Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Sites: Advances

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Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Sites: Advances and Implication on the Safety Goals Seminar Presentation Ohio State University Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering September 14, 2016 Mohammad Modarres Center for Risk and Reliability (CRR) Department of Mechanical Engineering University of Maryland, College Park 1

Topics Covered Why Multi-Unit Accidents are Important Multi-unit / multi-module Risk Metrics Significance of Multi-Units Events Observed An Approach to Account for Multi-Unit Risks Implications of Multi-Unit Risks on USNRC Safety Goals Conclusions 2

Multi-Unit U.S. NPP Sites Number of U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Sites 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 26 35 0 Single-Unit Site Multi-Unit Site Number of Operating Reactor Units per Nuclear Power Plant Site 3

4 Background NRC: Requires units to be independent Post Chernobyl control room habitability (quantify site risk) Staff recommended SMRs to account for integrated risk (2005) Current level-3 PRA activities involving multi-units and fuel pool Industry Station blackout (SBO) Site risk (Seabrook)-early 1980 s Seismic-induced dependencies of units and component fragilities International IAEA Guidebook Workshops (Ottawa-11/2014) University Suzanne Schroer (UMD study) UMD s NRC grant on this subject

Classification of Unit-to-Unit Dependencies Schroer used a fishbone categorization of multi-unit interdependencies Same%design% Same%direct%IE% Same%condi5onal%IE% Same%support%SSC% Same%interface% Same%environment% % % (principles)% Same%hardware% Same%func5on% Same%so7ware% % Same%room% Same%coupling%structures% Same%coupling%mechanisms% Same%installa5on%staff% Same%maintenance%staff% Same%operators% % Same%procedures% Same%tech%specs% Source: Schroer, S. An Event Classification Schema For Considering Site Risk In A Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment, University of Maryland, Master of Science Thesis in Reliability Engineering, 2012. % Schroer s LER analysis showed 9% of events reported involve two or more units 17% of LERs in multiunits sites involved more than one unit Most involving Organizational and Shared Connection types of dependencies 5

Options for Multi-Unit CDF Measures Single-Unit CDF Representations: CDF of one unit implicitly assuming the other units will not melt Multi-Unit CDF (Site) Representations: Marginal CDF of one unit: CDF of one unit considering all states of the other units Frequency of at least one or more core damages Frequency of multiple concurrent core damages 6

Options for Multi-Unit CDF Measures (Cont.) A multi-unit PRA (MUPRA) analysis for any of the proposed CDF metric requires assessment of the inter- and intra-unit dependencies 7

Options for Multi-Unit CDF Measures (Cont.) At least one core damage definition: P( U i=1 n C D (i) )= Σ i n P(C D (i) ) Σ i1<i2 P(C D (i1) C D (i2) )+ + ( 1) n+1 Σ i1<i2, <i(n) P(C D (i1) C D (i2) C D (in) ) Conditional and Marginal Definitions: P(C D (i) )= j P(C D (i) C j )P( C j ) Where for causal conditions, P( C j )= m P(C j C j1, C jm )P( C j1, C jm ) 8

A Depiction of Dependent Failures in Multi-Units Classes of Dependencies: Parametric Causal 9

Accounting for Dependent Failures in MUPRA Identical dependent events Some preliminary assessments to be discussed Estimate of multi-unit parametric values Causal (dissimilar dependent events) Parametric Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure Bayesian Networks 10

Preliminary Assessment of Multi-Unit Parametric Dependencies A recent parametric analysis of multi-unit dependencies LER Data of 2000-2011 of multi-unit sites were categorized by their root-causes and effects 11

Preliminary Assessment of Multi-Unit Parametric Dependencies (Cont.) 12

Preliminary Assessment of Multi-Unit Parametric Dependencies (Cont.) Site-to-Site variations in the above estimates were also evaluated 13

A Simple Case-Study 14

Preliminary Case Study Results q Single Unit CDFs Frequency of unit-1-specific cut sets: 4.64 10-6 /yr. Frequency of units-1 cut sets involving SCC failures (causally) occurred due to Units-2 events: 2.09 10-7 /yr. Frequency of Unit-1 cut sets involving initiating events (causally) started from Unit-2 events: 4.23 10-8 /yr. q Marginal CDF Marginal CDF of Unit-1: 5.16 10-6 /yr. 15

Preliminary Case Study Results (Cont.) DOUBLE (Concurrent)-Event The frequency of double-unit CD frequency (total independence) without consideration and correction for causal or common cause dependencies: 2.4 10-11 /yr. Double-unit CD frequency with causal dependency correction, but without common cause parametric correction: 1.97 10-10 /yr. Double-unit CD frequency with common cause parametric correction, but without causal dependency correction: 1.45 10-8 /yr. Double-unit CD frequency with causal dependency correction and common cause parametric correction:1.47 10-8 /yr. Contribution from CCF dependencies to the total double-unit CD frequency: 98.66% Contributions from causal dependencies to the total double-unit CD frequency: 1.18% Contribution from independent double-unit CD cut sets to the total double-unit CD cut set frequency: 0.16% Double-unit CDF accounting (parametrically) for human, initiating event and equipment failure dependencies between units: 1.47 10-8 /yr. Site-CD frequency (i.e., frequency of at least a CD): 1.03 10-5 /yr. Factors by which site CD frequency events are smaller than the double-unit CD frequency events: 703 16

