The political-economy of power sector reform in South Africa Prof Anton Eberhard Graduate School of Business University of Cape Town & Board of the National Electricity Regulator
Overview istorical development of ESI in SA Key features of ESI in SA Political-economy of SA Drivers for reform Key reform episodes since 1990 Linkages between political-economy and ESI reform Final observations
The first 100 years of power sector development in South Africa 1882 First electric street lights Mining industry stimulates power development 1922 Electricity Act, creation of ESCOM Electricity Control Board Electrification linked to industrial development 1948 ESCOM buys out last major private generator, competition extinguished 1973 National grid integrated, increased scale economies 70-80s Over-investment 1983/7 Government commission Eskom commercialisation,, improved governance Investments cancelled
istorical development of the power sector in South Africa Electricity in South Africa is as cheap as anywhere in the world, because wasteful competition has been eliminated There will always be a very large field for private capital but there are certain industries which can can be driven better by government without loss through wasteful competition - Prime Minister Smuts 1939
World Industrial Electricity Prices World Industrial Electricity Prices 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 South Africa Chile Poland USA Canada Finland New Zealand Australia Norway France Germany Denmark South Korea Luxembourg Taiwan Greece Netherlands Spain Csech Rep Ireland Portugal Israel UK Belgium India Singapore Argentina Austria Italy Japan 1.33 2.47 2.51 2.54 2.65 2.69 3.05 3.20 3.26 3.43 3.47 3.55 3.60 3.62 3.64 3.66 3.78 3.88 3.92 4.00 4.01 4.08 4.10 4.38 4.41 4.41 4.74 5.13 5.46 7.60 UK pence/kwh *Source:Electricity Association Services Limited Prices as at 1 January 2000 including local taxes but excl recoverable VAT, from a representative utility for a 2,5 MW 40% load factor customer. South Africa
Current structure of the electricity market in SA Generation - Eskom 96% Transmission - Eskom 100% Distribution Eskom 50% Municipalities 50% No competition National Electricity Regulator licences market access and approves all tariffs Prices amongst lowest in world Until recently, significant generation over-capacity and supply quality good
Gabon Brazzaville Congo Kinshasa Dem Rep of the Congo Rwanda Burundi Kenya Nairobi Tanzania Dar es Salaam Luanda Angola Malawi Zambia Lusaka T arare Lilongwe T Mozambique Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Windhoek Gaborone Pretoria Johannesburg South Africa T ET ET ETET ET ET ET ETET ET ET ET T Maputo Mbabane Swaziland T P Lesotho P T ET ydro station Pumped storage scheme Thermal Station Eskom thermal station Cape Town N P
Political and economic context after 1990 1990, ANC un-banned, Mandela released 1994, democratic elections Populist, state-led development policies Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) From 1996/7 self-imposed structural adjustment Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Conservative macro-economic management Micro-economic reform / state-owned enterprises
Electrification doubles after 1993 from one-third to two-thirds thirds of population as many households electrified in 7 years as in previous 100 years 80 70 60 Electrified 50 40 30 20 10 0 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Year
International drivers for reform of the power sector Inefficiencies in investment and operations Financing for capacity expansion Public resources insufficient -> > private Part of overall economic restructuring State redefines relationship to SOE s Opportunity to unlock / redistribute economic rent Power sector reform as a fad? International role models ow strongly are these drivers experienced in SA?
Drivers for reform in South Africa Consolidation of distribution / electrification Re-structuring of state-owned enterprises Poor investment efficiencies (analysts perspective) Black economic empowerment Within context of macro-economic reforms & perceptions of international trends in ESI reform
45 000 40 000 35 000 30 000 25 000 20 000 15 000 10 000 5 000-90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0 % Installed capacity/max demand (MW) 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 Reserve margin Reserve margin Net maximum installed capacity Maximum demand Over-investment led to increasing reserve margin
Electricity prices have followed investment cycles, but are today no lower in real terms than in 1950 or 1970 25 Eskom real electricity prices CPI and PPI base 2000=100 20 cent / kwh 15 10 5 0 CPI as deflator PPI as deflator 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Key reform steps in 1990s Rationalisation of distribution sector plus funded electrification programme Independent regulator Corporatisation of Eskom Managed liberalisation of electricity market - lots of planning, very little progress
70%30% 30%30% Eskom oldings Ltd IPP 1 IPP n Eskom G1 Eskom G2 Eskom G3 Eskom G4 Imports Power Trading Eskom Enterprises State-owned independent transmission company RED 1 RED 2 RED 3 RED 4 RED 5 RED 6 Customers Special Customers South Africa: future electricity market model
Current concerns Reliability and quality of supply is deteriorating: Policy uncertainty and slow process of reform results in under-investment in distribution sector Capacity shortages by 2006 when demand growth will exceed supply Policy uncertainty and Eskom monopoly deter investment Future price increases Will future generation investments be optimal? Will new regulator be effective? No political champion for power sector reform
Current concerns Reliability and quality of supply is deteriorating: Policy uncertainty and slow process of reform results in under- investment in distribution sector Capacity shortages by 2006 when demand growth will exceed supply Policy uncertainty and Eskom monopoly deter investment Future price increases Will future generation investments be optimal? Will new regulator be effective? No political champion for power sector reform Will reform gather pace only when there is a crisis?
Conclusions No simple transition from state-centred ESI to idealised World Bank ESI model; need to understand political-economy to understand nature and pace of reform Understand which issues assume political importance and why Some issues may be of concern to analysts but are either not understood by stakeholders or are not expressed politically Understand the effect of finance, governance, and industrial organisation
Conclusions The usual international reform drivers are only weakly felt in South Africa Corporatised,, commercially run state-owned Eskom has been able to access private capital and has delivered low prices, reliable supply and increased access owever, historical analysis of Eskom performance reveals that SOEs tend to make hugely inefficient investments Policy uncertainty is leading to potential investment and security of supply crisis Private investment unlikely without policy certainty and appropriate market reform
Final observations cookbook solutions for power sector reform clearly have to be avoided competition, unbundling, private participation are not ends in themselves power sector reforms should be designed to promote poverty alleviation and economic growth it is important to consider the full range of options for public- private partnerships the possibilities for different levels of private participation depend on political-economy factors the extent of vertical and horizontal unbundling should be assessed on a case by case basis Public and private sector roles in the supply of electricity services New operational guidance for World Bank Staff February 2004
Final observation At the heart of most power sector reform efforts are a set of interrelated challenges: changing the manner in which new investments are financed, increasing the efficiency and development effectiveness of those investments, and increasing operational efficiency, while addressing equity concerns as the sector expands Public and private sector roles in the supply of electricity services New operational guidance for World Bank Staff February 2004