EIROPAS PARLAMENTS 2014-2019 Budžeta kontroles komiteja 3.9.2014 DARBA DOKUMENTS par Eiropas Revīzijas palātas Īpašo ziņojumu Nr. 13/2013 (2013. gada budžeta izpildes apstiprināšana) "ES attīstības palīdzība Vidusāzijai" Budžeta kontroles komiteja Referents: Gilles Pargneaux DT\1030343.doc PE536.022v01-00 Vienoti daudzveidībā
Introduction This special report deals with the planning and management of European Union (EU) development assistance to the five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) during the period 2007-2012. The EU has been actively engaged with the countries of Central Asia since they became independent in 1991. The Commission s 2002 to 2006 Strategy Paper for Central Asia set out key objectives of the assistance strategy. These were to promote the stability and security in Central Asian countries and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction. For the 2007-13 period, the European Commission (EC) set out its plans for development assistance in a regional strategy paper it adopted in April 2007. The EU s policy towards Central Asia during the period to which the audit relates was agreed by the European Council in June 2007 and is set out in the Council document European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership which endorsed the Commission s approach. Through the Council s Strategy and the Commission s assistance programme, the EU defined the priorities for its cooperation with the region as a whole, highlighting security and stability as its main strategic interests. The strategy advocated active cooperation with the Central Asian states in order to promote peace, democracy and economic prosperity mainly through (i) the use of cooperation programmes and agreements along with political dialogue, (ii) the conciliation of bilateral approaches to tackle regional challenges, (iii) the identification of main policy areas and (iv) the increasing of the EU budget assistance for 2007-2013 to around 750 million euro. From 1991 to 2013, more than 2,1 billion euro were allocated by the EU for development and humanitarian assistance to the five Central Asian republics. Until 2007, the assistance was delivered through the TACIS programme whose goals were to promote transition to the market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law. In 2007, TACIS was replaced by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) with other objectives assigned i.e. poverty reduction, sustainable economic and social development, and the integration of developing countries in the world economy. During the 2007-2012 period, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were the main beneficiaries of the development assistance with 435 million euro. It is also noteworthy that the EU development assistance to the region with 89 million USD for 2010 and 2011 remains below the contribution of other donors (175 million USD by the USA, 165 by Turkey, 124 by Japan and 109 million USD by Germany) and represents as well a little proportion of overall financial flows in terms of annual Foreign Direct Investment (less than 5% for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and Gross Domestic Product (less than 0,2% annually). In 2011, the European Parliament concluded in its report 1 that EU funds were insufficient to allow the EU to have an impact in all of the Council s seven priority areas 2 and called on a better definition of the policy priorities and the compliance of these countries with international standards of democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights. The issue of 1 Text adopted, P7-TA (2011) 0588 on ''EU strategy for Central Asia". 2 The Council's priority axes are: (a) good governance, rule of law, human rights and democratisation, (b) education and training, (c) economic development, trade and investment, (d) transport and energy, (e) environmental sustainability and water management, (f) facing shared threats and challenges (g) intercultural dialogue. PE536.022v01-00 2/8 DT\1030343.doc
corruption on the use of sector budget support in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was also emphasized. Audit Scope and Objectives The audit assessed how the EEAS and the Commission planned and managed development assistance to Central Asia, in the period 2007-2012, in particular assistance paid under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which was the main financing instrument. The audit examined: whether, in allocating its budget, the Commission followed best practice and respected its declared priorities for development assistance in Central Asia; whether the Commission delivered development assistance in an appropriate way; whether the Commission successfully implemented its aid policy, developed it in the light of experience and reported appropriately. Other aspects of the EU strategy, such as policy dialogue, were not included in the scope of the audit. Audit work was carried out between June and November 2012 and was based on documentary review, interviews with visits made in October 2012 to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, during which the auditors interviewed EU delegation staff, representatives of national authorities, Member States embassies, technical experts, civil society organisations, other donors and stakeholders. A total of 21 support programmes (19 country-specific and two regional programmes) were reviewed and the Court also carried out a survey on donor coordination and on other donors perceptions of the EU s work in the field for each of the five Central Asian republics. Court's Findings and Observations Allocation of the budget The