DESIGNING GOOD TAX POLICY: A PRIMER

Similar documents
THE TAX SYSTEM IN BELGIUM COMPARED TO OTHER OECD COUNTRIES

THE TAX POLICY LANDSCAPE SIX YEARS AFTER THE CRISIS: A REVIEW OF RECENT TAX POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Corrigendum. OECD Pensions Outlook 2012 DOI: ISBN (print) ISBN (PDF) OECD 2012

Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2016

A Comparison of the Tax Burden on Labor in the OECD, 2017

The Case for Fundamental Tax Reform: Overview of the Current Tax System

Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2014

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2018

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2017

Recommendation of the Council on Tax Avoidance and Evasion

8-Jun-06 Personal Income Top Marginal Tax Rate,

Approach to Employment Injury (EI) compensation benefits in the EU and OECD

OECD Report Shows Tax Burdens Falling in Many OECD Countries

Tax Working Group Information Release. Release Document. September taxworkingroup.govt.nz/key-documents

TAX POLICY CENTER BRIEFING BOOK. Background. Q. What are the sources of revenue for the federal government?

Trade and Development Board Sixty-first session. Geneva, September 2014

Sources of Government Revenue across the OECD, 2015

Ways to increase employment

PENSIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES: INDICATORS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Recommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle

Burden of Taxation: International Comparisons

REFORMING PENSION SYSTEMS: THE OECD EXPERIENCE

BETTER POLICIES FOR A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY

Declaration on Environmental Policy

TAX POLICY: RECENT TRENDS AND REFORMS IN OECD COUNTRIES FOREWORD

Recommendation of the Council on Establishing and Implementing Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs)

2018 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MUNICIPAL FISCAL HEALTH U.S. Tax Reform and Its Impact on State and Local Government Finance Presented by Jane L.

Statistical annex. Sources and definitions

Stronger growth, but risks loom large

Budget repair and the changing size of Australia s government. Crawford Australian Leadership Forum John Daley, Grattan Institute June 2016

SKEMA BUSINESS SCHOOL Global risk and the mounting wealth gap Michel Henry Bouchet

Low employment among the 50+ population in Hungary

Introduction to Public Finance

Switzerland and Germany top the PwC Young Workers Index in developing younger people

TAX REFORM TRENDS IN OECD COUNTRIES

Double-Taxing Capital Income: How Bad Is the Problem?

BRIEF STATISTICS 2009

The OECD s Society at a Glance Simon Chapple OECD ELS/SPD Villa Vigoni, Italy, 9-11 th March 2011

Budget repair and the size of Australia s government. Melbourne Economic Forum John Daley, Grattan Institute December 2015

STATISTICS. Taxing Wages DIS P O NIB LE E N SPECIAL FEATURE: PART-TIME WORK AND TAXING WAGES

DEMOGRAPHICS AND MACROECONOMICS

LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF PUBLIC PENSION EXPENDITURE

Investing for our Future Welfare. Peter Whiteford, ANU

WHAT ARE THE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO INVEST IN EDUCATION?

Indicator B3 How much public and private investment in education is there?

TAXATION OF TRUSTS IN ISRAEL. An Opportunity For Foreign Residents. Dr. Avi Nov

COMPARISON OF RIA SYSTEMS IN OECD COUNTRIES

Brazilian Tax System Dysfunctions (and a tax reform agenda) Bernard Appy

EUROPA - Press Releases - Taxation trends in the European Union EU27 tax...of GDP in 2008 Steady decline in top corporate income tax rate since 2000

Social Expenditure in Japan: Trends and Backgrounds

Programme for Government Joe Reynolds Director Programme for Government and Delivering Social Change

The macroeconomic effects of a carbon tax in the Netherlands Íde Kearney, 13 th September 2018.

