LECTURE 5 The Effects of Fiscal Changes: Aggregate Evidence. September 19, 2018

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Economics 210c/236a Fall 2018 Christina Romer David Romer LECTURE 5 The Effects of Fiscal Changes: Aggregate Evidence September 19, 2018

I. INTRODUCTION

Theoretical Considerations (I) A traditional Keynesian model (sticky prices and demand-determined output in the short run; consumption determined largely by current income; small supply-side effects; etc.) - Increases in G (or decreases in T) cause Y, C, and r to rise; I falls. - The response of monetary policy is very important.

Theoretical Considerations (II) A neoclassical model with lump-sum taxation (flexible prices; permanent-income consumers; ) - Changes in T have no effects (Ricardian equivalence). - The effects of changes in G work through wealth and substitution effects. For example, an increase in G means lifetime private resources are lower (wealth effect), leading to a fall in leisure (and so an increase in labor supply) and a fall in consumption. It also leads to changes in interest rates (substitution effect), further changing behavior.

Theoretical Considerations (III) News of a future rise in G in a neoclassical model with lump-sum taxation - Wealth effects cause immediate falls in consumption in leisure. - Since output is higher and C is lower (and G hasn t yet changed), I is higher. - When the change in G occurs, C and L don t change discontinuously. So I falls sharply. -

Theoretical Considerations (IV) Examples of possible additional complications: - Adding GHH preferences. When these are added to a neoclassical model with lump-sum taxation, a rise in G has opposing effects on C: the fall in wealth acts to push it down, but the rise in L acts to push it up. - Adding distortionary taxes. Now taxes matter in a neoclassical model. - Adding more complicated Keynesian features, such as gradual price adjustment.

II. HALL, BY HOW MUCH DOES GDP RISE IF THE GOVERNMENT BUYS MORE OUTPUT?

Hall s Regression where Y is real GDP and G is real government military purchases (and the data are annual).

What Question Are We Trying to Answer?

Are There Possible Sources of Omitted Variable Bias in Hall s Regression? How Does Hall Interpret His Regression?

From: Hall, By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government Buys More Output?

From: Hall, By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government Buys More Output?

III. RAMEY, IDENTIFYING GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS: IT S ALL IN THE TIMING

Themes Particularly interested in the effects of government purchases on consumption and real wages. Argues that sheds important light on neoclassical vs. Keynesian theories of consumption and on competing views of product markets. Particularly interested in correctly measuring the timing of shocks to government spending.

Results from a Conventional VAR From: Ramey, Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It s All in the Timing

Themes Particularly interested in the effects of government purchases on consumption and real wages. Argues that sheds important light on neoclassical vs. Keynesian theories of consumption and on competing views of product markets. Particularly interested in correctly measuring the timing of shocks to government spending. Argues that if a variable jumps in response to news and then returns slowly to normal, a slight measurement error in timing can cause us to misestimate the sign of the effect.

From: Ramey, Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It s All in the Timing

From: Ramey, Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It s All in the Timing

From: Ramey, Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It s All in the Timing

From: Ramey, Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It s All in the Timing

From: Ramey, Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It s All in the Timing

From: Ramey, Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It s All in the Timing

IV. ROMER AND ROMER, THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAX CHANGES: ESTIMATES BASED ON A NEW MEASURE OF FISCAL SHOCKS

Background: Blanchard and Perotti A VAR with Y, G, cyclically-adjusted T. G and cyclically-adjusted T assumed not to respond to Y within the quarter. More precisely: Shocks to G and cyclically-adjusted T assumed uncorrelated with present and future shocks to Y.