Observations From the Simple Example Contribution from dependencies to the total site CDF is significant Contributions from causal dependencies to multi-unit CDF is not significant Contribution from multi-unit (simultaneous) CDF to the total site CDF is small, but not insignificant Site CDF not significantly smaller than than single-unit CDF Application to a real multi-unit site seismic PRA of an advanced reactor site is completed and under review with similar conclusions 17

Quantitative Health Objectives (QHO) NRC qualitative safety goals and QHOs still applicable to multi-unit sites. Ø Prompt fatality goal remains more restrictive than the latent cancer fatality goal in multi-unit releases Multi-unit risk should be below the QHOs for both prompt and latent fatalities For multi-unit releases, surrogates for QHOs (CDF, LRF and LERF) for site risk should be assessed and compared to goals Ø Would limits of 10-4, 10-6, and 10-5 for these surrogates remain the same? 18

Quantitative Health Objectives (QHO) (Cont.) Important factors for prompt fatality risk relate to source-term parameters become more critical in multi-unit releases Ø radionuclide activity, frequency and release timing, chemical and physical forms, thermal energy, etc. Level 3 consequence analysis would be needed assuming a generic site along with MUPRA scenarios to evaluate implications of the QHOs 19

Multi-Unit Accident Contributions to QHOs To evaluate the implications of the QHOs, Level 3 consequence analyses was performed at two representative U.S. NPP sites using SORCA study. Ø Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 and 3 Ø Surry Power Station Unit 1 and 2 Specific Research Aims Ø Base Case Analysis Ø One-Way Sensitivity Analyses Ø Variation in assumed inter-unit dependence Ø Variation in assumed timing offset between multiple releases 20

Policy Alternatives Option 1: Status Quo Ø Only single-unit accident contributions included in estimating risk metrics for comparison to QHOs Option 2: Expansion in Scope of Safety Goal Policy Ø Contribution from both single-unit and multi-unit accident scenarios (marginal risk) included in estimating risk metrics for comparison to QHOs Option 3: Expansion in Scope of Safety Goal Policy Ø Besides the ones in Option 1 and 2, single-unit exclusive accident scenarios from other units included 21

Figures of Merit Figures of Merit 1 (FOM 1 ): Ø The percentage change in the mean value of QHO risk metrics, comparing Option 2 relative to Option 1 Figures of Merit 2 (FOM 2 ): The percentage change in the mean value for QHO margins, comparing Option 2 relative to Option 1 Figures of Merit 3 (FOM 3 ): The percentage change in the mean value of QHO risk metrics, comparing Option 3 relative to Option 1 Figures of Merit 4 (FOM 4 ): The percentage change in the mean value for QHO margins, comparing Option 3 relative to Option 1 22

Results of Base Case Analysis The contribution from the two-unit accident scenarios results in Ø Non-negligible increases in QHO risk metric. The QHO risk metrics are increased by 15% to 77% comparing Option 2 to Option 1, and by 115% to 177% comparing Option 3 to Option 1. Safety Goal QHO Risk Metric FOM 1 FOM 3 Representative BWR (Peach Bottom) Analysis Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) 77% 177% Population-Weighted Latent Cancer 15% 115% Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) Representative PWR (Surry) Analysis Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) 20% 120% Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) 18% 118% 23

Results of Base Case Analysis (cont.) The contribution from the two-unit accident scenarios results in Ø Non-negligible reductions in QHO margin. The mean margins to QHO are reduced by 13% to 43% comparing Option 2 to Option 1, and by 53% to 64% comparing Option 3 to Option 1. Safety Goal QHO Risk Metric FOM 2 FOM 4 Representative BWR (Peach Bottom) Analysis Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) -43% -64% Population-Weighted Latent Cancer -13% -53% Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) Representative PWR (Surry) Analysis Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) -17% -55% Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) -16% -54% 24

Results of Sensitivity Analysis 1 Variation of the assumed inter-unit dependence from 0% to 100% for simultaneous releases reinforced conclusions from base case analysis. Two additional conclusions were drawn: Ø Percent change in risk is more sensitive to assumptions about inter-unit dependence than percent change in QHO margin. Ø Several orders of magnitude in margin to both QHOs exist even for worst-case assumption of complete dependence. Including the contribution from multi-unit accidents to safety goal QHO metrics may result in non-negligible changes in risk estimates but no change in conclusions from safety goal evaluation. 25

Results of Sensitivity Analysis 2 Variation of the timing offset between concurrent releases from co-located units with assumed 10% inter-unit dependence reinforced conclusions from base case analysis. Two additional conclusions were drawn: Ø Early fatality risk is more sensitive to assumptions about differences in timing for multi-unit accident scenarios in which the co-located unit experiences a more rapidly progressing accident. Ø Increasing the delay between concurrent accidents may cause latent cancer fatality risk to increase for some scenarios. Severe accident mitigation measures that serve to delay more rapidly progressing concurrent accident scenarios in a co-located unit can lead to significant reductions in multi-unit early fatality risk. 26

Conclusions Multi-unit events important contributors to site risks Parametric methods for MUPRA useful LER a starting point Causal dependence modeling needs further research Unit-to-unit causal events are significant in external events Site-level CDF and LRF as surrogates to latent cancer and prompt fatality QHOs need better definition Contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios results in non-negligible increases in QHO risk metrics, and reductions in QHO margins. Societal disruption risks quantitatively monetized would be a critical addition to QHOs. 27

Questions? 28