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Mizuho Economic Outlook & Analysis The BOJ after the Comprehensive Assessment will shift to a managed float system with the US adoption of Trumponomics - The BOJ may tolerate a gradual rise without fixing long-term interest rates - November 24, 2016 Copyright Mizuho Research Institute Ltd. All Rights Reserved.

Summary The background to change in the BOJ s policy framework includes concerns over the sustainability of its purchase of JGBs. The Comprehensive Assessment marks a historical policy shift that envisages an extension of monetary easing toward 2020 as the BOJ frees itself from quantitative restraints and demands for additional monetary easing. Given the rise of US interest rates driven by Trumponomics, control of Japan s long-term interest rates has caused the Japanese yen to weaken. Unlike the pegging operation in the US during the 1940s, the present Japanese version of interest rate pegging refers to a managed float system (*) which tolerates a certain degree of interest rate fluctuation while controlling the yield curve. As Trumponomics serves to intensify these characteristics, the BOJ is expected to tolerate a certain level of interest rate rise mainly in the ultra long-term zone. Provided, however, a sharp rise will be curbed by quote operations etc. We expect the BOJ to begin cutting back on its JGB purchases from 2017 without explicit notice. Yields on 20-year JGBs are forecast to rise to around the 0.6% level due to the decline in purchases of ultra long-term JGBs, Under its ongoing policy of driving the inflation rate higher over the long term, going forward we expect the BOJ to (1) adopt a managed float system with an exit envisaged, (2) shift its policy emphasis from quantity to quality (albeit with limits), (3) allow greater flexibility regarding the inflation target, and (4) clarify its policy for stronger cohesiveness with the government and pass the torch to the growth strategy. * Managed float system: a method to control interest rates through intervention by the BOJ, with interest rate formation dependent on the market mechanism. We assume a framework similar to the managed float system in the foreign exchange market. 1

The Comprehensive Assessment marks a historical turning point in the monetary policy framework toward 2020 Based on the Comprehensive Assessment in the Monetary Policy Meeting (MPM) held on September 20 and 21, the BOJ has decided to adopt Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with Yield Curve Control. This marks a shift from monetary easing with quantitative restraints aimed at producing short-term results to a sustainable monetary easing framework over the long-term, free from quantitative constraints. [ Roadmap of monetary and fiscal policies under Abenomics ] Monetary policy Monetary easing 2013 QQE 2016 QQE with a negative interest rate Yield curve control Inflation overshooting commitment QQE with yield curve control 2020 Price stabilization Bold monetary easing aimed at achieving the target in the short term Comprehensive Assessment Long-term measures taking into account quantitative and interest rate restrictions Aimed at meeting the price target with efforts united with the government Inflation target Political agenda Fiscal consolidation 2% "price stabilization target Policy collaboration of the government and BOJ (joint statement) Assessment of economic and price trends as well as policy effects up to present Japan s structural problems Formation of adaptive inflation expectations If this continues Purchase of JGBs will reach its limit Reappointment of Prime 2018 Minister Abe? LDP presidential election Expiry of the Lower House term of office 2019 Consumption tax hike (8%10%) Negative impact on financial institutions earnings Difficulty in fund management of insurance companies. and pension funds Price stabilization 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games Achievement of a primary surplus target Source: Made by Mizuho Research Institute (MHRI). 2

