Public Disclosure Authorized IEG ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 09/06/2007 Report Number : ICRR12684 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized PROJ ID : P068368 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Marmara Earthquake Project Costs (US$M US$M): 732.06 441.23 Emergency Reconstruction Project Country: Turkey Loan/Credit (US$M US$M): 505.0 294.4 Sector Board : UD Cofinancing (US$M US$M): Sector(s): Housing construction (47%) Non-compulsory pensions insurance and contractual savings (25%) Central government administration (25%) Law and justice (2%) Health (1%) Theme(s): Natural disaster management (23% - P) Law reform (22% - P) Health system performance (22% - P) Land administration and management (22% - P) Injuries and non-communicable diseases (11% - S) L/C Number: L4517 Partners involved : Evaluator : Panel Reviewer : Group Manager : Group: Kristin S. Little Ronald S. Parker Alain A. Barbu IEGSG 2. Project Objectives and Components: a. Objectives: Board Approval Date : 11/16/1999 Closing Date : 05/31/2005 12/31/2006 (i) Help restore the living conditions in the region of Turkey that was affected by the August 17, 1999 Marmara earthquake, (ii) Support economic recovery and resumption of growth, and (iii) Develop an institutional framework for disaster risk management and mitigation b.were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No c. Components (or Key Conditions in the case of DPLs, as appropriate): Component A - Disaster Response System and Risk Mitigation Al: Emergency Management and Response System (appraisal cost: US$110.17m/actual cost US$16.83m): create a comprehensive emergency management organization, an emergency management and response system, a headquarters building in Ankara, and purchase equipment. A2: Disaster Insurance Scheme (appraisal cost: US$273.00m/actual cost US$71.46m): support the government s Earthquake Insurance Program to establish and expand national catastrophic risk management and risk transfer capabilities. A3: Land Use Planning and Enforcement of Construction Codes (appraisal cost: US$11.78m/actual cost US$17.81m): review ongoing modifications in the current legal system and make additional modifications as required, and strengthen municipal capability to regulate, plan and implement disaster -resistant development. A4: Cadastre Renovation and Land Management (appraisal cost: US$24.21m/actual cost US$24.44m): supply current and reliable land ownership information, update and improve the obsolete registers and maps; facilitate land supply operations, with emphasis on housing schemes and the overall improvement of the land market. Component B - Trauma Program for Adults (appraisal cost: US$6.89m/actual cost US$7.67m). A trauma program for adults, supporting the strengthening of community mental health services, the reconstruction of working life, and the reinsertion of adults into the workforce. Component C - Construction of Permanent Housing in Bolu, Kocaeli and Yalova (appraisal cost: US$293.32m/actual cost US$290.67m). The reconstruction of permanent housing in the urban and rural areas affected by the earthquake. Component D - Project Management (appraisal cost: US$12.69m/actual cost US$12.35m). Financed costs of expanding and maintaining the existing Project Implementation Unit (PIU), set up for the TEFER (Turkey Emergency Flood and Earthquake Recovery). d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Several changes took place during the course of the project. Political conflicts made the creation of a comprehensive emergency management organization difficult, so the institutional support component (A1) was cut to 15 percent of its original size. Funding to the Turkish Catastrophic Insurance Program (A2) was increased by US$80m, to create a larger, more sustainable pool. US$3.91m in additional support to the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements served to carry out studies on the development of a legal framework for urban planning and code enforcement (A3). The pilot municipalities sub-component (A3.2) financed feasibility studies with an extra US$ 10.7m. US$2.0m were allocated to study the feasibility of a flood protection scheme in Bartin, which was later dropped. Emergency health stations and command control centers received new funding of US$ 6.97m (B). The funding allocation for housing that had been completed at the time of the changes to the components was reduced by US$45.05m. Site works from a previous emergency project (TEFER) received an additional US$6.0m from MEER for site amenities. Pilot building retrofitting in the Istanbul region received US$ 13.3m. Component D, Project Management, was reduced by US$2.4m. 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: MEER's objectives were highly relevant as they met the critical needs of the infrastructure sector and the affected population following the earthquake.though disaster was not covered in the ' 00 CAS, the objectives were consistent with major CAS and government priorities (social development, private sector growth, and environment ). The '03 CAS subsequently made disaster mitigation a priority. Additionally, at project inception, there was a high level of government commitment from the numerous agencies and municipal /regional governments. The relevance of project design was substantial in that it addressed the pressing need for housing and long -term emergency management capabilities. However, it was unrealistic to expect to be able to establish a sustainable multi -hazard emergency management organization in the timeframe of an emergency loan. 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): The first and second objectives (restoring living conditions and supporting economic growth ) were substantially achieved. However, the third objective, the development of an institutional framework for disaster risk management and mitigation, was only partially achieved during the lifetime of the project. The first objective, (i) to help restore living conditions, was substantially achieved, primarily through the successful completion of Component C - Construction of Permanent Housing in Bolu, Kocaeli and Yalova. A 2004 IEG mission observed that the housing was well-built, residents had independently planted amenity gardens to beautify their housing complexes, and sports facilities such as basketball courts and playgrounds had been installed. The mission understood from interviews with residents that they appreciated the Bank -funded housing because they perceived it to be safe and of good construction quality. The same mission noted that the number of units handed over to the beneficiaries closely followed the number of
