WT/DS472/R WT/DS497/R

Similar documents
( ) Page: 1/9 BRAZIL CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TAXATION AND CHARGES REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY JAPAN

( ) Page: 1/11 BRAZIL CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TAXATION AND CHARGES REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS BY JAPAN

Article 2. National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions

T h e l e g a l i t y o f t h e p r o p o s e d U. S. b o r d e r a d j u s t m e n t t a x " u n d e r W T O l a w

( ) Page: 1/11 BRAZIL CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TAXATION AND CHARGES REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE EUROPEAN UNION

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

World Trade Law. Text, Materials and Commentary. Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio with Arwel Davies and Kara Leitner

THIRD PARTY SUBMISSION OF NEW ZEALAND

TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

WTO Appellate Body rules against USA in the Cotton Dispute Case. Parthapratim Pal

INDIA MEASURES AFFECTING THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR

United States Subsidies on Upland Cotton. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil. Third Participant s Submission of Australia

In the World Trade Organization

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures

NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

United States Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea (AB , DS464)

BEFORE THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

METI Priorities Based on the 2017 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements (May 23, 2017)

NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

BEFORE THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES

In the World Trade Organization CANADA MEASURES RELATING TO THE FEED-IN TARIFF PROGRAM (DS426)

Article 20. Other Requirements

( ) Page: 1/7 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MEASURES RELATING TO TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, AND TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX SCM Agreement Article 3 (Jurisprudence)

UNITED STATES - RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF SUGAR. Report of the Panel adopted on 22 June 1989 (L/ S/331)

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE. Chapter 2 1. OVERVIEW OF RULES. 1) Background of the Rules. 2) Legal Framework GATT ARTICLE III

No. WP/ECO/DTL/08/01. Regional Trade Arrangements, Generalized System of Preferences and Dispute Settlement in the WTO.

BRAZIL CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TAXATION AND CHARGES

5 Implications of WTO s agreement for logistics FTZs 29

(COURTESY TRANSLATION) (DS344)

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

In the World Trade Organization CANADA MEASURES RELATING TO THE FEED-IN TARIFF PROGRAM (DS426)

INFORMATION ON INDIRECT TAX PROGRAMMES IN BRAZIL

PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ClDNA. Preamble

General National Treatment Obligation: Article III:4 of the GATT 1994

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 5 (Jurisprudence)

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

LL.M. in International Legal Studies WTO LAW

UNITED STATES - DENIAL OF MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT AS TO NON-RUBBER FOOTWEAR FROM BRAZIL

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

UNITED STATES- RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORT OF COTTON AND MAN-MADE FIBRE UNDERWEAR WT/DS24/AB/R AB APPELLATE BODY DIVISION:

PERU ADDITIONAL DUTY ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (DS457)

European Union Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies

MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

WTO DISPUTE ANALYSIS*

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

DECISION No 2/2000 OF THE EC-MEXICO JOINT COUNCIL of 23 March 2000 (2000/415/EC)

STAHL Trade Conflicts: The Role of WTO Dispute Settlement. 9 th and 10 th November Wege über Grenzen Crossing frontiers. Thomas A.

ANNEX D ORAL STATEMENTS OF THIRD PARTIES OR EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES THEREOF

PART I CHAPTER 1 MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

CHINA MEASURES RELATED TO THE EXPORTATION OF RARE EARTHS, TUNGSTEN, AND MOLYBDENUM

Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO Rules

ANNEX D REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL

QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

ANNEX C. Second Submissions by the Parties

TECHNICAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK ON NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES. Revised August 2013

AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: NEED FOR CLARIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

'Brazil Cotton' Makes Trade Retaliation Operational

WTO DISPUTE ANALYSIS*

The agreement of principal relevance in the WTO context is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures (the "SCM Agreement").

