STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. BOX 30755 LANSING, MICHIGAN 48909 MIKE COX ATTORNEY GENERAL November 10, 2010 Ms. Mary Jo Kunkle Executive Secretary Michigan Public Service Commission 6545 Mercantile Way Lansing, MI 48911 Dear Ms. Kunkle: Re: MPSC Case No. U-16384 I am attaching for filing the Attorney General's Reply Brief. This filing is being submitted electronically pursuant to the Commission's E-Dockets User Manual. I am also attaching a proof of service. Sincerely, Donald E. Erickson Assistant Attorney General c All Parties
PROOF OF SERVICE - U-16384 The undersigned certifies that a copy of the Attorney General's Reply Brief was served upon the parties listed below, by mailing the same to them at their respective addresses with first class postage fully prepaid thereon, on the 10th day of November 2010. Wendy J. Cadwell Administrative Law Judge: Barbara A. Stump (P37356) Michigan Public Service Commission Administrative Law Judges Division 6545 Mercantile Way, Suite 14 Lansing, MI 48909-8195 MPSC Staff: Kristin M. Smith (P46323) Assistant Attorney General Public Service Division 6545 Mercantile Way, Suite 15 Lansing, MI 48911 Energy Michigan: Eric J. Schneidewind (P20037) Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett, LLP The Victor Center, Suite 810 201 N. Washington Square Lansing, MI 48933 The Detroit Edison Company: Bruce R. Maters (P28080) Jon P. Christinidis (P47352) Richard P. Middleton (P41278) Michael J. Solo (P57092) The Detroit Edison Company One Energy Plaza Detroit, Michigan 48226 ABATE: Robert A. W. Strong (P27724) Clark Hill, P.L.C. 151 S. Old Woodward Ave., Suite 200 Birmingham, MI 48009 Leland R. Rosier (P33827) Clark Hill, P.L.C. 212 E. Grand River Ave. Lansing, MI 48906
STATE OF MICHIGAN BEFORE THE MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION In the matter of the application of THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY for authority to increase its rates, amend its rate schedules and rules governing the distribution and supply of electric energy (Refund) / MPSC No. U-16384 Attorney General's Reply Brief Michael A. Cox Attorney General Donald E. Erickson Assistant Attorney General Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division Sixth Floor Williams Bldg. 525 W. Ottawa Street P. O. Box 30755 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 373-1123 November 10, 2010
Table of Contents Page History of the Proceedings...1 Replies Concerning the Lawfulness and Amount of the Refund...1 A. Lawfulness of the Calculated Refund...2 B. The Refund Should Be $29,830,000 Instead of $25,389,000...6 Replies Concerning Interest...8 Replies Concerning Allocation of the Refunds...9 Replies Concerning Implementing Prospective Refunds...10 Relief Requested...14 i
History of the Proceedings Pages 71-73 in the Michigan Public Service Commission's (MPSC or the Commission) January 11, 2010 Opinion and Order in Case No. U-15768 required The Detroit Edison Company (DECo or the Company to filed a refund application pursuant to MCL 460.6a(1)by April 1, 2010., and DECo filed its application by that date. On June 8, 2010, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Barbara A. Stump conducted a prehearing conference. Subsequently, this refund case has been reassigned Case No. U-16384. On August 25, the Staff filed testimony and exhibits, and on September 15, DECo and ABATE filed rebuttal testimony. A hearing was conducted on October 5, 2010. DECo, the MPSC's Staff, ABATE, and the Attorney General filed initial briefs on October 25, and reply briefs are due by November 10. The Attorney General offers the following replies to the arguments presented in briefs filed by the other parties. Replies Concerning the Lawfulness and Amount of the Refund DECo argues there is no disagreement with respect to the total principal amount that should be refunded (Brief, p 3). Even though DECo's and the Staff's calculations now agree that refunds total $25,389,000, there is a mismatch between the method used to make those calculations and the refund requirements mandated in MCL 460.6a(1) Aside from that legal question, the Attorney General also contends the refund amount should be $29,830,000 instead of the $25,389,000 identified in Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1. 1
A. Lawfulness of the Calculated Refund MCL 460.6a(1) states in relevant part: If a utility implements increased rates or charges under this subsection before the commission issues a final order, that utility shall refund to customers, with interest, any portion of the total revenues collected through application of the equal percentage increase that exceed the total that would have been produced by the rates or charges subsequently ordered by the commission in its final order. [Emphasis added.] In Exhibit A-1 Revised, DECo did not just multiply its MPSC-approved surcharges times actual sales to calculate total revenues collected; DECo used all rates that were in effect during the selfimplementation period for each rate class plus the MPSC-approved surcharges times billing determinants to calculate each class's total revenues from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010 (2 