EIROPAS PARLAMENTS 2014-2019 Budžeta kontroles komiteja 10.9.2014 DARBA DOKUMENTS par Eiropas Revīzijas palātas Īpašo ziņojumu Nr. 2/2014 (2013. finanšu gada budžeta izpildes apstiprināšana) Vai preferenciālie tirdzniecības režīmi tiek pienācīgi pāvaldīti Budžeta kontroles komiteja Referents: Bart Staes DT\1030522.doc PE536.036v01-00 Vienoti daudzveidībā
Introduction Preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) are an essential instrument of EU trade policy and allow trading partners to grant preferential terms in the context of their trade with each other. PTAs can be either reciprocal or unilateral. The former reduce tariff barriers with the objective of increasing trade, economic growth, employment and consumer benefits for both parties. Through unilateral arrangements, the EU grants preference without reciprocity with the objective of providing developing countries tariff-free access to the EU market, thereby contributing to poverty eradication and to promoting sustainable development in developing countries. End 2013, 39 PTAs cover trade between the EU and 180 countries and territories were in force. In 2011, the value of goods imported in the EU under these agreements amounted to more than 242 billion, representing 14% of EU imports. According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, common commercial policy is the exclusive competence of the Union and the procedure for establishing PTAs is set out in its Articles 206 and 207. The Commission is responsible for negotiating preferential trade arrangements, assessing and evaluating their economic, social and environmental impacts and supervising their implementation by Member States and partner countries. The Member States customs authorities bear the main responsibility for overseeing the EU s international trade by implementing measures to safeguard the financial interests of the EU and to protect it from unfair or illegal trading practices, while encouraging legitimate trade. The authorities of the beneficiary/partner countries are responsible for checking that the arrangements are adhered. The effects of PTAs by the Commission are assessed through two types of ex ante assessments used to support decision-making in trade matters i.e. impact assessments (IAs) and sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) conducted by external consultants and used as a policy tool for an ex ante assessment of the economic, social and environmental implications of a trade negotiation. Interim and ex post evaluations are also carried out to assess the actual impacts of the PTAs as a result of their implementation. Supervision and controls on PTAs rest with the customs authorities of the Member States, the authorities of the beneficiary countries and the Commission which jointly manage PTAs and cooperate to ensure that the conditions required to benefit from the preferential treatment are met thereby protecting the EU's financial interests from losses due to import of goods under PTAs not entitled to preferential tariff treatment. Audit Scope and Objectives The objective of the Court s audit was twofold: to evaluate whether the Commission has appropriately assessed the economic effects of PTAs; to assess whether the controls thereon are effective in ensuring that imports cannot wrongly benefit from a preferential tariff, resulting in the loss of EU revenue. PE536.036v01-00 2/8 DT\1030522.doc
The Court examined the ex-ante and ex post evaluations carried out by, or on behalf of, the Commission of the economic effects foreseen or realised. To this end the Court analysed the documentation available at the Commission in respect of a sample of 44 PTAs, notably any IA reports, SIA studies, ex post evaluations and the arrangements for future monitoring. Particular attention was paid to how the Commission ensured the robustness of data sources used in these evaluations. The Court also verified whether ex post evaluations show that the PTAs are delivering their intended benefits and examined as well the effectiveness of the supervision arrangements and of the controls performed on PTAs by the competent authorities in five Member States (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), their control strategies and risk management, the functioning of administrative cooperation arrangements and their procedures for the recovery of any traditional own resources (TOR) due. Commission's prior evaluation, ex post monitoring function in the beneficiary countries, supervisory and control activities on PTAs were also assessed. Court's Findings and Observations The assessment of the economic effects of PTAs The Court found that the Commission has not appropriately assessed all the economic effects of PTAs. Indeed the Court stated that impact assessment or ex ante evaluations were not always carried out (only for 7 of the 13 PTAS where there was a legal requirement or a formal commitment to do so). Likewise, SIAs were only prepared for 5 of the 28 PTAs and interim and ex post evaluation for 16 out of 27 PTAs. In addition, the revenue foregone i.e. the revenue that the EU forfeits due to the tariff preferences granted to beneficiary/partner countries