CHINA MEASURES IMPOSING ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON HIGH- PERFORMANCE STAINLESS STEEL SEAMLESS TUBES ("HP-SSST") FROM JAPAN

UNITED STATES FINAL DUMPING DETERMINATION ON SOFTWOOD LUMBER FROM CANADA. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada (AB )

WT/DS8/15 WT/DS10/15 WT/DS11/13 14 February Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

GATT Obligations: -Shailja Singh Assistant Professor Centre for WTO Studies, New Delhi

GATT Obligations: Article I (MFN), II (Bound Rates), III (National Treatment), XI (QRs), XX (Exceptions) and XXIV (FTAs) -Shailja Singh

Chapter 7 SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

European Communities Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Indonesia Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken Meat and Chicken Products WT/DS484

Overview of WTO Rules: Subsidies and Trade Remedies. Prof. Mukesh Bhatnagar Centre for WTO Studies IIFT, New Delhi

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Course on WTO Law and Jurisprudence Part II: WTO Law on Services, Intellectual Property, Trade Remedies, and Other Disciplines

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

RESTRICTED GENERAL AGREEMENT ADP/ April 1995 ON TARIFFS AND TRADE Special Distribution

Detailed Presentation of Domestic Support

WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 2 (Jurisprudence)

( ) Page: 1/5 UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON COLD- AND HOT-ROLLED STEEL FLAT PRODUCTS FROM BRAZIL REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS BY BRAZIL

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

INDIA CERTAIN MEASURES RELATING TO SOLAR CELLS AND SOLAR MODULES

CANADA ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CARBON STEEL WELDED PIPE FROM THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU

Elements of a Trade and Climate Code

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Transcription:

- 305 - Brazil could indeed devise a WTO-consistent rule that is effectively aimed at credit-accumulating companies, to avoid the problem of credit-accumulation. 1604 7.1237. In light of the above, the Panel concludes that the subsidies granted under the PEC and RECAP programmes are contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, and thus prohibited under Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. 7.5.1.5 Conclusion 7.1238. In light of the foregoing, the Panel concludes that the tax suspensions granted under the PEC and RECAP programmes are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement and contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, and thus are prohibited subsidies, inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. 7.6 Final comments 7.1239. Article 12.10 of the DSU states that: "in examining a complaint against a developing country Member, the panel shall accord sufficient time for the developing country Member to prepare and present its argumentation." 7.1240. Furthermore, Article 12.11 of the DSU requires that: Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the panel's report shall explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and more-favourable treatment for developing country Members that form part of the covered agreements which have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement procedures. 7.1241. In adopting the timetable for the proceedings, the Panel took into account the need to give all the parties sufficient time to prepare and present their respective arguments. Furthermore, in the course of the proceedings, Brazil raised certain provisions of the Enabling Clause, with respect to preferential treatment through non-tariff measures and regional trade agreements. The Panel took account of these provisions by examining Brazil's arguments in detail, as set out in section 7.4.8above. 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8.1 Complaint by the European Union (DS472) 8.1. With respect to Brazil's assertion that Implementing Order 257/2014 is outside the Panel's terms of reference, the Panel concludes that the rules on calculation of presumed tax credits under the INOVAR-AUTO programme, as contained in Implementing Order 257/2014, are within the Panel's terms of reference. 8.2. With respect to whether Article III of the GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, and the SCM Agreement, are not applicable to measures that regulate pre-market production steps, the Panel concludes that Article III of the GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, and the SCM Agreement, are not per se inapplicable to such measures, in particular "pre-market" measures directed at producers. 8.3. With respect to whether Article III of the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement are not applicable to the challenged measures, or aspects of the challenged measures, because they are payments of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, pursuant to Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994, the Panel concludes that measures in the form of subsidies provided exclusively to domestic 1604 The European Union acknowledges that "Brazil could devise a general rule to prevent tax credit accumulation with respect to companies (as opposed to sectors) whereby e.g. companies accumulating a particular amount of tax credits in the preceding or preceding years could benefit from a suspension on taxes." European Union's second written submission, para. 510.

