Market Reforms in the Time of Imbalance: Online Appendix

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Market Reforms in the Time of Imbalance: Online Appendix Matteo Cacciatore HEC Montréal Romain Duval International Monetary Fund Giuseppe Fiori North Carolina State University Fabio Ghironi University of Washington, CEPR, EABCN, and NBER April8,6 A Individual Demand for Non-Tradable Varieties Recall the translog unit-expenditure function, equation () in the main text: ln = µ Z + ln + Ω Z Z Ω Ω ln (ln ln ) Taking the derivative of equation () with respect to ln the Shephard s lemma we get that the share of good in the expenditure of the representative household is given by µ () ln () where Z ln ( )+( ) ln () Ω is the maximum price that a domestic producer can charge while still having a positive market share. The Home household s demand for good is then () = () (), where is the nominal income spent on non-tradable differentiated goods. Therefore, the HEC Montréal, Institute of Applied Economics, 3, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec). E-mail: matteo.cacciatore@hec.ca. URL: http://www.hec.ca/en/profs/matteo.cacciatore.html. International Monetary Fund, 7 9th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 43, U.S.A. E-mail: RDuval@imf.org. URL: https://ideas.repec.org/e/pdu64.html. North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, 8 Founders Drive, 45 Nelson Hall, Box 8, 7695-8 - Raleigh, NC, USA. E-mail: gfiori@ncsu.edu. URL: http://www.giuseppefiori.net. Department of Economics, University of Washington, Savery Hall, Box 35333, Seattle, WA 9895, U.S.A. E-mail: ghiro@uw.edu. URL: http://faculty.washington.edu/ghiro. A-

demand for variety canbewrittenas: µ () = ln () () B Wage Determination Consider a worker with idiosyncratic productivity. The sharing rule implies: () =( ) () (A-) where () and () denote, respectively, worker s and firm s real surplus, and is the worker s bargaining weight. The worker s surplus is given by () = () + + + + (A-) where + ( ) +,and [ ( )] Z ()() represents the average surplus accruing to the worker when employed in firm. The term is the worker s outside option, defined inthetext: i + + h + + + The firm surplus corresponds to the value of the job to the firm, (), plus savings from firing costs,i.e., () = ()+ as pointed out by Mortensen and Pissarides (), the outside option for the firm in wage negotiations is firing the worker, paying firing costs. The value of the job to the firm corresponds to the revenue generated by the match, plus its expected discounted continuation value, net of the cost of production (the wage bill and the rental cost of capital): h () = () () ()+ + + + + i + where [ ( )] R ()() corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier in the firm profit maximization. For each job, the producer equates the marginal revenue product of capital to its rental cost: () = (A-3) Let [ ( )] R () () be the average capital stock per worker. Equation (A-3) A-

implies: µ = (A-4) h R i where is defined as in the main text: ( ) (). ( ) Let be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint =( )( + ), corresponding to the average marginal revenue product of a job. The first-order condition for and imply, respectively: = n + ( + )+ o + + (A-5) = + By combining equations (A-3) and (A-4), we obtain µ () = (A-6) (A-7) Using equations (A-3), (A-7), and (A-6), () can then be written as () = () ()+ (A-8) where () ( ) µ ( ) denotes the marginal revenue product of the worker. Therefore, the firm surplus is equal to () = () ()+ + (A-9) Since the sharing rule in (A-) implies that = ( ), theworkersurpluscanbe written as: () = () + n + ³ + + ()+ + o Using equation (A-5), we obtain: () = () + + ³ + + (A-) Inserting equations (A-9) and (A-) into the sharing rule (A-), we finally obtain: () = ()+ ( ) + + +( ) A-3