of PTAs was only estimated for the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 1 but not in SIAs. The Court's work also revealed that the various assessments contained inaccuracies, were not always useful or comprehensive and based on robust methods and reliable data. Even though the use of the impact assessment tool has increased, the review of IAs showed that only the IA on the GSP regulation included a comprehensive analysis of economic impacts for beneficiary countries based on robust data sources and there was a need to better defined monitoring indicators and actions to measure the effectiveness and to strengthen the linkage to fraud and customs duties evasion to better check the GSP's vulnerability to fraud. For SIAs, the model used for quantifying the impacts (the General Equilibrium modelling - CGE) used insufficiently verified statistical data for consistency and reliability including the risk to lead to wrong conclusions in the SIAs. Timeliness and completeness of economic sectors assessed in SIAs are other elements that must be ensured to be useful for negotiators. As regards interim or ex post evaluations, the Court noted some weaknesses concerning their completeness since the analysis of economic impacts was limited to trade flows without any sectorial analysis. For the GSP, mixed results were shown by the interim evaluation insofar the policy has not 1 For the 2006-2009 period, the impact (revenue foregone) on the EU budget amounted 8.6 billion euro amounting nearly 14% of the customs duties collected in that period. DT\1030522.doc 3/8 PE536.036v01-00
yet fully delivered its intended benefits notably the increase export diversification, economic growth or sustainable development in developing countries. The controls and supervision on PTAs The controls performed by the competent authorities (Member States, beneficiary/partner countries and the Commission) as well as the management of the administrative cooperation should ensure the correct implementation of PTAs, thereby protecting legitimate economic and financial interests. The Court reviewed the overall control strategy and risk management applied to PTAs by customs authorities and identified some weaknesses in customs controls applied leading to potential losses to the EU budget. The main weaknesses identified by the Court consist in manual, complex and time consuming interventions required in order to assess the results of the risk profiles, the low number of new local risk profile introduced in the control system in 2011-2012, the fact that the criteria of preferential origin was taken into account in combination with others and was not a priority in the risk management system and the absence or acceptance of copies of the movement and origin certificates by customs authorities instead of using only originals when they perform documentary checks on imports under PTAs. According to the extrapolation of the errors found in its sample of 2009, the Court has estimated the amount of duties at stake in these Member States to be 655 million euro 1 (or 6% of the gross amount of import duties collected in the 5 Member States in 2009). Shortcomings were also identified by the Court in the management of the administrative cooperation 2 by the authorities of the Member States. The review showed that Member states authorities have not started post-clearance recovery of the debt when the tariff preferential treatment received by beneficiary countries was unjustified. Following mutual assistance communications issued by OLAF in Member States when operations appear to constitute breaches of PTA provisions, the audit found too that certain Member States have not introduced the relevant information into their risk management systems. The Court identified two cases, amounting to over 2 million euro, where Member States have not reacted promptly to OLAF reports dedicated to origin investigations that may lead them to identify imports that may not be entitled to preferential tariff treatment and to proceed to the recovery of the customs debt. With regard to the Commission s supervision of Member States and beneficiary/partner countries in respect of PTAs, shortcomings have been addressed. The Commission should evaluate the continuing capacity of the country benefiting from preferential treatment to administer the arrangement and the related rules and procedures on a risk basis. The Court noted that the Commission has made prior evaluation only in respect of a limited number of partner countries and has not conducted monitoring visits to the countries benefiting from preferential treatment to check the correct implementation of the scheme as it should be. The Court then verified whether a periodical reporting system by beneficiary countries on their 1 The breakdown by Member States of this amount is the following: up of 167 million euro in respect of Germany, 176 million euro for France and 312 million euro in respect of the United Kingdom. 2 Administrative cooperation requests are sent by Member states' authorities to partner countries in case of reasonable doubts about the preferential tariff treatment they receive. PE536.036v01-00 4/8 DT\1030522.doc
