REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 2016 SOUTHERN ASIA EDITION

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REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 2016 SOUTHERN ASIA EDITION

Contents Introduction...3 How Occupational Fraud Is Committed...5 Frequency and Median Loss of Occupational Fraud Schemes... 5 Detection of Fraud Schemes...8 Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds... 8 Sources of Tips... 9 Impact of Hotlines... 10 Victim Organizations...11 Type of Organization... 11 Size of Organization... 12 Industry of Organization... 13 Anti-Fraud Controls at the Victim Organization... 14 Effectiveness of Controls...15 Internal Control Weaknesses That Contributed to Fraud...17 Perpetrators...18 Perpetrator s Position... 18 Perpetrator s Department... 20 Perpetrator s Gender... 21 Perpetrator s Criminal and Employment History... 22 Perpetrator s Criminal Background...22 Perpetrator s Employment History...22 Case Results...24 Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Suits... 24 Recovery of Losses... 25 Action Taken Against Perpetrator... 25 Methodology...26 Analysis Methodology... 26 About the ACFE...27 2 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Introduction Fraud is a global issue, but the way it affects organizations in different geographical regions can vary. While the ACFE s 2016 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse contains several comparisons of fraud data based on region, we wanted to provide a more robust analysis of occupational fraud trends in these areas. Consequently, we present this regional report that provides a closer view of the cases from Southern Asia that were included in our global study. REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 3

Introduction For this report, we looked at 98 cases of occupational fraud against victim organizations in Southern Asia that were investigated between January 2014 and October 2015. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of these cases by the country in which the fraud occurred. Figure 1: Breakdown of Cases by Country Country Number of Cases Afghanistan 4 Bangladesh 4 India 77 Nepal 2 Pakistan 11 This report contains information on the specific fraud schemes, victim organizations demographics and controls, detection techniques, fraud perpetrators, and case results. 1 (Readers should note that analyses involving fraud losses are presented in terms of U.S. dollars [USD], which is how respondents reported this information in our Global Fraud Survey.) Our hope is that readers will use this and our other regional reports to help tailor fraud prevention, detection, and investigation strategies to the risks in their respective regions. 1 For a glossary of terms used in this report, please see page 90 of the 2016 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse. 4 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Frequency and Median Loss of Occupational Fraud Schemes Occupational fraud schemes can be broken down into three primary categories: asset misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement fraud. Of these, asset misappropriation schemes were the most common form of occupational frauds among the cases in Southern Asia, which is consistent with both our previous findings and our global data for 2016. Nearly 75% of the cases in this region involved the misappropriation of organizational assets; these schemes caused a median loss of USD 100,000. Corruption schemes were the next most common, occurring in approximately 67% of cases, and causing a median loss of USD 112,000. Financial statement frauds were the least common form of occupational fraud in the region, occurring in 8.2% of the reported cases. Due to the small number of financial statement fraud cases, we were unable to calculate a median loss for this category. median loss for All southern asia Cases USD 100,000 median duration for All southern asia Cases 12 months REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 5

How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Figure 2: Occupational Frauds by Category Frequency TYPE OF FRAUD Asset Misappropriation Corruption Financial Statement Fraud 8.2% 67.3% 74.5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% PERCENT OF CASES Figure 3: Occupational Frauds by Category Median Loss TYPE OF FRAUD Asset Misappropriation Corruption Financial Statement Fraud* $100,000 $112,000 $0 $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 MEDIAN LOSS *Financial Statement Fraud category had insufficient responses for median loss calculation. To expand the analysis of the types of occupational frauds that affect organizations in Southern Asia, we further broke down the asset misappropriation cases into nine sub-categories; Figure 4 on page 7 illustrates the frequency of these fraud schemes along with the other two primary categories (corruption and financial statement fraud) for comparison purposes. When examined in this way, our data illustrates the relatively high risk of corruption for organizations in the region; corruption was more than three times as common as any other sub-scheme type among the cases from Southern Asia in our study. 6 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Figure 4: Frequency of Fraud Schemes Corruption 67.3% Non-Cash 22.4% SCHEME TYPE Expense Reimbursements Billing Cash on Hand Financial Statement Fraud Skimming Cash Larceny Payroll Check Tampering Register Disbursements 14.3% 12.2% 9.2% 8.2% 7.1% 7.1% 4.1% 4.1% 2.0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% PERCENT OF CASES Concealment of Fraud Schemes In addition to gathering information about how the frauds were perpetrated, we also asked survey respondents how the perpetrators attempted to conceal their schemes. While the sample size of cases from Southern Asia in which concealment methods were provided was quite small, illustrated below are the four most common methods used by the perpetrators in our study. Created Fraudulent Physical Documents Altered Physical Documents Created Fraudulent Transactions in the Accounting System Altered Transactions in the Accounting System REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 7