The BOJ introduces yield curve control and shifts from quantity to interest rates The BOJ has shifted its policy target from the monetary base to yield curve control; it has secured greater flexibility in purchasing JGBs. In the Comprehensive Assessment, long-term interest rates are assumed that 10-year JGB yields will remain more or less at the current level (around zero percent). However, it should be noted that this is only an assumption until the next policy meeting. Even though interest rate levels are expected to remain unchanged for the time being, they may change depending on expectations centered on price levels. Measures Guideline for market operations New market tools of market operations for facilitating yield curve control Source: Made by MHRI based on the BOJ and other sources. [ Yield curve control ] [ Analysis in the Comprehensive Assessment ] Description Short-term policy interest rate: The BOJ will apply a negative interest rate of minus 0.1% to the Policy-Rate Balances in the current accounts held by financial institutions at the BOJ. Long-term interest rate: The BOJ will purchase JGBs so that 10-year JGB yields will remain more or less at the current level (around zero percent). With regard to the amount of JGBs to be purchased, the BOJ will conduct purchases more or less in line with the the current pace -- an annual pace of increase in the amount outstanding of its JGB holdings at about 80 trillion yen -- aiming to achieve the target level of a long-term interest rates specified by the guideline. JGBs with a wide range of maturities will continue to be eligible for purchase, while the guideline for average remaining maturity of the BOJ's JGB purchases will be abolished. Outright purchase of JGBs with yields designated by the BOJ (fixed-rate purchase operation) Fixed-rate funds-supplying operations for a period up to 10 years (extending the longest maturity from the 1 year at present) (1) QQE transmission mechanism (2) Factors hampering the achievement of the 2% price stability target (3) Mechanism of inflation expectation formation (4) Yield curve pushed down through negative interest rates and JGB purchases (5) Effects and impact of the declining yield curve Source: Made by MHRI based on the BOJ. QQE has lowered real interest rates. With real interest rates well below the natural rate of interest, financial conditions have improved. (1) Decline in crude oil prices, (2) weaker demand following the consumption tax hike, and (3) slowdown in emerging economies have weakened the inflation expectations, reflecting the fact that expectation formation in Japan is largely adaptive. The relationship between the monetary base and inflation expectations seems to be long run rather than short term. The BOJ's commitment to expand the monetary base in the long run is important. The combination of the negative interest rate policy and the purchase of JGBs is an effective means for the central bank to exert its influence on the entire yield curve. Short- and medium-term interest rates have a rekatively larger impact on economic activity than long-term rates. Excessive decline and flattening of the yield curve can have a negative impact on economic activity, affecting people's mindset as uncertainty increases about the sustainability of financial functions. 3

Concern over the sustainability of JGB purchases (quantitative limit) is the underlying factor behind the Comprehensive Assessment The BOJ is the largest holder of JGBs in Japan, with the amount of outstanding JGBs held by the BOJ exceeding all other financial institutions. The main sellers of JGBs are financial institutions. If we assume that the BOJ makes all of the necessary JGB purchases from private investors each year in the amount of 86 trillion yen (120 trillion yen - 34 trillion yen [newly issued JGBs]) from financial institutions, the BOJ is estimated to be able to continue the purchase for about three years (up until 2019). (Outstanding JGBs held by domestic financial institutions: 232 trillion yen (as of the end of March 2016) / 86 trillion yen) [ Outstanding JGBs held by major investors ] [ Estimated period that the BOJ can continue buying JGBs ] (JPY trillion) 350 Deposit-taking institutions JGB issuance plan for FY2016 BOJ purchases of JGBs in FY2016 300 250 200 150 100 Insurance companies BOJ Newly issued JGBs 34 trillion yen Refunding bonds 109 trillion yen Reduction of JGB holdings by investors 86 trillion yen Increase target of BOJ purchases of JGBs 80 trillion yen JGB redemption amount 40 trillion yen Total purchase 120 trillion yen 50 Overseas Pension funds Non-financial private companies Households - 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 (CY) Source: Made by MHRI based on the BOJ. FILP bonds 16 trillion yen Restoration bonds 2 trillion yen Source: Made by MHRI. Decrease of JGB holdings by domestic financial institutions: 86 tril. yen = 80 tril. yen (annual increase target of JGB purchases by BOJ) + 40 tril. yen (redemption amount of JGBs held by BOJ BOJ will purchase JGBs from private investors in the same amount) - 34 tril. yen (JGBs newly issued in FY2016) Possible JGB purchasing period: About 3 years = 232 tril. yen (outstanding JGBs held by domestic financial institutions) / 86 tril. yen 4

