Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding

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Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding Evren Damar Césaire Meh Yaz Terajima Bank of Canada Fourth BIS Consultative Council for the Americans Research Conference Financial stability, macroprudential policy and exchange rates Central Bank of Chile 25 April 2013 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.

INTRODUCTION Leverage procyclicality could amplify aggregate volatility (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Panetta and Angelini et al., 2009). This paper provides further evidence on these issues using Canadian data. Questions: 1 How does leverage procyclicality depend on wholesale funding? 2 How does it change with market conditions? 3 How does it relate to market volatility? Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 2/27

WHAT WE DO Use monthly balance-sheet data on all federal deposit taking institutions in Canada. Group FIs by the use of wholesale funding (WSF). WSF includes uninsured deposits, repos and banker s acceptances. WSF is a liquid but potentially unstable source of funding. Empirical analyses: Apply the two-step procedure as in Kashyap-Stein (2000) to identify leverage procyclicality in Canada. Analyze if banking-sector leverage procyclicality is correlated with equity-market volatilities. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 3/27

PREVIEW OF MAIN FINDINGS We find evidence of leverage procyclicality (i.e., positive correlations between changes in balance-sheet size and leverage) in Canada. Heavy users of wholesale funding are more likely to show stronger leverage procyclicality. Their procyclicality become even stronger when short-term funding markets are more liquid. Banking sector procyclicality can forecast equity market volatilities. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 4/27

OUTLINE Introduction Illustration of Asset-Leverage Correlation by Funding Source Data Empirical Analysis Results Conclusion Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 5/27

Illustration: Asset-Leverage Correlation by Funding Source Define: Leverage (Lev) = Total Assets Equity Suppose two banks with different funding patterns: Bank 1 is funded by WSF and Bank 2 by retail deposits. Bank 1 Bank 2 Assets Liability Assets Liability 200 Ret. Dep. 0 200 Ret. Dep. 190 WSF 190 WSF 0 Equity 10 Equity 10 Lev(Bank 1) = Lev(Bank 2) = 200 10 = 20 Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 6/27

Illustration: Asset-Leverage Correlation by Funding Source Adrian-Shin Channel: Suppose bank s marked-to-market assets appreciate in value by 1 %. Bank 1 Bank 2 Assets Liability Assets Liability 202 Ret. Dep. 0 202 Ret. Dep. 190 WSF 190 WSF 0 Equity 12 Equity 12 Lev(Bank 1) = Lev(Bank 2) = 202 12 = 16.8 Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 7/27

Illustration: Asset-Leverage Correlation by Funding Source Suppose both banks actively manage its balance sheet and try to re-lever up by increasing non-equity funding. Bank 1 raises $38 of WSF while Bank 2 can raise a half of it due to the sluggish nature of retail deposits. Bank 1 Bank 2 Assets Liability Assets Liability 240 Ret. Dep. 0 221 Ret. Dep. 209 WSF 228 WSF 0 Equity 12 Equity 12 Now, Lev(Bank 1) = 240 12 = 20, and Lev(Bank 2) = 221 12 = 18.4 Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 8/27

Illustration: Asset-Leverage Correlation by Funding Source Movements in assets and leverage, (% Assets, % Leverage), are Bank 1: (1%, 16%) then (19%, 19%). Bank 2: (1%, 16%) then (9.4%, 9.4%). Asset-leverage correlation is higher for Bank 1 that uses WSF. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 9/27

DATASET TDS Tri-Agency Database System (TDS) developed by BoC, OSFI and CDIC. Monthly balance sheet data for all federally chartered deposit-taking institutions in Canada. We exclude foreign branches, and fully-owned subsidiaries of other Canadian banks. Sample period: January 1994 - December 2009 (192 months). Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 10/27

CATEGORIZING FIs BY WHOLESALE FUNDING USE Define the wholesale funding (WSF) ratio: % WSF = Non-personal deposits + Repos + BAs Total Liabilities + Total Equity For each month, FIs are divided into three categories: No WSF: % WSF = 0 Low WSF: % WSF < Median of all non-zero % WSF High WSF: % WSF Median of all non-zero % WSF Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 11/27

Monthly Changes in Assets and Leverage (1994-2009) High wholesale funding Low wholesale funding No wholesale funding 1 Leverage growth.5 0.5 1 1 Leverage growth.5 0.5 1 All banks 1.5 0 Asset growth.5 Evren Damar, Ce saire Meh, Yaz Terajima Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 1 1.5 0 Asset growth.5 1 12/27

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: STRATEGY A two-step setup similar to the literature on monetary transmission (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Step 1: Estimate correlations of asset-leverage changes for each month. Only bank-level balance sheet data is used in this step. These correlations are estimated for each WSF group. Step 2: Determine how these correlations change with market-wide liquidity and macroeconomic conditions over time. Only market-wide financial and macroeconomic variables are used. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 13/27

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: STEP 1 In the first step, run the following regression once for each month: ln(leverage) i,t = ψ 1,t + ψ 2,t Low i,t + ψ 3,t No i,t + β 1,t ln(assets) i,t + β 2,t ln(assets) i,t Low i,t + β 3,t ln(assets) i,t No i,t + β 4,t ln(acm Limit i,t ) + β 5,t Liquid i,t + β 6,t Merger i,t + β 7,t ln(leverage) i,t 1 + ɛ t Correlations: β 1,t (high WSF), β 1,t + β 2,t (low WSF), and β 1,t + β 3,t (no WSF). Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 14/27