Detection of Fraud Schemes Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds We asked respondents to identify how the occupational fraud schemes were initially detected, and the results are shown in Figure 5. The majority of cases in Southern Asia (53.1%) were detected by tips. Internal audit was the second-most common detection method (21.9%), followed by management review (9.4%). These were also the three most common methods of detection in our global study. Figure 5: Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds Tip 53.1% Internal Audit 21.9% DETECTION METHOD Management Review Account Reconciliation By Accident Surveillance/Monitoring External Audit 5.2% 4.2% 3.1% 1.0% 9.4% Confession 1.0% Other 1.0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% PERCENT OF CASES 8 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Detection of Fraud Schemes Sources of Tips Understanding where tips of fraudulent conduct tend to originate helps organizations tailor their anti-fraud reporting and training programs to be more effective. In cases that were detected by tip, we asked survey respondents to identify the source. In Southern Asia, employees accounted for 43.1% of tips. More than one-quarter of sources chose to remain anonymous, while customers and vendors each accounted for about one-fifth of tips. Figure 6: Source of Tips Employee 43.1% SOURCE OF TIPS Anonymous Customer Vendor 19.6% 19.6% 25.5% Other 5.9% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% PERCENT OF TIPS Formal Reporting Mechanism Used by Whistleblower In cases where the fraud was detected by tip, we asked respondents to identify the reporting mechanism used by the whistleblower. Below are the three most common methods in Southern Asia. email web-based/online form telephone hotline REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 9

Impact of Hotlines We also analyzed how the presence of a reporting hotline affected the method by which fraud was initially detected; the results are shown in Figure 7. In organizations that had hotlines, 59% of cases were initially detected by tip, compared to 40% of such cases in organizations without hotlines. Figure 7: Impact of Hotlines on the Top Five Detection Methods DETECTION METHOD Tip Internal Audit Management Review Account Reconciliation By Accident 9.8% 8.0% 4.9% 8.0% 3.3% 4.0% 18.0% 28.0% 40.0% 59.0% Organizations With Hotlines Organizations Without Hotlines 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% PERCENT OF CASES 10 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Victim Organizations As part of our survey, we asked respondents to provide information about the victim entity s type, size, and industry, as well as the mechanisms the organization had in place to help prevent and detect fraud. Type of Organization Figure 8 illustrates both the median loss and percent of cases based on the type of organization that was victimized. Privately held companies represented the highest reported number of cases, at 43.9%, and had a median loss of USD 85,000. Publicly held organizations represented 40.8% of the cases and suffered a median loss of USD 100,000. Figure 8: Type of Victim Organization Frequency and Median Loss $120,000 50% MEDIAN LOSS $100,000 $80,000 $60,000 $40,000 43.9% $85,000 $100,000 40.8% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% PERCENT OF CASES $20,000 7.1% 6.1% 2.0% 10% 5% $0 Private Company Public Company Government* Not-for-Profit* Other* 0% TYPE OF VICTIM ORGANIZATION Median Loss Percent of Cases *Government, Not-for-Profit, and Other categories had insufficient responses for median loss calculation. REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 11

