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Edinburgh Research Explorer The affects of health shocks and house prices on debt holdings by older Americans Citation for published version: Crook, J & Hochguertel, S 2010, 'The affects of health shocks and house prices on debt holdings by older Americans' Paper presented at NETSPAR Workshop, Tilburg, Netherlands, 27/01/10,. Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Publisher Rights Statement: Crook, J., & Hochguertel, S. (2010). The affects of health shocks and house prices on debt holdings by older Americans. Paper presented at NETSPAR Workshop, Tilburg, Netherlands. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 01. Jan. 2019

The Effects of Health and House Price Shocks on Debt holdings by Older American Households Jonathan Crook and Stefan Hochguertel Netspar Workshop 27-29 January 2010

Related Literature Asset portfolios of the elderly: Venti & Wise (1989, 1990, 2004); Shiener & Weil (1993); Hurd (1999); Coile & Mulligan (2006); Yogo (2008) Debt holdings of the elderly: Lee et al (2007) Saving by the very old: Di Nardi et al (2009) 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 2

Theoretical Considerations + + = + + + ) (1 ) ))(1 ( ( ) ( 1 1 1 ' ' t t t t t r c u E c u ρ, = r ρ Assume PIH, If 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 3 j t t j j t y E r s + = + = 1 ) (1 Borrowing occurs when. < 0 s t

Implications Those predicting income to drop on retirement will prefer to save rather than hold debt. As individual comes closer to expected life end, discount rate rises, consumption increases and so does deb. If hyperbolic discounting the debt holding even higher. Model assumes zero bequests. If positive bequests then will consume so expected net assets equal desired bequest. Consumption, so debt, is a function of taste shifters. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 4

Health Shocks If retired and has health ins demand for debt may be unaltered If working and has health ins - Yp may fall and if cannot reduce consumption- short term debt increases has no health ins Yp may fall and even more short term debt is taken on 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 5

Medicare Available to eligible Americans aged >=65 Will pay for up to 4 types of benefits: Hospitalisation (Part A) free (apart from $1068 deductible) for up to 60 days if paid 40 consecutive months of FIC Act taxes. (otherwise pay up to $423/m premium) Outpatient care (Part B) need to pay up to $96.40/month as premium Contribution to outpatient and hospitalisation care (Part C) (rest paid for by private health care plan) Prescription charges (Part D) 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 6

Widowhood If partner dies remaining partner may reduce mortgage debts by using life insurance payouts or by downsizing family home Venti & Wise (1989, 1990, 2004), Merrill (1984), Shiener & Weil (1992), Coile & Mulligan (2006) find home equity declines after bereavement, but do not consider mortgage debt holdings. May engage in equity withdrawal, especially if not bequest motive. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 7

Debt Supply Incentive to default (finitely repeated game) Administrative data suggests probability of defaulting is lower for older debt applicants (Crook et al 1992, Bellotti & Crook 2009) Lenders aware of lower expected income of elderly so constraint debt supply Lenders often aware of net worth of applicants may encourage supply to elderly 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 8

Data Wave Survey Survey Cohort Survey Cohort Survey Cohort Survey Cohort Survey Cohort Year 1 1992 HRS 1931-41 1993 AHEAD 1923 2 1994 HRS 1995 AHEAD 3 1996 HRS 1997 4 1998 HRS CODA 1923-31 WB 1942-47 1999 5 2000 HRS CODA WB 2001 6 2002 HRS CODA WB 2003 7 2004 HRS CODA WB EBB 1948-53 2005 8 2006 HRS CODA WB EBB 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 9

Empirical Models p * jit T T T T = α + β1 ageit + β2 healthit + β3 housevalueit + β4 X it + δt + υi + ε it p p * jit * jit Incidence of holding: random effects probit > 0 < 0 p p jit jit = 1 = 0 ε p T T T T jit = Φ α + β1 ageit + β2 healthit + β3 housevalueit + β4 X it + δt + NID ~, σ 2 2 01 υ i NID 0 υ it Volume: random effects Tobit υ ; σ ~, υ i debt jit T T T T = α + β1 ageit + β2 healthit + β3 housevalueit + β4 X it + δt + υi + ε it ε it NID ~, σ υ 2 2 0 ε i NID 0 υ ; ~ σ, 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 10

