Does the choice of well-being measure matter empirically? An illustration with German data

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Does the choice of well-being measure matter empirically? An illustration with German data Koen Decancq University of Antwerp Dirk Neumann Université catholique de Louvain Winter School IT10 Alba di Canazei, January 14, 2015 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 1 / 18

Motivation How to measure+compare well-being is crucial to social policy making This especially affects the identification of target groups, essentially the worst off in a society Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 2 / 18

Motivation How to measure+compare well-being is crucial to social policy making This especially affects the identification of target groups, essentially the worst off in a society Many different approaches existent (in theory), e.g. 1 Income 2 Composite well-being index (incl. non-monetary dimensions, e.g. HDI) 3 Subjective well-being measure (life satisfaction, happiness) 4 Equivalent income (preference based) 5 Expected utility (accounting for risk preferences)... Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 2 / 18

Motivation How to measure+compare well-being is crucial to social policy making This especially affects the identification of target groups, essentially the worst off in a society Many different approaches existent (in theory), e.g. 1 Income 2 Composite well-being index (incl. non-monetary dimensions, e.g. HDI) 3 Subjective well-being measure (life satisfaction, happiness) 4 Equivalent income (preference based) 5 Expected utility (accounting for risk preferences)... Does the choice matter empirically? Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 2 / 18

Contribution This paper: 1 Empirical implementation of individual well-being measures and comparison based on a common data set (GSOEP 2010) 2 Comparison by means of worst off characteristics: identification of same individuals? well-being rankings: extent of overall re-ranking Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 3 / 18

Outline 1 Framework: five well-being measures 2 Implementation 3 Results 4 Conclusion Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 4 / 18

Framework: five well-being measures We assume four (possible) building blocks for a well-being measure: 1 Outcome vector (well-being dimensions) l i = (y i, x i ) 2 Informed opinion on the good life (preference ordering) R i 3 Risk preferences (vnm utility function) V i 4 Satisfaction function S i (such that s i = S i (l i )) Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 5 / 18

Framework: five well-being measures We assume four (possible) building blocks for a well-being measure: 1 Outcome vector (well-being dimensions) l i = (y i, x i ) 2 Informed opinion on the good life (preference ordering) R i 3 Risk preferences (vnm utility function) V i 4 Satisfaction function S i (such that s i = S i (l i )) A well-being measure: WB(l i, R i, V i, S i ) Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 5 / 18

1. Income, 2. Composite index Income: WB 1 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 6 / 18

1. Income, 2. Composite index Income: WB 1 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i Resource fetishism? Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 6 / 18

1. Income, 2. Composite index Income: WB 1 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i Resource fetishism? A natural alternative: include all outcomes in one measure Composite index: WB 2 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = I (l i ) Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 6 / 18

1. Income, 2. Composite index Income: WB 1 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i Resource fetishism? A natural alternative: include all outcomes in one measure Composite index: WB 2 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = I (l i ) with I (l i ) = [w 0 (f 0 (y i )) β + w 1 (f 1 (x 1 i ))β +... + w m (f m (x m i )) β ] 1 β How to choose f (.), w, β? Paternalism? Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 6 / 18

1. Income, 2. Composite index Income: WB 1 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i Resource fetishism? A natural alternative: include all outcomes in one measure Composite index: WB 2 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = I (l i ) with I (l i ) = [w 0 (f 0 (y i )) β + w 1 (f 1 (x 1 i ))β +... + w m (f m (x m i )) β ] 1 β How to choose f (.), w, β? Paternalism? Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 6 / 18

1. Income, 2. Composite index Income: WB 1 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i Resource fetishism? A natural alternative: include all outcomes in one measure Composite index: WB 2 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = I (l i ) with I (l i ) = [w 0 (f 0 (y i )) β + w 1 (f 1 (x 1 i ))β +... + w m (f m (x m i )) β ] 1 β How to choose f (.), w, β? Paternalism? Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 6 / 18

1. Income, 2. Composite index Income: WB 1 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i Resource fetishism? A natural alternative: include all outcomes in one measure Composite index: WB 2 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = I (l i ) with I (l i ) = [w 0 (f 0 (y i )) β + w 1 (f 1 (x 1 i ))β +... + w m (f m (x m i )) β ] 1 β How to choose f (.), w, β? Paternalism? Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 6 / 18

