Simple New Keynesian Open Economy Model

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Simple New Keynesian Open Economy Model Lawrence J. Christiano SAIF, December 2014

Outline Standard Simple Closed Economy Model Extend Model to Open Economy Equilibrium conditions Indicate complications to bring the model to the data. Similar in spirit to Rames I model (Adolfson-Laséen-Lindé-Villan) at Riksbank Brief Discussion of Introducing Financial Frictions Christiano-Trabandt-Walentin Model, Ramses II model. Mihai Copaciu of Romanian Central Bank.

BasicModel Household preferences: Ã 0 X =0 { ( ) exp ( )! 1+ ( ) log 1+ Aggregate resources and household intertemporal optimization: = = +1 +1 Law of motion of price distortion: Ã 1 ( ) = (1 1 ) 1! 1 + 1 1 (1) 2

Basic Model... Equilibrium conditions associated with price setting: 1+ 1 +1 +1 = (2) 1 1 1 1 1 = (3) = intermediate good rm marginal cost z } { = by household optimization z } { exp ( ) 1 + (1 ) 1 = + +1 +1 (4) 3

Homogeneous Domestic Good Final Consumption Foreign Homogeneous good Intermediate Good Producers Exporters Labor Market Foreign Buyers

Extension to Small Open Economy Outline the equilibrium conditions of the open economy model systemjumpsfrom6equationsinbasicmodelto16equationsin16 variables! additional variables: rate of depreciation, exports, real foreign assets, terms of trade, real exchange rate, respectively z } { price of domestic consumption (now, is a composite of domestically produced goods and imports) z} { price of imports consumption price in ation z} { z} { reduced form object to (i) achieve technical objective, (ii) correct a fundamental failing of open economy models closed economy variables z } { z} { 4

computing the steady state the uncovered interest parity puzzle, and the role of in addressing the puzzle. summary of the endogenous and exogenous variables of the model, as well as the equations. several computational experiments to illustrate the properties of the model. 5

Modicationstobasicmodeltocreateopeneconomy unchanged: household preferences production of (domestic) homogeneous good, (= ) three Calvo price friction equations changes: household budget constraint includes opportunity to acquire foreign assets/liabilities. intertemporal Euler equation changed as a reduced form accommodation of evidence on uncovered interest parity. = no longer true. introduce exports, imports, current account. exchange rate, = domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency = domestic money foreign money 6

Monetary policy: three approaches µ Taylor rule µ 1 log = log +(1 ) [ log µ +1 + log µ +1 ]+ where (could also add exchange rate, real exchange rate and other things): ~targetconsumerpriceination ~iid,meanzeromonetarypolicyshock ~ ~ riskfree nominalrateofinterest policythatsolvesramseyproblemwiththefollowing preferences: X ³ µ { 100 h 1 2 3 ( ) 4i 2 + 100 log =0 + (400 [ 1 ]) 2 + 2 } straight Ramsey policy that maximizes domestic social welfare. µ 2 (5) 8

Household budget constraint +1 + + +1 i 1 + h 1 1 + + Domestic bonds ~beginning of period stock of loans ~rate of return on bonds Foreign assets ~beginning-of-period net stock of foreign assets (liabilities, if negative) held by domestic residents. ~rate of return on ~premium on foreign asset returns, over foreign risk free rate, 9

optimality of household foreign asset decision (verify this by solving Lagrangian) utility cost of one unit of foreign currency= units of domestic currency, which is units of z } { conversion into utility units z } { = +1 quantity of domestic consumption goods that can be purchased from the payoff of one unit of foreign currency or or z } { foreign currency payoff next period fromoneunitofforeigncurrencytoday z } { +1 +1 +1 = +1 +1 1 +1 = +1 +1 exp ( +1 ) 1 = (6) 10

Optimality of household domestic bond decision: 1 = +1 +1 after scaling: 1 = +1 (7) +1 exp ( +1 ) 11