Variable Definitions Acute it either head or spouse, i, reports in period t that has ever been told the suffer from cancer, have had a heart attack or heart disease or a stroke. Chronic it either head or spouse, i, is reported in period t to have ever suffered from high blood pressure or hypertension or chronic lung disease (except asthma). Insurance posses any type of health insurance Controls household income, employment status, years of education, gender, whether white, marital status, wave specific dummies Income in interval linear slope splines 1992 prices 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 11

Percentage Holding of Debt by Age and Health Shock 2006 Total Debt With Acute Without Acute Total Age Range Health Shock Health Shock Under 50 73.42 70.65 73.10 50-54 74.46 83.12 75.37 55-59 72.84 79.48 73.88 60-64 64.09 70.01 63.27 65-69 57.81 61.79 56.30 70-74 43.76 48.28 43.39 75-79 34.62 40.11 33.95 80-84 23.82 25.27 22.67 85 and over 13.25 18.13 12.82 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 12

Percentage Holding of Debt by Age and Health Shock 2006 Mortgage Debt Consumer Debt With Acute Without Acute Total With Acute Without Acute Total Age Range Shock Shock Shock Shock Under 50 60.63 58.92 61.46 49.89 40.23 42.51 50 54 56.04 72.42 58.87 48.30 46.04 46.10 55 59 52.34 69.71 56.51 46.95 45.76 46.41 60 64 52.52 57.79 47.29 37.52 34.08 35.65 65 69 43.21 49.03 41.18 31.37 30.52 30.50 70 74 27.84 36.72 28.02 25.04 22.09 24.41 75 79 18.65 29.30 19.11 21.58 19.86 21.21 80 84 13.14 16.57 12.67 14.40 11.18 13.49 85 and over 6.08 18.13 6.17 8.01 100.00 7.52 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 13

Mean Holding of Debt by Age and Health Shock 2006 Total Debt Unconditional on holding debt Conditional on holding debt With Acute Without Acute Total With Acute Without Acute Total Age Range Shock Shock Shock Shock Under 50 59,200 83,797 73,275 80,630 118,605 100,244 50 54 54,618 80,424 62,286 73,354 96,756 82,642 55 59 64,009 69,595 58,383 87,872 87,563 79,027 60 64 43,037 47,781 39,856 67,150 68,244 62,998 65 69 36,674 41,227 32,740 63,438 66,721 58,148 70 74 18,466 33,099 18,970 42,195 68,562 43,719 75 79 12,339 26,726 13,204 35,638 66,630 38,892 80 84 7,053 11,685 6,752 29,606 46,234 29,784 85 and over 2,197 30,414 3,007 16,584 na 23,461 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 14

Mean Holding of Debt by Age and Health Shock 2006 Mortgage Debt Unconditional on holding debt Conditional on holding debt With Acute Without Acute Total With Acute Without Acute Total Age Range Shock Shock Shock Shock Under 50 53,952 80,820 69,518 88,991 137,170 113,108 50 54 49,973 75,133 57,561 89,176 103,745 97,775 55 59 58,690 64,991 52,227 112,131 93,230 92,424 60 64 34,253 45,115 34,891 72,225 78,066 73,777 65 69 34,565 38,967 30,857 79,994 79,478 74,934 70 74 17,032 31,013 17,570 61,176 84,459 62,715 75 79 10,611 22,342 11,524 56,894 76,252 60,315 80 84 6,469 10,922 6,235 49,231 na 49,226 85 and over 2,006 30,414 2,795 3,3001 na 45,236 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 15