Taxation trends in the European Union Further increase in VAT rates in 2012 Corporate and top personal income tax rates inch up after long decline

DG TAXUD. STAT/11/100 1 July 2011

GREEK ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Growth in OECD Unit Labour Costs slows to 0.4% in the third quarter of 2016

the taxation of families

Macroeconomic Theory and Policy

Tax background paper. National Reform Summit John Daley, Grattan Institute August 2015

Financial wealth of private households worldwide

Romania. Structure and development of tax revenues. Romania. Table RO.1: Revenue (% of GDP)

Major Trends in Pension Reforms. Ambrogio Rinaldi Director, COVIP, Italy Chair, OECD Working Party on Private Pensions

Revenue Statistics Tax revenue trends in the OECD

BROADENING THE TAX BASE

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia takes part in some of the work of the OECD (agreement of 28th October 1961).

Improving data on pharmaceuticals. Meeting of OECD Health Data National Correspondents 3-4 october 2011

Revenue Arrangements for Implementing EU and OECD Exchange of Information Requirements In Respect of Tax Rulings

Performance Budgeting (PB) in OECD Countries

Reporting practices for domestic and total debt securities

A Retrospective on the Tax Law of 2017 and Prospective on the Next Tax Laws Note some estimates represent work in progress that is subject to revision

OECD GOOD PRACTICES OF PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT

The Outlook for the U.S. Economy and the Policies of the New President

Statistical Annex. Sources and definitions

Implementing ICP Recommendations Financing The Road To Prosperity. Paul Daniel Muller. President Montreal Economic Institute

IMPLICATIONS OF LOW PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH FOR DEBT SUSTAINABILITY

THE SEARCH FOR FISCAL SPACE AND THE NEW CHALLENGES TO BUDGETING. 34 th annual meeting of Senior Budget Officials Paris, 3-4 June, 2013

axia Axia Economics Civil-service pension schemes Edward Whitehouse Civil-Service World Bank core course Washington DC, April 2016

Lowest implicit tax rates on labour in Malta, on consumption in Spain and on capital in Lithuania

Definition of international double taxation

10% 10% 15% 15% Caseload: WE. 15% Caseload: SS 10% 10% 15%

Public Financial Management (PFMx) Module

Assessing Developments and Prospects in the Australian Welfare State

OECD HEALTH DATA 2012 DISSEMINATION AND RESULTS. Marie-Clémence Canaud OECD Health Data National Correspondents Meeting October 12, 2012

US Reimbursement Systems: Effects on R&D

DANMARKS NATIONALBANK

Income support for older persons in the Republic of Korea : a perspective of older persons

Recommendation of the Council concerning Consumer Protection in the Field of Consumer Credit

Third Revised Decision of the Council concerning National Treatment

Decumulation debate. New Zealand Society of Actuaries Financial Services Forum 16 November 2015

TAX POLICY REFORMS 2018

Statistical Annex ANNEX

Public Pension Spending Trends and Outlook in Emerging Europe. Benedict Clements Fiscal Affairs Department International Monetary Fund March 2013

Ageing and employment policies: Ireland

OECD HEALTH SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY 2012

Lecture 10. Welfare State Expenditure ANDREEA STOIAN, PHD DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND CEFIMO

Federal Tax Reform NCSL Executive Committee Task Force on State and Local Taxation Jackson, Wyoming June 16, 2017

Fiscal Policy in Japan

COVERAGE OF PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND MAIN TRENDS IN THE PENSIONS INDUSTRY IN THE OECD

Transcription:

DESIGNING GOOD TAX POLICY: A PRIMER Bert Brys, Ph.D. Senior Tax Economist ADB Workshop on Tax Policy for Domestic Resource Mobilisation, 20-23 September 2018

Outline of the presentation 1 Introduction 2 Tax Revenue 3 Efficiency and Tax Incidence 4 Equity 5 Other objectives and criteria 6 Reconciling conflicting goals 2

Outline of the presentation 1 Introduction 2 Tax Revenue 3 Efficiency and Tax Incidence 4 Equity 5 Other objectives and criteria 6 Reconciling conflicting goals 3

