1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA GULBARGA BENCH ON THE 4 TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2014 BEFORE THE HON BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH M.F.A. NO.30794/2013 (MV) BETWEEN THE NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., BILGUNDI COMPLEX, OPPOSITE MINI VIDHAN SOUDHA, GULBARGA. (NOW REPRESENTED THROUGH DIVL. MANAGER, D.O. GULBARGA)... APPELLANT (BY SMT. PREETI PATIL MELKUNDI, ADV.) AND 1. SRIDEVI W/O RAVI BIRADAR, AGED 31 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD, 2. POOJA D/O RAVI BIRADAR, AGED 11 YEARS, 4 TH STD. STUDENT, 3. DRUSHTI D/O RAVI BIRADAR, AGED 9 YEARS, 3TH STD. STUDENT, 4. VIJAYALAXMI D/O RAVI BIRADAR, AGED 6 YEARS, 5. MALLIKARJUN S/O RAVI BIRADAR, AGED 3 YEARS,
2 6. SUMITRABAI W/O MAHARUDRAPPA BIRADAR, AGED 55 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD, 7. MAHARUDRAPPA S/O KALYANAPPA BIRADAR, AGED 64 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, PETITIONERS NO.2 TO 5 BEING MINORS, ARE REPRESENTED BY THEIR NEXT FRIEND/ MOTHER I.E., PETITIONER NO.1. ALL ARE R/O JAMAGA (B) VILLAGE, ALAND TALUK, GULBARGA DISTRICT. NOW RESIDING AT H.NO.11/1802, VIDYANAGAR, GULBARGA 585 101. 8. SHAMSHUDDIN S/O MD. AYUB, AGED MAJOR, OCC: DRIVER OF VEHICLE, R/O E/8/1796, NEHRU GUNJ, TAJ NAGAR, FILTERBED ROAD, GULBARGA 585 101. 9. MD. AYYUB S/O RUKNUDDIN CHINCHANSOOR, AGED MAJOR, OWNER OF THE VEHICLE, R/O H.NO.1544/19, TAJ NAGAR, MUSLIM SANGH, GULBARGA 585 101.... RESPONDENTS (SRI GANESH NAIK, ADV. FOR SRI AMARESHWAR S. RAWOOR, ADV. FOR R1, R6 & R7; R2 TO R5 ARE MINORS REPTD. BY R1; SRI AYYANAGOUDA & J. SHAHABUDDIN, ADVS. FOR R8 & R9) THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 173(1) OF MV ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 13.09.2012 PASSED IN MVC NO.61/2011 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE & M.A.C.T AT GULBARGA, PARTLY ALLOWING THE CLAIM PETITION AND AWARDING THE COMPENSATION OF RS.11,21,000/- WITH INTEREST AT 6% P.A. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
3 JUDGMENT Aggrieved by the judgment and award of the Tribunal granting compensation to the claimants, the insurer has filed this appeal questioning the excessive grant of compensation. 2. Smt. Preeti Patil, learned counsel appearing for the appellant addressed two arguments. The first is that the notional income of the deceased as held by the Tribunal at Rs.6,000/- per month is far too excessive. That even though the deceased was an agriculturist and the accident took place on 04.07.2010, the notional income held at Rs.6,000/- per month cannot be granted. She contends that in matters being decided by the Lok Adalath, the income being taken of an accident which occurred in the year 2010 for an agriculturist ranges between Rs.5,000/- to Rs.5,500/. Therefore, she submits that the amounts as determined by the Lok Adalath are binding on this Court. Therefore, this Court
4 would have to follow the orders passed by the Lok Adalath and reduce the monthly income to Rs.5,000/- to Rs.5,500/- per month. 3. Inspite of bringing it to the notice of the counsel, the same submission is reiterated. It is contended that since matters are being settled at the Lok Adalath at the rate of Rs.5,000/- to Rs.5,500/- per month, this Court is bound by such an order. This Court is too shocked in anguish that the learned counsel makes such submissions. The Court is out of words even to express as to how such a contention can be made by a learned counsel at the High Court. The submission that the order of the Lok Adalath is binding on this Court is atrocious. The submission is made not by a raw junior but by a counsel who has put in more than one and a half decades at the bar. It is rather unfortunate that the learned counsel is not even aware of the status of the Lok Adalath and this Court. The submission therefore on this
5 account requires to be rejected outrightly. Such contentions are unacceptable. 4. The second contention is that 30% has been added on by the Tribunal towards the future prospects. She submits that this too is erroneous. In support of her contention, she relies on an interlocutory order dated 02.07.2014 passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court of India in SLP No.8058/2014 passed in the case of NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. VERSUS PUSHPA, AND OTHERS which specific reference to paragraph 43.5 which reads as follows: 43.5. While making addition to income for future prospects, the Tribunals shall follow para 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma. Be it noted, though the decision in Reshma (supra) was rendered at earlier point of time, as is clear, the same has not been noticed in Rajesh (supra) and that is why divergent opinions have been expressed. We are of the considered opinion that as regards
6 the manner of addition of income for future prospects there should be an authoritative pronouncement. Therefore, we think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench. 5. She contends that this is the law that has been declared by the Hon ble Supreme Court and therefore, such an order is binding on this Court. Such a contention is unacceptable. The order referred to is an interlocutory order. It decides no law. It is an order referring the question raised therein to be placed before an appropriate larger Bench. It does not declare any law. The reference to para 43.5 of an interlocutory order passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court, cannot be pressed into service in support of such a contention. Interim orders are not binding. It is only the final order that could be binding. Even this elementary principle of law is unknown to the learned counsel.
7 6. Secondly, except placing reliance on para 43.5, there are no other submissions as to why 30% future prospects has been wrongly granted. Under these circumstances, this contention of the appellant also fails. Consequently, the appeal being devoid of merit, is dismissed. The amount in deposit be transmitted to the Tribunal for necessary orders. LG Sd/- JUDGE