Purchase of JGBs is expected to fall beginning from 2017 without explicit notification Based on the policy change in September, a reduction in JGB purchases has become possible. According to the Minutes of the September MPM, the BOJ appears to have sought a compromise with opinions pointing out the positive effects of quantitative expansion. The increase in outstanding JGBs in 2016 is expected to fall below 80 trillion yen. The amount is expected to decrease from 2017 onward. In this case, the BOJ may not necessarily announce the reduction in the purchase amount of JGBs. Even if the BOJ maintains the current pace of monthly JGB purchases, the net annual increase of outstanding JGBs is expected to slow down given the increase in the redemption of JGBs held by the BOJ. Relationship between the monetary base and inflation expectations Yield curve control and JGB purchases [ Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting (September 20 and 21) ] Source: Made by MHRI based on the BOJ. Up until now, commitment to the "price stability target" backed by expansion of the balance sheet or monetary base has contributed to higher inflation expectations. Introducing the commitment to expand the monetary base w ould be an effective measure. There may have been a superficial correlation betw een the monetary base and inflation expectations through foreign exchange rates, but a long-term relationship has yet to be observed. Foreign exchange rates and stock prices are monetary phenomena, and a long-term relationship betw een money and prices can be formed theoretically. To achieve the operation target of long-term interest rates, changing the purchase amount of JGBs is possible. But it is necessary to clearly explain that the change in JGB purchases itself has no policy implications. Yield curve control necessitates the continued buying of large amounts of JGBs, substantially expanding the monetary base. [ Forecast of the amount of JGBs held by the BOJ if maintaining its current pace of monthly purchases ] (JPY trillion) 90 Current purchase level: 80 tril. yen 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 (CY) Source: Made by MHRI. 5

Time schedule of the reduction of JGB purchases (without explicit notification) [ JGB purchase amount (amount of annual increase) ] Present 80 trillion yen Will maintain the current pace of JGB purchases in the immediate future. Latter half of FY2017 60 trillion yen (Possible purchase amount up until FY2020) Will reduce the purchase amount gradually starting with ultra long-term JGBs. The reduction will increase depending on developments of the economy, prices and the market. By implementing the twist of increasing short-term JGB purchases, the BOJ may reduce its JGB holding. From FY2020 onward 30 trillion yen or less (Possible purchase amount over the long term) Will reduce the purchase amount until it reaches a level possible for sustainable purchases. Will try to exit from the negative interest rate policy during the change of the Abe administration, depending on developments of the economy, prices and the market. 6

The BOJ will leave its monetary policy unchanged for some time, shifting to a long-term strategy which allows more time In the Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (the Outlook Report), the BOJ extended the timeline to achieve the price target from FY2017 to around FY2018. However, the BOJ decided to leave monetary policy unchanged, revealing its view that the momentum to achieve the price target is being maintained. By shifting its focus from quantity to yield curve control, the BOJ is now free from protracted expectations for additional monetary easing and has secured the policy freedom to adopt a long-term strategy. The BOJ has made its inflation target a de facto mid to long-term target and intends to closely monitor the effects of the government s fiscal stimulus and growth strategy. [ OIS curve ] [ Outlook Report (November 1) ] (%) (%) 0.0 0.0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3 0.3 0.4-0.4 11 22 3 4 5 Source: Made by MHRI based on Bloomberg. 2016/11/1 2016/9/20 2016/7/27 2016/11/1 2016/9/20 2016/7/27 ( 年 ) (Year) Real GDP FY2016 +0.8 to +1.0 (+1.0) Forecast made in July +0.8 to +1.0 2016 (+1.0) FY2017 +1.0 to +1.5 (+1.3) Forecast made in July +1.0 to +1.5 2016 (+1.3) FY2018 +0.8 to +1.0 Forecast made in July 2016 (+0.9) +0.8 to +1.0 (+0.9) CPI (all items less fresh food) (Y-o-y % change) Excluding the impact of the consumption tax hike -0.3 to -0.1 (-0.1) 0.0 to +0.3 (+0.1) +0.6 to +1.6 (+1.5) +0.8 to +1.8 (+1.7) +0.9 to +1.9 (+1.7) +1.0 to +2.0 (+1.9) Note: The above table represents the forecasts of the majority of the Policy Board members. Figures in brackets indicate the median of the Policy Board members forecasts. Source: Made by MHRI based on the BOJ. 7