Introduction: when should governments intervene in markets? The role of government is to: improve the functioning of markets (i.e. when markets are inefficient or even fail) Externalities Imperfect competition Imperfect & asymmetric information Individual irrationality and other failures when Pareto efficient private market outcomes are undesirable due to redistributional concerns To finance public goods (non excludable and nonrivalrous): in that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from use and where use by one individual does not reduce availability to others

Positive and negative externalities Externalities occur when producing or consuming goods causes an impact on third parties not directly related/ taken into account in the transaction Correct for negative externalities: i) social costs exceed private costs (e.g. agent s unhealthy way of living, which leads to high health costs for society; pollution); ii) when private return exceeds the societal return (excessive financial sector risk taking; free-riding behaviour) Stimulate in presence of positive externalities: when private agents do not receive the full societal return i.e. social return exceeds private return (R&D) Think of externalities also in terms of markets which are incomplete/ missing markets in the absence of a market there will be no prices (e.g. pollution is often for free) or agents will not be able to transact (e.g. health contracts for the already sick)

A wide range of instruments is available to intervene in markets TAXES + Subsidies (to stimulate the good): financial assistance or subsidies, including cash grants, tax preferences, loan guarantees and low-interest loans, etc. Command-and-control regulations, such as standards or mandates, which may be performance-based (e.g. maximum levels of SO 2 emissions from a plant or sulfur content in fuel) or technology-based (e.g. mandatory use of emissions scrubbers or bans on particular fuels) Price setting and creation of a market & market development (e.g. time dependent road-user charges) Price regulations Fines Permits Information programmes (e.g. equipment labelling requirements regarding environmental performance; advertising campaigns); Government procurement policies, voluntary industry agreements, etc.

Outline of the presentation 1 Introduction 2 Tax Revenue 3 Efficiency and Tax Incidence 4 Equity 5 Other objectives and criteria 6 Reconciling conflicting goals 7

The OECD average tax-to-gdp ratio reached a new record level in 2016 Evolution of the OECD average tax-to-gdp ratio since 1965 60 50 % OECD range OECD average 40 30 34.3 20 24.8 10 0 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: OECD Revenue Statistics Database 8

Mexico Chile Ireland Turkey United States Korea Switzerland Australia Latvia Japan Israel Canada New Zealand Slovak Republic United Kingdom Spain Poland Czech Republic Portugal Estonia Iceland Slovenia Luxembourg Germany Norway Greece Netherlands Hungary Austria Italy Sweden Finland Belgium France Denmark but tax-to-gdp ratios vary widely across countries Tax-to-GDP ratios in OECD countries in 2000 and 2016 50 % 2016 2000 OECD average in 2016 40 OECD: 34.3% 30 20 10 0 Source: OECD Revenue Statistics Database 9

SSCs, PIT and VAT are the main sources of revenues in the OECD Evolution of the OECD average tax mix 2000, 2007 and 2015 PIT CIT SSCs and payroll Property taxes VAT/GST Other consumption taxes Other 2015 24.4 8.9 27.0 5.8 20.0 12.4 2007 23.7 11.2 25.6 5.6 19.5 12.5 2000 24.6 9.6 25.7 5.5 19.2 13.8 0 20 40 60 80 100 Source: OECD Revenue Statistics Database 10

Outline of the presentation 1 Introduction 2 Tax Revenue 3 Efficiency and Tax Incidence 4 Equity 5 Other objectives and criteria 6 Reconciling conflicting goals 11

Efficiency and Tax Incidence A. Minimizing excess burden B. Correcting Externalities and Market Failures C. Tax incidence

A. The efficiency cost of taxation Market economy Public sector Key role of prices Taxes alter Prices Requires Taxes

A. The efficiency costs of taxation Classical economic theory suggests that lump-sum taxation can be carried out without welfare loss. In practice this is not possible. In reality, taxation or sales/work/income/economic activity of any kind causes taxpayers to change behaviour from the no-tax optimum. We think of behaviour without taxes as being optimal (though not always the case!) Thus, the more taxation the more behaviour change the more efficiency loss. How can we tax best? Involves taxing where behaviour change is minimised (or when behaviour changes are good for taxpayers). How much behaviour changes is also known as the elasticity with respect to taxation. In general, the higher the tax rate, the larger the economic distortion and welfare cost as a result of taxation. It is more efficient to spread taxes across all goods to keep each tax rate low.

