Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks

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Transcription:

Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks Victoria Ivashina (with David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein)

Facts US dollar assets of foreign banks are very large - Foreign banks play a major role around the world and in the U.S. market To raise US dollar financing, foreign banks rely heavily on wholesale Foreign banks cannot take on FX risk: their dollar assets are matched most of the time by dollar liabilities they actively use swap market to hedge the FX risk

Syndicated Lending Around the World (2005-2007) Paper: Table II Foreign banks play a major role around the world and in the U.S. market

U.S. Prime Money Market Funds as a Dollar Funding Source MMF Reliance=MMF Holdings April 2011 /(Deposits + Short Term Debt) 2010

MMFs Reduce their Exposure to Eurozone Banks European Debt Crisis May 2011- June 2012

Deviations from Covered Interest Parity (CIP) European Debt Crisis

Background Elements of the Model Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Eurozone bank: EURO lending h(l E ) USD lending g(l D ) L E + L D K

Background Elements of the Model Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Eurozone bank: EURO Assets (mix of EURO and USD) USD Capital Capital constrained banks can lend in dollars and euros but they must hedge FX risk or borrow in the currency in which they lend

Background Elements of the Model Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Eurozone bank: Assets (mix of EURO and USD)? EURO USD Capital FX swap market L E = B E S L D = B D + S Capital constrained banks can lend in dollars and euros but they must hedge FX risk or borrow in the currency in which they lend 9

Background Elements of the Model Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Eurozone bank: EURO Insured Assets (mix of EURO and USD)? USD Wholesale p: probability of default : fraction of wholesale/uninsured Capital

Background Elements of the Model Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Eurozone bank: Negative shock to bank s creditworthiness: EURO Insured EURO Assets (mix of EURO and USD)? USD Wholesale USD Capital Capital Borrowing in the home (euro) country is cheaper because of a too-big-to-fail subsidy Increase in concerns about bank solvency increases the costs of dollar relative to euro 11

Background Elements of the Model Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Eurozone bank: Negative shock to bank s creditworthiness: EURO Insured EURO Assets (mix of EURO and USD)? USD Wholesale USD FX swap market Capital Capital In absence of a breakdown in FX market, shock to USD affect the currency blend of the, but not of the assets 12

Background Elements of the Model Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Eurozone bank: Negative shock to bank s creditworthiness: EURO Insured EURO Assets mix of EURO to USD increases USD Wholesale USD FX swap market Capital Capital Increase in bank solvency risk increase in the costs of USD relative to euro increase in demand for borrowing in euros and swapping into dollars capital-constrained arbitrageurs need to earn higher returns on the swap Increase in bank solvency risk makes it more expensive to make dollar loans

Background Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Elements of the Model

Background Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Characteristics of the Equilibrium 1. Swap Supply: Arbitrageurs equate the expected swap return,, to the expected return on alternative investment opportunity - > 0 implies violation of Covered Interest Parity (CIP) 2. Swap Demand: Bank swaps euro borrowing into dollars such that the expected endogenous cost of the swap,, equals the relative subsidy to euro borrowing, αp - The subsidy is increasing in the probability of default, p, and the extent to which the bank depends on wholesale in USD, α 3. Dollar and Euro Lending: Banks equate the marginal value of euro lending, h, to the marginal value of dollar lending, g, net of the cost of swaps, : h = = Euro lending relative to dollar lending is increasing in the subsidy to euro borrowing (high α and high p)

Background Model Dollar Lending After Shock MMF Dependence Key Empirical Implications An increase in perceived riskiness (p) of Eurozone banks, as in the recent MMF crisis, leads to: i. decreased lending in dollars; ii. increased lending in euros; iii. increased swap activity; iv. larger deviations of CIP basis. Given that the MMF shock was also associated with concerns about Eurozone bank capital (K) we would expect to see a decrease in dollar and euro lending but a decrease in the share of loans that are made in dollars - As noted before, a capital shock alone (a decrease in K) would not generally predict an decrease in the dollar loan share Main empirical prediction is that Eurozone banks will decrease their dollar loan share, while there should be no effect for banks with limited European sovereign debt exposure The model also predicts that there should be a bigger impact of increase in p on the lending behavior of banks that receive more dollar wholesale (as proxied by dependence on U.S. MMFs) - More MMF dependent banks should experience bigger drop in dollar loan share