- 306 - producers are not for that reason alone exempted from the disciplines of Article III of the GATT 1994 or Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 8.4. With respect to whether the incentivised products that are the subject of certain challenged measures are "domestic products" for the purposes of Article III of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the Panel concludes that the incentivized products are Brazilian domestic products. 8.5. With respect to the European Union's claims in respect of the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD and Digital Inclusion programmes, the Panel concludes that: a. The production-step requirements under the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD, and Digital Inclusion programme; and the requirement for products to obtain the status of result in imported products being subject to internal taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994; b. The production-step requirements under the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD, and Digital Inclusion programme, and the requirement for products to obtain the status of the aspect of the mechanism for the calculation of the amount of resources required to be invested in R&D under the Informatics and PADIS programmes relating to the deductible part; and the lower administrative burden on companies purchasing domestic incentivised intermediate products under the Informatics and PADIS programmes; accord to imported products treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:4 of the c. It is not necessary to make findings with respect to the complaining parties' claims under d. The Informatics, Digital Inclusion, PATVD and PADIS programmes constitute traderelated investment measures, and the aspects of these programmes found to be inconsistent with Article III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 are also inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement; e. The tax exemptions, reductions and suspensions granted under the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD and Digital Inclusion programmes are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement which are contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, and thus are prohibited subsidies, inconsistent with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement; and f. Those aspects of the PATVD programme found to be inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement are not justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. 8.6. With respect to the European Union's claims in respect of the INOVAR-AUTO programme, the Panel concludes that: a. Certain aspects of the accreditation process, the system of rules on accrual and resulting from expenditure on strategic inputs and tools in Brazil, result in imported products being subject to internal taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:2 of the b. Certain aspects of the accreditation process, the system of rules on accrual and resulting from expenditure on strategic inputs and tools in Brazil; the accreditation requirement to perform a minimum number of manufacturing steps in Brazil; that aspect of the rules on accrual of presumed IPI tax credits pertaining to expenditure in strategic

- 307 - inputs and tools; and those aspects of the accreditation requirements to invest in R&D in Brazil and make expenditures on engineering, basic industrial technology and capacitybuilding of suppliers in Brazil, pertaining to the purchase of Brazilian laboratory equipment; accord less favourable treatment to imported products than that accorded to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:4 of the c. It is not necessary to make findings with respect to the complaining parties' claims under d. The INOVAR-AUTO programme constitutes a trade-related investment measure, and those aspects of the programme found to be inconsistent with Article III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 are also inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement; e. The tax reductions through presumed tax credits granted under the INOVAR-AUTO programme are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement and contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, and thus are prohibited subsidies, inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement; f. Those aspects of the INOVAR-AUTO programme found to be inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement are not justified under Article XX(b) or XX(g) of the g. The tax reductions accorded to imported products from MERCOSUR members and Mexico under the INOVAR-AUTO programme are advantages granted by Brazil to products originating in those countries, which are not accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products originating in other WTO Members, inconsistently with Article I:1 of the h. The complaining parties were not under a burden to invoke the Enabling Clause in their panel requests, and their claims under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 are therefore within the Panel's terms of reference; and i. The tax reductions accorded to imported products from Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay and found to be inconsistent under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 are not justified under paragraph 2(b) or 2(c) of the Enabling Clause. 8.7. With respect to the European Union's claims under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, in respect of the PEC and RECAP programmes, the Panel concludes that the tax suspensions granted under the PEC and RECAP programmes are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement and contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, and thus are prohibited subsidies, inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. 8.8. Pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the agreement in question. The Panel therefore finds that, to the extent that Brazil has acted in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994, TRIMs Agreement, and SCM Agreement, it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the European Union under those agreements. 8.9. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, to the extent that those aspects of the challenged programmes are WTO-inconsistent, the Panel recommends that Brazil bring the challenged measures into conformity with its obligations under the covered agreements. 8.10. Pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel recommends that Brazil withdraw the subsidies identified above without delay. 8.11. Article 4.7 further provides that "the panel shall specify in its recommendation the timeperiod within which the measure must be withdrawn." In other words, the Panel is required to

- 308 - specify what period would represent withdrawal "without delay. Taking into account the procedures that may be required to implement our recommendation on the one hand, and the requirement that Brazil withdraw its subsidies "without delay" on the other, the Panel recommends that Brazil shall withdraw the subsidies identified in paragraphs 8.5(e), 8.6(e), and 8.7 above within 90 days. 8.2 Complaint by Japan (DS497) 8.12. With respect to Brazil's assertion that Implementing Order 257/2014 is outside the Panel's terms of reference, the Panel concludes that the rules on calculation of presumed tax credits under the INOVAR-AUTO programme, as contained in Implementing Order 257/2014, are within the Panel's terms of reference. 8.13. With respect to whether Article III of the GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, and the SCM Agreement, are not applicable to measures that regulate pre-market production steps, the Panel concludes that Article III of the GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, and the SCM Agreement, are not per se inapplicable to such measures, in particular "pre-market" measures directed at producers. 8.14. With respect to whether Article III of the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement are not applicable to the challenged measures, or aspects of the challenged measures, because they are payments of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, pursuant to Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994, the Panel concludes that measures in the form of subsidies provided exclusively to domestic producers are not for that reason alone exempted from the disciplines of Article III of the GATT 1994 or Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 8.15. With respect to whether the incentivised products that are the subject of certain challenged measures are "domestic products" for the purposes of Article III of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the Panel concludes that the incentivized products are Brazilian domestic products. 8.16. With respect to Japan's claims in respect of the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD and Digital Inclusion programmes, the Panel concludes that: a. The production-step requirements under the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD, and Digital Inclusion programme; and the requirement for products to obtain the status of result in imported products being subject to internal taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994; b. It is not necessary to make findings with respect to Japan's claims under Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994, and the Panel therefore exercises judicial economy with respect to these claims; c. The production-step requirements under the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD, and Digital Inclusion programme, and the requirement for products to obtain the status of the aspect of the mechanism for the calculation of the amount of resources required to be invested in R&D under the Informatics and PADIS programmes relating to the deductible part; and the lower administrative burden on companies purchasing domestic incentivised intermediate products under the Informatics and PADIS programmes; accord to imported products treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:4 of the d. It is not necessary to make findings with respect to the complaining parties' claims under e. The Informatics, Digital Inclusion, PATVD and PADIS programmes constitute traderelated investment measures, and the aspects of these programmes found to be