A. The efficiency costs of taxation No taxation With taxation Sales/Consumption Taxes Income/Payroll Taxes Capital/Corporate Income Taxes The price the consumer pays equals the revenue of the producer Return from work = cost for hiring the worker for the employer Return from savings (s) = cost of capital (p) Market price > producer price The tax system inserts a wedge. Net wage < labour cost s < p

A. Marginal Dead Weight Loss increases with level of the tax rate

A. Taxation and economic growth Recent (2008) OECD research Some taxes are more distortive than others and harm economic growth to a greater degree Ranking of taxes in terms of their negative impact on GDP per capita: 1. Corporate income taxes (CIT, financial transaction taxes) 2. Personal income taxes 3. Consumption taxes (VAT, excise & ecological taxes) 4. Recurrent taxes on immovable property Shift part of the revenue base from income to consumption and property Broad tax bases and low tax rates Reduce tax progressivity But need to also consider equity considerations

B. Correcting for Externalities and Market Failures Taxes can cause economic distortions when they change behaviour away from what it might be otherwise. But not all behaviour changes are bad. Often, the tax system is adjusted for various purposes where the no-tax behaviour is not optimal. Specific tax provisions are offered to encourage or discourage a kind of economic activity. Known as either tax incentives or Pigouvian taxes.

B. Negative Externalities and Taxing Bads Taxing bads can allow government to charge taxpayers for external costs Internalises external costs Increases tax revenue With no efficiency loss It is not acting against the market But it corrects market failures The same holds in the case of inelastic demand Examples Carbon Taxes, Tobacco Taxes, Sugar/Health Taxes

B. Positive Externalities and Tax Incentives to Encourage Goods Just as taxing bads can potentially improve efficiency by internalising externalities, so tax incentives can improve efficiency when well designed. Case of positive externalities Research and Development Energy savings schemes Housing? Market failures Pension savings SME s (financing) Most of the tax incentives are not justified by market failures or externalities, they just reflect specific tax policy goals

B. Tax incentives Additionnality or windfall gain? Does the tax system create new good behaviour? Or just provide a wasteful subsidy to good behaviour that would happen anyway? Distribution of the incentives Does it incentivise new taxpayers? Highincome taxpayers? Low-income taxpayers? Add to the complexity of the tax system

C. Tax Incidence: Introducing a unit tax per littre on producers or consumers Tax Policy Workshop - China - March 2016

C. Tax Incidence Tax incidence is the study of the effects of tax policies on prices and the welfare of individuals Who pays the tax is not necessarily the agent who bears the burden of the tax Why? Statutory incidence is NOT equal to the economic incidence The market equilibrium is independent of who nominally pays the tax Because taxes can be shifted: taxes affect directly the prices of goods, which affect quantities because of behavioural responses, which affect indirectly the price of other goods Who then bears the burden of the tax? The agent who is the least sensitive to the tax; i.e. the agent who changes her/his behaviour the least in response to the tax!

C. Tax Capitalisation Price P before the introduction of the tax t Price after the introduction of the tax: price before tax (i.e. net of tax): P* price after tax (i.e. gross of tax): Q = P*+t In general: P* < P < Q=P*+t The tax t is fully capitalised in the price/ value of the asset) if: P t = P* < P = Q dp/dt=-1 and dq/dt=0 : supplier bears entire burden of the tax as she will now receive a price which is 100% reduced by the tax t while the consumer does not pay anything more than before the introduction of the tax (as Q=P) The tax t is not capitalised in the price/ value of the asset if: P* = P < Q = P + t dp/dt=0 and dq/dt=1: consumer/investor bears the entire burden of the tax as she will now have to pay a price which is 100% increased by the tax t while the supplier continues to receive the same price as before the introduction of the tax

Perfectly inelastic demand: p does not change (dp/dt =0) and q increases fully with t (dq/dt=1) so consumers bear entirely the burden of the tax

