Measuring the Wealth of Nations: Income, Welfare and Sustainability in Representative-Agent Economies

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Measuring the Wealth of Nations: Income, Welfare and Sustainability in Representative-Agent Economies Geo rey Heal and Bengt Kristrom May 24, 2004 Abstract In a nite-horizon general equilibrium model national income is the value of output at supporting prices and a perturbation increases welfare if and only if it raises national income. We show how to extend these results to an in nite horizon representative agent model, and in the process relate them to a debate about how to measure welfare in a dynamic model, how to measure green national income," and how to measure sustainability." The obvious extension has all the right properties - it measures national income, provides an if and only if welfare increase criterion, and acts as a good indicator of sustainability. Our measure is observable and has been measured for a number of countries. Our index is a Fisherian wealth measure and our results represent the completion of a research agenda set out by Samuelson in 1961. JEL Classi cation: Key Words: representative agent, national income, wealth, sustainability. 1 Context In nite horizon general equilibrium models it is quite clear how to measure national income and how to judge whether a small change is a potential welfare improvement. Indeed both problems have the same solution. Under the standard assumptions about completeness of markets and absence of externalities, if p is a competitive equilibrium price vector and c i are the equilibrium consumption levels of the n consumers i = 1; :::; n then national income is p P i c i ; the total value of consumption at equilibrium prices, and 1

a small change in the allocation of resources is a potential Pareto improvement if and only if it increases the value of this inner product. This measure of national income is a linear approximation to a true welfare measure, which is the source of the need to consider only small changes in resource allocation. 1 With in nite horizon models, in contrast, there is no general agreement on how to measure changes in welfare, or on what is the right measure of national income, or on how the two relate. Here we show how to extend the nite results to an in nite horizon representative agent model, and in the process relate them to the debate about how to measure welfare in a dynamic model, how to measure green national income," and how to measure sustainability." 2 The obvious extension has all the right properties - it measures national income, provides an if and only if welfare increase criterion, and acts as a good indicator of sustainability. Our preferred measure is a measure of wealth rather than income, and in this respect is in keeping with Samuelson s remark that in extending national income to a dynamic context, we nd that the only valid approximation to a measure of welfare comes from computing wealth-like magnitudes.." (Samuelson [8] page 57 line 4 on). Perhaps surprisingly, it also relates closely to an empirical measure of sustainability that is increasingly widely used, the World Bank s measure of genuine savings." Because of this, our measure is observable and has been measured for a number of countries (see Arrow et al [1]). The extension of the standard welfare measure to the in nite horizon case is not straightforward: the nite dimensional version is proven by using separating hyperplane theorems, which are not easily used in the in nite dimensional case as hyperplanes can have counterintuitive properties and separation arguments are treacherous because of emptiness of the interiors of many preferred-or-indi erent sets. Our arguments circumvent these problems by drawing instead on results from dynamic programming and optimal control, and can be thought of as completing a research program set out in Samuelson s insightful early contribution [8], which has been neglected in subsequent literature. 2 Representative agent model Let the vector c(t) be an m-vector of ows of goods consumed and giving utility at time t, and s(t) be an n-vector of stocks at time t, also possibly 1 For an early contribution see Samuelson [7]. 2 For contributions to that debate see Asheim and Weitzman [2], Dasgupta and Maler [3] and Heal [5]. For a survey of the eld see Heal and Kristrom [6]. 2