Victim Organizations Size of Organization Organizations with 1,000 to 9,999 employees represented the highest number of cases reported in Southern Asia (46.3%) and suffered a median loss of USD 100,000. Organizations with 10,000 or more employees experienced the greatest median loss of USD 136,000, while entities with 100 to 999 employees had the lowest median loss of USD 36,000. Small organizations (those with fewer than 100 employees) represented 14.7% of cases reported and suffered a median loss of USD 87,000. It is important to consider that small businesses would likely feel the impact of such a loss much more than larger organizations. Figure 9: Size of Victim Organization Frequency and Median Loss $160,000 $140,000 46.3% $136,000 50% 45% MEDIAN LOSS $120,000 $100,000 $80,000 $60,000 $40,000 $87,000 14.7% 16.8% $36,000 $100,000 22.1% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% PERCENT OF CASES $20,000 5% $0 <100 100 999 1,000 9,999 10,000+ 0% NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES Median Loss Percent of Cases 12 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Victim Organizations Industry of Organization Figure 10 categorizes the cases reported to us by industry of the victim organization. Manufacturing, banking and financial services, and technology were the most represented sectors in the reported fraud cases. The manufacturing and banking and financial services industries each reported 17.3% of the cases and suffered the same median loss of USD 100,000. Organizations in the technology sector represented 12.2% of the cases and suffered a median loss of USD 200,000. (All other industries had insufficient responses for a median loss calculation.) It is important to note that our data was collected through a survey of Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs), so this distribution primarily reflects the industries for which CFEs typically provide services; therefore, this data does not necessarily suggest that these industries are more at risk of fraud than others. Figure 10: Industry of Victim Organization Manufacturing Banking and Financial Services 17.3% 17.3% Technology 12.2% Other 10.2% Health Care 7.1% Education 5.1% INDUSTRY Telecommunications Insurance Government and Public Administration Construction 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% Retail 3.1% Oil and Gas 3.1% Communications and Publishing 3.1% Services (Other) 2.0% Transportation and Warehousing 1.0% Mining 1.0% Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 1.0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% PERCENT OF CASES REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 13

Victim Organizations Anti-Fraud Controls at the Victim Organization We asked survey respondents which, if any, of several anti-fraud controls were in place at the victim organization at the time the fraud occurred. External audits of the financial statements were the most commonly implemented control. As reflected in Figure 11, 96.5% of victim organizations in Southern Asia in our study had their financial statements audited by an independent auditor. Other common controls among these organizations included an internal audit department and management certification of the financial statements. Figure 11: Frequency of Anti-Fraud Controls External Audit of Financial Statements 96.5% Internal Audit Department Management Certification of Financial Statements 94.7% 91.6% Code of Conduct 89.0% External Audit of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting 86.7% Independent Audit Committee 82.6% ANTI-FRAUD CONTROL Management Review Hotline Fraud Training for Managers/Executives Anti-Fraud Policy Surprise Audits Fraud Training for Employees Dedicated Fraud Department, Function, or Team 61.2% 58.1% 57.1% 54.9% 53.8% 70.5% 79.8% Proactive Data Monitoring/Analysis 44.7% Formal Fraud Risk Assessments 44.6% Employee Support Programs 34.6% Job Rotation/Mandatory Vacation Rewards for Whistleblowers 20.3% 23.5% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% PERCENT OF CASES 14 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Victim Organizations Effectiveness of Controls To explore the effectiveness of various anti-fraud controls, we compared cases where a certain control had been in place at the time of fraud against cases where the control was not in place. We then measured the size of the loss and the duration of the fraud in each group. As shown in Figure 12, the presence of several controls was associated with a lower median loss. Similarly, most controls corresponded with quicker fraud detection (see Figure 13 on page 16). Figure 12: Median Loss Based on Presence of Anti-Fraud Controls Control Percent of Cases Control in Place Control Not in Place Percent Reduction Fraud Training for Employees 54.9% $62,000 $100,000 38.0% Fraud Training for Managers/Executives 61.2% $73,000 $100,000 27.0% Anti-Fraud Policy 58.1% $85,000 $100,000 15.0% Code of Conduct 89.0% $92,000 $100,000 8.0% Independent Audit Committee 82.6% $92,000 $100,000 8.0% Hotline 70.5% $92,000 $100,000 8.0% Job Rotation/Mandatory Vacation 23.5% $92,000 $100,000 8.0% Rewards for Whistleblowers 20.3% $96,000 $100,000 4.0% External Audit of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting 86.7% $100,000 $100,000 0.0% Management Review 79.8% $100,000 $89,000-12.4% Surprise Audits 57.1% $100,000 $89,000-12.4% Proactive Data Monitoring/Analysis 44.7% $100,000 $85,000-17.6% Dedicated Fraud Department, Function, or Team 53.8% $100,000 $74,000-35.1% Formal Fraud Risk Assessments 44.6% $100,000 $56,000-78.6% Employee Support Programs 34.6% $100,000 $50,000-100.0% External Audit of Financial Statements 96.5% $100,000 * Internal Audit Department 94.7% $100,000 * Management Certification of Financial Statements 91.6% $100,000 * *Category had insufficient responses for median loss calculation. REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 15

