INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND DOMINICA. Debt Sustainability Analysis. Prepared by the staff of the International Monetary Fund

Similar documents
The Gambia: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND LAO PEOPLE S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Cape Verde: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 1 2

January 2008 NIGER: JOINT BANK-FUND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. SM/07/347 Supplement 2

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ST. LUCIA. External and Public Debt Sustainability Analysis. Prepared by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SUDAN. Joint World Bank/IMF 2009 Debt Sustainability Analysis

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2015 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS UPDATE

Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2018 Update

Uganda: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis

Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis Update

March 2007 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: JOINT BANK-FUND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

PAPUA NEW GUINEA STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2015 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

Risk of external debt distress: Augmented by significant risks stemming from domestic public debt?

Nicaragua: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 1,2

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND BENIN JOINT BANK-FUND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND NIGERIA

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND RWANDA. Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis

FOURTH REVIEW UNDER THE POLICY SUPPORT INSTRUMENT DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND NEPAL. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2017 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA

(January 2016). The fiscal year for Rwanda is from July June; however, this DSA is prepared on a calendar

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND UGANDA. Joint World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis Update

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND KENYA. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis - Update

Vietnam: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 1

KINGDOM OF LESOTHO SIXTH REVIEW UNDER THE THREE-YEAR ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

Georgia: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 1

REQUEST FOR A THREE-YEAR ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

SIERRA LEONE. Approved By. June 16, 2016

MALAWI. Approved By. December 27, Prepared by the staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association

JOINT IMF/WORLD BANK DEBT SUSTAINABILITY

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATION MONETARY FUND SOLOMON ISLANDS. Joint World bank-fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2013 Update

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETRY FUND CAMBODIA. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 1

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MALI. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis Update

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2016 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE THREE-YEAR ARRANGEMENT

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Malawi: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis Based on Low-Income County Framework 1

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2016 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 1

Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2018 Update 1

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SENEGAL. Joint Bank/Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND UNION OF THE COMOROS. Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis 2009

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND LIBERIA

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND KENYA. Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2017 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION SENEGAL. Joint IMF/IDA Debt Sustainability Analysis

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2017 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

TOGO. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis Update

STAFF REPORT OF THE 2015 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS UPDATE. Risk of external debt distress

LIBERIA. Approved By. December 3, December 7, Prepared by the International Monetary Fund and International Development Association

Burkina Faso: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis

Nepal: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION REPUBLIC OF MODOVA

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION SIERRA LEONE. Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis 2010

THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Risk of external debt distress:

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND REPUBLIC OF CONGO. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2013 Update

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2017 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2018 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2018 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS. Risk of external debt distress:

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE

May 2006 SIERRA LEONE: JOINT BANK-FUND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

CÔTE D'IVOIRE ANALYSIS UPDATE. June 2, Prepared by the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association

REQUEST FOR A THREE-YEAR POLICY SUPPORT

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND GHANA. Joint IMF and World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MALAWI. Joint Bank Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis Update

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION MALDIVES

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2016 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C.

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2017 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND CHAD

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SOLOMON ISLANDS. Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis 1

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERANTIONAL MONETARY FUND BURKINA FASO. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2013 Update

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION AND SECOND REVIEW UNDER THE POLICY SUPPORT INSTRUMENT DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2018 Update

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND THE GAMBIA. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis

Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2018 Update

CAMEROON. Approved By. Prepared by the staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association.

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND BURUNDI. Joint Bank/Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2010

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA. Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis 2010

Approved By. November 13, Prepared by the Staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

CÔTE D'IVOIRE. Approved by Dominique Desruelle and Daria Zakharova (IMF); and Paloma Anos-Casero (IDA) November 21, 2017

CÔTE D'IVOIRE. Côte d Ivoire continues to face a moderate risk of debt distress.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MALI. May 12,2008

REQUEST FOR A THREE-YEAR ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI. Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis 2012

CÔTE D'IVOIRE. Approved By. November 23, Prepared by the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND RWANDA. Joint World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION MONGOLIA

TONGA JOINT IMF/WORLD BANK DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS Approved By. July 2, 2013

Transcription:

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND DOMINICA Debt Sustainability Analysis Prepared by the staff of the International Monetary Fund In consultation with World Bank Staff July 2, 27 This debt sustainability analysis (DSA) assesses the sustainability of Dominica s public and external debt. The analysis shows that Dominica has improved its debt sustainability outlook since the last Article IV consultation, primarily due to stronger than expected fiscal performance and output growth, the initiation of a reform to the pension system, and the recent participation in the Caribbean Catastrophe Insurance Facility a regional insurance pool organized by the World Bank. The outlook still presents, nevertheless, large risks, as Dominica s debt remains high and the country is exposed to potentially large shocks (including volatility of aid flows, natural disasters, among others). I. INTRODUCTION 1. After a restructuring of its public sector debt, a strong fiscal turnaround, and a rebound of economic activity, Dominica has been able to improve its debt sustainability outlook. The debt restructuring that started in 24, jointly with donors help, allowed a reduction in debt s face value and improved the terms of a large portion of the existing debt. The central government primary balance, which had been in deficit since 1997, has exhibited sound surpluses in the last three years in the context of a PRGF program (concluded in December 26). Growth rebounded under program and the government has started the implementation of the Growth and Social Protection Strategy (GSPS), which constitutes a comprehensive strategy to foster private sector-led growth and reduce poverty while maintaining prudent fiscal policy. II. UNDERLYING DSA ASSUMPTIONS 2. Staff has prepared a baseline scenario whose main parameters are consistent with the authorities projections under the GSPS, and with staff projections and assumptions in the 25 Article IV consultation DSA.

2 Box 1. Baseline Macroeconomic Assumptions (27 27) Real GDP growth is projected at 3 percent (as in GSPS and 25 Article IV DSA). While this assumption implies a rate of growth higher than the average observed in the 199s (2 percent), it seems consistent with the stronger growth observed in the period 24 6, with the reforms envisaged, and with the projected international environment (see Box 2). Inflation is projected to remain low (1.5 percent per year), consistent with historical averages. Primary balance of the central government remains at 3 percent of GDP over the projection period (as in GSPS and 25 Article IV DSA), while public enterprises run an overall deficit of.5 percent of GDP. The assumption about the government primary balance is consistent with the strong fiscal turnaround Dominica has had in recent years. The assumption on public enterprises follows the average observed during the period 1999 26. External grants are assumed to remain at 8.3 percent of GDP broadly in line with the GSPS. This number is high by historical standards although it is lower than the grants actually received and not out of bound given the authorities attempt to improve the management of aid and aid-related expenditures. Given the uncertain grants outlook, we undertake a stress test below. Annual disbursements of external concessional debt reach 1.5 percent of GDP (as in 25 Article IV DSA), consistent with the country s public sector investment program (PSIP). The financing terms are similar to those of existing external debt. New domestic financing is projected to be available at an interest rate of 7 percent (as in 25 Article IV DSA). The current account deficit is assumed to remain high in a transition period (27 12), while gradually falling to a level fully financed by the projected external grants and FDI. This assumes that: (i) banks continue to use their external assets to extend domestic credit and that the government draws down its deposits to finance its investment program (government deposits in domestic banks have increased substantially given the recent increase in grants received. Banks have allocated a large fraction of those deposits to external assets); and (ii) the loss of export revenue associated with the closure of a large factory is partially and temporarily compensated by a decline in private agent s foreign assets. FDI is assumed to remain at the 26 level (8 percent of GDP). While this number is higher than its historical average (so helping finance the current account), its actual net impact is not large since it is linked in the projections to foreign firms retained earnings (which increase the current account deficit). III. EVALUATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT SUSTAINABILITY Dominica s public debt as of end-26 3. As of end-26 Dominica s public sector debt stood at 12 percent of GDP, of which 71 percent of GDP represented external debt and the remaining 31 percent represented domestic debt. Regarding the external debt, the largest share is owed to multilateral creditors (around 43 percent of GDP, with the Caribbean Development Bank holding around two thirds of that), followed by the debt with bilateral and commercial creditors (around 16 and

