CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND CAPITAL MISALLOCATION IN AGRICULTURE

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CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND CAPITAL MISALLOCATION IN AGRICULTURE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA K. Burchardi 1 J. de Quidt 1 B. Lerva 1 S. Tripodi 2 1 IIES, Stockholm University 2 Copenhagen Business School Brac, 14 December 2018 1

OUTLINE 1 2 The Setting: Agricultural Firms 3 Main Results Policy Recommendations 2

INVESTMENT LAGGING BEHIND I A problem for firms in developing countries: low capital investment (tools, machinery, etc) Low investment can result in low productivity The case of agricultural firms: 3

INVESTMENT LAGGING BEHIND II Liquidity and credit constraints play a big role Firms cannot borrow (high interest rate, no collateral) Firms do not want to borrow (consider too risky) Our agricultural firms are credit constrained:.4 Fraction of respondents.3.2.1 0 Impossible Possible Easy How easy would it be for you to borrow 300 000 UGX for 6 months? 4

TODAY S QUESTION Do firms invest in fertilizer if we relax their credit constraints? Measure truthful maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for fertilizer Compare WTP of farmers whose constraints are relaxed vs. non-relaxed = if non-constrained farmers have higher WTP than constrained ones, evidence that credit constraints matter for investment 5

AGRICULTURAL FIRMS THE SETTING: AGRICULTURAL FIRMS We work with 1200 maize farms in Eastern region Intervention in two stages: 1 Lottery ticket: can win 5,000 UGX or 200,000 UGX 2 Investment opportunity: buy 50Kg DAP & 50Kg CAN bundle 6

MEASURING WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY THE SETTING: AGRICULTURAL FIRMS What is the maximum amount a household is willing to pay to buy the bundle of fertilizer? Typical problem: people underreport in hope of a low price The method we use (BDM) rewards truthful reporting It works like an auction: 1 They tell us the maximum amount they are willing to pay 2 Then we reveal the (predetermined, random) price 3 They can only buy if they were willing to pay at least that price 4 They only pay the predetermined price Reporting lower willingness-to-pay cannot decrease the price they pay, but might mean they do not get to buy the fertilizer Use multiple practice stages and comprehension checks to ensure understanding 7

M OTIVATION O UR A PPROACH R ESULTS S UMMARY T HE S ETTING : AGRICULTURAL F IRMS M EASURING W ILLINGNESS - TO -PAY 8

MAIN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FEWER CONSTRAINTS, MORE INVESTMENT Mean WTP for fertilizer 200000 180000 160000 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 Lost lottery Won lottery Lottery assignment Fertilizer price 200000 180000 160000 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 All participants Lost Lottery Won Lottery 0.2.4.6.8 1 Quantity demanded 9

NEXT STEPS MAIN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Our ongoing work: Today we showed you how willingness-to-pay responds to relaxing constraints We also have detailed household- and plot-level information on yields, incomes, expenditures. Can use these to measure how willingness-to-pay relates to the profitability of fertilizer Crucial question 1: does the fertilizer market sell fertilizer to those who profit most? Crucial question 2: when we relax constraints, do we bring high-profitability or low-profitability people into the market? Key questions for policies that seek to improve yields and rural incomes. 10

11 MAIN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS POLICY TOOLS TO REACH MOST PROFITABLE FIRMS? Subsidies (+) increase adoption and food production (Malawi) (+) reduce risk for early adopters ( ) subsidize farmers who would invest anyway, encourage firms with lower returns to invest, overuse (Zambia) ( ) expensive for gov t budget, money could be used on public goods instead (India) Cash Transfers, credit market policies (+) Make investment feasible to firms with higher returns (our question) (+) Allow for purchase of complementary inputs (Mexico) ( ) Targeting is difficult (Zambia) ( ) Administrative costs (Ethiopia), elite capture (India)

12 Investment in productive capital is low among agricultural firms in Uganda, but firms want to invest Firms with higher returns may not realize them because of credit constraints Important to choose right policy tools to achieve growth potential (price subsidies or cash transfers) Looking forward Do farmers who profit most from fertilizer buy it? Do subsidies encourage fertilizer purchase from high-profit or low-profit firms?