Taylor Rule and Macroeconomic Performance: The Case of Pakistan

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Taylor Rule and Macroeconomic Performance: The Case of Pakistan by Wasim Shahid Malik (Research Associate PIDE) and Ather Maqsood Ahmed (Member (FR&S) CBR)

Rules vs Discretion John B. Taylor (1993)

Current Debate in Monetary Policy Rules John B Taylor Lars E O Svensson Instrument vs targeting rules Proponents of former are Taylor, McCallum and Nelson while of the latter are Svensson,, Woodford and Giannoni among others.

Instrument vs Targeting Rules Issues: Simplicity Role of judgment Robustness International practice Technical feasibility

Instrument rules Monetary policy instrument (e.g. short interest rate) responds to current economic conditions State contingent rule Meltzer (1987), McCallum (1988), Henderson and McKibbin (1993), Taylor (1993) Taylor (1993) rule i = r + π + α y + α ( π π ) * * t t 1 t 2 t * = π = α1 = α2 = r* 2%, 2%, 0.5

Characteristics of Instrument Rules Very simple Need very little amount of information Are robust to changes in models Easily verifiable so are technically feasible No role of judgement------ ------mechanical Requires little human capital We need only a a clerk armed with a simple formula and a hand calculator.. (McCallum: 2000).

However, there is often a conspicuous asymmetry in many papers in that central-bank behavior is still often modeled in a mechanical way, as following an ad hoc instrument rule, such as a Taylor rule. Lars E O Svensson (2003)

Targeting Rules In 1989 RBNZ and in 1990s some other CBs adopted a framework that, at that time, had less academic support Inflation targeting strategy Inflation forecast as intermediate target. Three steps central banks announce a numerical inflation target (point target or target range) Monetary policy has legislated mandate for achieving that inflation target high degree of transparency and accountability Constrained Discretion (Svensson( 1997)

Two types of targeting rules General Targeting Rule: A general targeting rule specifies an operational loss function, which the monetary policy is committed to minimize. Specific Targeting Rule: specifies first order Euler condition, like marginal rate of transformation and substitution between the target variables is equalized. It gives an implicit reaction function of the monetary authority that needs not be announced.

Characteristics of Developing Countries low professionals capacity weak institutions small information set monetary policy having multiple objectives without clear prioritization Calvo and Mishkin (2003) identify five fundamental institutional problems in developing countries weak fiscal institutions, weak financial institutions, low credibility of monetary institutions, currency substitution and liability dollarization and finally the vulnerability of the developing countries to sudden stop in capital inflows

Strategy for Developing Countries start with simple mechanical rules that do not require more pre-requisites requisites and are easy to follow Once the central bank becomes independent and transparent, a system of accountability is set to punish the central bankers in case of acting against social interest and central bankers improve their intellectual and analytical capacity to make good judgment, a developing country can easily switch from simple mechanical rule to more elaborate inflation targeting framework

Objectives of the study to estimate the Taylor rule for Pakistan to investigate whether the simple monetary policy rules (Taylor rule here) can improve macroeconomic performance given the constraints, mentioned above, faced by the monetary authority to verify whether the parameters in original Taylor (1993) rule (the weights on output and inflation stabilization in the rule, real interest rate and target inflation rate) are optimal for Pakistan or they should be changed because the values for these parameters given by Taylor were suggested for the Federal Reserve

Methodology Taylor (1993) rule Coefficients Restrictions * it = r* + π t + α1yt + α 2( π t π*) i = α + α y + α π t 0 1 t 2 t * 0 = r * α 2π * * 2 = (1 + α 2) α α α = 1, α = 0.5, α = 1.5 0 1 2 Estimate by OLS a requirement of the rule Trade-off between estimation efficiency and theory of the rule

Methodology------ Small macro model by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). y y i u AD t = β1 t 1+ β2( t 1 πt 1) + t ( ) π = γπ + γ y + ε ( AS) t 1 t 1 2 t 1 t i = α + αy + απ ( CBRF) t 0 1 t 2 t β > 0, β < 0, γ > 0, γ > 0, β < 1, γ < 1, α > 0, α > 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 Backcasting using estimated parameters and shocks and Taylor rule as monetary policy strategy Bootstrap simulation

