %48 of changes n Dvdend polcy. TABLE II RESULT OF FIRST HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS T F -2.290 2.303 3.762 0.026 0.025 17.245 0.48 ε ε ε Confrm (1) (2) (3) (4) 1.903 Second Hypothess: As t s shown n the followng fgure (Table 3), the varables of Jont Ownershp, proft growth and 330
(<0.05) have a Postve and meanngful relatonshp wth the company's Dvdend per Share rato. The amount of beta shows that the effect of the prevous year's Dvdend per Share polcy over the current year's Dvdend per Share polcy s more than other varables under our nvestgaton. Regardng the amount of F, Jont Ownershp 0.224 0.267 0.411 Thrd Hypothess: As t s shown n the followng fgure (Table 4), the varables of proft growth and prevous year's Dvdend polcy (<0.05) have a Postve and meanngful relatonshp wth the company's Dvdend per Share rato. But Manageral ownershp and Dvdend polcy don't have meanngful relatonshp wth the company's Dvdend per Share rato. The amount of beta shows that the effect of the prevous year's Dvdend per Share polcy over Manageral Ownershp -.082 0.320 0.439 the balanced regresson pattern s meanngful and Insttuton ownershp and controllng varables have a meanngful effect on the current year's Dvdend polcy together and regardng the determnaton coeffcent, these varables explan %48 of changes n Dvdend polcy. TABLE III RESULT OF SECOND HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS T F 2.190 0.033 16.981 2.354.022 3.705 TABLE IV RESULT OF THIRD HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS T F -0.814 2.798 3.836 Fourth Hypothess: As t s shown n the followng fgure (Table 5), the varables of Ownershp Concentraton, proft growth and (<0.05) have a Postve and meanngful relatonshp wth the company's Dvdend per Share rato. The amount of beta shows that the effect of the prevous year's Dvdend per Share Ownershp Concentraton Internatonal Conference on Management, Appled and Socal Scences (ICMASS'2012) March 24-25, 2012 Duba 0.242 0.238 0.381 0.476 confrm 1.894 the current year's Dvdend per Share polcy s more than other varables under our nvestgaton. Regardng the amount of F, the balanced regresson pattern s meanngful and Insttuton ownershp and controllng varables have a meanngful effect on the current year's Dvdend polcy together and regardng the determnaton coeffcent, these varables explan %44 of changes n Dvdend polcy. 0.419 0.007 14.557 TABLE V RESULT OF FOURTH HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS T F 2.16 2.029 3.354 0.035 0.047 0.001 VI. CONCLUSION The man purpose n ths artcle s to study the relatonshp between Dvdend Polcy and Ownershp Structure n Companes Lsted at Tehran The results of testng the frst hypothess showed that there s a negatve and meanngful relatonshp between Insttuton Ownershp and the Dvdend per Share rato n lsted Frms of Tehran When there s a conflct n revenue, f great nsttuton nvestors act as supervsng agences and dvdend s pad to reduce agency expendtures, there should exst an alternatve relatonshp between dvdend polcy and Insttuton Ownershp. Ths relatonshp creates a negatve relatonshp between the percentage of stock owned by Insttuton Ownershp and dvdend polcy [5]-[20]. Ths result agrees wth the researches of [15]-[14] and does 0.438 Reject 1.735 polcy over the current year's Dvdend per Share polcy s more than other varables under our nvestgaton. Regardng the amount of F, the balanced regresson pattern s meanngful and Insttuton ownershp and controllng varables have a meanngful effect on the current year's Dvdend polcy together and regardng the determnaton coeffcent, these varables explan %47.5 of changes n Dvdend polcy. 16.904 0.475 Confrm 1.812 not accord wth researches of [1]. The results of testng the second hypothess showed that there s a postve and meanngful relatonshp between jont Ownershp and the Dvdend per Share rato n lsted Frms of Tehran Ths result agrees wth the researches of [15]. The results of testng the thrd hypothess showed that there sn't a meanngful relatonshp between Manageral Ownershp and the Dvdend per Share rato n lsted Frms of Tehran Ths result agrees wth the researches of [1] and does not accord wth researches of [15]-[20]. The results of testng the fourth hypothess showed there s a postve and meanngful relatonshp between jont Ownershp and the Dvdend per Share rato n lsted Frms of Tehran Snce The dstrbutve proft s consdered to be an alternaton for supervson [19] and the other hand; great stockholders 331
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