JOINT VENTURE REVIEW

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JOINT VENTURE REVIEW The joint venture has been widely misunderstood as being a separate type of petroleum agreement. It is not usually so. It is a partnership arrangement wherein the State, either directly or through its national oil company (NOC), receives an equity or ownership interest in the rights and obligations of a contract or a concession. The State may achieve this through "participation" as in the case of Saudi Arabia 1 /, or nationalization, as in the many partial nationalizations or enforced participations throughout the world (Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Norway, to name a few). It may originate in the structure of the arrangement from the first, as with the 1980 Indonesia joint venture 2 /. As a partner, the State shares in the production from the contract or concession in proportion to its interest; thus 251 joint venture interest would accord right to 25% of production. In addition, the associated oil company pays taxes and/or production sharing on its share of production, so the benefits to the State are two-fold - however the corresponding participation in costs may become a burden. Costs: The State or its NOC shares in the costs in depending on its equity proportion. Frequently, however, the arrangement provides that the private partner assume part of the government's risk, State to asset its share of costs only after production is discovered 3 /. This arrangement is called a "carry". The State s share of costs is repaid either directly by the State, as is done in Colombia, or through allocation of part of the State s share of the joint venture production to the oil company. Exploration cost is rarely repaid, however. Colombia is an exception. l/ 60% of the original Aramco Concession was assigned to the government, but the concession is actually operating as 100% government-owned and under a service contract arrangement. For a review of this arrangement see Petroleum Legislation. 2/ See Petroleum Concession Handbook, Supplement 45. 3/ Frequently the government participates only after discovery, thus transferring exploration risk to the oil company. For examples see Mobil contract in Indonesia (see 2) or the Ecopetrol joint venture contracts in Colombia (South America Basic Oil Laws & Concession Contracts, Supplement 45).

Cost Reimbursement: Exploration costs may not be reimbursable to the oil company, i.e. as they are not in China and Libya. Once production begins, however, the State normally pays its share of operating costs. The State may be "carried through development", in which case the state or its NOC will be carried to the point of production. It then becomes essential to have a clear definition of when commercial production begins, since from that point on the State will share in costs. The farther the State is carried, the lower the return it must expect to obtain. Thus the State when "carried through development' would normally receive a lower share in the joint venture or the production split than if carried only through exploration- The advantage to the State in both arrangements is that it takes no share of risk in exploration and may elect to put little money in development since arrangements can frequently be made to have the State share repaid out of its share of production. Interest: In some cases, interest is paid on exploration (rarely) and development costs advanced by the oil company. In Brazil, development moneys advanced are repaid plus interest from productions 1 /. Participation: The government's participation amount in production is no determined by the oil company's estimate ok the potential t size of discoveries, costs of development, political risk, and other factors. The final production split may vary with these factors, but the State must decide on the amount of 'its participation on the basis of its own financial and. technical capabilities. Taxes: Provision can be made in the joint venture concessions or contract to accommodate changes in production levels, with the State tax or royalty on a sliding scale basis rising with production. This can be done with prices as well, with the State -share rising with crude oil prices. 1/ See South America - Basic Oil Laws & Concession Contracts, Supplement 60 for Model Brazilian Contract text

Advantages: The State may find advantages in the joint venture approach. The greatest risks exist in the exploration phase, and all this is assumed by the oil company. Once a commercial discovery has been made there may still be some risk but it is normally not difficult to obtain financing- Major financial institutions such as the World Bank lend to governments at advantageous interest rates, and other international and regional development institutions may make financing available An example is Pakistan s former joint venture with Gulf' Oil where the World Bank guaranteed the Pakistani share of development costs. Operating Agreements: Joint ventures require mutual agreement on procedures, such as meeting costs of operations in a timely manner. The agreement to determine these procedures is known as an "operating agreement 1 /, or a "joint venture operating agreement'. It contains detailed specifications on who is to be the operator, what operations can be performed without special permission, etc. A joint management committee may -be established to pass on important decisions and to decide the future course of operations, and other essential details. Voting on. the management committee is usually proportionate to interests held. Often the State holds the post of president of the management committee, with the oil company acting as operator. Incorporated Vs Unincorporated Status: The joint venture can be a incorporated or non-incorporated vehicle. In the latter case participation shares are held in undivided interest, i.e. the NOC and the oil company each own an undivided interest in the venture embodied by a mining title and a concession contract with the government (in its capacity as grantor of the mining title). Each acquires its own share of the production and is responsible for paying taxes on his share. The assets used in the venture are jointly owned. 1 / The operating agreement can be incorporated in the basic concession or in the contract itself, as done in Colombia.

The NOC and the oil company jointly supervise the operations. Usually there exists a joint management or operating committee for this purpose. In such committee decisions are taken unanimously or by qualified majority, providing that a 51% to 60% government participation will not automatically lead to a power of veto for the NOC. In most cases the oil company is the operator of the venture. Sometimes however the operations -are entrusted to the NOC or to a non-profit making and no-assets-owning operating company which is jointly owned by. the NOC and the oil company in proportion to their participating interests. The funding of the operating company takes place in accordance with the rules of financial participation agreed in the joint venture agreement. Participation may also be implemented on a corporate basis. The government or its NOC and the oil company each own its percentage interest share of the shares of a company holding a concession contract. This will then be a profit making company selling all the crude oil produced by the venture and owning all the assets. This form has been chosen in very few cases and then only when a joint venture has introduced at a mature stage of the venture (e.g. Brunei). The joint company is subject to the fiscal legislation and is responsible for the payment of taxes. The corporate profits after taxes are divided between the two shareholders, viz. the oil company and the government, and paid to them in the form of dividends. The disadvantages of the incorporated Joint Venture compared to a non-incorporated Joint Venture are: 1) All crude oil is sold by the joint company, which means that prices and customers have to be agreed between the shareholders. Under an undivided interest set-up each Participant acquires its own share of the Production and is free in the disposal of this share, subject of course to the requirements of the applicable legislation and the concession contract. 2) Under the corporate route the participants get their shares of the benefits of the venture in the form of dividends. The dividend policy is thus a matter that has to be settled in mutual agreement. The disadvantages are of such importance that where an incorporated joint venture is unavoidable the shareholders usually make arrangements among themselves allowing direct access to the crude oil, thereby reducing the joint venture to a mere operating organization.

The joint ventures formed in the Middle East Participation Agreements initially envisaged also a varying level of anticipation, not however on the basis of production levels but progressing with time. Participation started at 25% and would increase by steps of 5% over the years till a final 51% would have been reached on 1 January 1982. This so-called "General Agreement" which was effective as from 1 January 1973, was soon superseded by Join t Venture Agreements establishing a fixed 60% participation for the host government with effect from 1 January 1974. In Nigeria the Middle East participation example was followed, but with a difference. The initial percentage was set at 35% from 1 April 1973. When the 60/40 participation deals were made, Nigeria agreed a fixed 55% participation from 1 April 1974. The level was subsequently raised to 60%. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar subsequently raised their participation to 100%, substituting technical service contracts for the former concessions.