Jessie Jumpshot. Creating Value with Contingent Contracts

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Transcription:

Jessie Jumpshot Creating Value with Contingent Contracts 1

BATNAS and Reservation Prices Jessie must get a TOTAL DEAL in expected monetary value at or in excess of alternative deal worth $2.1 M Salary Merchandising Bonus Sharks must pay in expected value no more than $3.0 M. 2

Jessie Gets $2.5M Salary Jessie s net gain 0.95 x $400K = $380K Sharks net gain = $500K 3

Issues Jessie s Salary S in 10 6 or M dollars Bonus to Jessie B in 10 6 or M dollars Jessie s fraction of Merchandising Profits (in 10 6 dollars) if the Sharks win the title: Either a fixed fraction X or. 4

Contingent Contract Variables Y,Z Jessie and the Sharks can agree that: The Sharks will pay Jessie a fraction Y of merchandising profits if they win the title If they do not, Jesse gets a fraction Z merchandising profits) 5

Bonus Bonus can be treated in a similar fashion: Jessie gets B + if they win the championship, B - if they do not with B + > B -. 6

Constraints The Sharks will pay at most $10 M in bonus: 0 B + 10.0 The fractions Y and Z may be different but both lie between 0 and 1.0: 0 Y, Z 1.0 7

Jessie s View of Bonus =>B + = B and B - = 0 0.6 Win Title $ B 0.4 Don t Win $0 Expected Value of this contract is: (0.6 $B) + (0.4 $0) = 0.6 $B 8

Shark s View of Bonus 0.1 Win Title Pay Jessie $ B 0.9 Don t Win Pay Jessie $0 Expected Cost of this contract is: (0.1 $B) + (0.4 $0) = 0.1 $B 9

Exploiting Differences in Probabilities Each added BONUS dollar that the Sharks pay Jessie is worth 60 cents in expected value to Jessie at an expected cost of 10 cents to the Sharks Differences in probabilities leverage is 6 to 1! Compare this to salary s leverage of 0.95 to 1 Big opportunity to create value for both Jessie and the Sharks 10

Bonus In principle, the Sharks could pay a maximum bonus to Jessie if they win the title: at an expected cost to the Sharks of $1 M For expected revenue to Jessie of $ 6 M Under what circumstances might the Sharks do this? 11

Jessie s View of Merchandising Profits 0.6 Win Title $10 Contingent Receive $10 Y 0.4 Don t Win $5 Receive $5 Z Jessie s Expected Value of this contract is: (0.6 $10 Y) + (0.4 $5 Z)= ($6 Y) + ($2 Z) IF Y = Z = X, the expected value is = $8.0 X 12

Shark s View of Merchandising Profits 0.1 Win Title $12 Contingent Pay $12 Y 0.9 Don t Win $2 Pay $2 Z The Shark s Expected Cost of this contract is: (0.1 $12 Y) + (0.9 $2 Z) = ($1.2 Y) + ($1.8 Z) IF Y = Z = X, the expected value is $3.0 X 13

Tradeoff Structure Jessie must get 0.60B + 6.0Y +2.0Z +0.95S 2.1 Sharks will pay 0.10B + 1.2Y + 1.8Z + S 3.0 14

Best to Jessie Maximize Subject to: 0.60B + 6.0Y +2.0Z +0.95S B 10.0 0 Y, Z 1.0 And cost to Sharks is exactly $3.0 M: 0.10B + 1.2Y + 1.8Z + S = 3.0 15

Best for Sharks Minimize 0.10B + 1.2Y + 1.8Z + S Subject to: B 10.0 0 Y, Z 1.0 and Expected Revenue to Jessie is exactly $2.1M : 0.60B + 6.0Y + 2.0Z + 0.95S = 2.1 16

No Salary! Efficient Frontier with No Salary Paid to Jessie 17

DEALING OFF THE TOP! Start with a the best deal possible for the Sharks Look first for the issue where Jessie gets the most value in return for the Sharks incurring the least cost Allocate as much as possible to Jessie while respecting constraints 18

Ratios Bonus: Jessie gets $6 for each $1 paid by the Sharks Merchandising: if the Sharks win the title, Jessie gets $6 for each $1.2 paid by the Sharks Merchandising: if the Sharks don t win the title Jessie gets $2 for each $1.8 paid by the Sharks Salary: Jessie gets $0.95 for each $1 the Sharks pay in salary 19

Overall Best for Sharks Exploit 6 to 1 leverage on Bonus first: Jessie gets $3.5 M in Bonus for Expected Revenue of 0.60 $3.5M = $2.1M Jessie s Net Gain = $2.1M -$2.1M=$0 Sharks Expected Cost 0.10 $ 3.5 M = $350K Shark s Net Gain = $3.0M -$350K = $2.65 M The agent gets nothing! 20

Jessie s Net Gain 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Net Gains--No Salary $2.5 Salary Only (0,2.65) 0 1 2 3 Sharks Net Gain 21

Dealing Off the Top Exploit 6 to 1 leverage on Bonus Give Jessie the max bonus subject to constraints Jessie gets $10 in Bonus for Expected Revenue of 0.60 $10M = $6 Jessie s Net Gain = $6 -$2.1=$3.9 Shark s Expected Cost is 0.10 $10 = $1 Shark s Net Gain = $3 -$1 = $2.00 The agent gets nothing!