3 12 percent of GDP, respectively). In the domestic front, the largest creditor is Dominica s own Social Security System (around 13 percent of GDP) followed by a commercial bank with a significant government stake. In NPV terms, public sector debt stood at around 88 percent of GDP, due to the concessionality attached to most of the external debt (whose NPV was around 56 percent of GDP). 1 The baseline scenario 4. Under the baseline scenario (Table 1a.), all the indicators show a progressive improvement in terms of debt sustainability. The only indicator that does not decline continuously is the debt service to revenue ratio, which temporarily shows an upward trend and then a decline in 211. 2 Even though the increase in the indicator is temporary, it is important, however, to take into account that it remains high for several years, which calls for maintaining fiscal discipline in order to avoid liquidity constraints. Under this scenario, Dominica would reach a public debt to GDP ratio of 6 percent the guidance of the ECCB by 217. Alternative scenarios and stress tests Changes in growth and primary balance 5. Economic growth and the primary balance are the two key drivers of Dominica s debt path and both are subject to large exogenous shocks, such as volatility of grants (see below) and of foreign growth (see Box 2). 6. The sensitivity analysis illustrates two important points (Table 1b.). First, if Dominica s primary balance and economic growth return to their averages of the last ten years (a primary deficit of.1 percent and annual growth of.9 percent), then public debt starts rising again (Scenario A.1), although the path of the debt increase is not steep. Second, if Dominica can maintain the fiscal effort projected for 27 (a primary balance of 4.8 percent) public debt stays on a declining path (Scenario A.2). 7. In addition, the sensitivity analysis shows the importance of sustaining growth. In the alternative Scenario A.3, in which growth falls to 2.3 percent per year, debt initially declines but later returns to an ascending path. This is because as output growth slows, fiscal revenues 1 The figures could change somewhat depending on the final agreement with hold-out creditors (since different options have different hair-cuts). These final agreements, however, should not have a material impact on the debt sustainability paths given that all restructuring options available for restructuring have the same NPV. The simulations in this appendix assume that hold-out creditors take the intermediate bond, which carries a hair-cut of 2 percent. The discount rate for the NPV calculations is 5 percent. 2 The initial upward trend is mainly caused by the early repayment clause that was included in Dominica s debt restructuring agreement. Under that clause, there is an increase in amortization starting in 29 and a bunching of payments up to 211.

4 are projected to decline relative to the baseline scenario while expenditures are assumed to remain constant relative to the baseline scenario (which produces a deterioration of the primary balance). Figure 2 shows the individual contributions of growth and primary balance to the debt path. The importance of growth in debt sustainability is clear from the second panel, but it is also clear that public debt remains on a declining path if Dominica is able to maintain a primary balance of 3 percent of GDP even if growth were to decline to an annual rate of 1 percent. Box. 2. Dominica: External Shocks and Growth Since independence in 1978, Dominica has gone through periodic difficulties. The island was ravaged by hurricanes; experienced with banana-driven booms and busts; and more recently suffered from a debt and economic crisis. The lack of economies of scale and accessibility increases business costs. Also, as a small state, it faces more volatile growth and terms of trade, more prone to natural disasters, and more vulnerable to external shocks. External shocks are a key challenge to sustaining growth in Dominica. In a standard vector autoregression analysis, 3 staff found that a 1 percentage point shock to the U.S. output affects Dominica output roughly by the same magnitude, doubles the effect on some larger countries in the region, such as Mexico and Canada. Similarly, staff found that Dominica is particularly vulnerable to other external shocks: more than half of its growth volatility can be explained by growth volatility of its main trading partners; and typical shocks to annual banana prices (about 14 percentage points) and aid inflows (about 2¾ percent of GDP) affect Dominica GDP by ¾ 1 percentage point over a year or two. 3 2 Dominica: Response of growth to a 1 percentage point shock to U.S. growth 1..8 Dominica: Response of growth to a 1 percentage point shock to U.S. growth Percent 1.6.4-1 -2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 Years.2. Dominica Canada Latin America 1/ Mexico Source: Fund staff estimates. 1/ Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 3 Based on the methodology used in World Economic Outlook, April 27, Chapter 4.