sources of utility. Each stock s i (t) changes over time in a way which may depend on the values of all stocks and of all ows: s i (t) = d i (c(t); s(t)) ; i = 1; :::; n (1) The economy s objective is to maximize the discounted (at discount rate ) integral of utilities (2): max Z 1 0 u (c(t); s(t)) e t (2) subject to (1). Utility is a function of s as well as c because some stocks may a ect welfare directly as well as through their impact on consumption, as for example is the case with human capital or with forests. The utility function u is assumed strictly concave and the reproduction functions d i (c(t); s(t)) concave. This general formulation makes it possible to include human capital and other assets. Note that if n = m = 1 and u = u (c) and s = f (s) c we have the Ramsey-Solow model. When u does not depend on s and (1) takes the form s i (t) = c i (t) we have the Hotelling model. The general formulation we have chosen captures the possible contributions of environmental stocks to consumer utility and to productive e ciency. This is a general representative agent or optimal growth model, a distinct framework from the general equilibrium model we started with, but it nevertheless allows us to establish an analogous set of results. To solve this problem we construct a Hamiltonian which takes the form H(t) = u (c(t); s(t)) e t + nx i (t)e t d i (c(t); s(t)) (3) where the i (t) are the shadow prices of the stocks. The rst order conditions for optimality can be summarized as i=1 @u (c(t); s(t)) @c j = nx i=1 i;t @d i (c(t); s(t)) @c j (4) i (t) i (t) = @u (c(t); s(t)) @s i nx k=1 k (t) @d k (c(t); s(t)) @s i (5) 3

2.1 Measuring future welfare We make use of the state valuation function V (s) ; which we de ne in the usual manner: V (s 0 ) = max fc tg Z 1 0 u (c; s) e t, s i;t = d i (c t ; s t ) ; i = 1; :::; n; s 0 given V is the true non-linear welfare measure and we will show that an extension of the nite horizon national income to the in nite case is a linear approximation to V, just as p : P i c i is a linear approximation to the true welfare measure in the nite case. By standard results, @V @s i = i (6) so that the shadow price of the i th. stock is the marginal social productivity of that stock. It immediately follows that dv = X i i si (7) We can obtain a second expression for the rate of change of the state valuation function by di erentiating under the integral sign in the de nition of V. Equating the two expressions for dv gives V = H. A hyperplane which supports the optimal path is one that separates the set of paths preferred to an optimum from those which are feasible. 3 This is a time path of prices for stocks and ows p c;j (t) and p s;i (t) which satis es two conditions: any path at least as good as the optimum has a value at these prices at least as great as the optimal path, and any feasible path costs no more than the optimum. De nition 1 A set of prices p c;j (t) and p s;i (t) supporting the optimal path will be called optimal prices and will be used to de ne National Wealth NW as follows: National Wealth along the optimal path is NW = Z 1 0 fhp c (t) ; c (t)i + hp s (t) ; s (t)ig e t : 3 We shall assume that the functions d i (c(t); s(t)) ; i = 1; :::; n are such that the set of feasible paths for c j(t) and s i(t) is bounded: reasonable conditions su cient for this are presented for the models used here in Heal [5]. 4

Here hp c (t) ; c (t)i represents the inner product of the price vector p c (t) at time t with the consumption vector c (t) at time t. NW is just the in nite horizon analog of the conventional nite horizon national income measure, and Fisher was the rst to use the term wealth for such a magnitude. 4 Samuelson [8] sets out the need for working with preferences over consumption paths that are functions of time if we are to measure national income correctly in a dynamic context but, not surprisingly given when he was writing, shies away from doing this. We want to establish that any small change which increases this measure is a welfare improvement. Next we characterize a set of optimal prices which are quite intuitive: they are the marginal utilities of the stocks and ows along an optimal path. Proposition 2 The sequence of prices de ned by the derivatives of the utility function along an optimal path, i.e., @u (c (t); s (t)) fp c;j (t) ; p s;i (t)g = ; @u (c (t); s (t)) 8j; i; t @c j (t) @s i (t) form a set of optimal prices in the sense of de nition 1. The derivatives of the utility function can be used to de ne a price system at which national wealth can be computed. It is immediate that any small change in a path which has a positive present value at these optimal prices will increase welfare, and vice versa. An increase in NW is therefore a necessary and su cient condition for a welfare increase: Theorem 3 A variation fc(t); s(t)g 1 t=0 on optimal path fc (t); s (t)g 1 t=0 has positive present value at the optimal prices fp c;j (t) ; p s;i (t)g 1 t=0, and so is an increase in NW, if and only if the implementation of this variation leads to an increase in welfare. This theorem, though immediate given what precedes it, is important: it tells us that any other linear index indicates a small increase in welfare if and only if it agrees locally with NW; which is therefore the benchmark for welfare indices. The alternative measure of wealth, used inter alia by Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), is the value of stocks at shadow prices, W = P i is i : 4 This de nition was used in Heal [5]. Note that Irving Fisher de nes wealth at the present discounted value of all future consumption - see Samuelson [8] page 51. So this is in fact a Fisherian de nition of wealth. He did not de ne wealth as the value of assets at market prices - an alternative de nition that has tempted some. 5