3. Subjective well-being measure Use what individuals state themselves? Subjective well-being: WB 3 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = S i (l i ) Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 7 / 18

3. Subjective well-being measure Use what individuals state themselves? Subjective well-being: WB 3 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = S i (l i ) Opinions of individuals (preferences) respected? Under consistency assumption S i (l i ) S i (l i ) if and only if l ir i l i Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 7 / 18

3. Subjective well-being measure Use what individuals state themselves? Subjective well-being: WB 3 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = S i (l i ) Opinions of individuals (preferences) respected? Under consistency assumption S i (l i ) S i (l i ) if and only if l ir i l i SWB respects preferences in intrapersonal comparisons but not in inter personal comparisons: Individual specific scaling factors influence comparison graph Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 7 / 18

4. Equivalent income, 5. vnm utility A possible solution: equivalent income (e.g. Fleurbaey and co-authors) = the hypothetical income that if combined with a reference value on all non-income dimensions would place the individual in a situation that she finds equally good as her initial situation Equivalent income: WB 4 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i such that (y i, x i )I i (y i, x) Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 8 / 18

4. Equivalent income, 5. vnm utility A possible solution: equivalent income (e.g. Fleurbaey and co-authors) = the hypothetical income that if combined with a reference value on all non-income dimensions would place the individual in a situation that she finds equally good as her initial situation Equivalent income: WB 4 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i such that (y i, x i )I i (y i, x) But additional information necessary: Individual preferences: empirically difficult Reference values: ethically demanding graph Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 8 / 18

4. Equivalent income, 5. vnm utility A possible solution: equivalent income (e.g. Fleurbaey and co-authors) = the hypothetical income that if combined with a reference value on all non-income dimensions would place the individual in a situation that she finds equally good as her initial situation Equivalent income: WB 4 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = y i such that (y i, x i )I i (y i, x) But additional information necessary: Individual preferences: empirically difficult Reference values: ethically demanding graph What about risk preferences? Here: a variant of vnm utility (Adler 2012, 2014 building on Harsanyi), WB 5 Normative choice: individuals with different risk attitudes might be treated differently details Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 8 / 18

Implementation Data: GSOEP for 2010 (14,200 individuals >= 25 years) Outcome vectors: three dimensions in l i 1 Income: household equivalized disposable income, EUR/mth 2 Health: objective index in [0; 100] (obtained from a regression of self-assessed health on a range of objective indicators, e.g. Doorslaer and Jones 2003) 3 Unemployment: yes/no Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 9 / 18

Implementation Empirical well-being indices: 1 Income: household equivalized disposable income, EUR/mth 2 Composite index: f (.) [0; 1], w = (0.41, 0.24, 0.35), β = 1 3 Subjective well-being: Life satisfaction as a 0-10 answer to: To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present time? 4 Equivalent income: Estimation of preferences using life satisfaction... Best values as references 5 vnm utility: Transformation of estimated model: utility function more concave if willingness to take risks below median Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 10 / 18

Estimating preferences Life satisfaction approach (Fleurbaey, Schokkaert, Decancq frth.) Starting point: canonical life satisfaction regression s i = α + βy i + γx i + δz i + ɛ i Sophistications: Heterogeneity in taste for income: β = β 0 + β 1 d i Decreasing marginal returns (income, health): f (t) = (t ε 1)/ε Estimation: maximum likelihood Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 11 / 18