12 Net Gains--No Salary + Bonus Jessie s Net Gain 10 8 6 4 2 0 (3.9, 2.0) (0, 2.65) 0 1 2 3 Sharks Net Gain 23

Dealing Off the Top Exploit 6 to 1.2 leverage on Merchandising Profits if They Win the Title: Give Jessie the max subject to constraints Set Y= 1.0. Jessie gets 0.60 $10 = $6 Jessie s Net Gain = $6 + $6 -$2.1=$9.9 Sharks Expected Cost is 0.10 $12 = $1.2 Shark s Net Gain = $3 - $1 - $1.2 = $0.80 The agent gets nothing!

Jessie s Net Gain 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Net Gains: No Salary+Bonus+MPY (10.79,0) (9.9, 0.8) (3.9, 2.0) (0, 2.65) 0 1 2 3 Sharks Net Gain 25

Dealing Off the Top Exploit 2 to 1.8 leverage on Merchandising Profits if They Don t win the Title: Give Jessie the max subject to constraints Set Z= 0.444. Jessie gets Expected Revenue increment 0.444 0.40 x $5M = $0.888 Jessie s Expected Revenue =$6+$6+$0.888 =$12.888 Jessie s Net Gain = $12.888 -$2.1=$10.79 Sharks MP Cost is 0.444 x 0.9 $2 = $0.80 Shark s Net Gain = $3 - $1 - $1.2 - $0.80 = $0 The agent gets nothing!

12 10 Net Gains-No Salary+Bonus +MPYZ (10.79,0) (9.9, 0.8) Jessie s Net Gain 8 6 4 2 0 (3.9, 2.0) (0, 2.65) 0 1 2 3 Sharks Net Gain 27

Jessie Get $1M Salary Agent gets $50K 28

Shark s Best if $1M Salary Min Expected Revenue to Jessie is $2.1 : Agent now takes 5% or $ 50K Sharks must give her $1.15 more to ensure Jessie net gain of $0 The Sharks minimize expected cost by choosing B = $1.15/0.60 = $1.92 Expected Cost to Sharks: $1 + (0.10 $1.92) = $1.192 Sharks Net Gain = $1.808 29

Dealing Off the Top Increase Bonus from $1.92M to $10M: Jessie s net gain increases by 0.60 x 8.08M = $4.85M to $4.85M Shark s net gain decreases by 0.10 x $8.08M =$808K to $1M Increase Merchandising Share Y: Max that Shark s will pay is 0.10 x $12M x Y = $1M or Y = 0.833 Reduces Shark s net gain to $0. Yields Jessie 0.60 x 0.833 x $10 = $4.998M Jessie s net gain is $9.848 30

12 10 Net Gains $1M Salary+ Bonus + MP if Win 0.0, 9.848 Jessie Net Gain 8 6 4 2 1.00, 4.85 0 1.848, 0 0 1 2 3 Sharks Net Gain 31

Best for Sharks Minimize 0.10B + 1.2Y + 1.8Z + S Subject to: B 10.0 0 Y, Z 1.0 and Expected Revenue to Jessie is exactly $2.1M : 0.60B + 6.0Y + 2.0Z + 0.95S = 2.1 32

Jessie Gets $2M in Salary Agent gets $100K 33

Shark s Best if $2M Salary Min Expected Revenue to Jessie is $2.1 : Agent takes 5% or $100K Jessie gets $1.9 Sharks must give her $0.200 more to ensure Jessie net gain of $0 The Sharks minimize expected cost by choosing B = $0.20/0.60 = $0.333 Expected Cost to Sharks: $2 Salary +(0.10 $0.333) = $2.033 Sharks Net Gain = $ 0.967 34

Dealing Off the Top Increase Bonus from $0.333 until Shark s reach $0 net gain: Shark s net gain is reduced to $0 with bonus of B = $10. Jessie s total revenue is $2 - $0.100+ (0.6 x $10) = $7.9 Jessie s net gain increases from $0 to $7.9 - $2.1 = $5.8 Shark s net gain is now $3 - $2 - $1 = $0 35

12 Net Gains--Salary $2M+ Bonus 10 Jessie's Net Gain 8 6 4 (5.80, 0) $2.5 M Salary Only 2 0.50, 0.38 0 (0, 0.967) 0 1 2 3 4 Sharks' Net Gain 36

Jessie Gets $2.5M Salary Jessie s net gain 0.95 x $400K = $380K Sharks net gain = $500K Large salary restricts flexibility Best to Jessie is to give her a bonus of $0.5/.1=$5 at cost of $0.50 Creates 0.6 x $5 = $3 in value for Jessie 37

12 Net Gains--Salary $2M Plus Bonus 10 Jessie's Net Gain 8 6 4 (5.680, 0) 2 0 (0, 0.967) 0 1 2 3 4 Sharks' Net Gain 38

12 Net Gains Indexed by Salary Jessie's Net Gain 10 8 6 $1M Salary No Salary 4 $2M Salary 2 $25M Salary Only 0 0 1 2 3 Sharks' Net Gain 39

* Principal-Agent issue: The agent and Jessie are not perfectly aligned. The agent will push for as large a salary deal as possible because she only collects on salary. This is the reason that most principal-agent agreements in the sports arena say "Whenever derived and from whatever source". * The agent can use Jessie as the "final authority" in wheeling and dealing * Synergies: The relative leverage of Bonus is greater than that of any other issue. This drives the deal to bonus in place of salary and squeezes out the agent. 40

12 Net Gains Indexed by Salary 10 Jessie's Net Gain 8 6 4 $2M Salary $1M Salary No Salary 2 0 $2.5M Salary Only 0 1 2 3 Sharks' Net Gain Student Data 41

MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 15.067 Competitive Decision-Making and Negotiation Spring 2011 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.