Court first examined how the Commission allocated the EU budget and to what extent it followed best practices and followed its declared priorities for development assistance in Central Asia. The Court found that the Commission set three broad overall priorities for its spending within its regional strategy paper (RSP) namely fostering regional cooperation, reducing poverty and promoting democratisation and human rights. The RSP was then further clarified in an indicative programme with detailed plan for the allocation of aid and specific priorities. It also appeared from the audit that the Commission departed in certain respects from recognised best practices for the allocation of development aid as only limited justification was provided for justifying Commission's choice of spending priorities. However, in most cases, the Commission has shown continuity in the distribution of funds, ensured that EU spending was in line with those of other donors to avoid overlapping and has chosen good quality programmes. The Court acknowledged that the Commission had to face particular challenges in terms of coordination with partner countries in which for instance need assessments for development assistance were lacking, human rights and good governance DT\1030343.doc 3/8 PE536.022v01-00
were not the priority or national programmes were missing clear focus. Regardless those examples, the Court stated that the results of discussions between the Commission and recipient countries on aid priorities and on the alignment of the EU spending on national plans were reflected in the RSP and indicatives programmes and that the projects reviewed by the Court namely in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were in line with the Commission strategy and with priorities of the partners. The Court observed that the Commission earmarked the highest levels of aid to the countries it perceived to be most in need and most willing and capable of best use of aid, namely Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the audit revealed that the Commission s approach was less satisfactory in respect of the number of sectors to which it paid assistance according to the principle that EU donors should aim to focus their efforts on a maximum of three sectors in any partner country, so as to optimise results and reduce transaction costs. Notwithstanding the small size of its development assistance programme in Central Asia, the Commission did not apply this principle rigorously as four sectors for assistance were selected in Kyrgyzstan (governance, agriculture and rural development, education and social protection), five sectors in Tajikistan (governance, agriculture and rural development, social protection, private sector and health), and six in Uzbekistan (private sector, governance, health, agriculture and rural development, environment and energy and education). In addition, it was found that the Commission channelled EU development assistance money to various additional sectors through regional and thematic programmes. Despite an allocation of aid to too many areas, the Court identified no significant cases where aid was provided to a national programme which did not address one of the Commission's objectives of reducing poverty and improving governance. The amounts contracted by the end of 2012 respected the priorities of the RSP. Putting the policy into effect The second Court's audit objective was to evaluate the Commission' choice of delivery modes, the management of administrative costs, the monitoring tools and the design of the budget support. The Court identified several ways of delivering aid from 2007 to end 2012, namely through contribution agreements with international organisations (36% of the total value), budget support (28%), grants to NGOs (17%) and service and works contracts (19%). The Court further noted the large proportion by number of services and contracts (244 out of 435) but representing a small value which induces important administrative implications. In addition, the Commission used several financing instruments such as DCI, five thematic DCI instruments, five global instruments and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the latter being operated in Union's Delegations or by Headquarters, thus adding further complexity to the overall management of the EU spending in Central Asia. The Court observed that a breakdown of the Union's spending by country and per sector was uneasy due to the weaknesses of the Common Relex Information system (CRIS). As regards administrative costs, the Court found that the Commission has not implemented a system for reporting on the overall administrative cost led by the delivering of its development assistance. The Court estimated for 2011 the level of administrative costs to 10.5 million euro (representing approximately 14,6% of the development spending for Central PE536.022v01-00 4/8 DT\1030343.doc