The BOJ intends to manage long-term interest rates through yield curve control The BOJ has decided to control long-term interest rates that have long been considered difficult to manipulate. This marks an end to quantitative restraints and a shift to yield curve control. Provided, however, we expect that the 10-year JGB yield will not be fixed and will be managed within a certain range. [ Image of yield curve control ] (%) 0.8 Quantitative monetary easing (purchase of JGBs) 0.6 Overshoot commitment (time axis) 0.4 0.2 0.0 Policy interest rate "-0.1%" Yield curve control target "around 0%" -0.2-0.4-0.6 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 (Remaining years) Source: Made by MHRI. Target (quote operation) Negative interest rates 8

The BOJ stresses its stance on monetary easing for achieving its inflation target with an overshoot commitment The BOJ has strengthened its commitment to achieve its inflation target by tolerating an increase in the CPI over 2% y-o-y and emphasizing its stance on monetary easing. Up until now, the BOJ has stated that the Bank will continue QQE with negative interest rates, aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2%, as long as it is necessary for maintaining the target in a stable manner. The BOJ s new commitment reflects its stance on monetary easing by continuing to expand the monetary base until the year-on-year increase in the observed CPI (all items less fresh food) exceeds 2% and remains above the target level in a stable manner. But we need to pay attention to the fact that this is not a commitment to maintain long-term interest rates. [ Image of the overshoot commitment ] CPI y-o-y rate of increase 2.0% (Inflation target) Observing that prices actually exceed the 2% y-o-y increase High pressure economy? Flexible long-term quote operation Learning the process of prices falling to 2% from upper level Re-anchoring the annual inflation expectation of roughly 2% Timeline extension through dialogue with the market Reduction of the JGB purchase operation -0.5% (Present) Source: Made by MHRI. FY2016 FY2019 and onward 9

Policy expectations under US President-elect Donald Trump cause interest rates to rise around the world Interest have been rising around the world, reflecting expectations toward policy measures under US President-elect Donald Trump. Japan s 10- year JGB yield has also moved into positive territory. However, compared with other major countries, the rise of interest rates have been subdued in Japan under the BOJ s yield curve control. [ JGB yield ] [ 10-year government bond yields of major countries ] 1.6 (%) 40 years MPM (Sept. 21) (%) 3.0 Interest rates rose globally (%) 2.0 1.1 20 years 2.5 US 1.5 2.0 1.0 0.6 10 1.5 Germany (right axis) UK 0.5 1.0 0.1 5 years 0.5 0.0-0.4 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov 2015 2016 (mmm) Source: Made by MHRI based on Bloomberg. Japan (right axis) 0.0-0.5 16/Jan 16/Feb 16/Mar 16/Apr 16/May 16/Jun 16/Jul 16/Aug 16/Sep 16/Oct 16/Nov 16/Dec (yy/mmm) Source: Made by MHRI based on Bloomberg. 10

Thanks to Trumponomics, the yen has weakened with yield curve control A policy mix of interest rate hikes (monetary tightening) and fiscal expansion under Trumponomics serve to strengthen the dollar. On the other hand, the BOJ s yield curve control will lead to a widening of the interest rate gap between the US and Japan, leading to the depreciation of the yen. [ Widening interest rate gap between the US and Japan reflects a difference in policy mix ] [ Trends of US-Japan 10-year interest rates and USD/JPY ] (Interest rate) Interest rate hike + fiscal expansion Interest rate gap widens Yen depreciation US yield curve 180 160 140 (Yen) (%) Dollar/Yen US 10 years (right axis) Japan 10 years (right axis) 15 13 11 120 9 Interest rate gap widens Yen depreciation effect 100 80 7 5 Japan s yield curve 60 40 3 1 0% 20-1 -0.1% Yield curve control Fiscal expansion 0 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16-3 (CY) Source: Made by MHRI. (Period) Source: Made by MHRI based on Bloomberg. 11