housing units constructed, but the number of units actually occupied was lower than that handed over (according to PIU data). Additionally, those occupied were not all occupied by the beneficiaries. As time passes following a disaster assessment, potential beneficiaries often find other living situations. Many beneficiaries were renting out their units and surplus units had been handed over to other entities. In all of the project sites there was a relatively high general occupancy rate except in one Hereke, which at the time of the mission (six years post-earthquake) was 30 percent occupied. In sites not 100 percent occupied, the mission observed vandalism of unoccupied units. The IEG mission observed rural housing that consisted of seismic -resistant, safe buildings, designed to accommodate expansions. Only 58 percent of the eligible beneficiaries actually participated in this subcomponent, however. A PIU-contracted study suggests important ways to increase beneficiary acceptance in future rural housing projects (see lessons). Component B, the trauma program for adults, contributed less directly to the "substantial" efficacy rating. The program lacked government commitment and was subsequently transformed into funding for the health sector (communication, IT, medical equipment, emergency operation units, ambulances, specialized rescue vehicles, etc.). The achievement of the second objective, (ii ii) to support economic recovery and resumption of growth was substantial. The successful housing reconstruction component provided direct support to the lives and livelihoods of the affected population.the overall Framework Program was designed to contribute to this objective through Components E and G, business rehabilitation and rebuilding and repair of roads, water, wastewater, and electricity distribution networks. Components E and G were not funded by the Bank. The achievement of the third objective, (iii iii) to develop an institutional framework for disaster risk management and mitigation, was modest. The primary component supporting this objective, the setup of the emergency management organization, TEMAD, lacked inertia and the support of the various ministries that would ordinarily deal with disasters. On a more positive note, the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP) was successfully set up. This pool mitigates disaster risk by reducing the fiscal burden on the government in the (likely) event of another disaster. The project also contributed to the formulation of a building retrofitting code to strengthen building stock. Further progress toward disaster mitigation was achieved through a pilot program in six vulnerable municipalities of Marmara region. The program resulted in multi-hazard risk analyses, hazard mapping, loss estimation and mitigation plans. A nd the Cadastre Renovation and Land Management component was successful in that it supplied current and reliable land ownership information that then could be used for the overall improvement of the housing stock and land market. 5. Efficiency (not applicable to DPLs): As this was an emergency project, no ERR was required. a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated estimated value at evaluation : Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope* Appraisal ICR estimate No No * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome: The project substantially achieved its objectives, the bulk of the funding (82 percent) actually went to the quite successful housing and insurance components. The less successful national emergency management system received much less funding than originally planned (15 percent of the original figure), as funds were successfully reallocated following mid-term review. a. Outcome Rating : Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: While the insurance component supported the successful development of a critical institution, the creation of a national disaster management agency did not fare as well (see section 4). On balance, the risk to development outcome of this component is substantial. The other components, however, pose less risk. The risk to developmental outcome of the housing component is low for several reasons, including the creation of user groups, the construction of amenities (playgrounds, basketball courts), and the quality of the housing construction. a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate 8. Assessment of Bank Performance:
This project benefited from a very broad and experienced team of Bank experts, and took into account lessons learned from within Turkey and around the world, earning the World Bank's Award for Excellence. The project recognized the importance of social issues in disaster management, which was a relatively new approach. It also helped develop the first countrywide insurance pool, which has served as an example to countries around the world. Supervision missions were followed by course corrections along the way, as is particularly important in the disaster context. a. Ensuring Quality -at at-entry Entry:Highly Satisfactory b. Quality of Supervision :Satisfactory c. Overall Bank Performance :Satisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: A lack of ownership of the national institutional framework for disaster risk management during the first few years was overcome toward the end of the project. This was too late, however, to fully achieve the institutional outcome goals. The GOT has shown its long-term commitment to disaster risk management through, by funding a US$400m natural disaster mitigation project--the Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (ISMEP). The PIU from previous emergency projects carried on to implement the project. The fully dedicated and experienced unit was critical to the success of the project. They brought to the task a wealth of experience and expertise, and liased effectively with the many ministries involved in the reconstruction. a. Government Performance :Satisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance :Highly Satisfactory c. Overall Borrower Performance :Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization: Design: From the design perspective, funds were made available from the outset for a quite comprehensive M&E framework. Very importantly, a social scientist was hired to dedicate herself full time to the monitoring of the social aspects of the project. As is often the case, however, elements tended to measure outputs over outcomes --number of houses built, etc. Implementation : Implementation of the M&E plan was successful. Several aspects of the project were monitored and the PIU performed quarterly progress reports. Utilization : Information gleaned through monitoring fed into adjustments to project design and implementation, such as the addition of health posts, sport fields, playgrounds, guardrails, etc. a. M&E Quality Rating : Substantial 11. Other Issues (Safeguards, Fiduciary, Unintended Positive and Negative Impacts): The Bank team complied with OP 4.12 Resettlement, when some sites proposed by the GOT for housing that were planned to be on public land ended up needing some amount of expropriation. The process was closely monitored by the PIU. Environmental safeguards were also monitored by the PIU, its local representatives, and Bank staff. When necessary, steps were taken to ensure high environmental standards, such as the construction of a sewage plant in Golcuk and the construction of retaining walls and drainage channels where necessary in the housing sites. 12. Ratings: ICR IEG Review Outcome: Satisfactory Satisfactory Risk to Development Moderate Moderate Outcome: Reason for Disagreement /Comments Bank Performance : Satisfactory Borrower Performance : Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory
Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTES: - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: The ICR identified some lessons of natural disaster experience that could benefit future disaster projects. The following lessons come from the ICR, IEG field visits, and analytical documents prepared for the project. Post-disaster recovery needs assessments need to take into account that some people will find other housing solutions after the disaster. Therefore, while designing the housing reconstruction projects, the teams should be very prudent in needs assessments and take into account other factors and housing options affected people have in the medium- or longer-term following the disaster. Reconstruction budget allocations made for the entire duration of the reconstruction period, not as an annual sectoral appropriation, minimize uncertainties caused by annual budgeting and administrative procedures. Such an approach enabled the government to move swiftly with the reconstruction program. This flexibility as well as the specialized and dedicated PIU are key factors that contributed to the success of the reconstruction program. Creating new disaster management institutions takes more time than is available under one project. Although it was anticipated that the emergency management subcomponent would help to prevent the recurrence of similar damage in the future by increasing capacity for hazard mitigation, such a goal proved impossible to obtain in one project cycle. Nevertheless, the idea of preparedness has taken root, and become a topic of discussion. Turkey s focus is moving from crisis management to disaster preparedness. Rural Housing Lessons The education level of the beneficiaries can affect their willingness to participate in a program. Project design needs to take into account that many of them may not be familiar with banking or credit systems. Simple, clear communication at all levels (promotion, information, contracts, etc.) is needed. Having village organizations coordinate the sub -contracting for all of the houses in the village can reduce the costs, and increase participation by certain groups, such as the elderly (who were less likely to participate in the self-construction or sub-contracting than other groups). Simultaneous rural and urban housing projects can conflict with one another if they address the same target group. Linking the two under one multi -dimensional program could be more effective. Because the rural project area was close to the urban housing built in the MEER project, potential rural housing beneficiaries were considering both options. 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No Why? The assessment of the MEER project, upon the completion of the subsequent natural disaster -related project, ISMEP, would complete a series of emergency assessments in Turkey, and would likely show the continuation of a learning process. By that time, the success of the national disaster management institution, TEMAD, could be better assessed, as the time needed for such institutions to take hold is often longer than the project cycle. 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: Overall the ICR is very clearly written and easy to follow, and it covers all of the essential elements. However, it would have been a stronger report if it had included more data on which the findings were based. a.quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory