European Parliament 2014-2019 Committee on Budgetary Control 2018/2113(INI) 4.12.2018 AMDMTS 1-18 Tomáš Zdechovský (PE628.699v01-00) Implementation of the Treaty provisions on Parliament s power of political control over the Commission (2018/2113(INI)) AM\1171185.docx PE631.883v01-00 United in diversity
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1 Recital A A. whereas Parliament ensures democratic control over the Commission, which is political in nature but includes different aspects and procedures; A. whereas Parliament is mandated to ensure democratic control over the Commission, which is political in nature but includes different aspects and procedures; 2 Recital C C. whereas, despite the Commission s commitment to performance, activitybased budgeting is still the fundamental principle in drafting the Union s budget; C. whereas, despite the Commission s commitment to performance, activitybased budgeting remains - regrettably - the fundamental principle in drafting the Union s budget; 3 Paragraph 1 1. Recalls that scrutiny over the EU bodies is the raison d'être of the European Parliament and that the accountability of the Commission is an underpinning principle of the functioning of the EU and of internal democratic control; 1. Recalls that scrutiny over the EU bodies is the raison d'être of the European Parliament and that the accountability of the Commission to Parliament is an underpinning principle of the functioning of the EU and of internal democratic AM\1171185.docx 3/11 PE631.883v01-00
control; 4 Paragraph 3 3. Points out that the discharge procedure has proved to be a powerful tool that has had an impact on the evolution of the EU s budgetary system, financial management, the shaping of the agenda and the way EU policies are defined and implemented, while contributing to increasing Parliament s political leverage; 3. Points out that the discharge procedure has proved to be a powerful tool that has had an impact on the positive evolution of the EU s budgetary system, financial management, the shaping of the agenda and the way EU policies are defined and implemented, while contributing to increasing Parliament s political leverage; 5 Paragraph 5 5. Notes that Parliament s decision to grant, postpone or refuse the discharge is primarily, although not exclusively, based on the audit of the European Court of Auditors that examines the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions; 5. Notes that Parliament s decision to grant, postpone or refuse the discharge is primarily, although not exclusively, based on the audit of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) that examines the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions; notes further that questionmarks remain over the error-rate correction method employed by the same ECA (when the ECA does its audit and comes across areas that had already been audited by the Commission or relevant Member State, the corrections thus found, though they are known to have occurred PE631.883v01-00 4/11 AM\1171185.docx
exclusively in those previously audited areas, are treated as though those corrections had happened everywhere, as the subsequent error-rate correction is applied to the entire audit); 6 Paragraph 13 13. Welcomes, in particular, the fact that owing to its focus on financial performance, the evaluation report provided for in Article 318 TFEU complements the compliance approach developed by the European Court of Auditors in its annual report and offers to the European Parliament the opportunity to assess policy achievements; 13. Welcomes, in particular, the fact that owing to its focus on financial performance, the evaluation report provided for in Article 318 TFEU should complement the compliance approach developed by the European Court of Auditors in its annual report and thus offer to the European Parliament the opportunity to assess policy achievements, with the caveat as noted above re the error-rate correction calculation method; 7 Dennis de Jong Paragraph 14 14. Notes that no real legal sanction is available if Parliament decides not to grant discharge to the Commission; 14. Notes that no real legal sanction is available if Parliament decides not to grant discharge to the Commission; but that not granting discharge is nevertheless a strong political signal, as it means that Parliament has not sufficient confidence in the Commission s accountability and therefore should not be left unanswered AM\1171185.docx 5/11 PE631.883v01-00
by the Commission but should lead to definite follow-up actions aimed at improvement of the situation; 8 Paragraph 14 14. Notes that no real legal sanction is available if Parliament decides not to grant discharge to the Commission; 14. Notes with concern that no real legal sanction is available if Parliament decides not to grant discharge to the Commission; 9 Paragraph 17 introductory part 17. Notes that the reality on the ground is very different: 17. Notes with concern that the reality on the ground is very different: 10 Miguel Viegas Paragraph 19 19. Welcomes the fact that the Commission renewed its commitment to performance and to results-based 19. Criticises the fact that the Commission renewed its commitment to performance and to results-based PE631.883v01-00 6/11 AM\1171185.docx