5 Decline in external grants 8. External grants to the central government are expected to reach around 8 percent of GDP in the fiscal year 26 7 4, around 3 percentage points above its historical average. Figure 2 (lower panel) illustrates the impact of a 3 percent of GDP decline in external aid from 29 on. The results present two alternative scenarios: (i) the partial adjustment scenario, which assumes that government cuts investment spending by around 1.5 percent of GDP and finances the rest of the aid decline with larger borrowing (the increase in borrowing is assumed to increase interest rates by 1 percentage point). The other scenario assumes no cuts in public investment. The aid decline is financed entirely via higher borrowing, which increase interest rates by 2 percentage points. In both scenarios, the new borrowing is assumed to be domestic. 9. As the figure illustrates, under the no adjustments scenario, public debt quickly starts rising again due to the cascading effects of rising debt and higher refinancing rates. The debt to GDP ratio stabilizes at around 62 under the partial adjustment scenario. Other shocks 1. We also assessed shocks to interest rates, the impact of natural disasters, and the balance sheet implications of a depreciation of the U.S. dollar against other major international currencies. Natural disasters produce an initial increase in debt but the latter returns to a declining trajectory after growth is restored and fiscal costs of reconstruction have ended. 5 Interest rates shocks have little impact on Dominica s public debt path of most of its debt, including domestic debt, has fixed interest rates. A depreciation of the U.S. dollar against other major currencies would have a modest balance sheet effect on Dominica s public debt: around 7 percent of the external debt is denominated in the U.S. dollar, 19 percent in SDR (where the U.S. dollar weigh is about 5 percent), and around 4 percent is denominated in the Euro. 4 Measured as grants spent, in line with IMF Country Report No. 5/384. 5 It is assumed that the shock costs the government 9 percent of GDP over a three-year period (thus exhausting the primary surpluses assumed under the baseline scenario) and causes real growth to decline to zero over the same period. This shock is costlier than the standard shock reported in IMF Country Report No. 4/335, in particular. In addition, the actual impact of this shock could be lower given the recent participation of Dominica into the Caribbean Catastrophe Insurance Facility a regional insurance pool organized by the World Bank has lowered the costs of catastrophe insurance and is expected to mitigate fiscal costs in the event of extreme hurricanes.

6 The rest is denominated in the EC dollar, and other currencies that are pegged to the U.S. dollar. IV. EVALUATION OF EXTERNAL DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 11. Dominica s external debt is mostly owed by the public sector, since private sector borrowing takes place with domestic commercial banks. Due to this feature, the external DSA has to a large extent the same properties as the public sector DSA. 12. External debt remains on a declining path in the baseline scenario (Table 2a.). Similarly to the public debt DSA, the only indicators of debt sustainability that do not decline continuously are those related to the share of external debt service as a percent of exports and public sector revenues. Both indicators increase up to 21 as a consequence of the features of the debt restructuring and then start declining. The closure of operations of a large foreign manufacturing company also contributes to the increase of the debt service as a share of exports. The large residuals observed in the first five years of the projections period reflect our assumptions regarding the temporary financing of part of the current account deficit by a reduction in bank s and private agents net foreign assets. 13. Sensitivity tests show a picture similar to the public debt DSA (Table 2b.). If key variables were to return to their historical averages (Scenario A.1) external debt would return to an ascending path, as lower grants, lower FDI, and lower growth would push external debt up. Higher interest rates (Scenario A.2) do not significantly impact the external debt paths as in the baseline scenario Dominica faces low financing needs (see previous section). V. CONCLUSIONS AND COMPARISON WITH THE 25 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION DSA 14. Dominica has improved its debt sustainability outlook since the previous Article IV consultation (25), mostly due to stronger than projected fiscal performance and economic growth. Public debt for end-27 is currently projected at 96 percent of GDP, which is 3.5 percentage points lower than the projections made in the last Article IV consultation. At the same time, Dominica has introduced a reform to its pension system, which targets one of the main vulnerabilities to debt sustainability identified in the 25 Article IV consultation. Dominica has also made progress in reducing debt-related vulnerabilities, particularly by joining the Caribbean Catastrophe Insurance Facility. 15. In spite of the progress achieved, important debt-related vulnerabilities remain, as: (i) public debt is high (over 1 percent of GDP), which gives the government little room to maneuver in case of unforeseen events; (ii) there is a bunching of payments between 29 and 211; (iii) the arrival of new grants is uncertain; and (iv) the country is exposed to external shocks and natural disasters. 16. The government s medium-term reform strategy, which appropriately envisages the maintenance of a fiscal policy geared at achieving a primary surplus target of 3 percent of

7 GDP and thereby bringing about a gradual reduction in the debt ratio, constitutes, therefore, a step in the right direction. The structural reforms proposed in the government strategy will via its positive impact on economic growth also help to attain the objective of reducing debt related vulnerabilities.

