Case Study: Deposit Freezes

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BANKING AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY Case Study: Deposit Freezes Professor Todd Keister Rutgers University May 2017

Deposit freezes Almost every major banking crisis involves some sort of deposit freeze Terminology has varied over time: an individual bank may suspend payments or suspend convertibility of deposits into specie (i.e. gold) or currency common in the U.S. 19 th and early 20 th century some deposit contracts explicitly included this option government may declare a banking holiday close all banks for some time period money market mutual funds may now erect gates prevent redemptions and/or impose a redemption fee 2

Theory vs. practice Diamond & Dybvig (1983) show that self-fulfilling bank runs will not occur if the freeze policy is: quick: implemented soon after the run is discovered strict: no further withdrawals allowed The deposit freezes we observe in reality tend to be: 1. implemented relatively late after a crisis has intensified and other efforts have failed not at the first sign of trouble (as in the theory) 2. only partial freezes allow some additional withdrawals by investors which requires liquidating some additional bank assets 3

U.S. in 1933 Growing banking crisis in late 1932 early 1933 Policy makers seemed reluctant to freeze deposits as crisis unfolded fear that doing so would further disrupt real activity directors of NY Fed urged President Hoover to declare a banking holiday, but he did not A banking holiday was eventually declared by President Roosevelt immediately after his inauguration... but: Suspension occurred after, rather than before, liquidity pressures had produced a wave of bank failures without precedent. (Friedman & Schwartz, 1963) 4

Argentina in 2001-2 Major banking (and fiscal) crisis in 2001 currency board was in place; 1 peso = 1 US$ full-fledged run occurs in late November el corralito 5

Deposits are not completely frozen, however people need access to some money, after all Depositors could withdraw up to 1,000 pesos per month from each account and some managed to divide their money across multiple accounts In addition, some depositors filed lawsuits claiming urgent financial needs examples: illness, hospitalization, etc. nearly 200,000 cases filed between Dec. 2001 and June 2003 courts awarded over 14 billion pesos to depositors 6

The end result: Deposits fall by 25% in the 6 months after the freeze 7

More recent examples of deposit freezes Florida Local Government Investment Pool (2007) Cyprus: banks closed in March 2013 as financial crisis worsened contentious debate over imposing losses on deposits capital controls restricted access to deposits until 2015 transfers/payments within Cyprus allowed but limits on money flowing out of banking system, country Greece: banks closed for three weeks in June-July 2015 ATM withdrawals initially limited to 60 euros/day capital controls to restrict flows out of country 8

Takeaways In order to remove the incentive for investors to run a deposit freeze must be quick and strict Freezing investors deposits is costly, however authorities are often reluctant to freeze, do so relatively late and are lenient with additional withdrawals When investors expect a late and/or lenient freeze Question: How does a late/lenient freeze affect patient depositors withdrawal incentives? 9

References and further reading Dominguez, Kathryn M. E., and Linda L. Tesar (2007) International Borrowing and Macroeconomic Performance in Argentina, in Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices, and Consequences, ed. Sebastian Edwards, University of Chicago Press, 297-342. Ennis, Huberto M. and Todd Keister (2009) Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention, American Economic Review 99:1588-1607. Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz (1963) A Monetary History of the United States, 1867 1960. Princeton University Press. see especially the section on The Banking Panic of 1933 in Chapter 7, pages 327-331 10