Asia) which can be divided as follows: 6.6 million euro (63%) dedicated to development cooperation work, 1.8 million euro for headquarters staff costs (17%) and 2.1 million euro (20%) including various support expenditure. Concerning the setting-up of SMART objectives and correlative indicators, a mixed picture was found during the Court's visits. In Tajikistan the technical assistance programme supporting the Ministry of Finance had vaguely formulated objectives, in Kyrgyzstan the food security information programme contained vague indicators and in Uzbekistan two out of the four programmes examined had no benchmarks and baselines defined to allow assessment of the added value of the programmes. For budget support (BS) activities in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the Court noted that Public Financial Management (PFM) programmes were present with disbursements conditional upon progress achieved towards PFM objectives. However, the Court estimated that in both countries, the Commission s enforcement of PFM conditions was insufficiently rigorous. In Kyrgyzstan even though progress had been slow, the Commission justified the disbursement of each of the three tranches mainly because it considered that the Kyrgyz government remained committed to further reforms. With regard to BS for social protection during the period 2007 09 in Tajikistan, the Commission had not defined strict deadlines by which the government had to comply with the conditions. Moreover, despite the serious problem of corruption in the republics of Central Asia, budget support programmes were not linked to specific anti-corruption measures. Implementing and reporting The Court finally analysed the way the Commission implemented and reported on its aid policy in Central Asia. The audit work identified cases with long delays in getting programmes under way due to heavy bureaucratic procedures in recipient administrations, difficulties in finding suitable fundable activities and complex Commission procedures delaying the strategy implementation. It was also observed that the speed of implementation varied significantly among partner countries: particular slow progress in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (reflecting the differences in priorities and approaches to development cooperation between the EU and these countries) and faster implementation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resulting from the improvement in development cooperation between the EU and these two countries. The Court found that the Commission committed about one third of the strategy budget to regional programmes to achieve leverage for its political efforts to promote regional cooperation. Although this was consistent with the EU strategy objectives, regional programmes have not achieved a genuine regional dimension neither in terms of joint implementation nor in terms of regional impact envisaged by its development strategy. A considerable share of the regional funds of the RSP have been committed to multi-country programmes (such as Erasmus and Tempus (36 %) and the Investment Facility for Central Asia programme (29 %)) mainly replicating similar activities in more than one beneficiary country rather than promoting cooperation between the Central Asian republics. The Border Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA) provides another example of varying participation among recipient countries with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan participating DT\1030343.doc 5/8 PE536.022v01-00
selectively in the regional capacity-building activities and being unwilling to share their professional experience with the other countries. The Court noted that the Commission, following the 2010 mid-term review, has taken into account in the 2011-2013 indicative programme, new developments in the partner countries such as the gradual development of civil society, the need for technical assistance programmes to be combined with budget support and institutional reform programmes. Some new types of programmes such as the investment facility programme were also integrated in the programming. Nevertheless, there was still room for improvement for the Court as the Commission did not take the opportunity to give higher priority to promoting twinning and secondment of staff between EU and Central Asian administrations albeit it was a priority identified in the Council s strategy for EU-Central Asian relations. In the field of budget support programmes in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, useful recommendations were not taken on board. With regard to reporting activities, the Court found that the indicators were focused on activity rather than the intended results of the Council's new partnership strategy for Central Asia. Summary of the Commission and European External Action Service Replies The Commission and EEAS underlined the objective difficulties of Central Asian countries to advance with the reform agenda, their institutional and political framework being among the main limiting factors for the implementation of development cooperation. On budget allocation, the Commission recalled that the choices of interventions were in line with the relevant strategy papers and adequately justified and also agreed with the aid effectiveness principle of focusing aid on a maximum of three sectors with partner countries. The Commission and the EEAS undertook specific efforts, notably for 2011-13, to concentrate the areas of intervention for bilateral assistance. The Commission and the EEAS reminded that the decision of the modality of implementation was the result of a specific analysis and integrated evaluation for each programme; including a consultation and quality scrutiny process and that the Commission was working to reduce the number of small-size projects. Furthermore, the Commission clarified that the reporting on the implementation necessarily involved different geographic and thematic services at headquarters while also both including the information on spending for different programmes and instruments and already different tools to evaluate the administrative costs involved with development cooperation. The Commission however considered the level of administrative costs calculated by the Court as overestimated. Regarding on-going budget support programmes, the Commission and the EEAS underlined that they were linked to specific corruption prevention measures. Eligibility criteria for budget support required a holistic approach based on credibility and positive implementation which are by nature general. Satisfactory progress should be based on a dynamic approach, looking at past and recent policy performance benchmarked against reform expectations, but allowing corrective measures and refining the objectives and targets if necessary. PE536.022v01-00 6/8 DT\1030343.doc