8 Table 1a.Dominica: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 24 27 (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) Actual Est. Projections 24 25 26 Historical Average 1/ Standard Deviation 1/ 27 28 29 21 211 212 Average 27 12 217 227 Average 213 27 Public sector debt 2/ 116. 18.1 12.5 95.8 91.9 87.5 83.2 79.2 75.2 57.2 23.4 Of which: Foreign-currency denominated 3/ 4/ 8.6 74.8 7.9 65.2 6.5 56.3 51.4 46.9 43. 3.6 21.2 Change in public sector debt -14.8-7.8-5.7-6.7-3.9-4.4-4.3-4.1-3.9-3.5-3.4 Identified debt-creating flows 5/ -12. -9.1-9.1-6.7-3.9-4.4-4.3-4.1-3.9-3.5-3.4 Primary deficit -4.4-4.5-6.9.1 5.3-4.8-3.3-3.2-3.2-3.2-3.1-3.5-3. -3.1-3.1 Revenue and grants 48.7 48.9 5.1 49.4 48.7 49.6 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 of which : grants 6. 6.8 8.3 7.7 7. 7.9 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 Primary (noninterest) expenditure 44.4 44.4 43.1 44.7 45.5 46.4 46.9 46.9 47. 47. 46.9 Automatic debt dynamics -2.1-2.1-2.9-1.9 -.7-1.2-1.1 -.9 -.8 -.4 -.3 Contribution from interest rate/growth differential -2.1-2.7-3. -2.1-1.3-1.4-1.3-1.2-1. -.6 -.4 Of which : Contribution from average real interest rate 1.8 1. 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2.4 Of which : Contribution from real GDP growth -3.9-3.7-4.1-3.1-2.6-2.7-2.5-2.4-2.3-1.8 -.8 Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation..6..2.6.3.3.2.2...... Other identified debt-creating flows -5.6-2.5.8........ Privatization receipts (negative). -2.......... Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities -.9.......... Debt relief (HIPC and other) 6/ -4.6 -.6.8........ Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization)........... Residual, including asset changes -2.8 1.3 3.4........ NPV of public sector debt 35.4 93.3 87.7 82.8 8.1 76.8 73.6 7.4 67.3 52.1 2.9 Of which: Foreign-currency denominated. 6. 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.6 41.7 38.2 35.1 25.5 18.6 Of which: External... 6. 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.6 41.7 38.2 35.1 25.5 18.5 NPV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt)................................. Gross financing need 7/ 6.7.5 -.9 1.5 3. 3.4 4.4 4.2 3.8 1. -1. NPV of public sector debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 72.6 19.9 175.2 167.5 164.4 154.8 146.9 14.6 134.4 14.1 41.7 NPV of public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 82.9 221.8 29.9 198.2 191.8 183.9 176.1 168.6 161.1 124.8 49.9 Of which: External 8/ 142.6 134.4 125. 116.7 19.2 99.8 91.4 83.9 61. 44.3 Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 22.7 1.2 12. 12.8 12.9 13.3 15.1 14.6 13.7 8.1 4.3 Debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 9/ 25.9 11.8 14.4 15.1 15. 15.8 18.1 17.5 16.5 9.7 5.2 Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-gdp ratio 1.5 3.4-1.3 1.9.7 1.2 1.1.9.8.4.2 Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions Real GDP growth (in percent) 3. 3.3 4..9 3.1 3.2 2.8 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. Average nominal interest rate on forex debt (in percent) 3.9 2. 2.2 3.5 1.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.2 2.5 Average real interest rate on domestic currency debt (in percent).7 3.5 3.2 5.8 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.4 4. 3. 3.8 Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation)..8.1.3 1..2........................... Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 2.1 1.5 1.9 1.5.9 1.8 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent) 4.3 3.2.9 2.7 11.6 6.8 4.6 5.1 4.1 3.1 3.1 4.5 3. 2.9 3. Grant element of new external borrowing (in percent)......... 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9... Sources: Country authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections. 1/ Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 1 years, subject to data availability. 2/ Nonfinancial public sector (includes debt with Dominica's Social Security System). 3/ Refers to external debt. Assumes that nonpartcipating creditors receive the intermediate bond. Excludes external interest arrears. Arrears with participating creditors have been settled as part of the debt restructuring. Arrears with nonparticipating creditors are either in dispute or expected to be settled when an agreement is reached. Undisputed interest arrears are approximately.4 percent of GDP 4/ For 25, it includes the reallocation of part of an external bond (around 4 percent of GDP) from external to domestic 5/ Fiscal year aggregates are averaged to estimate calendar year figures. 6/ In 24/5, it is assumed that all nonparticipating creditors received the intermediate bond, which carries a face value reduction of 2 percent. 7/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period. 8/ Revenues excluding grants. 9/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium- and long-term debt.