Final domestic consumption goods, producedbyrepresentative,competitivermusing: = (1 ) 1 ( 1) + 1 ( ) ( 1 1) ~one-for-one transformation on domestic homogeneous output good, price ~imported good, with price ~ nalconsumptiongood,withprice, ~elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Proaximizationleadsto: = (1 )( ) = = µ h (1 ) + ( ) 1 i 1 1 (8) 12

isproducedbycompetitiverm,whichconvertsforeignhomogeneous output one-for-one into Setting price equal to marginal cost: = or, = ³ 1 + ³ 1 + Consumptiongoodination: = ~foreign currency price of foreign good. real exchange rate z} { ³1 + (9) 1 = 1 1 = " # (1 )+ ( ) 1 1 (1 )+ 1 1 1 (10) 13

Exports, foreign demand for exports Ã! = =( ) (11) ~foreign output, ~price of foreign good, price of export is produced one-for-one using the domestic homogeneous good by a representative, competitive producer. Equating price, to marginal cost: = ( +1 ) where =1ifallinputsmustbe nancedinadvance.rewriting where real exchange rate z} { = +1 (12) 1 = = terms of trade z} { = 1 (13) 14

Clearing in domestic homogeneous goods market: output of domestic homogeneous good, = uses of domestic homogeneous goods = goods used in production of nal consumption, z} { exports z} { + + government z} { =(1 )( ) + + Substituting out for : or, =(1 )( ) + + =(1 )( ) + + (14) 15

equality of international demand and supply for currency: currency owing out of the country z } { acquisition of new net foreign assets, in domestic currency units z } { +1 + expenses on imports = receipts from exports + The pieces: currency owing into the country z } { receipts from existing stock of net foreign assets z } { 1 1 expenses on imports = receipts from exports = : +1 + 1 + ³ 1 + µ µ = + 1 1 16

Divideby : +1 + ³ 1 + or, using (9): µ = + 1 1 + µ = + 1 1 1 (15) exp ( ) where is scaled real, domestic value of foreign assets : = +1 17

Risk adjustments = ³ = (16) ³ exp ³ ³ + 0 small and not important for dynamics 0 important ~mean zero, iid. Discussion of. 0 implies (i) if then return on foreign assets low and ; (ii) if then return on foreign assets high and implication: 0 is a force that drives in steady state, independent of initial conditions. logic is same as reason why steady state stock of capital in neoclassical growth model is unique, independent of initial conditions. in practice, is tiny, so that its only effect is to pin down in steady state and not affect dynamics (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe). 18

Discussion of Captures, informally, the possibility that there is a shock to the required return on domestic assets. Perhaps this could be a crude stand-in for a sub-prime mortgage crisis, because it implies that people require a higher return on domestic assets if they are to hold them. Discussion of isanimportantreducedformfeature,designedtocorrecta awinmodelsofinternational nance. Itrepresentsaquick x for the problem,notasubstituteforalonger-runsolution. tobetterexplainthis,itisconvenientto rstsolveforthemodel s steadystate. 19

Steady state householdintertemporalefciencyconditions: " # 1 +1 0= +1 steady state: 1= +1 exp ( +1 ) (17) 1 0= 1 +1 +1 exp ( steady state: 1= +1) (18) assumption about foreign households: 1 = (19) 1 (exogenous) 20

Taylor rule: = (centralbank sinationtarget). (20) from (10): = (21) 1 using price friction equilibrium conditions: = 1 1 ³ 1( ) 1 1 (no distortion if =1 ) (22) 1 1 = 1 1 (don t allow 1 1) (23) 1 = (1 ) exp() +1 (1 + ) ( 1 1) (24) 1 1 1 1 = (25) 1 21

other steady state conditions: = h (1 )+ ( ) 1 i 1 1 (26) = 1 + (27) = +1 (28) =(1 )( ) + + (29) + 1 + µ = + (30) =( ) (31) 15 equations: (17)-(31), 15 unknowns: for convenience, set exogenous variables,, = = where = 22