The Commission and the EEAS recalled the peculiarity of Central Asia regional programmes, which provided opportunities for dialogue and promote good neighbourhood relations and regional cooperation. A genuine regional dimension was not always feasible in the given present Central Asia political conditions due notably to rivalries among countries. The Commission mentioned its efforts towards an increasing focus on results and, whenever relevant, has always taken on board the recommendations resulting from the implementation of the programmes. Ziņojuma sagatavotāja ieteikumi iespējamai iekļaušanai Komisijas ikgadējā ziņojumā par budžeta izpildi: [Eiropas Parlaments] 1. atzinīgi vērtē īpašo ziņojumu par ES attīstības palīdzību Vidusāzijai; pieņem zināšanai konstatējumus, secinājumus un ieteikumus un turpmāk tekstā izklāsta savas piezīmes un ieteikumus; Vispārīgas piezīmes 2. atzinīgi vērtē ziņojumā paustos apsvērumus, kas norāda uz Komisijas EĀDD nozīmīgajiem centieniem šajā sarežģītajā ģeogrāfiskajā un politiskajā kontekstā; 3. tomēr norāda, ka joprojām ir nepieciešami uzlabojumi, lai efektīvāk orientētu un izstrādātu ES attīstības stratēģijas, izmantojot atbilstīgus palīdzības veidus, tādējādi veicinot ES politisko mērķu atpazīstamību un ietekmi reģionālā līmenī; 4. uzsver, ka ES iesaistīšanās mērogam un raksturam ir jābūt dažādotam un atkarīgam no izmērāma progresa demokratizācijas, cilvēktiesību, labas pārvaldības, ilgtspējīgas sociālekonomiskās attīstības, tiesiskuma un korupcijas apkarošanas jomā, vajadzības gadījumā sniedzot palīdzību šā progresa veicināšanā saskaņā ar pamatnostādnēm, kas ir līdzīgas ES kaimiņattiecību politikas principiem. 5. uzskata, ka pastāvīgs ES atbalsts Vidusāzijas valstīm paredzētām programmām ir būtisks pārrobežu mehānisms reģiona valstu savstarpējās izpratnes un sadarbības veicināšanā; 6. atkārtoti pauž Eiropas Parlamenta 2011. gadā pieņemto nostāju, kurā secināts, ka ES finansējums ir nepietiekams, lai ES būtu ietekme visās septiņās prioritārajās jomās, ko noteikusi Padome, un kurā aicināts skaidrāk definēt politiskās prioritātes, kā arī to, kādā mērā šīs valstis nodrošina atbilstību demokrātijas, pārvaldes, tiesiskuma un cilvēktiesību starptautiskajiem standartiem; 7. norāda, ka attīstības sadarbība ar Vidusāzijas valstīm var sniegt rezultātus tikai tad, ja šīs valstis ievēro starptautiskos standartus attiecībā uz demokrātiju, pārvaldību, tiesiskumu un cilvēktiesībām; tāpat norāda, ka ES nedrīkst pakārtot attīstības sadarbību ekonomikas, enerģētikas vai drošības interesēm; Turpmākie apsvērumi saistībā ar attīstības palīdzības plānošanu un īstenošanu nākotnē DT\1030343.doc 7/8 PE536.022v01-00
8. uzskata, ka turpmākās reģionālās programmas Komisijai jāizstrādā tā, lai tās nodrošinātu patiesu reģionālo dimensiju; 9. prasa, lai Komisija koncentrēti novirzītu visu sniegto palīdzību nelielam jomu skaitam; 10. norāda, ka turpmākā attīstības palīdzība ir jāpilnveido gan pastiprinot koordināciju ES iekšienē, gan aktīvāk sadarbojoties ar citiem starptautiskajiem līdzekļu devējiem un reģionālajiem dalībniekiem; 11. visnotaļ atbalsta to, lai visās Vidusāzijas valstīs tiktu atvērtas pilnībā funkcionējošas ES delegācijas, tādējādi nostiprinot ES klātbūtni un atpazīstamību reģionā un ilgtermiņa sadarbību un sasaisti ar visiem sabiedrības sektoriem, kā arī veicinot virzību uz dziļāku izpratni par tiesiskumu un cilvēktiesībām un to nostiprināšanu; delegāciju klātbūtne būtiski atbalstīs attīstības palīdzības mērķu sasniegšanu; 12. aicina Komisiju izveidot aprēķināšanas un ziņošanas sistēmu attiecībā uz kopējām administratīvām izmaksām saistībā ar attīstības palīdzības sniegšanu; 13. prasa, lai Komisija noteiktu un piemērotu stingrus un objektīvi pārbaudāmus nosacījumus attiecībā uz ikvienu spēkā esošu budžeta atbalsta programmu, jo īpaši pienācīgu uzmanību veltot atbalstam, kas paredzēts korupcijas apkarošanas mehānismiem; 14. atgādina, ka korupcija Vidusāzijas valstīs ir smaga problēma; Transparency International korupcijas uztveres indeksā 2011. gadā tām tika piešķirts rādītājs mazāks nekā 28 no 100, un Kirgizstāna, Turkmenistāna, kā arī Uzbekistāna tika ierindotas starp pēdējiem 10 % no 182 apsekotajām valstīm; 15. uzskata, ka šāda plaši izplatīta korupcija var negatīvi ietekmēt Komisijas reputāciju un samazināt atbalsta programmu efektivitāti; 16. lēmumi par piešķiršanu jāpieņem, pamatojoties uz partnervalstu panākto progresu nevis uz deklarēto apņemšanos īstenot reformas, uzsver, cik svarīgi ir nodrošināt pienācīgu politisko dialogu, kura pamatā būtu stimulējoša pieeja un pastāvīga nozares reformu un programmu uzraudzība, novērtējot darbību un rezultātu ilgtspējību; 17. prasa nodrošināt lielāku pārredzamību attiecībā uz ES un dalībvalstu vēstniecību piešķīrumiem, lai atbalstītu patiesi neatkarīgus nevalstiskos partnerus, tādējādi palīdzot tiem būt ietekmīgiem konsolidētas pilsoniskās sabiedrības veidošanā; 18. prasa, lai Komisija uzlabotu programmu izstrādi un īstenošanu, ņemot vērā gūtās mācības un mainīgos apstākļus; 19. prasa Komisijai ziņot par rezultātiem un ietekmi tā, lai būtu iespējams salīdzināt plānoto un sasniegto. PE536.022v01-00 8/8 DT\1030343.doc