which corresponds to equation (6) in the main text. The average wage is then given by = + ( ) + + +( ) (A-) Finally, notice that in the symmetric equilibrium the worker outside option reduces to: + + Therefore, in equilibrium, the average wage is given by: h + ³ + + i = + + ( )( ) + + +( )( + ) C First-Order Conditions for Household Intertemporal Behavior and Capital Utilization The Euler equation for share holdings is: = + + + + ;theeulerequationfor ª capital accumulation requires: = + + + +( + ) +, where denotes the shadow value of capital (in units of consumption), definedbythefirst-order condition for investment : = " µ µ µ + + " + µ + µ + # The optimal condition for capital utilization implies: = κ +. Finally, the Euler equations for bond holdings are: + + =(+ + ) + + + = ++ + µ + # D Equilibrium and Model Summary In equilibrium, 57 equations determine 57 endogenous variables:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, +,,,,,, +,,,, +, +,, their Foreign counterparts, and. Additionally, the model features eight exogenous variables: the aggregate productivity processes, and, red-tape costs of entry, and, unemployment benefits, and,andfiring costs, and. Table A. summarizes the key equilibrium conditions of the model. For brevity, the Foreign counterparts of the first 8 equations are omitted. The variables,,,,and that appear in the table depend on the variables listed above as described in the main text. A-4

E Sunk Entry Costs in Units of Intermediate Input For robustness, we consider an alternative version of the model in which the sunk entry cost is denominated in units of final the intermediate input,. Relative to the benchmark model, three equations are affected. First, the free entry condition now implies =,where is the price of the intermediate input. Second, aggregate demand of the consumption basket no longer includes expenditures on product creation, i.e., is now equal to the sum of market consumption, investment in physical capital, and the costs associated to job creation and destruction: = + + + ( ) ( ) Finally, since the intermediate input is now used also to produce new products, labor market clearing requires: ( ) =exp + + None of our results is significantly affected by changing the denomination of the entry cost. Results are available upon request. F Market Regulation Regulation in the Euro Area: Core and Periphery Table A. presents data on product and labor market regulation in core and periphery euro area countries. Calibration of Red Tape Costs Ebell and Haefke (9) estimate the regulation cost of market entry for 7 advanced countries in the year 997. They measure the average number of months of output lost due to administrative delays and fees. Data about administrative delays are taken from the Logotech S.A dataset, as reported by the OECD s 998 Fostering Entrepreneurship Report and Pissarides (3). Data on entry fees come from Djankov, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (). In the absence of more recent estimates, and in order to capture various product market reforms carried out in most advanced economies since 997, we update the Ebell and Haefke s measure for 3 by making use of the OECD s barriers to entrepreneurship indicators, which are available for the years 998 and 3 (see Koske, Wanner, Bitetti, and Barbiero, 4 for details). The index, measured on a -6 scale, measures administrative burdens on start-ups, capturing both delays and fees. Our procedure is the following. First, for the year 997, we regress the log of total entry costs in Ebell and Haefke (9) on the OECD indicator of administrative burdens on start-up. The implied coefficient is 854 with a of 487 corresponding to a correlation coefficient of 78. A-5

The constant term is 345. Not surprisingly, there is a very strong correlation between Ebell and Haefke s quantitative estimate of total entry costs and the OECD indicator. Next, we then plug the numerical value of the OECD s indicator for 3 into this regression, obtaining an updated estimate of Ebell and Haefke s total entry costs for each country in 3. Finally, we compute the relevant cross-country averages to calibrate the average value of regulatory entry costs. We consider a weighted average of the index values across euro area member countries, with weights equal to the contributions of individual countries GDPs to euro area total GDP. G Data-Consistent Variables First, recall that the welfare-based price indexes imply: = h ( ) = ( ) + i + ³ Next, define the variety effect as Therefore ( ) exp = = ³ = Therefore = ( ) + ³ and " = ( ) h i + ³ # By combining the above results, we obtain: =( ) " ( ) ³ + µ ³ # ³ + Interestingly, there is no statistically significant cross-country correlation between Ebell and Haefke s estimate and the other components of the OECD s barriers to entrepreneurship indicators, such as complexity of regulatory procedures and regulatory protection of incumbents. This clearly indicates that the administrative burdens on start-ups component does indeed capture firm entry costs. A-6