algorithm for solving for the steady state: can be computed from (21), (22), (23) and (25). solve (24) for solve (18), (19) imply = = = = (32) steadystatedepreciation,canbecomputedfromtheination differential: implies (see (13)) = (17), (18) imply = (33) or after multiplication by and rearranging, = so (see (32)) =1and = (see (16)) 23

rest of the algorithm solves a single non-linear equation in a single unknown. set = use (27), (28), (26): = = = = h (1 )+ ( ) 1 i 1 1 solve the resource constraint, (29), for in terms of : = + 1 + ³ 24

use the latter to substitute out for in the current account, (30): + 1 + µ = + + 1 + ³ which can be solved linearly for evaluate(31)andadjust untilitissatised.inpractice,weset = 1and used(31)tode ne 25

Uncovered interest rate parity puzzle and subtract equations (17) " and (18): # +1 +1 +1 exp ( +1) =0 (34) totally differentiate the object in square brackets, and evaluate in steady state +1 +1 +1 exp ( +1) = 1 h i + + +1 [ ] 2 [ +1 +1 exp ( +1 )] sothat,takingintoaccount(33),(34)is,toarstapproximation: ˆ = ˆ +1 + ˆ + ˆ ˆ =log( ) log () = 26

Note: ˆ =log log () ' log ˆ =log log ' log 1+ 1+ so that: log () =log +1 log log + log + ˆ It follows from: that log () log log =log µ =0 = log +1 log + + ˆ (35) ˆ =log = ³ ³ + which is our log-linear expansion of (34). 27

Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) Under UIP, ˆ 0 and there must be an anticipated depreciation(instantaneousappreciation)ofthe currency for people to be happy holding the existing stock of net foreign assets. Consider the standard UIP regression ( ' 0 =0)involving risk free rate differentials: ³ log +1 log = + + Substitute out for log +1 log from (35) and make use of the fact that a (rational expectations) forecast error is orthogonal to date information, to obtain: ³ log +1 log ˆ = ³ =1 28

In data, ˆ ' 75 so UIP rejected (that s the UIP puzzle) =175 ˆ = 075 VAR impulse responses by Eichenbaum and Evans (QJE, 1992) data: after monetary policy shock log + falls slowly for =1 2 3. UIP puzzle: and expected appreciation of the currency represents adouble-boosttothereturnondomesticassets. Onthefaceof it,itappearsthatthereisanirresistibleprot o p portunity. Why doesn tthedouble-boostto domesticreturnslaunchanavalancheofpressuretobuythe domesticcurrency? Instandardmodels,thispressureproducesa greaterinstantaneousappreciationintheexchangerate,untilthe familiaruipovershootingresultemerges-thepressuretobuythe currencyleadstosuchalargeappreciation, 29

that expectations of depreciation emerge. In this way, UIP leads to the counterfactual prediction that a higher will be followed (after an instantaneous appreciation) by a period of time during which the currency depreciates. model s resolution of the UIP puzzle: when the return required for people to hold domestic bonds rises. This is why the double-boost todomesticreturnsdoesnotcreateanappetitetobuylargeamounts ofdomesticassets.possiblythisisareducedformwaytocapturethe notionthatincreasesin makethedomesticeconomymorerisky. (However,theprecisemechanismbywhichthedomesticrequired returnrises-earningsonforeignassetsgoup-maybedif cultto interpret. Analternativespecicationwasexplored,withriskpremiaaffectingdomesticbonds,butthisresultedinindeterminacy problems.) 30

Model dynamics 16 equations: price setting, (1), (2),(3) and (4); monetary policy rule, (5); household intertemporal Euler equations (6), (7); relative price equations (13), (8), (9), (10), (12); aggregate resource condition, (14); current account, (15); risk term, (16); demand for exports (11). 16 endogenous variables: ˆ exogenous variables: for the purpose of numerical calculations, these were modeled as independent scalar AR(1) processes. the model was solved in the manner described above: compute the steady state using the formulas described above log-linearize the 16 equations about steady state solve the log-linearized system these calculations were made easy by implementing them in Dynare. 31