Data Empirical analysis uses loan data in U.S. and Eurozone from Thomson Reuters DealScan database - Loan issuance at origination DealScan primarily covers syndicated loans - Syndicated loan is typically originated by one bank but funded by a group of lenders (syndicate participants) Syndicated lending is an important part of the overall lending volume - In 2011, global syndicated loan issuance was $3.75 trillion USD $1.9 trillion in the U.S. market (46% investment grade) $1 trillion in the European market Loan size in 2011, U.S. borrowers: 1 st pct. -- $10 million, median -- $215 million Overall: - Downside of using DealScan is that It misses small loans - Upside is access to loan issuance data (vs. loans outstanding on bank balance sheets)

Paper: Table I (2005-2007)

Dollar Loan Share of Eurozone Banks Falls after Shock The dependent variable is the fraction of loans originated by bank s i in month t that is denominated in U.S. dollars (S it ); denominator is euro- and U.S. dollars- denominated loans. Sample period: 2005-2011

Dollar Loan Share of Eurozone Banks Falls after Shock The dependent variable is the fraction of loans originated by bank s i in month t that is denominated in U.S. dollars (S it ); denominator is euro- and U.S. dollars- denominated loans. Sample period: 2005-2013. vs. mean 17.7%

Dollar Loan Share of Eurozone Banks Falls after Shock The dependent variable is the fraction of loans originated by bank s i in month t that is denominated in U.S. dollars (S it ); denominator is euro- and U.S. dollars- denominated loans. Sample period: 2005-2013

Dollar Loan Share of Eurozone Banks Falls after Shock The dependent variable is the fraction of loans originated by bank s i in month t that is denominated in U.S. dollars (S it ); denominator is euro- and U.S. dollars- denominated loans. Sample period: 2005-2013

Are Results Driven by Differential Loan Demand? Borrowers from Eurozone banks in U.S. syndicated loan market are U.S. firms, not U.S. subsidiaries of European firms U.S. borrowers from Eurozone banks tend to be larger than U.S. borrowers from U.S. banks - If anything, suggests that demand for loans from Eurozone banks in U.S. should fall by less than loan demand from U.S. banks - Eurozone borrowers from Eurozone banks are also smaller, suggesting that loan demand in Eurozone should fall by more - Makes it more difficult to observe the patters we document Econometric evidence from firm fixed-effects regressions 23

Choice of Lender for Dollar-Denominated Loans Each observation is a separate loan. The dependent variable is the fraction of lead banks on the loan headquartered in the Eurozone. USD loans: USD and Euro loans:

Choice of Lender for Dollar-Denominated Loans Each observation is a separate loan. The dependent variable is the fraction of lead banks on the loan headquartered in the Eurozone.

Likelihood of Obtaining Dollar-Denominated Loans Sample of firms that received a dollar-denominated loan before the shock period.

Loan Spreads Dependent variable: change in spread charged over LIBOR for USD loans.

Regressions: Dollar Loan Share and MMF Dependence 28

Conclusion Eurozone banks are a key source of for U.S. firms and households We present a model that helps to explain this phenomenon - Greater government subsidies on euro borrowing relative to wholesale dollar - Creates incentives for banks to increase euro borrowing and swap into dollars to fund dollar loans - But limited arbitrage capital in FX swap market induces violations of Covered Interest Parity and reduces incentive of banks to swap euros into dollars - Banks cut dollar lending relative to euro lending One of the consequences of the European debt crisis was that Eurozone banks contracted their dollar lending relative to euro lending despite the fact that European economies were more threatened by the debt crisis - Banks that were more dependent on wholesale dollar (MMFs) cut their dollar loan share by more 29