management and control of preferential origin has been set up in GSP countries and found that this was not the case. Difficulties were also identified in the chain of communication of the necessary information under administrative cooperation between the Member States, the beneficiary countries and the Commission notably for getting good quality and timely information from partner countries. To verify the effectiveness of OLAF s role in the protection of the financial interests of the EU concerning PTAs 1, the Court reviewed a sample of 10 preferential origin investigations and stated that, except for one investigation, OLAF was successful in demonstrating that the imported goods were not eligible for preferential tariff measures but the financial follow-up of these investigations was not enough effective. Moreover, the use of preventive and reactive measures to protect the financial interests of the EU by the Commission and Member States has to be improved by using precautionary and safeguard measures such as suspension of preferences according to the anti-fraud clause and the management of administrative errors clause introduced in the PTAs, especially in case of unsatisfactory control, bad administrative cooperation, administrative errors by the beneficiary party or fraud. Concerning the legal provisions of the PTAs, the Court observed that PTAs did not contain sufficient safeguards to protect the financial interests of the EU, in particular when complex cumulation rules of origin were at stake, certain beneficiary countries lacking of administrative capacity to manage them. More, an increased use of self-certification by means of invoice declaration to certify origin would present advantages from the own resources point of view even though the use of certificates of origin and movement certificates is still widespread. Finally, it was observed that the EU's position in reciprocal FTAs did not adequately protect its financial interests. Summary of the Commission and European External Action Service Replies The Commission underlined that the economic gains associated with trade liberalisation are well known in the entire economic literature available and specified that since 1999 all major multilateral/bilateral trade negotiations have been accompanied by a SIA. Moreover, since 2010, with one exception, all important trade negotiations have been also preceded by an IA. To perform SIAs, the Commission indicated that different modelling techniques were used, mainly General Equilibrium modelling (CGE), and drawn on data from Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database which is widely accepted worldwide by virtually all similar international organisations such as the WTO, World Bank, OECD, UN, IMF. To date, these are the best available tools to best quantify the economic impact of trade policy changes. For the timeliness of SIAs, the Commission has committed to launch them no later than 6 months after the start of negotiations to ensure they can usefully feed into the negotiating. Eurostat is now systematically invited to the steering groups monitoring SIAs and the Commission is seeking to intensify cooperation on the quality of statistical data sources within an on-going update of the service-level agreement between DG Trade and Eurostat. 1 In addition to mutual assistance communications, OLAF carries out origin investigations to ascertain, in cooperation with the competent authorities, whether goods imported into the EU are indeed eligible for preferential tariff measures. DT\1030522.doc 5/8 PE536.036v01-00
While the Commission accepted the Court's observation on the mixed results on GSP, the Commission considered the GSP as only one of the elements contributing to the full delivery of intended benefits and stated that the new GSP regulation, entered into force on 1 January 2014, has made substantial reforms with a view to better targeting the countries most in need. As regards control activities, the Commission will further evaluate in which particular cases the usefulness of risk profiles and how they should be implemented in the area of rules of origin under PTAs. In the course of its inspections in recent years, the Commission has placed a special focus on the effectiveness of the Member States risk management systems and control strategies. The Commission will continue to encourage Member States to take all appropriate precautionary measures upon receipt of MA communications. The evaluation of the capacity of a beneficiary country is an integral part of the negotiation process with each partner. It is not, however, reflected in a formal evaluation report. The Commission will include an assessment of this capacity in the formal scoping exercises that precede new negotiations. With regard to monitoring visits, the Commission acted within the framework of the existing legal basis and in line with the respective provisions of the reciprocal trade arrangements approved by the Council and the Member States and, as appropriate, the European Parliament. However, a Commission action plan on monitoring of preferential rules of origin has been elaborated, under which visits to a beneficiary