Estimating preferences - ctd. income 0.150** (0.0563) health 0.674* (0.319) unemployment -0.575*** (0.0680) income partner 0.0247*** (0.00617) income male -0.0178*** (0.00390) income non-midlife 0.0202*** (0.00514) Box-Cox parameter income 0.114* (0.0459) Box-Cox parameter health 0.233* (0.115) age -0.0344*** (0.00750) age squared 0.000366*** (0.0000692) higher education 0.0941** (0.0305) divorced 0.00629 (0.0583) separated -0.0371 (0.0988) widowed -0.0411 (0.0680) control over life 0.144*** (0.0107) achieved what deserved 0.0745*** (0.00815) positive attitude 0.332*** (0.0124) constant -2.331* (0.980) N 14,027 pseudo R 2 0.1007 Regional dummies included. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. non-midlife denotes an age below 45 or above 60 years. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 12 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Who are the worst off? (bottom 9,2%) Full WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 samp. Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm satisf. (0-10) 6.95 5.80 5.36 2.98 5.16 5.39 income (EUR/mth) 1,705 619 980 1,317 1,125 1,166 health (0-100) 76.15 71.00 59.04 58.26 37.20 37.18 unemployed (in %) 6.44 32.93 69.91 16.75 24.44 21.84 age (years) 54.35 53.83 52.65 55.14 62.77 63.45 married (in %) 56.54 33.45 39.72 47.09 38.32 50.38 single parent (in %) 4.89 11.92 11.27 6.78 5.36 (4.08) low educ. (in %) 17.55 36.95 30.31 23.96 29.31 28.87 pension (in %) 32.93 (31.73) 23.55 (34.20) 56.31 58.86 disabled (in %) 16.01 18.36 32.44 29.82 59.12 57.22 risk taking (0-10) 4.11 3.88 (3.99) 3.50 3.55 (4.25) WTP health 2,250 1,358 3,257 3,673 5,764 5,762 WTP unem. 97 350 1,050 236 317 285 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 13 / 18

Degree of overlap poor accord. WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 % to: Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm Overlap 1 measure 9.20 1 measure 9.21 1 measure 9.20 1 measure 9.20 1 measure 9.21 2 measures 3.79 2 measures 2.04 2 measures 2.77 2 measures 2.43 2 measures 2.72 2 measures 5.02 2 measures 4.78 2 measures 3.17 2 measures 2.77 2 measures 7.36 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 14 / 18

Degree of overlap poor accord. WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 % to: Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm Overlap 1 measure 9.20 1 measure 9.21 1 measure 9.20 1 measure 9.20 1 measure 9.21 2 measures 3.79 2 measures 2.04 2 measures 2.77 2 measures 2.43 2 measures 2.72 2 measures 5.02 2 measures 4.78 2 measures 3.17 2 measures 2.77 2 measures 7.36 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 14 / 18

Degree of overlap - ctd. poor accord. WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 % to: Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm Overlap 3 measures 1.31 3 measures 2.26 3 measures 1.17 3 measures 2.02 3 measures 1.02 3 measures 2.15 3 measures 2.01 3 measures 1.90 3 measures 4.59 3 measures 2.54 4 measures 1.01 4 measures 1.91 4 measures 1.85 4 measures 0.94 4 measures 0.91 all measures 0.87 Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2010 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 15 / 18

Degree of overlap - ctd. poor accord. WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 % to: Income Cp. ind. Satisf. Eq. inc. vnm Overlap 3 measures 1.31 3 measures 2.26 3 measures 1.17 3 measures 2.02 3 measures 1.02 3 measures 2.15 3 measures 2.01 3 measures 1.90 3 measures 4.59 3 measures 2.54 4 measures 1.01 4 measures 1.91 4 measures 1.85 4 measures 0.94 4 measures 0.91 all measures 0.87 Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2010 Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 15 / 18

Re-ranking between measures Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 16 / 18

Re-ranking between measures - ctd. Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 17 / 18

Conclusion Does the choice matter empirically? Yes! If conclusion that income is a too narrow measure crucial issue = how to measure, aggregate and weight different dimensions of life This entails important value judgments It further depends on data availability and quality Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 18 / 18

Subjective well-being vs inter personal comparison back Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 19 / 18

Equivalent income Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 20 / 18

Equivalent income - ctd. Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 21 / 18

Equivalent income - ctd. Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 22 / 18

Equivalent income - ctd. back Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 23 / 18

vnm utility vnm utility: WB 5 (l i, R i, V i, S i ) = V i(l i ) V i (l ) V i (l ) V i (l ) with two calibration vectors l and l to be selected Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 24 / 18

vnm utility - ctd. back Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 25 / 18

vnm utility - ctd. Extended preference measure (l*=0, l**=100) 0.5 1 1.5 2 0 50 100 150 200 outcome vector l risk averse risk neutral back Dirk Neumann (U catholique de Louvain) Choice of well-being measure January 14, 2015 26 / 18