Under Trumponomics, the BOJ s negative interest rate policy may be perceived as a measure to weaken the Japanese yen Under a protectionist Trump administration, the BOJ s negative interest rate policy (NIRP) and yield curve control may be perceived as measures to weaken the yen. Given policy expectations under the Trump administration and rising speculation of US interest rate hikes, the US dollar is currently the strongest among the five major currencies. With the risk that the stronger US dollar may weaken the competitiveness of US export industries, the new Trump administration may be pressured into taking corrective measures to weaken the US dollar. Although the BOJ has explained that the purpose of monetary easing is to achieve its inflation target, external pressure may force the BOJ to reexamine the NIRP, hence the need to keep a close watch on future developments. (Further efforts to push down interest rates deeper into negative territory may be shelved.) (2014/7/1=100) 130 125 [ Nominal effective exchange rates of the five major currencies (G5) ] US dollar 120 115 110 105 Japanese yen Chinese yuan 100 95 90 85 Euro British pound 80 2013/1/1 2014/1/1 2015/1/1 2016/1/1 (Year/month/day) Notes: 1. Figures for the Japanese yen are announced by the BOJ (yen index of the prior business day). The latest figures are estimates by MHRI based on the BIS weight. 2. Figures for the US dollar are announced by the FRB. The latest figures not yet released are estimates by MHRI based on the FRB weight. 3. Figures for the Chinese yuan are estimates by Bloomberg. 4. Figures for the euro are announced by the ECB. 5. Figures for the British pound are announced by the BOE. The latest figures are estimates by MHRI based on the BOE weight. Source: Made by MHRI. 12

Policy choices that envisage an exit Even though the BOJ shifted its target from quantity to interest rates to enable a long-term strategy at the September MPM, the roadmap to achievement of the inflation target is still unclear. From a long-term perspective, the policy choices available to overcome deflation include (1) a managed float system that envisages an exit, (2) shift to a monetary policy that places emphasis on quality (albeit with limits), (3) greater flexibility regarding the inflation target, and (4) stronger cohesiveness with the government and passing the torch to the growth strategy. [ Roadmap of monetary and fiscal policies under Abenomics ] Monetary policy Monetary easing 2013 2016 2020 QQE Bold monetary easing aimed at achieving the target in the short term QQE with a negative interest rate Comprehensive Assessment QQE with yield curve control Price stabilization Target shift from quantity to interest rates Managed float system with an exit in mind (Japanese version of interest rate pegging) Inflation target Political schedule Fiscal consolidation Source: Made by MHRI. 2% price stabilization target Policy collaboration of the government and BOJ (joint statement) Shift to a monetary policy that places emphasis on quality (albeit with limits) Greater flexibility regarding the inflation target Stronger cohesiveness with the government and passing the torch to the growth strategy 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games Achievement of a primary surplus target 13

Managed float system that envisages an exit: effect of mild yield curve control Amid the widening gap between US and Japan interest rates, the BOJ can move the yield curve to avoid the perception that the purpose of its policy is to weaken the Japanese yen. [ Gap between US-Japan 10-year interest rates and USD/JPY exchange rates ] (Interest rates) US yield curve Restrain the widening interest rate gap Restrain excessive yen depreciation 0% Japan s yield curve -0.1% Source: Made by MHRI. 10 years (Period) 14

Mizuho Research Institute Ltd. This publication is compiled solely for the purpose of providing readers with information and is in no way meant to solicit transactions. Although this publication is compiled on the basis of sources which we believe to be reliable and correct, Mizuho Research Institute does not warrant its accuracy and certainty. Readers are requested to exercise their own judgment in the use of this publication. Please also note that the contents of this publication may be subject to change without prior notice. 15