Victim Organizations Figure 13: Median Duration of Fraud Based on Presence of Anti-Fraud Controls Control Percent of Cases Control in Place Control Not in Place Percent Reduction Anti-Fraud Policy 58.1% 6 months 24 months 75.0% Rewards for Whistleblowers 20.3% 5 months 14 months 64.3% Proactive Data Monitoring/Analysis 44.7% 6 months 16 months 62.5% Job Rotation/Mandatory Vacation 23.5% 6 months 15 months 60.0% Code of Conduct 89.0% 12 months 24 months 50.0% External Audit of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting 86.7% 12 months 24 months 50.0% Fraud Training for Managers/Executives 61.2% 12 months 24 months 50.0% Employee Support Programs 34.6% 9 months 17 months 47.1% Hotline 70.5% 12 months 18 months 33.3% Fraud Training for Employees 54.9% 12 months 18 months 33.3% Dedicated Fraud Department, Function, or Team 53.8% 12 months 18 months 33.3% Management Review 79.8% 11 months 16 months 31.3% Independent Audit Committee 82.6% 12 months 16 months 25.0% Formal Fraud Risk Assessments 44.6% 12 months 16 months 25.0% Surprise Audits 57.1% 12 months 12 months 0.0% External Audit of Financial Statements 96.5% 12 months * Internal Audit Department 94.7% 12 months * Management Certification of Financial Statements 91.6% 12 months * *Category had insufficient responses for median duration calculation. 16 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Victim Organizations Internal Control Weaknesses That Contributed to Fraud Survey respondents also provided information about the internal control breakdowns that contributed to fraud. A straightforward lack of internal controls was primarily to blame in more than 35% of cases in Southern Asia, making this the top contributing factor. Additionally, an override of existing controls and a poor tone at the top were the main contributing factor in 18.8% and 11.5% of the frauds, respectively. Figure 14: Primary Internal Control Weakness Observed by CFE Lack of Clear Lines of Authority 3.1% Lack of Independent Checks/Audits 7.3% Lack of Competent Personnel in Oversight Roles 8.3% Lack of Employee Fraud Education 2.1% Other 2.1% Lack of Reporting Mechanism 1.0% Lack of Internal Controls 35.4% Lack of Management Review 10.4% 6.6% 2.9% Poor Tone at the Top 11.5% Override of Existing Internal Controls 18.8% REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 17

Perpetrators We asked survey respondents to provide information about the fraud perpetrators they investigated, including the fraudster s level of authority, the department where he or she worked, the perpetrator s gender, and the behavioral signs that the fraudster had exhibited prior to or during commission of the fraud. 2 2 In cases where more than one perpetrator was involved, the data on perpetrators relates to the principal perpetrator, which may be defined as the person who worked for the victim organization and who was the primary culprit. 18 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Perpetrators Perpetrator s Position More than 62% of occupational frauds in Southern Asia were committed by managers, which was significantly higher than the number of frauds committed by employees or owner/executives. Managers also caused greater losses than employees, which is consistent with our global data and with prior studies, all of which have shown a correlation between the fraudster s level of authority and the financial loss resulting from the fraud. Due to the low number of frauds committed by owner/executives, we were unable to calculate a median loss for that category in Southern Asia, but generally speaking frauds committed by owner/executives tend to be the costliest of any position group. Figure 15: Position of Perpetrator Frequency and Median Loss $120,000 70% $100,000 62.4% $96,000 60% 50% MEDIAN LOSS $80,000 $60,000 $40,000 $75,000 26.9% 40% 30% 20% PERCENT OF CASES $20,000 7.5% 10% 3.2% $0 Employee Manager Owner/Executive* Other* 0% POSITION OF PERPETRATOR Median Loss Percent of Cases *Owner/Executive and Other categories had insufficient responses for median loss calculation. REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 19

Perpetrators Perpetrator s Department Figure 16 shows the departments where fraudsters in Southern Asia worked within their organizations. The four departments most commonly associated with occupational fraud schemes were operations, sales, purchasing, and accounting. Combined, these four departments accounted for 63.5% of frauds among the cases we reviewed from Southern Asia. Figure 16: Department of Perpetrator Frequency Operations 20.4% Sales 18.3% Purchasing 15.1% DEPARTMENT OF PERPETRATOR Accounting Other Warehousing/Inventory Customer Service Executive/Upper Management Information Technology Marketing/Public Relations Finance Human Resources 2.2% 1.1% 5.4% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 8.6% 9.7% Board of Directors 1.1% Manufacturing and Production 1.1% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% PERCENT OF CASES 20 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Perpetrators Perpetrator s Gender Approximately 97% of occupational frauds in Southern Asia were committed by males, which was significantly higher than the rate for males in our global study (69%). The median loss among occupational frauds committed by males in the region was USD 100,000. Due to the low number of female fraud cases, we were unable to calculate the median loss for frauds committed by women. Figure 17: Gender of Perpetrator Frequency Female 3.2% Male 96.8% PROFILE OF OCCUPATIONAL FRAUDSTERS IN SOUTHERN ASIA Education: University degree or higher Tenure: More than 5 years Collusion: cases with 2 or more perpetrators Median Age: 40 84% 16+84 58+42 42% 68% 32+68 MEDIAN LOSS IN COLLUSION CASES WAS TWICE AS HIGH AS IN SINGLE-PERPETRATOR SCHEMES REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 21

