Financial Crises, Liability Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies. BIS Research Network Meeting, March 2018

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Transcription:

Financial Crises, Liability Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies Luigi Bocola Guido Lorenzoni BIS Research Network Meeting, March 2018

Motivation 1 / 17 Financial sector stability depends on the capacity of domestic authorities to provide lending of last resort support In open economies, this capacity may be limited: Banks partly funded in dollars Currency mismatch (either explicit or implicit) Limited fiscal capacity Currency, banking, and fiscal crises tend to go together Foreign currency reserves may help (Obstfeld-Shambaugh-Taylor, Gourinchas-Obstfeld)

This paper 2 / 17 Model panics in open economy with flexible exchange rates Endogeneize mismatch/liability dollarization Identify challenges for domestic LOLR See if reserves help

Ingredients 3 / 17 Small open economy Agents: households, banks, international investors Tradable and non-tradable goods (relative price = exchange rate) Households can save in T and NT Banks can borrow in T and NT Government with limited fiscal capacity

Households 4 / 17 Preferences [ 2 ] E β t U (c t ) t=0 c t = (ct T ) ω (ct N ) 1 ω Supply 1 unit of labor to tradable sector Endowment ec N of non-tradables Tradable = numeraire p t price of NT Budget constraint q T t a T t+1 + p tq N t a N t+1 + ct t + p t c N t = w t + p t e N c + a T t + p t a N t

Technology and foreign investors 5 / 17 Production of tradables Y t = K α t L 1 α t Banks can convert 1 unit of tradable in capital Consumers can convert ψ > 1 units of tradable in capital Capital fully depreciates Foreign investors: risk neutral, consume T, discount rate β Can only hold T bonds

Banks 6 / 17 Bankers are risk neutral agents who consume only tradables at t = 2 Budget constraint at t = 0, 1 k t+1 = r t k t bt T + p t (eb N bn T t ) +qt bt+1 T }{{} + p tqt N bt+1 N net worth n t Collateral constraint b T t+1 + p t+1b N t+1 θk t+1

Roadmap 1 No government intervention t = 1, 2: continuation equilibria t = 0: endogenous dollarization 2 Lending of last resort t = 1, 2: ex-post interventions t = 0: reserve accumulation

Continuation equilibrium: NT market 7 / 17 In equilibrium price is constant in periods 1 and 2 Equilibrium condition in NT good market 1 1 ω ( ) a1 T p 1 1 + β + p 1a1 N + w 1 + βw 2 + (1 + β)p 1 ec N = ec N +eb N, Since future wages are w 2 = (1 α)k2 α increasing relation p 1 = P(K 2 ) A version of the Balassa-Samuelson effect we have an

Continuation equilibrium: Banks 8 / 17 Net worth is increasing in p 1 (assuming e N b > bn 1 ) Three cases: High net worth: reach first best K Low net worth: reach K low at which consumers use inferior investment technology Intermediate net worth: K 2 is increasing in p 1 So we have another increasing mapping K 2 = K(p 1 )

Continuation equilibria 9 / 17 (a) Unique continuation equilibrium (b) Multiple continuation equilibria

Roadmap 1 No government intervention t = 1, 2: continuation equilibria t = 0: endogenous dollarization 2 Lending of last resort t = 1, 2: ex-post interventions t = 0: reserve accumulation

Endogenous dollarization 10 / 17 Will banks choose debt composition that exposes them to a crisis? Or: can we sustain multiple continuation equilibria, with a sunspot selecting both with positive probability? A: Yes Banks have a hedging motive, which tends to eliminate multiplicity But households have a hedging motive too, which can dominate

Fragile equilibria 11 / 17 Portfolio choice between T and NT saving/borrowing In fragile equilibrium, N bonds pay higher return in state of the world in which marginal utility of wealth is lower [ ] ( 1 + i0 T (1 + in 0 )E p1 ( ) ) = Cov 1 + i0 N p1 λ 1, < 0 p 0 p 0 E [λ 1 ] This holds both for banks and consumers marginal utility of wealth λ 1 Theory of dollarization: banks borrow in dollars because it s cheap; it s cheap because dollars appreciate when things go bad

Safe equilibrium 12 / 17 When fragile equilibrium exists, there is also a safe equilibrium in which the continuation equilibrium is unique In safe equilibrium [ ] 1 + i0 T (1 + in 0 )E p1 = Cov p 0 ( ( ) 1 + i0 N p1, p 0 ) λ 1 = 0 E [λ 1 ] Now no risk, consumers no longer ask for protection

Roadmap 1 No government intervention t = 1, 2: continuation equilibria t = 0: endogenous dollarization 2 Lending of last resort t = 1, 2: ex-post interventions t = 0: reserve accumulation

Lending of Last Resort 13 / 17 At t = 1 benevolent government lends to banks b T,g 2 and takes the potential losses θk 2 b T,g 2 Benevolent government wants to eliminate Pareto dominated equilibrium Limited fiscal capacity: Government taxation is non-distortionary up to upper bound ξy t Microfoundation: less efficient informal sector, where labor efficiency is ζl t

Timing 14 / 17 Agents form expectations K2 e and set maximum they are willing to lend to the government based on expected fiscal revenue ξ(k2 e)α Consumers trade on NT market based on expected wages (that depend on K e 2 ) Government borrows and lends to banks to buy capital Result: with this timing multiple equilibria can be present even if the government intervenes optimally Why? Because p determines net worth and K e 2 determines fiscal capacity When both are low, banks finance low k 2, self-fulfilling

Roadmap 1 No government intervention t = 1, 2: continuation equilibria t = 0: endogenous dollarization 2 Lending of last resort t = 1, 2: ex-post interventions t = 0: reserve accumulation

Reserves 15 / 17 Suppose now government has position A T 1, AN 1 The value of this position is A T 1 + pan 1 Now when expectations are low, p is low Government can take positions A N 1 < 0 < AT 1 eliminate bad equilibrium and possibly Interpretation: borrowing in domestic currency to accumulate foreign currency resereves makes LOLR commitment credible

16 / 17 Reserves (continued) Remarks: Required reserves increase with the leverage of the financial sector. Obstfeld et al. (2010); Ainzemann and Lee (2007) Reserve might never be used in equilibrium. Aizeman and Sun (2012); Jeanne and Sandri (2016) Reserves reduce exchange rate volatility Moral hazard? For given interest rates, bankers have incentives to issue more dollar debt However, households save more in NT, bankers have less incentives to borrow in dollars

Concluding 17 / 17 What does it mean to have a stable currency? Item: having abundant sources of funding in that currency Stable inflation is important, but also needs financial stability, so agents willing to save in local currency Future work: explore more interactions with other policy tools (monetary policy, regulation, currency interventions)