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Wits School of Governance Prof Alex van den Heever Chair in the Field of Social Security Alex.vandenheever@wits.ac.za

Maputo Social Protection Colloquium Launch Lecture 1 September 2014 ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION INVESTMENT WITH RETURNS

Focus of talk Helping to build a conceptual framework for engaging on social protection reforms Contextualise economic debates Raise key issues for social protection design Attempt to deal with myths (more in discussion than through the slides)

What is social protection about? Much of social protection comes down to transferring risk from individuals and families to groups and/or society as a whole Group/Society Family 1 Family 2 Family 3

Mechanisms Informal family arrangements Private commercial schemes Private non-commercial schemes Regulated private schemes Social insurance Government transfers to households

Distinguishing between formal and informal social protection/security FORMAL social protection Legislated system of guaranteed protections Publicly delivered Social insurance Regulated private delivery Redistributive transfers Vertical via the tax system Horizontal Tax system Insurance Protection is a right INFORMAL social protection Inter- and intra-household transfers Private contracts Employees/employers Individual Redistributive transfers Vertical almost nil Horizontal limited to insurable risk and income group Protection is not a right

Multiple financing mechanisms for social protection/security Depends on purpose Poverty prevention/alleviation (which requires a transfer from rich to poor) Efficient risk pooling (which compensates for market failure affecting income earners)

Public versus private provision of social protection issues to note Market and government failures Natural monopolies and concentrations Public goods and services Externalities Information imperfections Redistributive failures

Broad Schematic of Social Security Mechanisms Social Security System Contributory Non-contributory Private Pensions Incapacity Loss of support Health Public Pensions Health Illness Unemployment Occupational injuries and diseases Incapacity Loss of support Cash benefits Means tested Income Tested Universal In-kind Social worker support to households Health

What can be guaranteed? Regardless of what is promised through a social protection scheme, or how it is financed, can absolute levels of consumption in the immediate or long-term future be ensured Only entitlements to a relative share of total present or future consumption in a given society is possible The longer the time horizon, the greater the uncertainty about absolute levels of consumption that can be guaranteed

What constitutes an affordability limit for social security? The levels of transfers recorded in national statistics do not appear to correspond closely to the economic potential of the different countries When (estimated) informal transfers are included the differences are far less World-wide informal transfers = roughly 50% of total transfers Most formal transfers in Europe Only fraction formal in developing world No evidence that formal transfers have become excessive

40,0% 35,0% 30,0% 25,0% 20,0% 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% Estimated total transfers and their composition (as a % of GDP), selected regions, early 1990s 0,0% East Africa South-East AsiaEastern Europe Western Europe Formal public transfers Informal private transfers North America Source: ILO

Lower-income Countries Intrafamily Interfamily Means tested/targeted SP Private insurance Social insurance Informal Universal SP Higher-income Countries

Evidence on redistributive effects

Developing country considerations Substantial social movement (rural to urban) Economic changes modify society Economic growth is not equivalent to improvements in welfare monetisation of economic production may occur with substantial losses in the hidden nonmonetised economy

30,0% 25,0% Zambia: population growth is differentiated by province reflecting a structural rural/urban shift (over 10 yrs) National growth rate = 18.2% 24,3% 23,5% 20,0% 15,0% 10,0% 18,5% 16,8% 15,0% 13,2% 13,0% 13,9% 15,6% 9,4% 5,0% 0,0% Percentage population growth rate Central province Copperbelt Eastern province Luapula Lusaka Muchinga Northern province North Western province Southern province Western province

Economic growth can either Occur within a narrow enclave (leads to long-term social and economic stagnation); or Represent a broad-based general improvement in welfare (leads to more sustainable and inclusive growth) Which route is followed is a policy choice

Normal level of social protection Approximates the overall level of both formal and informal social protection So long as formal social protection does not exceed the normal level no structural problems are likely However, formal social protection can be poorly designed, with negative results Overall the degree of formal social protection is a choice based on prevailing social values, to the extent that they can be revealed at a national level

Do extensive welfare states affect economic performance? During 1980s & 1990s the welfare state came under political attack Neoclassical arguments presented Impact on economic performance resulting from these arguments doubtful Counter-arguments stress that design is important SS schemes can have efficiencyinducing effects