Finding Optimal Parameter Values for Pakistan Minimizing variability in inflation and output Minimization of the loss function 1 L [ var( ) var( ) ] t = yt + π t 2 One time estimates Bootstrap simulation

Results Estimation Results i = 4.34 0.38 y + 0.51π t t t (4.28) (-2.28)( (4.17) Adjusted R2 = 0.22, DW= 0.89 i i i = 17.04 0.60y 0.78π t t t = 8.68 0.08y + 0.19π t t t = 5.77 + 0.18y 0.14π t t t (Hanfi s period) (Yaqub s period) (Ishrat s period)

21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 Estimation Results----- Actual and Taylor Rule Induced Short Interest Rate percent 1991Q1 2004Q1 1992Q1 1993Q1 1994Q1 1995Q1 1996Q1 1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2005Q1 actual rule induced

Estimation Results------- Actual and Rule Induced Short Interest Rate Mean Maximum Minimum Range Variance St. Deviation Actual 8.24 15.42 1.05 14.37 11.80 3.44 Rule Induced* 10.42 20.30 0.51 19.79 32.96 5.74 * We used actual data on output gap and inflation to calculate this rate.

Macroeconomic Performance Simulation with Taylor Rule and Estimated Model Interest rate Output gap Inflation Average St. Dev Average St. Dev Average St. Dev Actual 8.28 3.53-0.24 2.47 7.36 4.31 One-time 9.24 3.18-0.83 1.72 7.00 3.50 Rule Based Bootstrap * 1.80 (0.21) 3.70 (0.47) P-value** 0.002 0.10 * Average of 1000 values of standard deviations in bootstrap simulation. Standard errors in parenthesis ** probability of standard deviation with rule being greater than n that of actual data

Optimal Parameter Values for Pakistan i = 0+ π + y + 0( π π*) ( rule I) t t t t or i y t t t i = 0+ π + 0.5 y + 0.5( π 8) ( rule II) t t t t or i = π + = 4+ 0.5y + 1.5π t t t

Comparison of Strategies Loss Associated with Different Parameter Values for the Rule Actual Rule-I Rule-II Taylor Rule Y-Gap 6.10 2.40 2.80 2.94 Variance Inflation 18.54 13.11 12.15 12.25 One-Time 12.32 7.76 7.48 7.60 Loss to Society Bootstrap * 6.09 (1.40) 7.82 (1.92) 8.26 (1.72) * Standard errors in parenthesis. ** probability of loss associated with rule being greater than that t of actual data P-values** 0.00 0.02 0.02

Diagnostic Tests Impulse Response Functions Output gap must converge to zero in response to shock Inflation must converge to target level in response to shock Constrained Optimization Minimization of the loss function subject to different constraints

Diagnostic Tests Impulse Response Functions Response of Output to One Standard Deviation Shock in Output 3 2 percent 1 0-1 -2-3 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 quarters Actual Taylor Rule Rule-I Rule-II

Diagnostic Tests Impulse Response Functions Response of Inflation to One Standard Deviation Shock in Output 10 8 percent 6 4 2 0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 quarters Actual Taylor Rule Rule-I Rule-II

Constrained Optimization Constraints Case-I Case-II Case-III Case-IV Case-V Loss Minimization subject to Different Constraints Inflation Target 13.74 8.11 7.96 7.91 7.93 Y-Gap 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.99 0.71 Coefficients Inflation 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.01 0.29 * This value is not comparable to others because it is based on standard deviations while others are based on variances. Loss 7.42 7.47 7.47 7.76 5.14*

Constraints Two equations in macro model Case-I Sum of coefficients of output and inflation equals 1. Case-II In case of only one period shock output gap converges to a level in the range of 0.1-0.1. 0.1. Case-III In case of only one period shock inflation converges to a level in the range of target+-0.25. Case-IV In case of only one period shock inflation converges to a level in the range -0.50-target-0.50. Case-V Loss is calculated as the sum of standard deviations of output and a inflation.

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