Reforming Council Tax Benefit

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Transcription:

Reforming Council Tax Benefit Stuart Adam, IFS Yorkshire & Humber Finance Directors Network meeting The Orangery, Wakefield, 2 July 2012 www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6183

Council Tax Benefit the key facts 5.9 million recipients More than any other means-tested benefit or tax credit But only two-thirds of those entitled to it 4.9 billion total cost 2.4% of total benefit and tax credit expenditure 15.69 per claimant per week is not large relative to other benefits 85% of CTB goes to the lower-income half of households And half goes to the lowest-income fifth of households Maximum entitlement is the household s council tax bill Reduced by 20p per 1 of net income above a threshold Two thirds of claimants passported to full entitlement by receipt of another benefit

The policy CTB will be abolished from April 2013 LAs in England, and the Scottish and Welsh governments, given grants to run their own rebate schemes instead But pensioners in England will get current, nationally set, entitlements Grants based on 90% of what unreformed CTB would have cost in each area Free to spend more or less than these grants on rebate schemes

Consequences of localisation 1. Variation in schemes across areas Allows LAs to pursue local priorities and to learn from each other But increases bureaucracy and reduces transparency 2. LAs will receive fixed grants instead of having actual costs refunded Adds risk to LA finances An incentive for LAs to reduce the cost of rebates whether by promoting employment more, promoting take-up less, or discouraging claimants from living in the area 3. In two-tier areas, an incentive for district councils to focus disproportionately on minimising admin costs

Scale of the cuts Funding being cut by 480m per year: 19 per household But not 19 per household everywhere Cut proportional to spending on CTB

Annual funding cut per dwelling, by region London North East North West West Midlands Yorkshire & Humber East Midlands South West South East East Anglia England Wales Scotland 0 5 10 15 20 25 Annual cut per dwelling

Annual funding cut per dwelling in Y&H, by LA Hull North East Lincolnshire Rotherham Scarborough Sheffield Barnsley Bradford North Lincolnshire England Calderdale Kirklees Yorkshire & Humber Doncaster Wakefield Leeds East Riding Ryedale Selby York Harrogate Craven Hambleton Richmondshire 0 5 10 15 20 25 Annual cut per dwelling

Scale of the cuts Funding being cut by 480m per year: 19 per household But not 19 per household everywhere Cut proportional to spending on CTB No obligation to spend exactly the amount of the grant on rebates If protect all entitlements, would require savings elsewhere: 1.9% increase in council tax rates or 0.4% cut in local service spending If don t find any savings elsewhere: 19% cut in support for working-age claimants on average Higher where pensioners account for a larger share of CTB

Cuts in working-age support, by region Assuming cuts fully passed on to claimants East Anglia South West East Midlands North East Yorkshire & Humber South East West Midlands North West London England 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% % reduction in working-age support

Cuts in working-age support in Y&H, by LA Assuming cuts fully passed on to claimants Craven Richmondshire Ryedale East Riding Hambleton Harrogate Scarborough North Lincolnshire Selby York Doncaster Rotherham Sheffield Yorkshire & Humber Barnsley Wakefield North East Lincolnshire Bradford Calderdale England Leeds Kirklees Hull 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% % reduction in working-age support

The challenge for local authorities The timescale for introduction is very tight Agreeing on draft proposals Two separate consultations Technical implementation issues Schemes must be finalised by 31 January 2013 LAs have little experience or expertise in designing means tests Government hopes new rebate schemes will protect the vulnerable, support work incentives and fit alongside Universal Credit

Some options for local authorities We look in detail at 8 reforms, of 4 types: Reducing support for all claimants Reducing support for those in higher-band properties Means-testing more aggressively Reducing the single-person discount in council tax Not an option available to LAs, but one for central government to consider Protecting groups beyond pensioners would reduce savings from these

Reducing support for all claimants 1) Reduce all entitlements by 17% saves 9.8% in Y&H 2) Only refund 85% of council tax liability saves 9.3% in Y&H The most regressive of the options we consider Requires LAs to collect some council tax from those with the lowest incomes Poll tax experience suggests this might be difficult Strengthens work incentives, particularly for those with the weakest incentives at the moment

Reducing support for those in high-band properties 3) Restrict support to that for Band B property saves 0.7% in Y&H 4) Remove entitlement from Bands D and above saves 0.9% in Y&H High-band properties will mean different things in different areas! Affects those living in more expensive properties Tend to be families with children Less regressive than reducing support for all claimants Requires collecting council tax from some with very low incomes Though living in expensive properties: how poor are they? Strengthens work incentives for those affected Affects incentives to occupy bigger properties

Means-testing more aggressively 5) Increase withdrawal rate to 30% saves 1.5% in Y&H 6) Support only passported claimants saves 13.6% in Y&H 7) Count Child Benefit as income for means test saves 1.6% in Y&H Protects the poorest claimants Low-to-middle income lose the most, esp. working lone parents Ambiguous effects on work incentives Unlike previous reforms which unambiguously strengthened them But saves full 10% only if so severe that some people made worse off by a pay rise

Reducing the single person discount in council tax 8) Reduce discount to 17.5% raises equivalent of 8.0% in Y&H Most of the revenue comes from higher income groups Those on CTB protected: rebate rises to cover additional liability Though non-take-up lowest-income tenth lose most as % of income Slightly weakens incentive to work for single people Encourages more efficient use of housing stock Discount encourages single people to live in more expensive properties

Universal Credit Being phased in between October 2013 and December 2017 Replacing six of the seven main means-tested benefits for those of working age Income Support, income-based Jobseeker s Allowance, income-based Employment and Support Allowance, Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit CTB is the seventh Two key advantages are simplifying the system and rationalising work incentives Keeping council tax rebates separate definitely undermines the first How much it undermines the second depends on choices LAs make

Integrating council tax rebates with Universal Credit Universal Credit raises two key issues for designing council tax rebates: 1. Count Universal Credit as income in the means test? 2. What to do about passporting when separate out-of-work benefits disappear?

Should UC count as income for the means test? Some benefits being replaced by UC currently count as income while others do not, so some change is inevitable The choice will have several important implications Simplicity Work incentives Treatment of unearned income and childcare Question irrelevant if rebates run out before UC withdrawal starts i.e. withdraw rebates rapidly from first 1 of income......and to avoid overlap completely, limit maximum entitlement a big cut for single people without children This would save more than 10% on its own

Passporting under Universal Credit Currently two-thirds of CTB claimants are passported on to full CTB through receipt of an out-of-work means-tested benefit Income Support or income-based JSA or ESA These benefits will be abolished when Universal Credit is introduced No obvious yes/no indicator to give some people maximum rebate Requiring all these claimants to go through a full means test would significantly increase burden for claimants and local authorities One way to mitigate this would be for DWP to share information from Universal Credit claims with local authorities Contains the information needed to calculate council tax rebate entitlement But transferring data to LAs would only add to the complexity of an already difficult IT project for DWP

Conclusions Localisation has advantages but adds complexity to the system And gives LAs undesirable incentives as well as desirable ones LAs must decide whether to pass on cut in funding to claimants or find savings elsewhere Schemes that save full 10% tend to require collecting small amounts of council tax from those with very low incomes To save full 10% while protecting poorest, means test must be so severe that some people would be worse off after a pay rise LAs also need to consider the complex question of how their rebate schemes will work alongside Universal Credit

Reforming Council Tax Benefit Stuart Adam, IFS Yorkshire & Humber Finance Directors Network meeting The Orangery, Wakefield, 2 July 2012 www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6183