Comments on Adair Turner s book: Reprendre le contrôle de la dette. Money, Credit and Fixing Global Finance

Similar documents
Global Finance, Debt and Sustainability

MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE MODERN ECONOMY

The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies

Lecture 13: The Great Depression

Secular stagnation, deflation & fiscal policy

The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies

Princeton University. Updates:

Deposit Insurance or Lender of Last Resort

The Case for Money Finance:

Session 12. The New Normal. Deflation and Zero Lower Bound.

On Shareholder vs. Stakeholder finance

Rollover Crisis in DSGE Models. Lawrence J. Christiano Northwestern University

Chapter 10. The Great Recession: A First Look. (1) Spike in oil prices. (2) Collapse of house prices. (2) Collapse in house prices

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: SECULAR STAGNATION OR RECOVERY AT LAST? Adair Turner Chairman Institute for New Economic Thinking

Nobel Symposium 2018: Money and Banking

Financial Frictions in Macroeconomics. Lawrence J. Christiano Northwestern University

Financial Frictions in Macroeconomics. Lawrence J. Christiano Northwestern University

Mankiw Chapter 13 lecture & reading questions:

Nobel Symposium Money and Banking

Secular stagnation and growth measurement conference Paris, 16 January 2017

Banking Regulation: The Risk of Migration to Shadow Banking

What is Monetary Policy?

deposit insurance Financial intermediaries, banks, and bank runs

Financial Crises, Dollarization and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies

The Changing Risk Culture of UK Banks: A Historical Perspective

Banking, Liquidity Transformation, and Bank Runs

ECN 106 Macroeconomics 1. Lecture 10

Lecture 6: The New Art of Central Banking.

Investment Strategy and Portfolio Expertise. QE Explained. VBA bijeenkomst over Kwantitatieve Verruiming Mary Pieterse-Bloem.

Deflatie : Vloek of Zegen?

Discussion of Risk-Taking Dynamics and Financial Stability by Anton Korinek and Martin Nowak

Discussion of Intermediaries as Safety Providers by Toni Ahnert and Enrico Perotti

QUANTITATIVE EASING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY

Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan

Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive

Discussion of The Safety Trap by Ricardo J. Caballero and Emmanuel Farhi

Bank Liquidity and. Regulation. Yehning Chen Professor, Department of Finance National Taiwan University (NTU) June 2015

Institutional Finance

Why are interest rates so low?

A prolonged period of low real interest rates? 1

Comments on From chronic inflation to chronic deflation by Guillermo Calvo. Luis Servén June 2016

An Evaluation of Money Market Fund Reform Proposals

Topic 2: Should the inflation target be raised? Lecture to 3 rd year undergrad Current Economic Problems, Bristol, Spring 2015 Tony Yates

The Goods and the Bads of the U.S. Financial System and How to Make the System Better

EC Green Paper (GP) on Long-Term Financing (LTI) EESC ECO Section Public Hearing, 30 May, 2013 Andreas Botsch, ETUI

Lecture 25 Unemployment Financial Crisis. Noah Williams

Central bank liquidity provision, risktaking and economic efficiency

LEARNING OBJECTIVES 4. Debt and

Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation

Bubbles, Liquidity and the Macroeconomy

Lecture 26 Exchange Rates The Financial Crisis. Noah Williams

Paul Tucker: Shadow banking thoughts for a possible policy agenda

Macroeconomic Policy during a Credit Crunch

Financial Crises, Stabilization, and Deficits

Introduction and road-map for the first 6 lectures

The False Tradeoff between Economic Growth and Bank Capital

A Theory of Bank Liquidity Requirements

Discussion of The Varying Shadow of China s Banking System by Xiaodong Zhu

A Model of Shadow Banking: Crises, Central Banks and Regulation

Chapter 2 Theoretical Views on Money Creation and Credit Rationing

Macroprudential Bank Capital Regulation in a Competitive Financial System

What Governance for the Eurozone? Paul De Grauwe London School of Economics

absalon project For futher information please see

Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

Capitalism - Pros and Cons

Financial Crises and the Great Recession

How did Too Big to Fail become such a problem for broker-dealers? Speculation by Andy Atkeson March 2014

Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria

Multi-Dimensional Monetary Policy

Economic Theory and Lender of Last Resort Policy

Conference on Risk Management for Central Banks

The Federal Reserve System and Open Market Operations

TOO MUCH DEBT, FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY AND WIDER ECONOMIC IMPACTS

Banking on Physics! City College Interdisciplinary Seminar April Joe Pimbley (maxwell-consulting.com)

Macroprudential policies challenges for central banks

Fiscal Policy in Commodity Republics Comments. Guillermo Calvo Columbia University

Minsky s Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Leverage Cycle 1

The main lessons to be drawn from the European financial crisis

The Financial System: Opportunities and Dangers

Delegated Monitoring, Legal Protection, Runs and Commitment

Global Financial Systems Chapter 8 Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance

A Theory of Leaning Against the Wind

A Baseline Model: Diamond and Dybvig (1983)

Implications of Bank regulation for Credit Intermediation and Bank Stability: A Dynamic Perspective Discussion

The Evolving Role of Central Banking

International Money and Banking: 14. Real Interest Rates, Lower Bounds and Quantitative Easing