T 46). DECo then used the billing determinants from July 26 through January 25 and multiplied those determinants times the rates approved in the U-15768 orders issued on January 11 and 25, 2010 to calculate total revenues that would have been collected if all final rates had been in effect from July 26 through January 25 (2 T 46). In other words, MPSC-approved surcharges were only one component of DECo's calculations of revenues collected (2 T 47). The refund amounts described in Exhibit S-1 are based upon DECo's calculations in prefiled Exhibit A-1 with three Staff adjustments (2 T 74-75). DECo subsequently accepted the Staff's three adjustments and presented Exhibit A-1 Revised (2 T 23-25). Mr. Bloch explained why the Company made the calculations that he described: The Order [January 11, page 72], when it was issued, asked us to compare total revenues that would have been produced with the implementation surcharge versus what the total revenues would have resulted in based on the final ordered rates. So we simply went back, gathered the determinants for the implementation period, and applied those determinants across both the present rates at the time, including the implementation surcharge, and were comparing that to those same determinants applied to the rates that were approved in the final order. (2 T 47) 2
Mr. Bloch's testimony change the statutory language "total revenues collected through application of the equal percentage increase," which is also included on page 72 in the Commission's January 11 order. DECo's calculations compare total revenues with total revenues. This method calculates more than revenues DECo collected via MPSC-approved surcharge increases. MCL 460.6a(1) clearly requires a utility to calculate the total revenues collected via the increase. Exhibit A-1 Revised does not do that (2 T 46-47). The statute then requires a utility to compare that total with the total that would have been produced by the rates or charges subsequently ordered by the commission in its final order. In other words, the statute requires refunds to be based upon the difference in revenues between the surcharge impacts from the $280 million increase and what the self-implementation impacts would have produced if the final $217 million rate increase had been used for purpose of calculating self implementation increase revenues from July 26 through January 25. There is a significant difference between the mathematical comparison in Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1 and comparing only the revenue impacts from the difference between a $280 million increase and a $217 million increase. Mr. Bloch testified that Exhibit A-1 Revised reflect more than a revenue difference resulting from the difference between applying a $280 million and applying a $217 million increase (2 T 45-47). The exhibits reflect the other differences (for example, there is a difference between U-15244 sales and U-15768 sales and a difference between customer charges in the two cases). In other words, the calculations in Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1 do not comply with the refund mandate stated in MCL 460.6a(1), which was also adopted on page 72 of the Commission's order January 11 order. 3
The calculations in Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1 do not match and comply with the requirements adopted in MCL 460 and page 72 of the January 11 order. And by comparing total revenues to total revenues to calculate the revenue differences they report, Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1, DECo nullify, excise, or render surplusage the statutory phrase "collected through application of the equal percentage increase" even though MCL 460.6a(1) limits the term "total revenues." by including that phrase. The statute mandates comparing revenues collected via self implementation increases billed during the self-implementation period with revenues that would have been collected during the same period if final rates had been used to set self implementation surcharges from July 25, 2009 through January 25, 2010. Therefore, the Commission cannot lawfully compare two sets of total revenues when specific statutory language modifies and limits the statutory term "total revenues." In Stowers v Wolodzko 386 Mich 119, 133; 191 NW 2d 355 (1971), the Supreme Court interpreted a statute that permitted two types of probate orders: (1) a probate order placing a mentally diseased person in the custody of some suitable person until a hearing could be held or (2) a probate order that permitted removing a mentally diseased person to any state hospital for the mentally diseased for custody and treatment. The issue in that case concerned whether a doctor at a private hospital could detain and treat a patient under the statute. The court ruled that every word in a statute must be given meaning and that no word in a statute should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible. Id. Then the court ruled, "If we were to accept defendant's contention that there is no distinction between private and state hospitals, we would be avoiding the clear meaning of the statute and treating a part of the statute as surplusage." Id. at 134. 4
In Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW 2d 155 (1992), the court addressed the plaintiff's argument that Meridian Township could not rely upon MCL 560.182(4)(a) as a legal basis for rejecting the proposed plat because the disputed subdivision plat had one limited access to existing public streets and was not totally isolated. The court ruled that, if adopted, this argument would unlawfully insert into the statute the word "totally" and excise the word "suitable" from the statute. Id. at 632-636. In this case, the MPSC cannot lawfully adopt DECo's and Staff's comparison of total revenues instead of comparing total revenues collected through and resulting from the MPSCapproved surcharge increases because the total revenues method ignores, nullifies, excises, or renders surplus the statutory phrase "collected through application of the... increase." Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich at 133, and Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich at 635-636. 1 Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1 could have complied with the statute and page 72 in the January 11 order by comparing the results from the revenue differences between increases of $280 million and $217 million. First, Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1 should have from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010 multiplied each rate class's surcharge times actual sales for the period. Second, the total revenue increases that would have been collected via final rates could be limited to the impact of the final increase two ways: (1) the July 16 surcharges can be recalculated by substituting in the spreadsheet attachment to the July 16 order the final MPSC-approved increase of $217 million for the $280 million increase used in that attachment and then the recalculated surcharges can be multiplied times the actual sales in order to calculate what total self implementation increase revenues would have been produced if the final order had been used to establish the surcharges, or 1 In this case, the Attorney General relies upon the surcharges established in the July 16, 2009 order in U-15768 without regard to whether or not they are equal percentage increases. 5
(2) the final $217 million increase divided by the $280 million increase (77.5%) times the total revenues collected through application of the MPSC-approved surcharges would also mathematically identify the revenues that would have been self implemented using the final order. In any event, the calculations in Exhibits A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1 compare total revenues not upon total revenues collected through application of the increase as required by MCL 460.6a(1). So the Commission must re-open the record to comply with the statute. B. The Refund Should Be $29,830,000 Instead of $25,389,000. Assuming only for the sake of argument that the total-revenue method used to develop the numbers presented in Exhibit A-1 Revised and Exhibit S-1 does not violate MCL 460,6a(1), there is a second disagreement with respect to the total principal amount that should be refunded. In prefiled Exhibit A-1, DECo proposed refunds totaling $24,975,000 excluding interest. In Exhibit S-1, the Staff proposed refunds totaling $25,389,000. In Exhibit A-1 Revised, DECo has accepted the Staff's proposed totals (2 T 23-25). Exhibit A-1 Revised identifies a $25,389,000 total (2 T 33-34). In addition, Exhibit S-1 identifies the revenue differences for each rate class for the self implementation. The rate classes for which revenues during the self implementation period exceeded the class's final revenues for the same period are indicated by negative numbers in Exhibit S-1, while the rate classes for which self implementation revenues were less than final revenues are indicated as positive numbers (2 T 74-75). Rate classes that paid self-implemented rates higher than their final rates overpaid by a total of $29,830,000, while rate classes that paid lower self-implemented rates underpaid by $4,440,000 (2 T 89-90). Since DECo and the Staff support refunds totaling only the net amount of $25,389,000, rate classes that overpaid a total of $29.8 million will not receive complete refunds because under recovered revenues for rate 6
classes that underpaid $4.4 million from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010 are being deducted from the $29,830,000 excess recoveries to allow DECo to recover the under recoveries by reducing the actual total of excess recoveries (2 T 90). MCL 460.6a(1) says that utilities "shall refund" excess self implementation revenues. 