9 Table 1b.Dominica: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt 27 27 Projections 27 28 29 21 211 212 217 227 Baseline 83 8 77 74 7 67 52 21 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 83 85 86 87 88 89 96 15 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 27 83 79 74 7 65 61 39-5 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 83 81 79 77 75 73 69 77 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 28 9 83 86 91 91 91 91 92 92 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 28 9 83 88 92 88 84 81 66 33 B3. Combination of B1 B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 83 88 93 89 85 81 63 26 B4. One-time 3 percent real depreciation in 28 83 13 1 96 93 89 72 37 B5. 1 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 28 83 89 85 82 78 75 6 28 Baseline 168 164 155 147 141 134 14 42 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 168 173 172 172 174 175 184 194 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 27 168 162 15 139 13 121 77-11 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 168 166 158 152 149 146 137 149 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 28 9 168 175 18 178 179 179 181 18 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 28 9 168 18 184 175 169 162 131 67 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 168 18 185 175 168 161 125 51 B4. One-time 3 percent real depreciation in 28 168 212 21 192 185 178 144 74 B5. 1 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 28 168 182 171 163 157 15 12 56 Baseline 13 13 13 15 15 14 8 4 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 13 13 16 19 19 19 15 2 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 27 13 13 12 14 13 12 6-1 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 13 13 14 16 16 15 12 15 B. Bound tests NPV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio NPV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 28 9 13 13 16 2 2 2 15 18 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 28 9 13 13 19 23 18 16 1 7 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 13 13 18 21 18 16 9 5 B4. One-time 3 percent real depreciation in 28 13 14 15 17 16 15 9 6 B5. 1 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 28 13 13 2 18 16 15 9 6 Sources: Country authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections. 1/ Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of 2 (i.e., the length of the projection period) 2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants.

1 Figure 1. Dominica: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 27 27 1/ 1 8 NPV of debt-to-gdp ratio 6 4 2 Baseline Most extreme stress test Sustaining 27 fiscal stance -2 27 29 211 213 215 217 219 221 223 225 227 2 15 NPV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ 1 5 Baseline Most extreme stress test Sustaining 27 fiscal stance -5 25 2 27 29 211 213 215 217 219 221 223 225 227 Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ 15 1 5 Baseline Most extreme stress test Sustaining 27 fiscal stance -5 27 29 211 213 215 217 219 221 223 225 227 Source: Staff projections and simulations. 1/ Most extreme stress test is test that yields highest ratio in 217. 2/ Revenue including grants.

11 11 1 Figure 2. Dominica: Debt Sustainability Analysis (In percent of GDP) Sensitivity to Primary Balance 11 1 9 1 percent primary balance 9 8 7 6 The ECCB target (by 22) 2 percent primary balance 8 7 6 5 4 3 Baseline scenario (3 percent primary balance, 3 percent growth, and 7 percent interest rates for non-psip-related borrowing) 5 4 3 2 2 26 28 21 212 214 216 218 22 222 224 226 11 1 Sensitivity to GDP Growth 11 1 9 8 7 6 The ECCB target (by 22) 1 percent real GDP growth 2 percent real GDP growth 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 Baseline scenario 3 2 2 26 28 21 212 214 216 218 22 222 224 226 12 11 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 The ECCB target (by 22) Sensitivity to Aid Flows No adjustment: aid decline addressed by more borrowing 1/ Partial adjustment: aid decline addressed partly by spending cuts 1/ Baseline scenario 26 28 21 212 214 216 218 22 222 224 226 12 11 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Source: Fund staff calculations based on data from Dominica authorities. 1/ Assumes that grants decline to the pre-crisis historical average in 29.