Mean Holding of Debt by Age and Health Shock 2006 Consumer Debt Unconditional on holding debt Conditional on holding debt With Acute Without Acute Total With Acute Without Acute Total Age Range Shock Shock Shock Shock Under 50 5,248 2,977 3,757 10,520 7,401 8,837 50 54 4,645 5,291 4,724 9,617 11,492 10,249 55 59 5,318 4,604 6,156 11,327 10,061 13,264 60 64 8,785 2,666 4,965 23,415 7,822 13,928 65 69 2,109 2,260 1,884 6,721 7,406 6,176 70 74 1,434 2,086 1,400 5,727 9,443 5,736 75 79 1,729 4,385 1,680 7,945 22,073 7,923 80 84 583 763 517 4,052 na 3,832 85 and over 190 0 212 2,377 na 2,815 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 16

Figure 1 Mean Value Total Debt Holdings by Cohort 45000 40000 35000 30000 1992) $( 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 50-51 52-53 54-55 56-57 58-59 60-61 62-63 64-65 66-67 68-69 70-71 72-73 74-75 76-77 78-79 80-81 82-83 84-85 Age 50-51 in 1992 52-53 in 92 55-55 in 92 56-57 in 92 58-59 in 92 60-61 in 92 62-63 in 92 64-65 in 92 66-67 in 92 68-69 in 92 70-71 in 92 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 17

0.8000000 Figure 2 Incidence of Total Debt Holding by 1992 Cohort 0.7000000 0.6000000 Prop portion 0.5000000 0.4000000 0.3000000 0.2000000 0.1000000 0.0000000 50-51 52-53 54-55 56-57 58-59 60-61 62-63 64-65 66-67 68-69 70-71 72-73 74-75 76-77 78-79 80-81 82-83 84-85 Age 50-51 in 92 52-53 in 92 54-55 in 92 56-57 in 92 58-59 in 92 60-61 in 92 62-63 in 92 64-65 in 92 66-67 in 92 68-69 in 92 70-71 in 92 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 18

Effects of Health Shocks 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 19

Random Effects Tobit Parameter Estimates Ln (Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.060 0.157*** -0.085 Age 50-59 -0.153*** -0.138*** -0.156*** Age 60-69 -0.259*** -0.260*** -0.218*** Age 70-79 -0.390*** -0.400*** -0.317*** Age 80 plus -0.383*** -0.392*** -0.466*** ln(income1) 0.125** -0.053 0.238*** ln(income2) 2.159*** 3.900*** 2.302*** ln(income3) 0.348 0.771 0.015 ln(income4) 0.475 1.428*** -0.710 ln(income5) 1.193*** 1.562*** 0.347 ln(income6) 0.006 0.162-0.870*** Acute health shock 0.781*** 0.677** 1.360*** Chronic health shock 0.281 0.040 0.763** Health insurance 0.272 0.227 0.211 Acute*has insurance -0.541** -0.757** -0.702* Chronic*has insurance -0.433* -0.279-0.170 Value of homes (10+06) 1.05*** 1.65*** -2.48*** Widow -0.651*** -0.982*** -0.741** Rho 0.58 0.64 0.266 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 20

Probability of Holding Debt: Marginal Effects Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.008 0.017*** -0.005 Age 50-59 -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.009*** Age 60-69 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.011*** Age 70-79 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.015*** Age 80 plus -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.022*** ln(income1) 0.019*** 0.002 0.011** ln(income2) 0.186*** 0.272*** 0.097*** ln(income3) 0.031 0.057 0.007 ln(income4) 0.030 0.084** -0.037 ln(income5) 0.148*** 0.154*** 0.023 ln(income6) -0.020 0.011-0.051*** Acute health shock 0.093*** 0.062** 0.058*** Chronic health shock 0.061** 0.007 0.046*** Health insurance 0.055** 0.031 0.019 Acute*has insurance -0.064* -0.068** -0.026 Chronic*has insurance -0.073** -0.033-0.018 Value of homes (10+07) 1.45* 2.43*** -1.17*** Widow -0.046* -0.068** -0.040** Rho 0.67 0.77 0.47 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 21