Perpetrators Perpetrator s Criminal and Employment History Perpetrator s Criminal Background Only 4.9% of occupational fraudsters in our Southern Asia cases had been previously convicted of a fraud-related offense (see Figure 18). Historically, we have found that very few occupational fraud perpetrators have prior fraud convictions. Figure 18: Criminal Background of Perpetrator Other 1.6% Charged but Not Convicted 6.6% Had Prior Convictions 4.9% Never Charged or Convicted 88.5% Perpetrator s Employment History Only 5.8% of fraud perpetrators in Southern Asia had been previously terminated by an employer for fraud-related conduct, and only 9.6% had previously received some other form of punishment such as a suspension or reprimand for fraud-related activity. Figure 19: Employment Background of Perpetrator Previously Terminated 5.8% Previously Punished 9.6% Never Punished or Terminated 86.5% 6.6% 2.9% 22 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Perpetrators OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD PERPETRATORS OFTEN EXHIBIT CERTAIN BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR CRIMES. The following behavioral red flags were identified in at least 20% of southern asia fraud cases in our study: Living Beyond Means Unusually Close Association with Vendor or Customer financial difficulties 51% 35% 25% 35% OF OCCUPATIONAL FRAUDSTERS IN SOUTHERN ASIA HAD COMMITTED SOME FORM OF NON-FRAUD WORKPLACE VIOLATION PRIOR TO OR DURING THEIR FRAUDS. THE MOST COMMON NON-FRAUD VIOLATION WAS BULLYING OR INTIMIDATION. REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 23

Case Results Criminal Prosecution and Civil Suits We asked respondents about the outcome of their fraud cases, including whether the cases were referred to law enforcement for criminal prosecution or pursued in civil court. Figure 20 shows that less than one-third of organizations in Southern Asia referred cases to law enforcement, while about 18% of organizations sought civil litigation. Figure 20: Cases Resulting in Referral to Law Enforcement or Civil Suit LEGAL ACTION TAKEN Referral to Law Enforcement Civil Suit 18.1% 32.6% 67.4% 81.9% Yes No 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% PERCENT OF CASES 24 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

Case Results Recovery of Losses Detecting and investigating fraud is crucial to mitigate current losses and to serve as a deterrent against future frauds. However, our study suggests that organizations usually do not fully recover fraud losses, even when the perpetrator is identified. Almost half (48.5%) of organizations in Southern Asia were unable to recover any losses resulting from the fraud, while 21.2% of organizations obtained a full recovery. Figure 21: Recovery of Victim Organization s Losses PERCENT OF LOSS RECOVERED No Recovery 48.5% 1 25% 9.1% 26 50% 15.2% 51 75% 4.5% 76 99% 1.5% 100% 21.2% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% PERCENT OF CASES Action Taken Against Perpetrators Recovering assets is not the only goal of a fraud examination. It is also important to identify perpetrators at the organization and take appropriate disciplinary action against them. As shown in Figure 22, termination was the most common disciplinary action (66.7% of cases) taken by victim organizations in Southern Asia, with permitted or forced resignation a distant second (15.5% of cases). Figure 22: Action Taken Against Perpetrator ACTION TAKEN AGAINST PERPETRATOR Termination Permitted or Required Resignation Settlement Agreement Other Perpetrator Was No Longer With Organization No Punishment Probation or Suspension 3.6% 2.4% 6.0% 9.5% 9.5% 15.5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% PERCENT OF CASES 66.7% REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 25

