Credit Default Swaps and Bank Regulatory Capital

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Credit Default Swaps and Bank Regulatory Capital Susan Chenyu Shan Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, SJTU Dragon Yongjun Tang University of Hong Kong Hong Yan Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, SJTU June 12, 2015 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 1 / 23

Research Question Introduction How do credit derivatives affect bank regulatory capital? How does the use of CDS affect banks risk-weighted assets? Do banks react to capital regulation that recognize credit derivatives for capital relief? How does the use CDS change banks incentive to hold capital? What s the implication on bank capital quality and stability? Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 2 / 23

Motivation Introduction Milton Friedman: Bank regulation is the only form of necessary government intervention Capital regulation is the key part of banking regulation However, banks do not passively comply with regulations CDS are allowed for bank capital relief in Basel II and III Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 3 / 23

Introduction CDS-induced Capital Relief Basel II treats CDS and other credit derivatives that are similar to guarantees as instruments of credit risk mitigation Risk-weighted Capital Ratio = Total Capital (or Tier 1 Capital) Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) Risk-weight of claims on corporate credit (Basel I) Cash and Claims on Residential Corporate Loans Credit Assessment Govt Bonds OECD Banks Mortgages and Bonds Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% AIG s 2007 Form 10-K: 72% of CDS sold by AIG FP were used for capital relief Little empirical research on how banks use CDS for capital relief, and academic documentation is in sharp contrast to industry practice Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 4 / 23

Main Findings Introduction Does CDS affect banks capital choice? Yes! CDS usage leads to the below effects: Risk-weighted assets (RWA) shrink Banks reduce capital holdings Capital quality deteriorates, although regulatory capital ratios remain unchanged! CDS-using banks suffer more during crisis and become more procyclical Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 5 / 23

Literature Introduction Theoretical work on credit risk transfer and banking Allen and Gale (1994) Duffee and Zhou (2001) Theoretical and empirical work on effects of CDS Bolton and Oehmke (2011) Che and Sethi (2012) Yorulmazer (2013) Saretto and Tookes (2013) Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014) Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) Li and Tang (2015) So far, most empirical work is on the underlying firm (CDS-referenced firm) The effects of CDS on credit market are not clear if we don t understand the role of CDS in banking well Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 6 / 23

Data Data Banks CDS usage and position (1994-2012) FR Y-9C OCC reports Bank financial information and characteristics Bank Compustat We link FR Y-9C filing banks to Dealscan lead lenders 84 banks enter our sample 43 of which ever use CDS Our sample is mainly composed of large banks Syndicate lenders are more likely to use CDS for hedging purpose Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 7 / 23

Summary Statistics Data Panel A. Summary of Sample Banks by Year # of CDS-Using CDS Bank: Non-CDS Bank: Year # of Banks Banks Total Assets ($ Billion) Total Assets ($ Billion) 1994 55.. 56.15 1995 54.. 65.49 1996 52.. 76.09 1997 51 13 122.09 80.26 1998 53 17 169.13 104.55 1999 56 20 190.42 120.88 2000 56 19 200.15 142.95 2001 62 19 214.34 170.76 2002 66 18 291.28 174.73 2003 65 20 347.20 189.27 2004 64 19 366.22 238.86 2005 62 20 414.64 305.00 2006 61 18 493.92 350.90 2007 59 18 632.44 452.77 2008 57 16 755.41 542.39 2009 53 15 655.72 621.20 2010 53 15 723.52 615.62 2011 53 13 787.79 714.18 2012 53 13 586.03 786.45 Total 84 43 434.39 350.67 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 8 / 23

Bank CDS-Usage and Bank Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) Variable (1) (2) (3) CDSUsage -30.470*** -56.991*** -57.626*** (8.395) (9.032) (8.924) Total Assets 0.545*** 0.535*** (0.088) (0.087) Sales Growth 45.265*** 47.309*** (10.993) (11.054) Deposits/Total Liabilities -97.746*** -101.43*** (15.844) (15.915) Loans/Total Assets 312.167*** 317.027*** (67.117) (66.826) Non-Interest Income/Total Operating Income -9.764 (12.163) Asset Sale and Securitization 28.473*** (8.314) Intercept 97.745*** 106.826-35.125 (16.13) (70.892) (25.579) Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes R-squared %) 86.30 91.88 92.03 Observations 2878 2878 2878 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 9 / 23