The deflator is then given by ( h i µ ³ ) Ω ( ) ( ) + + As discussed in the main text, we construct an average price index as = Ω In turn, given any variable in units of consumption, its data-consistent counterpart is: = Ω ( ) H Welfare Calculations Welfare Calculations When reforms are undertaken at the steady state, we compute the percentage increase of steadystate consumption that would make the household indifferent between not implementing a given reform (consuming, constant, in each period) and deregulating (consuming, time varying until the economy reaches the new steady state): µ + =( ) X = When the economy is out-of the steady state, we compute the welfare effects of deregulating markets as the difference = The term is the the percentage of steady-state consumption that would leave the household indifferent between facing market deregulation at time =when aggregate productivity is in state (consuming, time varying until the economy reaches the new steady state) and consuming the pre-deregulation steady-state level,, constant,ineachperiod: µ+ =( ) X = The term is the the percentage of steady-state consumption that would leave the household indifferent between facing the same temporary productivity realization that brings the economy in state at time =(consuming, time varying until the economy returns to the initial steady A-7

state) and consuming the pre-deregulation steady-state level,, constant, in each period: µ+ =( ) X = I Productivity Shocks with and without Reforms See Figures A.-A.4. J Home Production Reforms: Normal Times versus Recession See Figures A.5 and A.6. K Labor Market Reforms under Financial Autarky See Figures A.7-A.9. L The Role of Sectoral Spillovers The model makes it possible to quantify the importance of input-output linkages for the consequences of lowering barriers to entry in the non-tradable sector. The key parameter governing sectoral interdependence is the share of non-tradables in production of tradables,. When 6, input-output linkages affect the consequences of service-sector liberalization through three channels. First, the increase in the number of producers in the non-tradable sector lowers markups, reducing, other things equal, the marginal cost of production in the tradable sector. Second, variety effects associated with higher reduce the price of the non-tradable basket, akin to an endogenous increase in the productivity of the tradable sector. Finally, input-output linkages increase total demand for non-tradable producers, expanding the market size. To address the importance of input-output linkages, we study the effects of product market deregulation when =, i.e., in the absence of sectoral spillovers. In the long-run, product market deregulation results in a smaller output gain for the Home economy (74 percent instead of percent), and in a smaller increase in the number of Home producers (7 percent instead of 74 percent). During the dynamic adjustment, the Home economy runs a smaller current account deficit relative to the benchmark scenario, and it experiences a smaller drop in aggregate consumption and slower producer entry. These results reflect the combined effect of the three channels discussed above. First, a smaller market for non-tradable varieties dampens, other things equal, the increase in the present discounted value of product creation, reducing the need to borrow from abroad. Second, as markups fall by less and productivity gains are muted, aggregate demand is lower, ultimately reducing the expansion of the deregulating economy. Home s terms of trade continue to improve in the first phase of the transition following deregulation, although the effect is smaller in the absence of input-output linkages. In the long run, Home s A-8

terms of trade deteriorate by less relative to baseline scenario. Such dynamics reflect two opposing forces induced by the absence of sectoral spillovers. On one side, lower demand for the intermediate input by new entrants result, indirectly, in lower real marginal costs for tradable producers (and thus lower export prices). On the other side, higher markups and lower productivity in the tradable sector contribute to increase the price of Home tradables relative to Foreign. In the first phase of the transition, the first effect dominates, with a positive effect on the external competitiveness of the Home economy. By contrast, in the long-run, the negative effect of smaller product creation on markups and productivity prevails. Finally, as shown in Figures A. and A., the strength of input-output linkages does not affect the conclusion that product market deregulation has rather similar implications in normal and crisis times. That is, even when =, the dynamics of a product market reform implemented during a recession remain rather similar to those observed in normal times, since the tradeoffs discussed in previous section remain substantially unaffected. A-9

