Lecture 4: Income Taxes Over Time & Across Countries

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Public Economics: Tax & Transfer Policies (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year 2014-2015 Lecture 4: Income Taxes Over Time & Across Countries (January 27 th 2015) (check on line for updated versions)

The modern progressive income tax The modern progressive income tax was created in 1909 in the UK, 1913 in the US, 1914 in France, 1922 in India, 1932 in Argentina, etc., and is based upon the principle of a comprehensive tax base Comprehensive income tax: t = t(y) with y = total income from all income categories (wages + pensions + self-employment income + rent + dividend + interest + etc.) schedular income tax: different tax rates for different income categories (UK system in 19 c )

Effective vs. Marginal tax rates Effective or average tax rate = t(y)/y t(y) progressive if and only if t(y)/y rises with y Marginal tax rate = t (y) t(y) convex = t (y)>0, i.e. t (y) rises with y Convexity implies progressivity (but not necessary: as we will see, U-shaped pattern of marginal tax rates when transfers are taken into account) Most progressive income taxes use a bracket system: fixed marginal tax rates within income brackets But one can also use continuous system Exemple of computations using tax schedules from France and the US: see excel file

Taxing individuals or couples? In many European countries (Scandinavia, UK, Italy, Spain,.), income tax t(y) is based upon individual income y: whether one lives in a couple or not is irrelevant In France, Germany & US (for bottom half of pop), income tax is computed at the level of married couples using «split» system («quotient conjugual»): income tax = 2 x t[ (y 1 +y 2 )/2 ], with y 1,y 2 = spouses incomes With t(y) convex, this favours unequal couples; if y 1 =y 2, there is no tax advantage at all Key question: unitary household or not? The split system can reinforce gender inequality; the individual system favours female labor supply

Marginal vs average tax rates: illustration with French 2013 Income Tax French 2013 income tax schedule Income brackets Marginal tax rate (applied to 2012 incomes) ( ) (%) (barème de l'impôt sur le revenu (IR)) 0 5 964 0,0% (see www.impots.gouv.fr) 5 964 11 896 5,5% French "quotient familial" (QF) sytem: 11 896 26 420 14,0% 26 420 70 830 30,0% 70 830 150 000 41,0% 150 000 45,0% y = taxable income = annual income - standard deduction for profesional expenses (10%) n = number of units of QF (nombre de parts de QF): n=1 if single, n=2 if couple, n=2.5 if couple with 1 kid, etc. y/n = taxable income per QF unift (revenu imposable par part de QF) Income tax = n x t(y/n) (because t(y) is convex, it is better to have a high n)

Exemple with an annual income y = 100 000 and n=2,5 (couple with one kid) (about P99): 100 000-10% x 100 000 = 90 000 (standard deduction for profesional expenses of wage earners: 10%) 90 000 / 2,5 = 36 000 = taxable income per QF unit >>> marginal income tax rate = 30% Income tax per QF unit = 5.5% x (11 896-5 964) + 14% x (26 420-11 896) + 30% x (36 000-26 420) = 4 033 Total income tax = 2,5 x 4 033 = 10 081 >>> average income tax rate = 10 081 / 100 000 = 10,1% >>> average effective tax rate taking into account tax credits etc. = 0,85 x 10,1% = 8,6% >>>>> 8,6% << 30,0%, i.e. average rate << marginal rate

U.S. Federal income tax rates applied to 2013 incomes Note: This does not include the personal tax exemption ($3,900 for singles & $7,800 for couples), the standard deduction ($6,100 for singles & $12,200 for couples), and the earned income tax credit (EITC) (tax rebate for low incomes) I.e. singles start paying federal income taxes above 10,000$ and couples above 20,000$ See Internal revenue service (IRS) web site for complete tax rates and schedules Marginal tax rate Single Married Filing Jointly or Qualified Widow(er) Married Filing Separately 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35% 39,6% $0 $8,925 $0 $17,850 $0 $8,925 $8,925 $36,250 $17,850 $72,500 $8,925 $36,250 $36,250 $87,850 $72,500 $146,400 $36,250 $73,200 $87,850 $183,250 $146,400 $223,050 $73,200 $111,525 $183,250 $398,350 $223,050 $398,350 $111,525 $199,175 $398,350 $400,000 $398,350 $450,000 $199,175 $225,000 $400,000+ $450,000+ $225,000+

(10/10/2012) U.S. Federal income tax rates applied to 2012 incomes Note: This does not include the personal tax exemption ($3,800 for singles & $7,600 for couples), the standard deduction ($5,950 for singles & $11,900 for couples), and the earned income tax credit (EITC) (tax rebate for low incomes) I.e. singles start paying federal income taxes above 9,750$ and couples above 19,500$ See Internal revenue service (IRS) web site for complete tax rates and schedules Marginal tax rate Single Married Filing Jointly or Qualified Widow(er) Married Filing Separately 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35% $0 $8,700 $0 $17,400 $0 $8,700 $8,701 $35,350 $17,401 $70,700 $8,701 $35,350 $35,351 $85,650 $70,701 $142,700 $35,351 $71,350 $85,651 $178,650 $142,701 $217,450 $71,351 $108,725 $178,651 $388,350 $217,451 $388,350 $108,726 $194,175 $388,351+ $388,351+ $194,176+

The top marginal tax rate Top marginal tax rate = marginal tax rate applying to the highest incomes Chaotic history during past century US and UK invented confiscatory tax rates for very high incomes; then big reversal since 1980s Same pattern for top inheritance tax rates: US-UK invented confiscatory top rates, then big reversal since 1980s (see Lectures 6-7) Until 1970s, top tax rates on «unearned income» (capital income) often higher than top tax rate on «earned income» (labor income) Reversal since 1980s: free capital flows with no exchange of information, special tax regimes for capital income >>> regressivity at the top (see France 2010)

100% Figure 3: Top Income Tax Rates: Earned (Labor) vs Unearned (Capital) 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% U.S. (earned income) U.S. (unearned income) U.K. (earned income) U.K. (unearned income) 0% 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

From an elite tax to a mass tax In every country, the income tax at the time it is created is targeted on the top 1-2% of the population; then it is gradually extended to the entire population (or at least to 50-60% of the population). This makes tax revenues much more significant: the mass income tax is an important part of the rise of the modern fiscal state See e.g. graph on fraction of pop subject to tax in France. See my 2001 book (chapters 4-5) for a complete politico-economic history of the French income tax Explanations for this transition from elite to mass tax? Is it happening everywhere in developing countries?

Explanations: Economics/Technology (rise of large corporations and wage-earner status >> easier to tax) or Politics (social acceptability of tax, fiscal consent)? Probably both On the political economy of fiscal development: Besley-Persson, On the Origins of State Capacity, 2009 ; Why do developing countries tax so little?, JEP 2014 Kleven-Kreiner-Saez, Why Can Modern Governments Tax so much?, 2009; How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?, JEP 2014 An interesting contrast: income tax in India and China; see T. Piketty & N. Qian, «Income inequality and progressive income taxation in China and India: 1986-2015», AEJ 2009 [article in pdf format]