Arguments against social protection/security programmes include Large welfare states create excessive administrative costs Large welfare states give rise to compliance costs and moral hazard Large welfare states affect the supply of productive resources Large welfare states generate deadweight losses

Continued Large welfare states create rigidities Labour market regulation Social security systems Wage formation process E.g. Minimum wage levels (truncates earnings distribution at a particular level) Restrictions on hiring and laying off Payroll taxes Central bargaining bargaining power imbalances Employment protection Generous unemployment benefits Openness of the economy

Important to note Income is also expenditure Social protection transfers modify the secondary distribution of income Can produce more efficient economy through a more balanced distribution of consumption expenditure Is a problem only where incentives to engage in economic activity are influenced negatively

Social protection restructures the relationship between households and economic production Expenditure flow Health and social Social Protection services Population Labour supply Employed Tax Government Tax Producers Social Protection Assistance Contribution subsidies Tax subsidies Risk pooling Health and Social Protection Pensions Income flow

Unblocking complex social problems Under-supply Indirect access costs Opportunity costs Insufficient incomes/ consumption Barriers to health service access Under-developed capabilities Food and income insecurity ANC Delivery PNC Nutrition support Stunting, poor health status, increased stress Under-utilisation of services

Positive social/welfare effects Conceptual framework for understanding cash transfers and associated redistributive programmes Positive greater than negative effects Negative effects overtake positive effects Income transfers as a % of GDP

Zambia key stats Poverty rate 60.5% Extreme poverty rate 42.7% Total births 647 790 Births in poverty 391 913 Births in extreme poverty 274 015 Urban births in poverty (crude estimate) 73 942 Rural births in poverty (crude estimate) 295 170 Urban births in extreme poverty (crude estimate) 35 223 Rural births in extreme poverty (crude estimate) 218 631 Approximate number of orphans 1/5 of all children 58.7% of formal Educational attainment employees have grades 8-12

Importance of multi-dimensional nature of poverty Small number of causes lead to a large number of negative outcomes Short-term distress Reduce access to health services Reduce access to educational opportunities Reduce access to income-earning opportunities Long-term distress - poverty Lack capabilities to access opportunities Lack adequate income to access opportunities Inter-generational transfer of disadvantages

Interventions need to address both Short-term short- and long-term distress Income support Services Re-skilling Long-term Income support general Income support targeted (e.g. periods of high vulnerability) Subsidised education Subsidised health care

Understanding poverty Where poverty is widespread and persistent interventions should be structural rather than residual Policies that simultaneously address poverty and inequality therefore aim to achieve a structural break in poverty and poverty traps

Widespread poverty Requires structural interventions Strategies need to be generalised across large groups of people Residual poverty Consistent with narrow targeting Much of Africa, including Zambia, make use of interventions appropriate for residual poverty to address structural poverty

Importance of early nutrition According to UNICEF the most recent evidence on the irreversible nutritional vulnerabilities arising during pregnancy and for up to two years thereafter have led to a shift in programme focus from children under the age of 5 to the first 1,000 days including pregnancy Nutritional improvements after age two do not lead to a recovery of lost potential

Unconditional cash transfers Unconditional cash transfers Improved child and maternal health Improvements in economic participation Improved health status Improved health and education seeking Conditional cash transfers Improved health seeking Improved education seeking

The key to answering the question as to whether formal social transfer systems are affordable or not does not lie in an abstract analysis of overall expenditure (however tempting that may be), but rather in an analysis of transfer efficiency that is, whether they achieve the objectives dictated by societal values with the fewest possible resources. If resources are wasted, there are social or economic opportunity costs. The unavailability of those resources for other purposes may have a negative impact on the GDP and hence on the public welfare. (Cichon et al, 2004)

In conclusion Regardless of the level of economic development social protection schemes are large and essential to the fair distribution of resources Impacts include Poverty reduction (both short-term and structural) Fostering economic growth and development Macroeconomic effects (automatic stabilisation) Human development Social cohesion through reducing wide income disparities (both short- and long-term)

However, Poorly designed social protection schemes can harm development Also, Harm may be overstated by vested interests to reverse or prevent social protection schemes Therefore, Distinguishing between rational arguments and misinformation requires rigour in planning, maintaining, and proposing social protections schemes

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