Perfectly elastic demand: dp/dt = -1 but q does not change, so producers/suppliers bear the entire burden of the tax

Outline of the presentation 1 Introduction 2 Tax Revenue 3 Efficiency and Tax Incidence 4 Equity 5 Other objectives and criteria 6 Reconciling conflicting goals 27

Horizontal Equity What does horizontal equity mean? Equal treatment of equals Equal in well-being, equal in ability to pay Ability to pay = income, consumption or wealth Equal treatment of various types of income, consumption and assets But.. Capital income : real or nominal? Taxing family or individuals? Does a child and/or a non-working spouse reduce ability to pay?

Vertical Equity Vertical equity requires that income after tax has to be distributed more equally than income before tax What has to be achieved depends on value s judgments about a fair income distribution Among the main differences between OECD and Asean countries Pre-tax inequality is higher in Asean countries, compared to the OECD Inequality as a result of different levels of effort might be OK Relative magnitude of the middle class and of the part of the population below the poverty threshold Vertical equity implies redistribution, which requires progressive taxation Increasing marginal tax rates Average tax rate increases with the tax base

5000 8000 11000 14000 17000 20000 23000 26000 29000 32000 35000 38000 41000 44000 47000 50000 53000 Vertical Equity Average and marginal tax rates PIT in Belgium 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% MTR ATR Taxable income ( )

1000 4000 7000 10000 13000 16000 19000 22000 25000 28000 Vertical Equity Average and marginal tax rates Flat tax 20%, zero-rate band 6000 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% MTR ATR

Channels through which tax policy affects inequality Tax revenues finance expenditure which may reduce inequality Most redistribution occurs through transfers Taxes can reduce disposable income inequality PIT progressivity is the key tool to narrow the distribution of disposable income Taxes can reduce market income inequality Taxes affect pre-tax opportunities and behaviours, e.g. tax and skills Equality of opportunity The tax system can redistribute income across the lifecycle Intra-personal as opposed to inter-personal redistribution, e.g. SSCs to finance future benefits 32

Outline of the presentation 1 Introduction 2 Tax Revenue 3 Efficiency and Tax Incidence 4 Equity 5 Other objectives and criteria 6 Reconciling conflicting goals 33

Other tax objectives and criteria Effective tax system allows government to manage the business cycle through fiscal policy Minimise administrative and compliance costs, which are often the result of: Specific rules for various types of income (Targeted) tax incentives Limit tax avoidance and tax evasion opportunities Stability of tax system Simplicity complexity breeds complexity Provide tax certainty

Outline of the presentation 1 Introduction 2 Tax Revenue 3 Efficiency and Tax Incidence 4 Equity 5 Other objectives and criteria 6 Reconciling conflicting goals 35

Tax policy guidelines Ramsey-rules: higher tax rates for inelastic tax bases Lower tax rates for mobile tax bases Broad bases, low rates Tax bads and subsidise goods Making tax system fair progressivity and raising tax revenues to spend in fair ways

Some tax policy design principles for inclusive growth 1 Broadening tax bases 2 Taking into account overall tax system progressivity 3 Affecting pretax behaviours and opportunities 4 Enhancing tax administration and policy Keep bases broad and rates low Remove inequitable tax expenditures Equitable taxation of capital income Horizontal equity to enhance vertical equity Provide incentives for formalisation Promote the optimal use of human capital Fight against tax avoidance and evasion Increase value for tax money Broaden social security financing Strengthen link between lifetime taxes & benefits Align private & social costs and returns Monitor income & wealth distribution Compensate losers of reforms 37

Bert Brys, Ph.D. Senior Tax Economist Head Country Tax Policy Team Head Personal and Property Taxes Unit Tax Policy and Statistics Division Centre for Tax Policy and Administration 2, rue André Pascal - 75775 Paris Cedex 16 Tel: +33 1 45 24 19 27 Fax: +33 1 44 30 63 51 Bert.Brys@oecd.org www.oecd.org/ctp 38