Bank CDS-Usage and 0%-Category Assets Plotted with a larger sample: 86 CDS-using banks (out of 10510 banks that filed for FR Y-9C) and their one-to-one matched non-cds-using banks Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 10 / 23

Bank CDS-Usage and Assets by Risk-Category Assets of Assets of Assets of Assets of 0% Category 20% Category 50% Category 100% Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) CDSUsage 0.210*** -0.022** -0.019*** -0.005 (0.044) (0.011) (0.005) (0.015) Total Assets -0.785*** 0.053 0.077** -0.430*** (0.172) (0.042) (0.033) (0.073) Sales Growth 0.024 0.02 0.003-0.031** (0.042) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) Deposits/Total Liabilities 0.437*** 0.050** 0.009-0.077*** (0.097) (0.021) (0.008) (0.016) Loan/Total Assets -0.540*** -0.345*** 0.216*** 0.189** (0.183) (0.060) (0.044) (0.090) Non-Interest Income 0.037* 0.018** -0.001-0.051*** /Operating Income (0.020) (0.009) (0.005) (0.017) Securitization 0.0185 0.0137*** 0.001-0.002 (0.015) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) Intercept -0.301*** 0.138*** 0.181*** 0.636*** (0.093) (0.026) (0.014) (0.021) Year and Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes R-squared (%) 85.38 78.29 69.54 78.28 Observations 2878 2878 2878 2878 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 11 / 23

Bank CDS-Usage and 0%-Category Assets: Excluding Largest Banks Exclude the Top-3 Largest Banks (Also the top-3 CDS users: J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, and Citi Corp) Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 12 / 23

The Instruments for Banks CDS Usage Reverse causality or omitted variables may underscore any significant relation between bank asset category and CDS Usage Instrument 1: Loan concentration ratio The sum of squared ratios of individual loan amount to the total amount of loan portfolio in which the same bank acts as the lead lender Instrument 2: The ratio of borrowers with bond issuance The ratio of borrowers with a bond market out of all borrowers that borrow from the same bank Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 13 / 23

Bank CDS-Usage and 0%-Category Assets: IV Variable (1) (2) (3) Instrumented CDSUsage (IV1) 0.358*** (0.125) Instrumented CDSUsage (IV2) 0.337*** (0.125) Instrumented CDSUsage (IV1, IV2) 0.335*** (0.124) Intercept -0.044-0.034-0.037 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) Bank Characteristics Controls Yes Yes Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes R-squared (%) 78.96 76.97 86.87 Observations 2878 2878 2878 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 14 / 23

Bank CDS Position and 0% Category Assets Variable (1) (2) (3) Log (CDS Long Position/Total Assets) 0.213*** 0.311*** (0.026) (0.037) Log (CDS Short Position/Total Assets) 0.143*** -0.049*** (0.017) (0.010) Intercept 0.011-0.026-0.049 (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes R-squared (%) 85.61 85.21 86.19 Observations 2878 2878 2878 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 15 / 23

Bank CDS Usage and Bank Capital Dependent variable: Bank Capital Holdings Tier 1 Capital Tier 2 Capital Total Capital Variable (1) (2) (3) CDSUsage -3.559*** -1.605*** -7.881*** (0.894) (0.311) (1.303) Total Assets 0.065*** 0.020*** 0.061*** (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) Intercept -48.738*** -12.390*** -31.191*** (8.548) (2.837) (11.302) Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes R-squared (%) 86.73 88.52 89.07 Observations 4280 4280 4280 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 16 / 23

Bank CDS Usage and Regulatory Capital Ratio Dependent variable: Risk-based vs. Non-risk based capital ratio Total Risk-Weighted Tier 1 Risk-Weighted Tier 1 Leverage Capital Ratio Capital Ratio Ratio Variable (1) (2) (3) CDSUsage -0.001-0.005-0.012*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) Total Assets -0.018-0.035 0.038 (0.038) (0.040) (0.033) Sales Growth 0.002 0.005 0.001 (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) Total Loans/Total Assets -0.182** -0.194*** 0.089*** (0.072) (0.075) (0.026) Deposits/Total Liabilities 0.001 0.001 0.021*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) Non-Interest Income -0.004-0.002-0.013** /Total Operating Income (0.025) (0.010) (0.006) Intercept 0.237*** 0.211*** 0.473*** (0.057) (0.057) (0.064) Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes R-squared (%) 47.47 57.95 78.65 Observations 4280 4280 4280 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 17 / 23