STEP 1 RESULTS: Kernel Density Estimates of Correlations All Banks By WSF Group 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 High WSF Low WSF No WSF.5 0.5 1 1.5 2 1 0 1 2 3 Concentration around 1 positive asset-leverage correlations. Fat left tail for No WSF weak correlations for this group. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 15/27

STEP 1 RESULTS: Statistics of Correlations Mean (µ) All Banks High WSF Low WSF No WSF Whole Sample (µ whole ) 0.833 0.933 0.787 0.654 1990s (µ 90) 0.930 0.952 0.872 0.915 2000s (µ 00) 0.774 0.921 0.735 0.550 H 0 : µ 90 = µ 00 25.36*** 1.23 5.90** 16.74*** Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 16/27

SUMMARY OF STEP 1 RESULTS Overall, positive correlations between asset-leverage changes. Leverage is procyclical as in Adrian-Shin (2010). Higher positive correlations for FIs that use wholesale funding. Correlations have decreased between the 1990s and 2000s. The differences among WSF groups and the changes over time seem to validate the empirical approach. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 17/27

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: STEP 2 Use estimated correlations (β s) from Step 1 as dependent variables and run time-series regressions for each group separately on: Funding liquidity variables: Repo: Total volume of repo market transactions BA: Total outstanding banker s acceptances CP: Total outstanding financial sector commercial paper TED Spread GDP Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 18/27

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: STEP 2 ξ j,t = η + + 1 1 θ 1q ln(repo) t q + θ 2q ln(cp + BA) t q q=0 q=0 1 1 θ 3q ln(gdp) t q + θ 4q TED Spread t q + ɛ j,t, q=0 q=0 where j = High WSF (ξ j,t = β 1,t), Low WSF (ξ j,t = β 1,t + β 2,t) or No WSF (ξ j,t = β 1,t + β 3,t). Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 19/27

STEP 2 RESULTS: Selected Explanatory Variables All Banks High WSF Low WSF No WSF ln(repo) 0.388** 0.327** 0.298-0.016 ln(repo) 1 0.045-0.048-0.027 0.342 ln(cp + BA) 1.323** 0.452 0.186 0.180 ln(cp + BA) 1 0.982* 0.0445 4.143** -0.209 ln(gdp) 0.062 0.032-0.023 0.123 ln(gdp) 1 0.017-0.063* -0.075 0.309*** TED Spread -0.094-0.059-0.169-0.232 TED Spread 1-0.008-0.009 0.077-0.129 No. of obs. 190 190 190 168 F-Stat 3.85*** 1.56 1.73* 2.12** Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 20/27

SUMMARY OF STEP 2 RESULTS Funding liquidity matters: When funding markets are more liquid, FIs that use WSF are more likely to expand balance-sheet size through higher leverage. Liquidity in the repo market is correlated with leverage procyclicality of high WSF banks. Liquidity in the BA and CP markets is correlated with leverage procyclicality of low WSF banks. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 21/27

PROCYCLICALITY AND MARKET VOLATILITIES Is there a relationship between banking-sector leverage procyclicality and market volatilities? Volatility t = λ 0 + λ 1Correlation t 1 + λ 2Correlation t 1 Crisis t + λ 3Crisis t + υ t, where Volatility is GARCH(1,1)-implied variance of Toronto Stock Exchange returns. Correlation is the WSF-weighted asset leverage correlation across banks. Crisis is a dummy for the period over July 2007 to December 2009. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 22/27

PROCYCLICALITY AND MARKET VOLATILITIES GARCH-Implied Volatility Variable Coefficient S. E. Correlation 0.487** 0.229 Crisis 2.558** 1.202 Correlation Crisis 0.937 1.857 Constant 0.868*** 0.102 Observations 191 F 3.210** Higher leverage procyclicality forecasts higher equity-market volatilities. Higher volatility during the crisis but no association with leverage procyclicality. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 23/27

CONCLUSION This paper has analyzed the evolution of leverage with respect to balance sheet size in the Canadian banking industry. Use of wholesale funding plays an important role: High WSF banks display stronger leverage procyclicality. When funding markets are more liquid, leverage is more procyclical. Banking-sector leverage procyclicality is correlated with market volatilities. Policy implications: Potential increase in volatility through the Adrian-Shin mechanism. Counter-cyclical capital buffer and liquidity standards could help. Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 24/27

Table: Balance Sheet Composition, % of Total Assets, 2009 December All Banks High WSF Low WSF No WSF Total Assets 100 100 100 100 Cash 6 8 6 10 Loans 58 57 66 75 Mortgage 21 14 33 64 Non-mortgage 37 42 33 11 Securities 29 27 23 12 Public Sector 8 8 11 9 Private Sector 15 14 9 3 Derivative Related 6 6 3 0 Other Assets 7 8 5 3 Total Liabilities 95 95 94 79 Retail Deposit 30 19 50 32 Wholesale Funding 48 60 30 0 Other Liabilities 18 16 14 47 Equity 5 5 6 21

SAMPLE: Grouping of FIs by WSF Number of banks in each group and the entire sample: High Low No Total WSF WSF WSF Sample Mean 26.59 26.06 14.79 67.44 Min 20 19 1 54 Max 33 32 30 75 Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 26/27

SAMPLE: Grouping of FIs by WSF Wholesale funding use seems to be relatively stable. The transition matrix shows high persistence: Group at t + 1 Group at t High WSF Low WSF No WSF High WSF 96.29% 3.51% 0.2% Low WSF 3.56% 94.22% 2.22% No WSF 0.05% 3.84% 96.11% Leverage, Balance Sheet Size and Wholesale Funding 27/27