budgeting in its proposals for a new MFF and insists that the EU budget should strengthen its focus on stability, simplicity, more effective spending, low operating costs, efficient allocation of resources, the delivery of key policy priorities, European added value, results, impact, and increased accountability and transparency; budgeting in its proposals for a new MFF and insists that the EU budget should strengthen its focus on stability, simplicity, more effective spending, low operating costs, efficient allocation of resources, the delivery of key policy priorities, European added value, results, impact, and increased accountability and transparency; Or. pt 11 Miguel Viegas Paragraph 25 25. Recalls that the current performance framework of the programmes reported in the programme statements of operational expenditure includes 716 indicators of different types measuring the performance against 61 general and 228 specific objectives; 25. Recalls that the current performance framework of the programmes reported in the programme statements of operational expenditure includes 716 indicators of different types measuring the performance against 61 general and 228 specific objectives, which gives an indication of the complexity of evaluations and makes clear that objective indicators do not necessarily reflect the underlying reality; Or. pt 12 Dennis de Jong Paragraph 26 26. Welcomes the Commission s proposal to reduce the number of spending programmes by a third and to make the rules more coherent; stresses that in order to actually achieve simplification for beneficiaries, all unnecessary rules, 26. Welcomes the Commission s proposal to reduce the number of spending programmes by a third and to make the rules more coherent; stresses that in order to actually achieve simplification for beneficiaries, all unnecessary rules, AM\1171185.docx 7/11 PE631.883v01-00
requirements and procedures should be eliminated; requirements and procedures should be eliminated, without, however, putting at risk the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions; 13 Miguel Viegas Paragraph 27 point a indent 1 - further reducing the number of objectives and indicators it uses for its various performance reports and focusing on those which best measure the performance of the Union budget in the interests of simplification, transparency and better control; further reducing the number of objectives and indicators it uses for its various performance reports and focusing on those which best measure the performance of the Union budget and using those indicators simply as tools for analysis and not as blunt decision-making tools; Or. pt 14 Dennis de Jong Paragraph 30 point b a (new) b a) an assessment of all preventive and corrective measures taken against funding falling prey to corruption or conflicts of interest. 15 Jean-François Jalkh PE631.883v01-00 8/11 AM\1171185.docx
Paragraph 32 32. Urges the Commission, once again, to propose measures to make Union funding arrangements for implementation of the Union budget which currently include different tools and combinations of tools, for example programmes, structural and investment funds, trust funds, strategic investment funds, guarantee funds, facilities, financial instruments, macrofinancial assistance instruments, etc. clearer, simpler, more coherent and better equipped to ensure sufficient transparency, accountability, performance and public understanding of how Union policies are funded and what benefits they bring; 32. Urges the Commission, once again, to propose measures to make Union funding arrangements for implementation of the Union budget which currently include different tools and combinations of tools, for example programmes, structural and investment funds, trust funds, strategic investment funds, guarantee funds, facilities, financial instruments, macrofinancial assistance instruments, etc. clearer, simpler, more coherent and better equipped to ensure sufficient transparency, accountability, performance and public understanding of how Union policies are funded; Or. fr 16 Dennis de Jong Paragraph 34 34. Recalls that the close political links Spitzenkandidaten system; welcomes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, to strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fully transparent. 34. Recalls that the close political links Spitzenkandidaten system; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fully transparent. 17 AM\1171185.docx 9/11 PE631.883v01-00
Paragraph 34 34. Recalls that the close political links Spitzenkandidaten system; welcomes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, to strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fully transparent. 34. Notes that the close political links Spitzenkandidaten system; notes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, to strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in particular for those election candidates who are not members of any political party, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fair to all candidates, and fully transparent. 18 Jean-François Jalkh Paragraph 34 34. Recalls that the close political links Spitzenkandidaten system; welcomes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, to strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fully transparent. 34. Recalls that the close political links Spitzenkandidaten system; welcomes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU through parliamentary representation; calls on the Commission to address any shortcomings in the current political party financing model, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fully transparent. PE631.883v01-00 10/11 AM\1171185.docx
Or. fr AM\1171185.docx 11/11 PE631.883v01-00