Value of Debt Conditional on Holding Respective Debt: Marginal Effects Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.026** -0.006 0.004 Age 50-59 -0.035*** -0.025*** -0.023*** Age 60-69 -0.045*** -0.029*** -0.024*** Age 70-79 -0.051*** -0.016*** -0.043*** Age 80 plus 0.020 0.015 0.022 ln(income1) -0.053*** -0.042*** -0.000 ln(income2) 0.410*** 0.070 0.198 ln(income3) 0.345*** 0.226** 0.209 ln(income4) 0.329*** 0.109 0.067 ln(income5) 0.367*** 0.242*** 0.072 ln(income6) 0.231*** 0.218*** 0.213*** Acute health shock 0.083-0.036 0.269*** Chronic health shock -0.063-0.112** -0.017 Health insurance -0.004-0.052-0.034 Acute*has insurance -0.095-0.019-0.148* Chronic*has insurance 0.012 0.056-0.021 Value of homes (10+07) 4.24*** 2.77*** 3.50*** Widow -0.229*** 0.006-0.032 Rho 0.60 0.59 0.43 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% GLS random effects regression 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 22

Marginal Effects for Net Worth Quartiles (Conditional on Holding Respective Debt) Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Quartile 1 Acute health shock 0.087-0.190*** 0.314*** Chronic health shock 0.001-0.074 0.113 Health insurance 0.247-0.001 0.260 Acute*has insurance 0.367 0.187 0.220 Chronic*has insurance -0.050-0.042 0.159 Quartile 2 Acute health shock 0.098** -0.022 0.116* Chronic health shock -0.068-0.064-0.049 Health insurance 0.048 0.029-0.077 Acute*has insurance 0.052-0.027 0.225 Chronic*has insurance 0.100 0.035 0.057 Quartile 3 Acute health shock 0.003 0.036 0.041 Chronic health shock -0.076* -0.083** -0.071 Health insurance -0.131-0.217*** -0.165 Acute*has insurance 0.009-0.076 0.035 Chronic*has insurance -0.046-0.185** -0.051 Quartile 4 Acute health shock -0.030-0.067 0.102* Chronic health shock -0.008-0.028-0.112* Health insurance -0.037-0.005 0.133 Acute*has insurance 0.073 0.031 0.125 Chronic*has insurance -0.028-0.016-0.092 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. GLS random effects regression. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 23

Marginal Effects for Net Worth Quartiles (Conditional on Holding Respective Debt) Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Below Median Acute health shock 0.105** -0.054 0.202*** Chronic health shock -0.042-0.076* 0.031 Health insurance 0.093 0.034 0.023 Acute*has insurance 0.163 0.025 0.186 Chronic*has insurance 0.037 0.015 0.089 Above Median Acute health shock -0.022-0.038 0.082** Chronic health shock -0.035-0.056** -0.096** Health insurance -0.092-0.084* -0.131 Acute*has insurance 0.041 0.020 0.076 Chronic*has insurance -0.101-0.118** -0.068 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. GLS random effects regression. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 24

First difference specification T T T T T ldebt jit = α + β1 ageit + β2 healthit + β3 housevalueit + β4 X it + β5 Zit + δt + υi + ε it denotes first difference operator X it = (never married divorced widowed retired works unemployed) T Z it = (gender race) T ever had health condition = 1 only in period condition was first recorded Estimated for Unconditional sample Sample conditional on no debt in previous period 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 25

First Difference Marginal Effects Type Conditional on Acute HS Chronic Acute & Ins Chronic & Ins N rho Mortgage Having no mortgage 1.430*** -0.423-1.53*** 0.419 12018 0.690 debt in t-1 Consumer Having no consumer -0.258 0.774** 0.365-0.598* 14628 0.550 debt in t-1 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 26

Conclusions on effects of health shocks Asymmetric relationship between health shocks and amount of debt owed. If household already has mortgage debt: health shock will not increase amount of mortgage debt owed If household already has consumer debt, having an acute shock will not immediately increase consumer debt, but will over time. If household does not owe mortgage debt and member suffers an acute shock, average household will take out a mortgage if has no insurance not take out a mortgage if has insurance If household has no consumer debt and suffers chronic shock they will incur new consumer debt and even if have insurance this will not quite cover the health costs incurred. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 27

Effects of Changes in House Value 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 28

Random Effects Tobit Parameter Estimates Ln (Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.060 0.157*** -0.085 Age 50-59 -0.153*** -0.138*** -0.156*** Age 60-69 -0.259*** -0.260*** -0.218*** Age 70-79 -0.390*** -0.400*** -0.317*** Age 80 plus -0.383*** -0.392*** -0.466*** ln(income1) 0.125** -0.053 0.238*** ln(income2) 2.159*** 3.900*** 2.302*** ln(income3) 0.348 0.771 0.015 ln(income4) 0.475 1.428*** -0.710 ln(income5) 1.193*** 1.562*** 0.347 ln(income6) 0.006 0.162-0.870*** Acute health shock 0.781*** 0.677** 1.360*** Chronic health shock 0.281 0.040 0.763** Health insurance 0.272 0.227 0.211 Acute*has insurance -0.541** -0.757** -0.702* Chronic*has insurance -0.433* -0.279-0.170 Value of homes (10+06) 1.05*** 1.65*** -2.48*** Widow -o.651*** -0.982*** -0.741** Rho 0.58 0.64 0.266 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 29

Probability of Holding Debt: Marginal Effects Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.008 0.017*** -0.005 Age 50-59 -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.009*** Age 60-69 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.011*** Age 70-79 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.015*** Age 80 plus -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.022*** ln(income1) 0.019*** 0.002 0.011** ln(income2) 0.186*** 0.272*** 0.097*** ln(income3) 0.031 0.057 0.007 ln(income4) 0.030 0.084** -0.037 ln(income5) 0.148*** 0.154*** 0.023 ln(income6) -0.020 0.011-0.051*** Acute health shock 0.093*** 0.062** 0.058*** Chronic health shock 0.061** 0.007 0.046*** Health insurance 0.055** 0.031 0.019 Acute*has insurance -0.064* -0.068** -0.026 Chronic*has insurance -0.073** -0.033-0.018 Value of homes (10+07) 1.45* 2.43*** -1.17*** Widow -0.046* -0.068** -0.040** Rho 0.67*** 0.77 0.47 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 30

Value of Debt Conditional on Holding Respective Debt: Marginal Effects Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.026** -0.006 0.004 Age 50-59 -0.035*** -0.025*** -0.023*** Age 60-69 -0.045*** -0.029*** -0.024*** Age 70-79 -0.051*** -0.016*** -0.043*** Age 80 plus 0.020 0.015 0.022 ln(income1) -0.053*** -0.042*** -0.000 ln(income2) 0.410*** 0.070 0.198 ln(income3) 0.345*** 0.226** 0.209 ln(income4) 0.329*** 0.109 0.067 ln(income5) 0.367*** 0.242*** 0.072 ln(income6) 0.231*** 0.218*** 0.213*** Acute health shock 0.083-0.036 0.269*** Chronic health shock -0.063-0.112** -0.017 Health insurance -0.004-0.052-0.034 Acute*has insurance -0.095-0.019-0.148* Chronic*has insurance 0.012 0.056-0.021 Value of homes (10+07) 4.24**** 2.77*** 3.50*** Widow -0.229*** 0.006-0.032 Rho 0.60 0.59 0.43 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% GLS random effects regression 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 31

Change in Value of homes: First Difference Marginal Effects Type Conditional on Change in value N rho of homes Mortgage Having mortgage in t-1 and 2.23*10-07*** 8556 0.38 owning home in t-1 Consumer Having consumer debt in t-1-4.14*10-07 5161 0.07 and owning home in t-1 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 32

Debt Holdings and Widowhood 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 33