country are one of the suggested activities. The action plan will cover both unilateral arrangements such as GSP and bilateral agreements with partner countries. Since 2001, the Commission has proposed that all EU preferential trade regimes include the possibility of temporary withdrawal of preferences in the event of particular problems with the management of the preferences and/or other significant breaches of customs legislation or non-cooperation. The Commission considered that these safeguards have proved to be sufficient and will continue to propose their inclusion in all future preferential trade arrangements. At the end of 2013, the possibility of temporary withdrawal of preferences was already included in four autonomous arrangements (including GSP) covering almost 200 countries and preferential agreements with more than 30 countries. The Commission will continue to provide Member States competent authorities with all necessary information to facilitate their recovery actions and will continue promoting the replacement of origin and movement certificates with exporters self-certification. Referenta ieteikumi iespējamai iekļaušanai ikgadējā ziņojumā par budžeta izpildes apstiprinājuma sniegšanu Komisijai [Eiropas Parlaments] 1. atzinīgi vērtē īpašo ziņojumu, kurā izvērtēta preferenciālo tirdzniecības režīmu pārvaldība ES ekskluzīvās kompetences kontekstā, uzskatot šo ziņojumu par nozīmīgu ieguldījumu vispārējā politiskajā diskusijā par Eiropas Savienības ārējās tirdzniecības un attīstības politiku; pieņem zināšanai konstatējumus un ieteikumus un turpmāk tekstā izklāsta savas piezīmes un ieteikumus; PE536.036v01-00 6/8 DT\1030522.doc
Vispārīgas piezīmes 2. pauž nopietnas bažas par to, ka Komisija nav pienācīgi un visā pilnībā novērtējusi preferenciālo tirdzniecības režīmu ekonomisko ietekmi un ka nav nodrošināta pilnīga ieņēmumu iekasēšana; 3. atgādina, ka ir ārkārtīgi svarīgi pienācīgi informēt politikas veidotājus, daudzās ieinteresētās puses un Eiropas nodokļu maksātājus par dažādo tirdzniecības politikas variantu un scenāriju galveno pievienoto vērtību, kā arī par to negatīvajiem aspektiem; 4. uzskata par nepieņemamu to, ka ilgtspējas ietekmes novērtējumi (IIN) dažos gadīijumos nav veikti vispār, dažos gadījumos ir nepilnīgi vai balstās uz senu vai novecojušu informāciju, savukārt citos gadījumos (Čīle) ir pieejami tikai pēc nolīguma parakstīšanas; 5. uzstāj, ka pirms ikviena jauna nolīguma parakstīšanas ir jābūt izstrādātam attiecīgajam ilgtspējas ietekmes novērtējumam un šis novērtējums jāpublisko; 6. pauž nožēlu par to, ka ne visos gadījumos vispārējā preferenču sistēmā iesaistītie partneri bija pievienojušies starptautiskām konvencijām par cilvēktiesībām un darba ņēmēju tiesībām, un aicina Komisiju piešķirt lielāku nozīmi vides un labas pārvaldības jautājumiem preferenciālās tirdzniecības režīmos; 7. vēlētos līdz 2015. gada oktobrim saņemt informāciju par pasākumiem, ko Komisija veikusi, pamatojoties uz Parlamenta un Revīzijas palātas ieteikumiem un piezīmēm; Turpmākā virzība Lai uzlabotu PTR ekonomiskās ietekmes novērtējumu, Komisijai ieteicams: 8. izņemot gadījumos, kad ir pamatoti rīkoties citādi, veikt ietekmes novērtējumu (IN) un ilgtspējas ietekmes novērtējumu (IIN) katram PTR, šajos novērtējumos sniedzot padziļinātu, vispusīgu un skaitlisku gaidāmās ekonomiskās ietekmes analīzi, kā arī precīzu aplēsi par negūtajiem ieņēmumiem; 9. pastāvīgi iesaistīt Eurostat IIN izmantoto statistikas datu avotu kvalitātes novērtēšanā un nodrošināt laikus veiktu analīzi sarunu dalībnieku vajadzībām; 10. veikt starpposma un ex post novērtējumus visiem PTR, lai novērtētu, cik lielā mērā PTR, kuru ietekme ir nozīmīga, atbilst izvirzītajiem politiskajiem mērķiem un kā var uzlabot to darbības rezultātus svarīgākajās nozarēs, minētajos novērtējumos iekļaujot arī negūto ieņēmumu aplēsi; Lai uzlabotu ES finansiālo interešu aizsardzību, Komisijai ieteicams: 11. izstrādāt ES riska profilus attiecībā uz PTR, lai dalībvalstīm būtu kopēja pieeja riska analīzei, tā samazinot zaudējumus ES budžetā; 12. pārliecināties, vai dalībvalstis uzlabo savu riska pārvaldības sistēmu un kontroles stratēģijas efektivitāti, lai samazinātu zaudējumus ES budžetā; DT\1030522.doc 7/8 PE536.036v01-00
13. mudināt dalībvalstis pieņemt piemērotus piesardzības un aizsardzības pasākumus, kad tās saņem savstarpējās palīdzības paziņojumus; 14. izvērtēt un veikt uz riska novērtējumu balstītus uzraudzības apmeklējumus valstīs, kurām tiek piemērots preferenciāls režīms, jo īpaši attiecībā uz izcelsmes un kumulācijas noteikumiem; 15. prasīt no dalībvalstīm, lai tās sniegtu kvalitatīvāku informāciju par administratīvo sadarbību; 16. uzlabot OLAF izmeklēšanu finansiālās pēcpārbaudes, lai nepieļautu zaudējumu rašanos ES budžetā noilguma dēļ; 17. nostiprināt ES pozīciju savstarpējos PTR un izmantot vairāk piesardzības un aizsardzības pasākumu, iekļaujot tos visos turpmākajos tirdzniecības nolīgumos; 18. uzstāj, ka vēlas nekavējoties saņemt pārskatu par laikposmā no 2010. līdz 2014. gadam atgūtajiem līdzekļiem; 19. vēlas saņemt informāciju par Globālā ilgtspējas pakta iniciatīvas īstenošanas rezultātiem Bangladešā. PE536.036v01-00 8/8 DT\1030522.doc