2 The Commission should adopt refunds totaling $29,830,000 instead of $25,389,000 because the lower net number does not constitute a complete refund. The statute mandates refunds not a reconciliation or true-up such as other statutes do. 3 In Grand Rapids v Iosco Land Co, 273 Mich 613, 617; 263 NW 753 (1935), the Supreme Court defines the term "refund" as follows: The word "refund" is defined in 3 Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3d Rev.), p. 2856: "To pay back by the party who has received it, to the party who has paid it, money which ought not to have been paid." Statutory language may also be interpreted by consulting dictionary definitions. Oakland County Road Comm'rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Ass'n, 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). And Macmillan's English Dictionary (American English Edition, 2nd Edition 2007) defines "refund" as follows: Money that was yours that you get again, especially because you paid too much for something.... The foregoing definitions of refund describe what MCL 460.6a(1) requires. The statute does not create any process for reconciliations, offsets, or additional charges to compensate a utility if and when a portion of a utility's self-implemented rate increases does not yield as much 2 A statute using the word "shall" is mandatory. Scarsella v Pollock, 461 Mich 547, 549; 607 NW 2d 711 (2000). 3 See MCL 460.6h(12), MCL 460.6j(12), and MCL 460.1049(1). See also MCL 460.10a(9) as enacted by 2000 PA 141. 7
money as final rate increases would have yielded for some rate classes. The statute requires refunds. The MPSC should not construe MCL 460.6a(1) as providing for a reconciliation, an offset, or additional under-recovery charges because the statutory language contains no language including those subjects. Pierce v General Motors Corp, 443 Mich 137, 147-148; 504 NW2d 648 (1993). The MPSC should not read into the statute what is not there. AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d 695 (2003). MCL 460.6a(1) simply does not say a utility can offset under collections against excess collections. In summary, at a minimum, specific rate classes identified by negative differences in Exhibit S-1 paid at least $29,830,000 more than they would have paid if final rates had been in effect from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010 (2 T 89-90). MCL 460.6a(1) says that utilities shall refund the portion of total revenues collected from the increase that exceeds what would have been produced by final rates. Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument only that the revenue comparison differences presented in Exhibit A-1 Revised and S-1 provide revenue comparisons that comply with MCL 460.6a(1), excess collection refunds total $29,830,000 because the statute does not permit additional charges, offsets, or netting under collections against excess collections. Replies Concerning Interest MCL 460.6a(1) mandates refunds with interest. DECo argues that there is no disagreement with respect to the application of interest (Brief, p 3). But Exhibit A-2 Revised and Exhibit S-1 do identify different interest amounts. This is because DECo calculated interest through July 2010, while Staff calculated interest through December 2010, because DECo used 8
three decimals and Staff used four decimals, and because Staff used different LIBOR rates from May forward. The interest calculated in Exhibit A-2 Revised and in Exhibit S-2 reflects only net refunds shown in Exhibit A-1 Revised and in Exhibit S-1. The Attorney General contends above that the statutory term "refund" relates only to excess collections and does not permit recovery of any under collections. Therefore, the Attorney General contends interest should be calculated on all excess collections, not upon net excess collections. MCL 460.6a(1) requires interest for each month of the appropriate time period, so the Attorney General contends the Commission's final order should update the interest rates and the interest calculations to comply with the statutory interest requirement. Replies Concerning Allocation of the Refunds DECo argues that not all rate classes are due a refund and that only those classes having a negative revenue difference in Exhibit S-3 should receive refunds (Brief, pp 4-5). DECo's argument is specious. When a rate class has paid no excess revenues, then that class is not entitled to receive a refund, but this conclusion does not justify offsetting under collections against excess collections. The Staff also supports offsetting under collections against excess collections (Brief, pp 6-8). The mathematical distinction between Exhibit S-1 and Exhibit S-3 is addition of interest from Exhibit S-2. Therefore, the Attorney General disagrees with the allocation arguments presented by DECo and Staff. What DECo and the Staff propose reflect calculations that differ from statutorily required calculations. They propose a reconciliation that offsets under collections against excess collections. MCL 460.6a(1) does not authorize or contain any 9
language referring to such a process. Post-refund, by deducting under payments from other rate classes from the amount of excess collections, DECo's and the Staff's method charge $4.4 million in under collections to rate classes who overpaid. MCL 460.6a(1) does not authorize charges above self-implemented surcharges to any rate class whether a rate class has experienced an over or an under recovery compared to final rates. When a statutory power is expressly conferred, the MPSC cannot extend a statute by inference; indeed, the inference is that a statute intends that no other or greater power was given than the power specified. Eikhoff v Detroit Charter Comm, 176 Mich 535, 540; 142 NW 746 (1913), cited in Alcona County v Wolverine Environmental Production, Inc, 233 Mich App 238, 247; 590 NW2d 586 (1998). In summary, neither the Commission's U-15768 order nor the evidence in this case can empower the MPSC to modify the meaning of the statutory term "refund" to incorporate a process of offsetting under collections against excess collections. MCL 460.6a(1) requires a utility to refund all excess amounts it has collected without providing for any offsets. Replies Concerning Implementing Prospective Refunds The refund totals identified by DECo and the Staff represent amounts to be returned to customers. For each of its four major customer rate classes, on a bills-rendered basis, and on an equal-cents-per-kwh basis for metered rates (on a percentage basis for unmetered rates), DECo proposes implementing two separate one-month, prospective refunds to allow for adjustments due to changes in sales volumes (Brief, p 5). However, DECo says the Company is not opposed to the Staff's proposed method of implementing refunds prospectively by rate class provided that the Commission approves the Staff proposed method of rolling the residual into the Company's next PSCR reconciliation via 10
either credits or charges (Brief, p 6). Staff does support prospective refunding process by rate class ultimately rolled into PSCR reconciliations (Brief, p 8). The Attorney General objects to these prospective proposals. First, as indicated above, MCL 460.6a(1) only authorizes refunds, which means the money should be returned to the customers who paid the money from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010. Instead, DECo and the Staff's propose to implement their so-called refunds by dividing the dollar amounts by projected sales in a future refund month and then paying the refund to future customers based upon billed future sales in the refund month or months. MCL 460.6a(1) specifies that a utility shall refund to customers, with interest, any portion of the total revenues collected through application of the equal percentage increase. The statute uses the past tense word "collected." When a statute uses the past tense, then the statute cannot be applied to a prospective set of facts. In Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 465 Mich 53, 59-61; 631 NW 2d 686 (2001), the plaintiff argued that MCL 600.2912(a)(2) encompassed recovery of damages arising from prospective future injuries involving loss of an opportunity to survive, but the Supreme Court ruled that the statute required proof that the plaintiff "suffered" an injury and that the past tense language in the statute precluded recovery of damages for prospective injuries. In this case, MCL 460.6a(1) ties refunds to revenues collected. Since refunds are tied to the difference between revenues collected and revenues that would have been collected during the same period, the statute mandates a historical process. And prospective refunding would violate the statute. DECo's and the Staff's proposed prospective refunds are not only statutorily prohibited; they also involve unnecessary, multiple calculations and proceedings. Even now, the 11
Commission can divide total refund dollars for each rate class by the total sales for each rate class from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010. This would identify a refund rate to be applied to customers' billed sales records from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010 to determine a refund amount to which each customer is entitled. Staff argues that refunds should be made to customers who are customers at the time refunds will be made not to customers who paid the surcharges when they were billed (Brief, p 10). This argument conflicts with the definition of the statutory term "refund" as discussed on pages 5-6 in this brief. A refund is money paid back to the party who has paid it. For example, assume that four people had a VISA credit card, assume that one of the people returned $30 of merchandise, and assume that one other person returned $50 dollars of merchandise. A refund by definition means returning the money to the people who returned the merchandise. But by analogy under the so-called refund method supported by DECo and the Staff paying each of the four customers (or for that matter four different customers) $20 apiece at some future date would also constitute a refund. This action would conflict with the plain meaning of the word refund and, therefore, would violate MCL 460.6a(1). Staff argues that using historical sales to make refunds would be administratively burdensome (Brief, p 11). Under this analysis, it was equally or more administratively burdensome to multiply historical rates times historical billing determinants to calculate revenues, then to calculate revenues using the final rate order times historical billing determinants to determine what revenues would have been collected, and then to calculate the revenues differences to identify the refund amounts. Refunding involves returning all or a part of a sum of money to a party who paid it; thus refunding is by definition historical. Furthermore, reversing the process used to calculate total 12