12 Table 2a. Dominica: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 24 27 1/ (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) Actual Projections Historical Standard Average Average 24 25 26 Average 2/ Deviation 2/ 27 28 29 21 211 212 27 12 217 227 213 27 External debt (nominal) 1/ 8.6 74.8 7.9 65.2 6.5 56.3 51.4 46.9 43. 3.6 21.1 Of which: Public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) 8.6 74.8 7.9 65.2 6.5 56.3 51.4 46.9 43. 3.6 21.1 Change in external debt -4. -5.8-3.9-5.7-4.7-4.2-4.9-4.4-3.9-1.7 -.3 Identified net debt-creating flows.3 12.8-1.2 -.8 2.4 1.4.1 -.5-3.1-1.9 -.8 Noninterest current account deficit 14.1 27.9 17.8 14.9 6. 15.5 17.6 17.5 16.7 16.1 13.5 14.6 15.5 14.8 Deficit in balance of goods and services 16.5 25.1 19.5 16.9 19. 19. 18.2 17.6 17. 16.6 17.5 Exports 47.5 44.5 46.6 46.9 44.7 44.2 44.3 44.3 44.5 44.5 44.5 Imports 64.1 69.7 66.1 63.8 63.6 63.2 62.5 62. 61.5 61.1 62. Net current transfers (negative = inflow) -7.3-7.6-7.3-6.3 1.1-7. -7. -7. -7. -7. -7. -7. -7. -7. Of which: O fficial -.5 -.7 -.3........ Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) 4.9 1.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 3.5 5. 5. Net FDI and capital grants (negative = inflow) -12.7-13.2-16.3-12.5 4. -15.7-15. -15.9-16.3-16.3-16.3-16.3-16.3-16.3 Endogenous debt dynamics 3/ -1.2-2. -2.7 -.7 -.2 -.3 -.3 -.3 -.3 -.2. Contribution from nominal interest rate 3.2 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1..7.7 Contribution from real GDP growth -2.4-2.6-2.8-2.1-1.8-1.7-1.6-1.5-1.3 -.9 -.6 Contribution from price and exchange rate changes -1.9-1. -1.4 Residual 4/ 5/ -4.2-18.5-2.7-4.9-7.1-5.6-5. -3.9 -.8.2.4 Of which: E xceptional financing -4.6 -.6.8........ NPV of external debt 6/...... 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.6 41.7 38.2 35.1 25.5 18.5 In percent of exports...... 12.5 111.4 19.1 13.2 94.2 86.1 78.8 57.3 41.6 NPV of PPG external debt...... 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.6 41.7 38.2 35.1 25.5 18.5 In percent of exports...... 12.5 111.4 19.1 13.2 94.2 86.1 78.8 57.3 41.6 In percent of government revenues...... 134.4 125. 116.7 19.2 99.8 91.4 83.9 61. 44.3 Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 2.7 12.6 8.6 9.8 1.3 1.4 12.1 11.1 1. 5.5 3.6 PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 2.7 12.6 8.6 9.8 1.3 1.4 12.1 11.1 1. 5.5 3.6 PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 23. 13.3 9.6 11. 11. 11. 12.8 11.7 1.6 5.9 3.8 Total gross financing need (billions of U.S. dollars) 3.6 58. 16.7 14.1 23.7 21.6 2.7 17.7 6.3 3.9 6.1 Noninterest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio 18.1 33.7 21.7 21.3 22.3 21.7 21.6 2.5 17.4 16.3 15.8 Key macroeconomic assumptions Real GDP growth (in percent) 3. 3.3 4..9 3.1 3.2 2.8 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms (change in percent) 2.3 1.2 1.9 1.6.8 1.8 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Effective interest rate (percent) 7/ 3.9 2. 2.2 3.5 1.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.2 2.5 Growth of exports of goods and services (U.S. dollar terms, in percent) 9.2-2. 1.9 2.3 1.1 5.6-1. 3.5 4.7 4.7 4.9 3.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 Growth of imports of goods and services (U.S. dollar terms, in percent) 11.3 13.7.6 2.5 7.3 1.3 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.3 5.1 4.5 4.6 Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent)............... 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 Aid flows (in millions of US dollars) 8/ 75.4 61.7 67.7 68. 64.3 78.3 86.1 89.9 93.9 117.2 182.9 Of which: Grants 16.4 19.4 25. 24.2 22.9 27. 29.8 31.2 32.6 4.7 63.5 Of which: Concessional loans 18.4 7.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.9 7.4 11.5 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 9/......... 7.8 7.1 8.1 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 9/......... 92.3 91.9 86.1 87. 87.2 87.4 87.4 87.4 87.5 Memorandum items: Nominal GDP (billions of US dollars) 271.7 284.3 31.3 316.3 328.7 343.6 359.2 375.5 392.6 49.3 764.7 (NPVt-NPVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) -1.3-1.6-1. -2. -1.8-1.5-1.5 -.1 1.. Source: Staff simulations. 1/ Only includes both public sector external debt. 2/ Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 1 years, subject to data availability. 3/ Derived as [r - g - r(1+g)]/(1+g+r+gr) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and r = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms. 4/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes. 5/ In 25, it includes the reallocation of part of an external bond (around 4 percent of GDP) from external to domestic. It also includes a negative FDI flow reflecting extraordinary dividends paid by a foreign company (5 percent og GDP), which were made out of an account in a foreign bank. 6/ Assumes that NPV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value. 7/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock. 8/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief. 9/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the NPV of new debt).