Random Effects Tobit Parameter Estimates Ln (Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.060 0.157*** -0.085 Age 50-59 -0.153*** -0.138*** -0.156*** Age 60-69 -0.259*** -0.260*** -0.218*** Age 70-79 -0.390*** -0.400*** -0.317*** Age 80 plus -0.383*** -0.392*** -0.466*** ln(income1) 0.125** -0.053 0.238*** ln(income2) 2.159*** 3.900*** 2.302*** ln(income3) 0.348 0.771 0.015 ln(income4) 0.475 1.428*** -0.710 ln(income5) 1.193*** 1.562*** 0.347 ln(income6) 0.006 0.162-0.870*** Acute health shock 0.781*** 0.677** 1.360*** Chronic health shock 0.281 0.040 0.763** Health insurance 0.272 0.227 0.211 Acute*has insurance -0.541** -0.757** -0.702* Chronic*has insurance -0.433* -0.279-0.170 Value of homes (10+06) 1.05*** 1.65*** -2.48*** Widow -0.651*** -0.982*** -0.741** Rho 0.58 0.64 0.266 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 34

Probability of Holding Debt: Marginal Effects Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.008 0.017*** -0.005 Age 50-59 -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.009*** Age 60-69 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.011*** Age 70-79 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.015*** Age 80 plus -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.022*** ln(income1) 0.019*** 0.002 0.011** ln(income2) 0.186*** 0.272*** 0.097*** ln(income3) 0.031 0.057 0.007 ln(income4) 0.030 0.084** -0.037 ln(income5) 0.148*** 0.154*** 0.023 ln(income6) -0.020 0.011-0.051*** Acute health shock 0.093*** 0.062** 0.058*** Chronic health shock 0.061** 0.007 0.046*** Health insurance 0.055** 0.031 0.019 Acute*has insurance -0.064* -0.068** -0.026 Chronic*has insurance -0.073** -0.033-0.018 Value of homes (10+07) 1.45* 2.43*** -1.17*** Widow -0.046* -0.068** -0.040** Rho 0.67*** 0.77 0.47 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 35

Value of Debt Conditional on Holding Respective Debt: Marginal Effects Ln(Total Ln(Mortgage Ln(Consumer debt) debt) debt) Age <50 0.026** -0.006 0.004 Age 50-59 -0.035*** -0.025*** -0.023*** Age 60-69 -0.045*** -0.029*** -0.024*** Age 70-79 -0.051*** -0.016*** -0.043*** Age 80 plus 0.020 0.015 0.022 ln(income1) -0.053*** -0.042*** -0.000 ln(income2) 0.410*** 0.070 0.198 ln(income3) 0.345*** 0.226** 0.209 ln(income4) 0.329*** 0.109 0.067 ln(income5) 0.367*** 0.242*** 0.072 ln(income6) 0.231*** 0.218*** 0.213*** Acute health shock 0.083-0.036 0.269*** Chronic health shock -0.063-0.112** -0.017 Health insurance -0.004-0.052-0.034 Acute*has insurance -0.095-0.019-0.148* Chronic*has insurance 0.012 0.056-0.021 Value of homes (10+07) 4.24**** 2.77*** 3.50*** Widow -0.229*** 0.006-0.032 Rho 0.60 0.59 0.43 * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% GLS random effects regression 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 36

Becoming Widowed: First Difference Marginal Effects Type Conditional on Becoming widowed N rho Mortgage Having mortgage in t-1 and -1.895 8556 0.38 owning home in t-1 and not widowed in t-1 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 37

Conclusions Consistent with PIH, debt holdings decrease with age amongst the elderly. Preferences, as indicated by demographics, still affect debt holdings and in same way as for those who are younger. If a household does not have a mortgage an acute health shock leads the household to take out a mortgage. If a household does not have consumer debt a chronic health shock would be associated with taking out a loan. On average, if household has health insurance this would cover the amounts of debt they would take out following a health shock. Those without insurance would take out additional debt, but only a small amount. Elderly households increase their mortgage if the value of their home increases. If one partner dies, and the household owned its own home with a mortgage, the surviving partner would reduce the value of the mortgage substantially within the following two years. 25/01/2010 Netspar Workshop 38