Discussion of Romer and Romer s Approach

Classifying Motivation Endogenous Countercyclical Spending-driven Exogenous Deficit-driven For long-run growth

Figure 1 New Measure of Fiscal Shocks b. Long-Run and Deficit-Driven Tax Changes 3 2 1 Deficit-Driven Tax Changes Percent of GDP 0-1 -2-3 -4 1945-I 1947-I 1949-I 1951-I 1953-I 1955-I 1957-I 1959-I 1961-I 1963-I 1965-I 1967-I 1969-I 1971-I 1973-I 1975-I 1977-I 1979-I 1981-I 1983-I 1985-I 1987-I 1989-I 1991-I 1993-I 1995-I 1997-I 1999-I 2001-I 2003-I 2005-I 2007-I Long-Run Tax Changes From: Romer and Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes

Figure 3 Comparing New Measure of Tax Changes and Cyclically Adjusted Revenues a. Exogenous Tax Changes and the Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 3 2 Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues Percent of GDP 1 0-1 -2 Exogenous Tax Changes -3-4 1947-II 1949-II 1951-II 1953-II 1955-II 1957-II 1959-II 1961-II 1963-II 1965-II 1967-II 1969-II 1971-II 1973-II 1975-II 1977-II 1979-II 1981-II 1983-II 1985-II 1987-II 1989-II 1991-II 1993-II 1995-II 1997-II 1999-II 2001-II 2003-II 2005-II 2007-II From: Romer and Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes

Specifications 1. 2. 3. A two-variable VAR with tax changes and GDP, 12 lags, tax variable ordered first.

Figure 4 Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP (Single Equation, No Controls) 1.0 0.0-1.0 Percent -2.0-3.0-4.0-5.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes

Figure 6 Results of a Two-Variable VAR for Exogenous Tax Changes and Real GDP Percent 1.0 0.5 0.0-0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0-4.5 c. Response of GDP to Tax 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes

Figure 7 Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP (Single Equation, No Controls) a. Using the Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 1.0 0.0 Using the Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues -1.0 Percent -2.0-3.0 Using Exogenous Tax Changes -4.0-5.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes

Figure 12 Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP Including Tax Changes Dated Both at Time of Implementation and at Time of Passage (Single Equation, Controlling for Lagged GDP Growth) 3.0 2.0 Time of Passage 1.0 0.0 Percent -1.0-2.0-3.0-4.0-5.0-6.0 Time of Implementation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes

Discussion

V. AUERBACH AND GORODNICHENKO, MEASURING THE OUTPUT RESPONSES TO FISCAL POLICY

Auerbach and Gorodnichenko s Question Does the size of the fiscal multiplier vary with the state of the economy?

Auerbach and Gorodnichenko s Method The variables in X are log real government purchases, log real government receipts net of transfers, and real GDP. The baseline sample period is 1947:Q1 2008:Q4.

Auerbach and Gorodnichenko s Method (continued) G is allowed to affect Y (and T) within the period, but is assumed to not be affected by Y (or by T).

Digression: The Jordà Local Projections Approach Consider A-G s approach without the assumption that the multiplier may vary with the state of the economy (and without T for simplicity). Suppose that our assumption is again that G can affect Y within the period but is not affected by Y. To see how G affects Y at different horizons, we can estimate a series of regressions for h = 0, 1, 2, : Y t+h = α h + β h G t + γ i h Y t i N i=1 N + φ i h G t i i=1 + e t h. The estimated impulse response function is just the sequence of β h s.

The Jordà Local Projections Approach (continued) Note: As always, this presumes that the identifying assumptions are correct! In general, one strength of local projections is that it easily allows for nonlinearities, interaction effects, etc. It also makes it easy to calculate standard errors under different assumptions. See Section III of the handout for Lecture 3 for more. (Among other things, the handout shows that if the truth is a VAR with the analogous timing assumption, the local projections approach gives us an unbiased estimate of the VAR impulse response function.)

The Local Projections Variant of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko s STVAR Approach From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion

From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Output Responses to Fiscal Policy

From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Corrigendum

From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Corrigendum

From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Corrigendum

From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Output Responses to Fiscal Policy

Accounting for Expectations Auerbach and Gorodnichenko try several approaches. One is to add either the forecast or the forecast error to the VAR.

From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Corrigendum

From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Corrigendum