TABLE A.: MODEL SUMMARY =( )( ( )) ( + ) + =( ) ³ + + =( )( + ) = ( ) =( ) + µ µ =( ) + n o =exp ³ =exp = + = + n o + = = + + + + ( ) ( ) ½ = + ( ) =( ) = ( ) ( )( ) ³ ³ + + + + + + + µ + + + ¾ +( ) + ( ) ³ + + = = ³ = = ½ + ( ) ³ ³ ( + ) ³ ³ + + + ³ + + + + + +( + ) + ¾ + ³ = κ + ½ ³ ¾ =( ) + + + + + (+ + +) + + + + =(+ + ) + + + = ³ ++ + + = =( ) µ =( ) µ = + + + = + + + = + + + =(+ ) + ( + ) + ³ ³ + + A-

TABLE A.: REGULATION IN THE EURO AREA Core Periphery Product Market Regulation, OECD Regulation Index Retail Industry, 3.58.94 Unemployment Benefits, Gross Replacement Rate, 3 9.4 34.9 Employment Protection Legislation, OECD Index, 3.59.34 A-

.5.5.5 Home Consumption.6.8 Foreign Consumption 3 4 Home GDP 3 4 Foreign GDP Home Investment Foreign Investment.5 Home Unemployment Foreign Unemployment 5 5 5.5.8.6.4. 4 3 Home Producers.4.5.6.7.8 Foreign Producers.5 Home Marginal Cost Foreign Marginal Cost..5..5.3 Home Wage.5.5 Foreign Wage.8.6.4.. Terms of Trade...3.4 Current Account Figure A.. Home and Foreign productivity shock followed by Home product market reform (continuous lines) versus Home and Foreign productivity shock in the absence of Home product market reform (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state

.4.6.8. Home Consumption.5.6.7.8.9 Foreign Consumption 3 4 Home GDP 3 4 Foreign GDP 5 Home Investment 5 Foreign Investment.5.5 Home Unemployment.8.6.4 Foreign Unemployment 5..4.5.6.7.8 Home Producers.4.5.6.7 Foreign Producers..5. Home Marginal Cost..5. Foreign Marginal Cost.5 Home Wage.5 Foreign Wage. Terms of Trade.4 Current Account.5.5.4. Figure A.. Home and Foreign productivity shock followed by Home firing costs reform (continuous lines) versus Home and Foreign productivity shock in the absence of Home labor market reform (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

Home Consumption Foreign Consumption Home GDP Foreign GDP.5.5.5.6.7.8.9 4 3 4 5 5 Home Investment 5 Foreign Investment.5.5 Home Unemployment Foreign Unemployment.8.6.4..4.6.8 Home Producers.4.5.6.7 Foreign Producers..5..5 Home Marginal Cost..5. Foreign Marginal Cost.5.5.5 Home Wage.5.5 Foreign Wage...3 Terms of Trade.5.5 Current Account Figure A.3. Home and Foreign productivity shock followed by Home unemployment benefits reform (continuous lines) versus Home and Foreign productivity shock in the absence of Home labor market reform (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

Home Consumption.4 Foreign Consumption Home GDP Foreign GDP.5.5.6.8 4 3 4 Home Investment Foreign Investment Home Unemployment Foreign Unemployment 5 5.8 5.6.4..4.6.8 Home Producers.4.5.6.7 Foreign Producers...3 Home Marginal Cost..5. Foreign Marginal Cost Home Wage Foreign Wage Terms of Trade Current Account 3.5.5...3.4.5..5.5 Figure A.4. Home and Foreign productivity shock followed by reduction in home production value at Home (continuous lines) versus Home and Foreign productivity shock in the absence of Home labor market reform (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

.8.6.4..8.6 Home Consumption.7.6.5.4.3 Foreign Consumption.5.5 Home GDP.8.7.6.5 Foreign GDP Home Investment Foreign Investment Home Unemployment Foreign x 3 Unemployment.6.4...5.5.5 5 5 Home Producers Foreign Producers Home Marginal Cost Foreign Marginal Cost...3.4.5..4.6.5..5..4.35.3 Home Wage Foreign Wage Terms of Trade Current Account.6.7.8.5.45.4.35.4.45.5.55..5.5 Figure A.5. Reduction in home production value at Home, normal times (continuous lines) versus recession (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