Global Financial Crisis. Econ 690 Spring 2019

A Theory of Bank Liquidity Requirements

We Need a New Q : Replace Quantitative with Qualitative Monetary Policy

The role of banks in the economy

Discussion of: On the Desirability of Capital Controls. Markus K. Brunnermeier. IMF Jacques Polak conference. Princeton University

Economic Fundamentals

Queen s Global Markets A PREMIER UNDERGRADUATE THINK-TANK

The Financial System. Sherif Khalifa. Sherif Khalifa () The Financial System 1 / 55

A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION

Mission (im)possible: connecting bank credit, money creation and economic imbalances

Monetary Easing and Financial Instability

Reverse Mortgage Design

Main Points: Revival of research on credit cycles shows that financial crises follow credit expansions, are long time coming, and in part predictable

Transcription:

France Stratégie - CEPII 10 July 2017 Comments on Adair Turner s book: Reprendre le contrôle de la dette Money, Credit and Fixing Global Finance Olivier GARNIER Group Chief-Economist

3 questions Should debt finance real estate? Should fractional reserve banking be abolished? Should overt money finance be used? P.1

Should debt finance real estate? (1) Too much of the wrong sort of debt? Good debt: financing new capital investment generating future additional income Bad debt: financing extra consumption or the purchase of an existing fixedasset (real-estate) However, in theory: Risky new capital investment should be financed by equity But reluctance of investors to provide 100% equity financing (information asymmetry, risk aversion, ) debt financing Debt enhances welfare by allowing households to smooth their consumption in the face of uncertain labour income or lumpy expenditures (housing investment) Households cannot issue equity against their human capital But lenders are reluctant provide 100% debt financing to housing purchases down payments P.2

Should debt finance real estate? (2) How to reduce the risk of boom-bust in housing credit? Reducing tax distortions in favor of housingdebt Tax-deductibility of interest expenses for owner occupiers (in some countries) and investors in rented property (in most countries) Lending against current and future borrower s incomes (human capital) rather than against the market value of its real estate property The French model Fixed-rate loans Guaranteed by a caution issued by a third-party credit institution rather than by a mortgage lien on the property Caps on LTIs at origination (rather than on LTVs) Penalized by the new regulation on Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB)? P.3

Should fractional reserve banking be abolished? (1) Credit creation is too important to be left to bankers (A. Turner) Narrow banking: separating deposit-taking from lending Deposits with 100% reserves (Treasury bills or central bank reserves) Narrow banks : no deposit-based funding of loans Credit assets with 100% equity (or LT debt) funding Mutual funds / Investment trusts This structure neglects the special role of banks as producers of safe and liquid assets ( information-insensitive ) through maturity and risk transformation Modigliani-Miller (all assets are perfectly liquid) vs. Diamond-Dybvig / Gorton Complete transfer of this role to governments and central banks (or to shadow-banking)? and would not eliminate the risk of credit crunch and financial crises Illiquid investment vehicles subject to fire sales and runs to narrow banks P.4

Should fractional reserve banking be abolished? (2) How to prevent excessive maturity transformation? The original sin of the saving markets: mismatch between supply and demand in terms of maturity/risk Savers: preference for safe, liquid assets Issuers/borrowers: funding risky and illiquid investment Acting on the demand-side of maturity transformation Promoting long-term saving (funded pension plans, taxation of savings, financial education) New regulations (liquidity ratios, collateralization/ccps, ) exacerbate the demand for safe short-term assets Less maturity transformation des not necessarily imply bank disintermediation Preserving the special role of banks in credit origination/monitoring Covered bonds ( Danish model for mortgage finance) Due to the pro-debt tax bias, there is already a tax distortion in favor of direct market financing and against bank intermediation (due to the corporate tax on bank s return on equity) P.5

Should overt monetary finance be used? (1) Monetary finance (or helicopter money ): one-off increase in fiscal deficit financed by a permanent increase in the monetary base In which circumstances could monetary finance be a more appropriate tool for stimulating nominal demand than debt-financed fiscal policy or pure monetary policy (such as QE)? Liquidity/deflationary trap Debt trap Monetary finance creates fiscal space, but it does not make the government more solvent Are we today in these circumstances? Risk of outright deflation have receded in the US and Europe QE policies have not proved ineffective so far Central banks have started to exit QE P.6

Should overt monetary finance be used? (2) Dismal growth performance of advanced economies since the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: different views on the causes and degree of persistence Demand-side or supply-side problem? Multi-year or secular? Even in the case of Summers-style secular stagnation, debt-financed government spending may be more appropriate Demand-side Supply-side Secular Self-perpetuating excess of savings over investment, due to the lower bound on nominal interest rates (L. Summers) Secular decline in productivity growth due to the death of growth-enhancing innovation (R.Gordon/ techno-pessimists ) Multi-year Debt-overhang (K. Rogoff) Global savings glut (B. Bernanke) Delayed impact on productivity growth of IT innovation (E. Brynjolfsson-A. McAfee/ techno-optimists ) Misallocation of capital (and zombie companies) resulting from the pre-crisis credit binge and post-crisis monetary policies delaying supply-side adjustment (BIS economists/ Austrian school ) P.7