Methodology This report is based on the results of the 2015 Global Fraud Survey, an online survey opened to 41,788 Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) from July 2015 to October 2015. As part of the survey, respondents were asked to provide a detailed narrative of the single largest fraud case they had investigated since January 2014. Additionally, after completing the survey the first time, respondents were given the option to submit information about a second case that they investigated. Cases submitted were required to meet the following four criteria: 1. The case must have involved occupational fraud (defined as internal fraud, or fraud committed by a person against the organization for which he or she works). 2. The investigation must have occurred between January 2014 and the time of survey participation. 3. The investigation must have been complete at the time of survey participation. 4. The respondent must have been reasonably sure the perpetrator(s) was (were) identified. Respondents were then presented with questions regarding the particular details of the fraud case, including information about the perpetrator, the victim organization, and the methods of fraud employed, as well as fraud trends in general. We received 7,497 total responses to the survey, 2,410 of which were usable for purposes of our global study. Of these usable responses, 98 involved occupational fraud cases perpetrated against organizations in Southern Asia; the data contained in this report is based solely on the information provided in these 98 responses. Analysis Methodology In calculating the percentages discussed throughout this report, we used the total number of complete and relevant responses for the question(s) being analyzed. Specifically, we excluded any blank responses or instances where the participant indicated that he or she did not know the answer to a question. Consequently, the total number of cases included in each analysis varies. In addition, several survey questions allowed participants to select more than one answer. Therefore, the sum of percentages in certain figures throughout the report exceeds 100%. Additionally, all charts throughout the report include only those categories for which we received at least one response from survey participants. All loss amounts discussed throughout the report are calculated using median loss rather than mean, or average, loss. Additionally, we excluded median loss calculations for categories for which there were fewer than ten responses. Because the direct losses caused by financial statement frauds are typically spread among numerous stakeholders, obtaining an accurate estimate for this amount is extremely difficult. Consequently, for schemes involving financial statement fraud, we asked survey participants to provide the gross amount of the financial statement misstatement (over- or under-statement) involved in the scheme. All losses reported for financial statement frauds throughout this report are based on those reported amounts. 26 REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA

About the ACFE About the ACFE Founded in 1988 by Dr. Joseph T. Wells, CFE, CPA, the ACFE is the world s largest anti-fraud organization and premier provider of anti-fraud training and education. Together with more than 80,000 members in more than 160 countries, the ACFE is reducing business fraud worldwide and providing the training and resources needed to fight fraud more effectively. The ACFE provides educational tools and practical solutions for anti-fraud professionals through initiatives including: Global conferences and seminars led by anti-fraud experts Instructor-led, interactive professional training Comprehensive resources for fighting fraud, including books, self-study courses and articles Leading anti-fraud publications, including Fraud Magazine, The Fraud Examiner and FraudInfo Local networking and support through more than 170 ACFE chapters worldwide Anti-fraud curriculum and educational tools for colleges and universities The positive effects of anti-fraud training are far-reaching. The best way to combat fraud is to educate anyone engaged in fighting fraud on how to effectively prevent, detect and investigate it. By educating, uniting and supporting the global anti-fraud community with the tools to fight fraud more effectively, the ACFE is inspiring public confidence in the integrity and objectivity of the profession. Membership Immediate access to world-class anti-fraud knowledge and tools is a necessity in the fight against fraud. Members of the ACFE include accountants, internal auditors, fraud investigators, law enforcement officers, lawyers, business leaders, risk/compliance professionals and educators, all of whom have access to expert training, educational tools and resources. Members from all over the world have come to depend on the ACFE for solutions to the challenges they face in their professions. Whether their career is focused exclusively on preventing and detecting fraudulent activities or they just want to learn more about fraud, anti-fraud professionals turn to the ACFE for the essential tools and resources necessary to accomplish their objectives. To learn more, visit ACFE.com or call (800) 245-3321 / +1 (512) 478-9000. Certified Fraud Examiners The ACFE offers its members the opportunity for professional certification. The Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) credential is preferred by businesses and government entities around the world and indicates expertise in fraud prevention and detection. Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) are anti-fraud experts who have demonstrated knowledge in four critical areas: financial transactions and fraud schemes, law, investigation, and fraud prevention and deterrence. In support of CFEs and the CFE credential, the ACFE: Provides bona fide qualifications for CFEs through administration of the CFE Exam Requires CFEs to adhere to a strict code of professional conduct and ethics Serves as the global representative for CFEs to business, government and academic institutions CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINER Provides leadership to inspire public confidence in the integrity, objectivity and professionalism of CFEs REPORT TO THE NATIONS: SOUTHERN ASIA 27

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