13 Table 2b. Dominica: Sensitivity Analyses for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 27 27 (In percent) Projections 27 28 29 21 211 212 217 227 NPV of debt-to-gdp ratio Baseline 52 49 46 42 38 35 25 19 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 28 27 1/ 52 49 48 46 46 48 62 9 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 28 27 2/ 52 49 46 43 39 37 29 26 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 52 51 51 46 42 39 28 21 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 3/ 52 51 54 5 47 44 34 23 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 52 49 46 42 39 35 26 19 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 4/ 52 56 6 56 53 49 39 27 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 52 52 56 51 47 44 34 24 B6. One-time 3 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 28 5/ 52 69 65 59 54 5 36 26 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio Baseline 111 19 13 94 86 79 57 42 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 27 26 1/ 111 11 18 15 14 18 14 22 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 27 26 2/ 111 11 14 96 89 83 65 59 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 111 19 13 94 86 79 57 42 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 3/ 111 123 148 137 127 118 92 64 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 111 19 13 94 86 79 57 42 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 4/ 111 125 136 127 119 111 89 6 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 111 115 127 117 18 1 76 53 B6. One-time 3 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 28 5/ 111 19 13 94 86 79 57 42 Debt service-to-exports ratio Baseline 1 1 1 12 11 1 6 4 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 28 27 1/ 12 1 11 13 12 12 9 14 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 28 27 2/ 12 1 1 12 11 1 6 5 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 12 1 1 12 11 1 6 4 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 3/ 12 11 13 16 14 13 8 6 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 12 1 1 12 11 1 6 4 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 28 9 4/ 12 1 11 13 12 11 8 5 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 12 1 11 14 13 12 7 5 B6. One-time 3 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 28 5/ 12 1 1 12 11 1 6 4 Source: Staff projections and simulations. 1/ Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows. 2/ Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline, while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline. 3/ Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly assuming an offsetting adjustment in import levels). 4/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI. 5/ Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 1 percent.

14 Figure 3. Dominica: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 27 27 1 8 6 4 2-2 -4 Debt Accumulation Grant-equivalent/GDP Grant element (right scale) Rate of debt accumulation 8 27 212 217 222 227 22 2 18 16 14 12 1 1 NPV of debt-to-gdp ratio 9 Historical scenario 8 7 Most extreme shock 6 5 Threshold 4 3 2 Baseline 1 27 212 217 222 227 25 2 15 NPV of debt-to-exports ratio Historical scenario Threshold 3 25 2 NPV of debt-to-revenue ratio Threshold Historical scenario 1 Most extreme shock 15 1 Most extreme shock 5 Baseline 27 212 217 222 227 5 Baselin 27 212 217 222 227 25 Debt-service-to-exports ratio Threshold 2 15 Most extreme shock Historical scenario 1 5 Baseline 27 212 217 222 227 35 Debt-service-to-revenue ratio Threshold 3 25 2 Most extreme shock 15 Historical scenario 1 5 Baseline 27 212 217 222 227 Source: Staff projections and simulations.