Ending Too Big to Fail : a Transatlantic Perspective

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Ending Too Big to Fail : a Transatlantic Perspective Florence School of Banking & Finance Online seminar Wilson Ervin September 2017 This document and the information contained therein may not be reproduced or otherwise shared without the written consent of the author. The views contained in this document and presentation reflect those of the author.

Today 1. A brief taxonomy of the Crisis 2. Fixing what broke down 3. Making solutions effective? 4. US and EU a comparison 5. Where are we now? 1

US Equity Volatility (VIX) A Taxonomy: Three Phases of the GFC 1. An asset class crisis (mortgages, esp. USA) 100 80 60 Phase 2 Systemic Crisis 40 Phase 1: Asset shock 20 0 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 2

US Equity Volatility (VIX) A Taxonomy: Three Phases of the GFC 1. An asset class crisis (mortgages, esp. USA) 2. Wall St fails Systemic risk dials go to eleven 100 80 60 Phase 2 Systemic Crisis 40 Phase 1: Asset shock 20 Lehman fails 0 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Markets hit fear levels unseen since the 1930s 3

Phase 3 of the GFC #1 #2 Netherlands Core (DE, NE) survive crisis okay Bank senior Phase 1 & 2 less stressful than many countries Post-crisis markets perform okay Periphery : crisis recurs 2011-12 Italy Gov t #3 Euro Crisis Yields spike in IT/ ES / PT/ GR Periphery banks rely on local gov t - and vice-versa ( doom loop ) Key Policies: ECB: whatever it takes Bank Gov t #1 #2 BRRD & SSM disentangle banks & sovereigns: unwind doom loop 4

Many reforms proposed but one is central Vickers / Liikanen Ring-fencing National firewalls (IHC/IPU) Volcker Rule Macro-prudential Systemic Regulation Regulatory Consolidation Basel 2.5, Basel 3, Basel 4... No Basel Leverage Rules Central Clearing Glass Steagall Subsidiarization Narrow Banking Size curbs break em up Board Governance Living Wills Bank Taxes Consumer Protection Compensation Reform Bonus Taxes, Bonus Caps Deferrals, Clawbacks Stop Rehypothecation Repo Reform OTC transparency Addressing the problem of too big to fail is the next central step in the reform program - Mario Draghi If the crisis has a single lesson, it is that the Liquidity Rules too big to fail problem must be solved - Ben Bernanke New Securities Rules Radical transparency Stop short selling / CDS Procyclicality Core Capital Hybrid capital Transaction Taxes Money Market reform Resolution Funds More Mark-to-market Intrusive supervision Coco s... less Mark to market Resolution / Bail-in 5

But How can we do that? What would really solve TBTF? Can it be solved? 6

How to solve TBTF? Some of the proposals 1. Better regulation; intervene early 2. Hard-nosed principles let em fail! no bail-outs! 3. Living Wills 4. Forced M&A/ P&A 5. Mutual aid strategies? 6. Good-bank / bad bank strategies 7. Break up the big banks? 8. «Narrow» or Utility Banking? 9. Something else? 7

Developing a new tool: Bail-in Borrow & adapt well-known tool ( Chapter 11 for banks ) A single-party, liability-based recapitalization No need for a merger partner Accelerated timing to address runs & market concern Old Balance Sheet New Balance Sheet $600 bn assets $575 bn (i.e. $25 bn loss) $430 bn franchise liabilities No change remains at par (deposits, swaps, payables) $120bn senior debt $25bn preferred & sub debt $25bn equity 15% new equity (85% unch) new equity write-off or warrants 8

Implications of a Bail-in Regime Lowers Contagion: Protects retail clients - reduced pressure for runs No impact on counterparties or key market infrastructure Preserves value avoids fire sales Less Pressure on Financial System: Creates new equity where needed Doesn t push the problem to other banks (forced mergers, mutual aid) Doesn t impair sovereign credit Bail-in provides a credible and consistent solution for TBTF Builds on a well tested regime - Chapter 11 style pre-pack workout Can address single failures - and replicable for broader systemic events 9