Home Consumption Foreign Consumption Home GDP Foreign GDP.5.5.6.4...4.5...3 Home Investment Foreign Investment Home Unemployment Foreign Unemployment 8.5.4 6 4.5. 4.5.8.6.4...4 Home Producers.5..5 Foreign Producers.... Home Marginal Cost Foreign Marginal Cost.5..5. Home Wage.5.5. Foreign Wage.5.5.5 Terms of Trade.5 Current Account Figure A.6. Anticipated reduction in home production value at Home, normal times (continuous lines) versus recession (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

.8.6.4..8 Home Consumption.8.6.4 Foreign Consumption.5.5 Home GDP..8.6.4. Foreign GDP Home Investment Foreign Investment Home Unemployment Foreign Unemployment.6.4...5.5.5.5..5..5...3.4.5 Home Producers..4.6 Foreign Producers.5..5. Home Marginal Cost Foreign Marginal Cost.5.4.3.. Home Wage Foreign Wage Terms of Trade Current Account.65.7.75.8.85.6.5.4.3...3.4.5..5.5 Figure A.7. Home firing costs reform in a recession, open capital account (continuous lines) versus financial autarky (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

..8.6.4 Home Consumption.6.5.4.3. Foreign Consumption.5 Home GDP.6.4. Foreign GDP Home Investment Foreign Investment Home Unemployment Foreign x 3 Unemployment.4...5.5 5 5...3 Home Producers...3.4 Foreign Producers..4.6.8.. Home Marginal Cost Foreign Marginal Cost.3...4.45.5.55 Home Wage.4.35.3.5. Foreign Wage...3 Terms of Trade.5.5 Current Account Figure A.8. Home unemployment benefits reform in a recession, open capital account (continuous lines) versus financial autarky (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

.8.6.4..8 Home Consumption.8.6.4 Foreign Consumption.5.5 Home GDP..8.6.4. Foreign GDP Home Investment.8.6.4. Foreign Investment Home Unemployment.5.5.5 Foreign Unemployment.5..5..5 Home Producers Foreign Producers Home Marginal Cost Foreign Marginal Cost.5...3.4.5..4.5..5..4.3...65.7.75.8.85 Home Wage.6.5.4.3 Foreign Wage...3.4.5 Terms of Trade.5..5.5 Current Account Figure A.9. Reduction in home production value at Home in a recession, open capital account (continuous lines) versus financial autarky (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

.5 Home Consumption..4.6 Foreign Consumption.4. Home GDP.8. Foreign GDP.8..5....4.6 Home Investment Foreign Investment Home Unemployment Foreign Unemployment 6 5.5 5 4.5 4 3.5.5.5.5...8.6.4. 5 4 3 Home Producers.5..5. Foreign Producers..8.6.4. Home Marginal Cost Foreign Marginal Cost..4.6.8.4..8.6.4 Home Wage.5.6.7.8.9. Foreign Wage.8.6.4.. Terms of Trade..4.6.8 Current Account Figure A.. Home product market reform, normal times, with ξ =.6 (continuous lines) versus Home product market reform, normal times, with ξ = (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org).5.5 Home Consumption..4.6.8 Foreign Consumption.4.3... Home GDP.8.. Foreign GDP Home Investment Foreign Investment Home Unemployment Foreign Unemployment.6 5.5 5 4.5.5..5.4.3 4 3.5.5... 5 4 3 Home Producers.5. Foreign Producers..8.6.4. Home Marginal Cost.3.4.5 Foreign Marginal Cost Home Wage Foreign Wage Terms of Trade Current Account..45.5.8.6.4.5.55.4...5..5.3 Figure A.. Home product market reform, recession, with ξ =.6 (continuous lines) versus Home product market reform, recession, with ξ = (dashed lines). Responses show percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Unemployment is in deviations from the initial steady state.