Numerical examples Parameter values: foreign and domestic in ation same z } { = =103 14 =1005 prices unchanged on average for 1 year z } { =34 modest elasticity of demand for domestic intermediate goods z } { =6 no nancial frictions z } { = = =0 1 Frisch elasticity z } { =1 small weight on in z } { =003 subsidy extinguishes monopoly power in labor margin z } { 1 1 = elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign inputs in producing nal consumption z } { =5 roughly 60% of domestic nal consumption is composed of domestic content z } { =04 elasticity of demand for exports as function of relative price paid by foreigners z } { =15 share of in z } { =03 net foreign assets/y z } { =0 monetary policy rule parameters z } { =09 =15 =015 32

iid shock, 0.01, to =0after instantaneous appreciation, positive shock followed by depreciation. for higher shock followed by appreciation. long run appreciation is increasing function of persistence of Response of log exchange rate to monetary policy shock 0 = 0 s 0.01 0.02 0.03 s = 0.5 s = 1.0 s = 1.75 s = 1.75, R = 0.8 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 33

We now consider a monetary policy shock, =001 According to (5), implies a four percentage point (at an annual rate) policy-induced jump in The dynamic effects are displayed in the following gure, for =0 =175 response to monetary policy shock 0.05 log, homogeneous output 0 0.1 0.02 0.04 0.06 log, consumption domestic risk free rate (APR) 7 6 5 0.07 0.08 0.09 log level, exchange rate 0.1 log, hours worked 0 0.05 0.1 consumer price inflation (APR) 0 10 20 0.01 0.02 0.03 log, real exchange rate 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 real foreign assets 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 log, terms of trade 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 log, exports 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 log, imports s = 0 s = 1.75 Note: (i) appreciation smaller, though a more drawn out, when is big; (ii) smaller appreciation results in smaller drop in net exports, so less of a drop in demand, so less fall in output and in ation; (iii) smaller drop in net exports results in smaller drop in real foreign assets. 34

Consider now a domestic economy risk premium shock, a jump in the innovation to equal to 0.01. response to country risk premium shock 0.06 0.04 0.02 log, homogeneous output 0 x 10 3 5 0 5 log, consumption domestic risk free rate (APR) log level, exchange rate 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 log, hours worked 0 consumer price inflation (APR) log, real exchange rate 0.04 0.02 0 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0.2 0.15 0.1 real foreign assets 0 0.02 0.04 log, terms of trade 0.06 log, exports 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 0 0.05 0.1 log, imports With the reduced interest in domestic assets, (i) the currency depreciates, (ii) net exports rise, (iii) hours and output rise, (iv) the upward pressure on costs associated with higher output leads to a rise in prices. 35

Next we consider a 0.01 innovation in log, government consumption, 1 0 1 log, homogeneous output x 10 3 x 10 3 x 10 3 1 0 1 3 x 103 2 1 0 1 1.5 2 log, consumption domestic risk free rate (APR) 4.95 4.94 4.93 4.92 4.5 5 5.5 6 log level, exchange rate x 10 3 log, hours worked consumer price inflation (APR) log, real exchange rate real foreign assets x 10 3 0 x 104 3 x 10 3 0.5 5 4 1 5 1.5 10 6 2 15 7 log, terms of trade response to government consumption shock 2 4 0 x 103 log, exports 3 2 1 0 x 10 3 log, imports After a delay, the higher leads to a rise in output. However, there is so much crowding out in the short run that output actually falls. There is crowding out of net exports and consumption because of the effects created by a higher interest rate. The higher interest rate directly reduces consumption, and by making the currency appreciate, it produces a fall in net exports. The initial drop in government spending in the wake of a rise in government spending is interesting. 36

Question Confronting Many Emerging Market Economies At some point, the Fed will implement its exit strategy and raise US interest rates (300-350 basis points?). In the past, when Fed raised rates sharply (e.g., 1982 Volcker disinflation, 1994 run-up in interest rates), hit the rest of world like a brick: Chilean crisis of 1982, Mexican default of August 1982. Mexican crisis of 1994. Will the US exit strategy inflict financial crises around the world, especially in emerging market economies? Last summer s taper episode makes people worry about this possibility. I ll call the above possibility the BIS scenario.