revenues and differences in order to return a portion of the revenues collected to those who paid that portion would require no new information and no projections. Computerized records were used to determine revenues collected during the self implementation period using historical rates. Converting resulting refund dollar amounts into refund rates per kwh is not burdensome. The dollar refunds for each rate class have already been calculated, and the historical sales for each rate class have already been calculated. Dividing the each class's refund dollars by its total historical sales to calculate a cents-per-kwh refund rate, and then multiplying that refund rate times each customer's sales from is not administratively burdensome given computer records. ABATE argues that not making refunds to customers who paid surcharges during the period from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010 would be unfair and would give DECo a lever to discourage customers from switching to choice sales service (Brief, p 8). ABATE's argument is consistent with the definition of statutory term "refund" discussed above. There is a second legal objection to the prospective refunding procedure supported by DECo and the Staff. MCL 460.6j(12) specifies that in a PSCR reconciliation, the Commission "shall reconcile the revenues recorded pursuant to the power supply cost recovery factors and the allowance for cost of power supply included in the base rates established in the latest commission order for the utility with the amounts actually expensed and included in the cost of power supply by the utility." In other words, pursuant to mandatory statutory language, a PSCR reconciliation cannot include revenue credits or expense charges that do not represent power supply revenues or expenses. Eikhoff v Detroit Charter Comm'n, 176 Mich at 540, and Alcona County v Wolverine Environmental Production, Inc, 233 Mich App at 247. This means that the MPSC cannot simply roll positive or negative self-implementation refund balances into a PSCR reconciliation without violating MCL 460.6j(12). 13
In summary, MCL 460.6a(1) says that utilities shall refund excess collections, if any, when revenues from self-implemented rates exceed the revenues that would have been collected under the final rate order issued by the Commission. Self implementation does not guarantee a utility will recover every increased dollar that the utility or the Commission designed surcharges to recover, but self implementation dramatically increases a utility's collections compared to the prior statutory rate-case process. The Legislature has expressly determined that whenever a utility self implements a rate increase and actual revenues collected exceed what would have been collected using final rate increases, then making refunds is required as a consequence of the fact that a utility self implemented up to a utility's proposed increases. The Commission should implement true refunds of excess collections not approve so-called prospective refunds that do not return the money to customers who actually paid it and that would either result in over or under refunds and require future reconciliation not statutorily authorized. Relief Requested The Attorney General requests the Commission to reopen the record to recalculate the refund amount and limit revenues to the portion of the total revenues collected through application of the self implementation surcharges not to include total revenues collected. In the alternative, the Commission should at least authorize refunds to each rate class based upon its share of the undisputed $29.8 million excess recovery not by deducting $4.4 million to offset DECo's under recovery from other ratepayers. Since MCL 460.6a(1) requires interest for each month of the appropriate time period, the Attorney General contends that the Commission's final order should update the interest rates and 14
the interest calculations presented in Exhibits A-2 Revised and S-2 and reflect the refund liabilities adopted in the final order. The Attorney General requests the Commission to allocate to each customer a refund based upon each customer's share of the rate class's refund amount. That is how the underlying revenues and refunds were calculated, and that is how the refunds should be implemented. Administrative burden is a red herring. DECo has the necessary billing information to perform a proper refund or else the Company's refund calculations must be erroneous because those calculations are supposed to compare historical billing determinants times historical surcharges from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010 with the same historical billing determinants times the result approved in the final order to determine revenues that would have been produced if final rates had been used to calculate the self implementation increase from July 26, 2009 through January 25, 2010. Respectfully submitted, Michael A. Cox Attorney General November 10, 2010 Donald E. Erickson (P13212) Assistant Attorney General Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division Sixth Floor Williams Bldg. 525 W. Ottawa Street P. O. Box 30755 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 373-1123 15