The road(s) to Implementing Bail-in Europe USA 10

Bail-in Implementation - Considerations USA EU Single, large jurisdiction Complex, multi-state jurisdiction Toxic Politics of TARP Long history of FDIC resolutions Chapter 11 recaps highly familiar Politics complex; national variation Historic expectation of state aid SRB & SSM newly established No common deposit insurance (yet) Well developed capital markets Holding company structure, with significant LTD financing Bank finance >>capital markets Heterogenous bank structures; emphasis on universal banking. Dodd-Frank «Title 2» (2010) BRRD (2014; in force 2016) 11

Numerous policy events at the national level Bail-in: Implementation Milestones 2010 2011 2012 2013 [Dodd Frank] FDIC adopts SPE Bail-in SRR bridge tool ICB ( Vickers ) Ring Fence & Bail-in TBTF Expert Commission: 10% Equity + 9% CoCos Key Attributes 2014 2015 Royal assent for Bail-in BIO, FINMA SPE Bail-in Bank RRD & SRM passed Swap Protocol 2016 TLAC consult New TBTF: 28.6% TLAC BRRD & SRB go live 12

Implementing Bail-in (2013) In short, the US authorities have the technology via Title II of Dodd Frank;... most US banks are.. organised in way that lends them to top-down resolution on a group-wide basis. I don t mean it would be completely smooth right now; it would be smoother in a year or two as more progress is made. But, in extremis, it could be done now. Europe has not reached the same point, but contrary to some commentary is not far behind. - Paul Tucker Head of FSB Resolution Group October 12, 2013 13

EU resolution - A major shift to private capital post crisis Post 2010 Loss-sharing / Bail-in events A bail-in itself is not a problem: it is the lack of ex ante rules known to all parties and the lack of capital buffers... that may make a bail-in a disorderly event [and] gives the impression of an ad hoc approach - Mario Draghi, post Cyprus News Conference 14

Solving TBTF - The Good Part 1. Ex Ante Rules: BRRD and Dodd Frank and now fully in force - Resolution Plans well advanced (depends on country) - ISDA protocol in place to stop derivatives unwind / runs 2. Capital Buffers (TLAC) resourcing building out rapidly a) USA: a «Trillion Dollar Wall» in place today; markets fully adapted b) UK: Avg. GSIB at 24% TLAC today c) Germany: statutory change. G-SIB at 34% TLAC d) Switzerland: TLAC ~30% of RWA today ~$400bn European GLAC Roughly 70% of the Western G-SIBs have crossed the TBTF Rubicon Scale of capital resources on call already larger than 2008 needs 15

Solving TBTF - The Challenges 1. USA: Politics - potential repeal of Title 2 RRP adaptation to Title 1 has many positive elements, but also: o Banks could fail much earlier (RLEN/RCEN triggers) o Liquidation strategies more likely. Implications? Federal Reserve liquidity constraints 2. EU: Uncertainty & Complexity. Rules (mostly) require Bail-in, but... MREL not fully in place /usable in many countries Local politics in some countries BRRD loopholes? SRB execution capacity build-out? Liquidity? Eurozone challenges? 3. Global Ring-fencing pressures 16

Bail-in and future crises Eliminating asset shock crises is hard! And can lead to risk build up (per Minsky) Systemic crises when financial system begins to unravel are far more destructive Bail-in: a key new tool to fight Crises FSB Key Attributes aligned US/EU rules Single point of control simplifies execution Adds resilience and avoids fire sale loop Removes government burden (& helps address banksovereign doom loop) Replicable and consistent Rapid global progress: Have crossed the TBTF Rubicon in many countries; EU moving quickly, but many countries not yet over Politics, Internal TLAC & Liquidity remain serious concerns 17

Commentary Q&A Session 18