Note from equation (7) that the rate of change of the state valuation function is the rate of change of W at constant prices. Building on this and the earlier de nitions we can establish an important relationship between the rates of change of national wealth NW and the state valuation function V : they are equal up to a rst order approximation. Theorem 4 The rate of change of NW equals that of V up to a rst order approximation. Proof. We have as the current value Hamiltonian of the basic systemh = u (c; s) + P s i so using the results on the properties of V H = u (c; s) + dv and so V = u (c; s) + dv so p c c p s s = dv V + O (2) (9) where O (2) is a second order term. Di erentiating the expression for NW and using (9) we have dnw which can be rewritten as d Note that (11) implies that NW = dv NW e t = d (8) V + O (2) (10) V e t + O (2) e t (11) dnw = dv + O (2) (12) The proof is that as d(nw e t ) = NW e t + e t dnw (13) equation (11) implies that NW e t + e and if NW = V then t dnw dnw = V e t + e = dv t dv + O (2) (14) + O (2) (15) 6

So the equality of the rates of change of the discounted values implies the equality of the rates of change of the undiscounted values provided that at the initial time these undiscounted values are equal. As the origins of the functions NW and V are arbitrary, we can add or subtract a constant from for example NW to ensure that at t = 0 we have NW = V. 3 Implications Change in NW is a linear approximation to change in V;the true welfare measure, and N W is a linear index. N W therefore plays a role exactly analogous to the standard general equilibrium measure in the nite horizon case. From (7) we have also that dnw = X i i si + O (2) (16) What is interesting here is that P i is i is observable in principle, depending only on current values of variables, and indeed is what Hamilton and Clements have termed "genuine savings." (See Hamilton and Clements [4] and also Arrow et al. [1]) So the change in NW is observable and equals, to a rst order approximation, a measure that has been suggested as appropriate for measuring how an economy s long-term productive potential is changing, how sustainable is its development. This is an insight that Samuelson [8] missed - he states of the NW measure that I know of no way of even approximating from market valuations of factors what the values of consumption quantities Q at prices P would be." Perhaps this is because he focussed on measuring wealth rather than the change in wealth. There is a direct connection to the literature on sustainability, as V measures the economy s long-term welfare potential and that this be nondecreasing has been suggested as an interpretation of sustainability (Heal [5], Arrow et al [1]). In this context sustainability is equivalent to non-decreasing national wealth (Dasgupta and Maler [3] amongst others). References [1] Arrow K.J., G.C. Daily, P.S. Dasgupta, G.M. Heal, K-G. Maler, P.R. Ehrlich, "Are we consuming too much?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2004. 7

[2] Asheim, G.B. and M.L. Weitzman (2001). Does NNP Growth Indicate Welfare Improvement? Economics Letters, 73, 233-239. [3] Dasgupta P.S. and K.-G. Mäler (2000). Net National Product, Wealth and Social Well-Being. Environment and Development Economics, 5, 69-93. [4] Hamilton, K. & M. Clemens (1999) Genuine Savings Rates in Developing Countries, The World Bank Economic Review, 13 (2), p. 333-56. [5] Heal, G.M. (1998) Valuing the Future: Economic Theory and Sustainability. Columbia University Press [6] Heal, G. and B. Kriström (2003) National Income and the Environment, Forthcoming, Mäler, K.-G. and J. Vincent, (eds), Handbook of Environmental Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam. [7] Samuelson P. A. Evaluation of Real National Income", Oxford Economic Papers (New Series), 1950, pp. 1-29. [8] Samuelson P.A. The Evaluation of Social Income, Capital Formation and Wealth", chapter 3 pp. 32-57,in The Theory of Capital, F.A. Lutz and D.C, Hague, St. Martins Press, New York, 1961. 8