- 309 - inconsistent with Article III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 are also inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement; f. The tax exemptions, reductions and suspensions granted under the Informatics, PADIS, PATVD and Digital Inclusion programmes are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement which are contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, and thus are prohibited subsidies, inconsistent with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement; and g. Those aspects of the PATVD programme found to be inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement are not justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. 8.17. With respect to Japan's claims in respect of the INOVAR-AUTO programme, the Panel concludes that: a. Certain aspects of the accreditation process, the system of rules on accrual and resulting from expenditure on strategic inputs and tools in Brazil, result in imported products being subject to internal taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:2 of the b. It is not necessary to make findings with respect to Japan's claims under Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994, and the Panel therefore exercises judicial economy with respect to these claims; c. Certain aspects of the accreditation process, the system of rules on accrual and resulting from expenditure on strategic inputs and tools in Brazil; the accreditation requirement to perform a minimum number of manufacturing steps in Brazil; and that aspect of the rules on accrual of presumed IPI tax credits pertaining to expenditure in strategic inputs and tools; accord less favourable treatment to imported products than that accorded to like domestic products, inconsistently with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994; d. It is not necessary to make findings with respect to the complaining parties' claims under e. The INOVAR-AUTO programme constitutes a trade-related investment measure, and those aspects of the programme found to be inconsistent with Article III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 are also inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement; f. The tax reductions through presumed tax credits granted under the INOVAR-AUTO programme are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement and contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, and thus are prohibited subsidies, inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement; g. Those aspects of the INOVAR-AUTO programme found to be inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement are not justified under Article XX(b) or XX(g) of the h. The tax reductions accorded to imported products from MERCOSUR members and Mexico under the INOVAR-AUTO programme are advantages granted by Brazil to products originating in those countries, which are not accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products originating in other WTO Members, inconsistently with Article I:1 of the

- 310 - i. The complaining parties were not under a burden to invoke the Enabling Clause in their panel requests, and their claims under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 are therefore within the Panel's terms of reference; and j. The tax reductions accorded to imported products from Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay and found to be inconsistent under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 are not justified under paragraph 2(b) or 2(c) of the Enabling Clause. 8.18. With respect to Japan's claim under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, in respect of the PEC and RECAP programmes, the Panel concludes that the tax suspensions granted under the PEC and RECAP programmes are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement and contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, and thus are prohibited subsidies, inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. 8.19. Pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the agreement in question. The Panel therefore finds that, to the extent that Brazil has acted in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994, TRIMs Agreement, and SCM Agreement, it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Japan under those agreements. 8.20. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, to the extent that those aspects of the challenged programmes are WTO-inconsistent, the Panel recommends that Brazil bring the challenged measures into conformity with its obligations under the covered agreements. 8.21. Pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel recommends that Brazil withdraw the subsidies identified above without delay. 8.22. Article 4.7 further provides that "the panel shall specify in its recommendation the timeperiod within which the measure must be withdrawn." In other words, the Panel is required to specify what period would represent withdrawal "without delay". Taking into account the procedures that may be required to implement our recommendation on the one hand, and the requirement that Brazil withdraw its subsidies "without delay" on the other, the Panel recommends that Brazil shall withdraw the subsidies identified in paragraphs 8.16(f), 8.17(f), and 8.18 above within 90 days.