Bank CDS Usage and Regulatory Capital Quality Dependent variable: Tier 1 Capital/Total Capital Variable (1) (2) (3) CDSUsage -0.032*** (0.011) Instrumented CDSUsage (1) -0.088** (0.045) Instrumented CDSUsage (2) -0.162*** (0.046) Intercept 0.875*** 0.915*** 0.844*** (0.044) (0.022) (0.018) Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes R-squared (%) 70.54 80.71 76.41 Observations 4280 4280 1766 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 18 / 23

Bank CDS Usage and Allowance for Off-Balance Sheet Credit Loss Dependent variable: Allowance for Potential Loss of Off-Balance Sheet Credit Exposure/Total Assets The coefficient of CDSUsage is multiplied by 100 Variable Estimate CDSUsage 0.026*** (0.003) Total Assets 0.019 (0.014) Total Loans/Total Assets 0.029** (0.013) Deposits/Total Liabilities 0.014** (0.006) Non-Interest Income 0.063 /Total Operating Income (0.045) Intercept 0.001 (0.000) Year Fixed Effects Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes R-squared (%) 51.29 Observations 4280 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 19 / 23

Stock Market Reaction and Assets by Risk Category Dependent variable: Buy-and-Hold Return in Quarter t Variable BHR (t) BHR (t) BHR (t) BHR (t) (1) (2) (3) (4) 0%-Category Assets/TA 0.052*** (0.012) 20%-Category Assets/TA 0.037 (0.324) 50%-Category Assets/TA 0.089 (0.248) 100%-Category Assets/TA 0.059 (0.058) BHR (t-1) -0.274*** -0.269*** -0.267*** -0.266*** (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) Total Assets 0.224* 0.202* 0.194 0.209* (0.123) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121) Intercept -0.646*** -0.657*** -0.636*** -0.649*** (0.161) (0.158) (0.160) (0.160) Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes R-squared (%) 16.89 16.24 16.14 16.21 Observations 2878 2878 2878 2878 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 20 / 23

Stock Market Reaction and Assets by Risk Category Dependent variable: Buy-and-Hold Return in Quarter t+1, t+2 Panel B. Predictability of 0%-Category Assets on Future Stock Returns Variable BHR (t+1) BHR (t+2) (1) (2) 0%-Category Assets/Total Assets 0.044*** 0.042*** (0.012) (0.015) BHR (t-1) -0.143*** 0.106** (0.047) (0.051) Log (Market Value) 0.052*** 0.019 (0.017) (0.020) Beta 0.014-0.008 (0.016) (0.012) Total Assets 0.109 0.136 (0.123) (0.139) Intercept -0.556*** 0.021 (0.145) (0.161) Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes R-squared (%) 18.14 9.82 Observations 2878 2878 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 21 / 23

Performance of CDS-Using Bank in Crisis Dependent variable: Buy-and-Hold Return 2008Q3-2008Q4 2007Q3-2009Q2 2006Q3-2007Q2 Variable (1) (2) (3) CDS-Using Bank in 2008:Q2-0.245** (0.106) CDS-Using Bank in 2007:Q2-0.292** (0.136) CDS-Using Bank in 2006:Q2 0.100*** (0.039) Return in Current Year 1.493 0.774-0.237* (0.920) (0.659) (0.127) Intercept -1.068-0.741* 0.548*** (0.729 ) (0.398 ) (0.165 ) R-squared (%) 73.87 75.38 77.77 Observations 59 57 61 Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 22 / 23

Summary Summary CDS allow banks to move assets off their book which leads to a small risk-weighted assets It creates incentives for banks to reduce capital holdings The unintended consequence is capital quality deteriorates and banks become more procyclical Shan, Tang and Yan (2015) CDS and Banking 23 / 23