BIS Scenario Low US interest rates since 2008 have encouraged excessive accumulation of debt in the world. This has particularly affected emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America.

Levels low relative to US, but still they grew to levels equal or greater than what they were in previous crises. Not a huge problem From: Jaime Caruana, General Manager, BIS, Debt, global liquidity and the challenges of exit, speech in Cartagena, Colombia, 8 July 2013.

Currency Mismatch Problem May Be Understated (Hyun Shin, The Second Phase of Global Liquidity, November, 2013) Many emerging market borrowers issue dollar-denominated debt through foreign subsidiaries (say in the UK). By the usual definition (based on the residence of the issuer), the bonds are a liability of the UK entity. But, it s the consolidated balance sheet that matters to the emerging market firm. So, the debt issued via a foreign subsidiary could make the emerging market firm vulnerable to currency mismatch problems.

Hyun Shin argues: Amount of dollar denominated debt from emerging market firms may be greatly understated. This is suggested by evidence that foreign currency debt by nationality can be much larger than foreign debt by the usual residency definition.

Shin conjectures that distinction between external debt according to nationality and residence helps to resolve the taper puzzle: convulsions in emerging markets during taper episode last summer seem inconsistent with apparently small net external debt position (measured in residence terms) of firms in emerging markets. Less surprising if external debt position is in fact much bigger.

BIS Scenario US raises interest rates. Emerging market exchange rates depreciate. Financial health of emerging market firms compromised. They cut back on investment activity.recessions start. Runs on emerging market banks known to be have made loans to now-questionable emerging market non-financial firms. And so on

Locomotive Scenario Previous episodes of US interest rate hikes may be playing too big a role in the pessimistic outlook. The circumstances in which the US raises interest rates may make a difference. Some previous episodes in which US raised rates were designed to fight inflation, not a response to strong US economy. In present circumstances, Fed has (credibly, I think) committed to only raise rates until well after the US economy has returned to health. Under these circumstances, interest rate hikes occur when the US is firmly in the position of a locomotive, pulling the rest of the world economy forward in its wake.

Which Will it Be: BIS or Locomotive Scenario? Need a model to think about this question. Build in the BIS-type factors that raise concerns about the world economy. Accurately capture the degree of foreign currency indebtedness of financial and nonfinancial firms (i.e., avoid the biases that Hyun is concerned about). Build in the nature of the constraints that cause firms to pull back when their net worth contracts with exchange rate depreciation. Build in the locomotive scenario: Carefully model forward guidance Fed commitment to keep interest rates low even after the US economy has begun to strengthen.

Mihai Copaciu (Romanian Central Bank) A Model Constructs small open economy models in which investment is sustained by purchases of entrepreneurs, who earn their revenues in domestic currency units. Entrepreneurs need financing, and the amount of financing they can get is partially a function of their accumulated net worth. Some of the financing is obtained from abroad. When the currency depreciates, entrepreneurs that borrowed abroad make capital losses and their net worth suffers. They are forced to cut back on expenditures, so that investment crashes, bringing down the economy. Same model also contains the usual features that imply an expansion in the US acts as a locomotive on the rest of the world.

Typical small open economy Mihai Copaciu s Model of Currency Mismatch (Banca Naţională a României)

Mihai Copaciu s Model of Currency Mismatch (Banca Naţională a României) Typical small open economy Entrepreneurs supply capital

DSGE Models Can Play a Useful Role in Discussions about Fed `Exit Strategy New Keynesian Open Economy Models can Capture Various Sides: Potential for US take-off to: be a locomotive. cause a loss of net worth by foreign firms/financial institutions and force a cut-back in foreign investment ( BIS scenario ). Two aspects of the BIS scenario Hyun Shin has drawn attention to measurement problems. Modeling: there are straightforward ways to get collateral constraints into models.