Modeling the Credit Card Revolution: The Role of IT Reconsidered

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Modeling the Credit Card Revolution: The Role of IT Reconsidered Lukasz A. Drozd 1 Ricardo Serrano-Padial 2 1 Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 2 University of Wisconsin-Madison April, 2014

The Role of IT in Credit Markets Time- varying Default Risk (Asymmetric Information) Credit Application Credit Utilization (borrowing) Debt Collection (repayment/default)

The Role of IT in Credit Markets Time- varying Default Risk (Asymmetric Information) Credit Application Credit Utilization (borrowing) Debt Collection (repayment/default) Credit Scoring (access, pricing) Behavior Scoring (change of terms) Collection Scoring (collection strategies) IT progress (Continuous Risk Assessment)

The Role of IT in Credit Markets Time- varying Default Risk (Asymmetric Information) Credit Application Credit Utilization (borrowing) Debt Collection (repayment/default) Credit Scoring (access, pricing) Behavior Scoring (change of terms) Collection Scoring (collection strategies) Literature This paper

Missing Ingredient of Existing Theory Conventional view of consumer default on unsecured debt court-based process, truthful revelation of state exogenous eligibility defined by law

Missing Ingredient of Existing Theory Conventional view of consumer default on unsecured debt court-based process, truthful revelation of state exogenous eligibility defined by law Conventional approach at odds with data

Missing Ingredient of Existing Theory Conventional view of consumer default on unsecured debt court-based process, truthful revelation of state exogenous eligibility defined by law Conventional approach at odds with data [1.] most debt discharged informally - Dawsey & Ausubel (2004): >50% of $ defaulted on

Missing Ingredient of Existing Theory Conventional view of consumer default on unsecured debt court-based process, truthful revelation of state exogenous eligibility defined by law Conventional approach at odds with data [1.] most debt discharged informally - Dawsey & Ausubel (2004): >50% of $ defaulted on [2.] vast resources involved in collection of unpaid debt - employment: 350k+ ( 30% share of cc-receivables)

Basic Idea of the Paper In the model: Enforcement by the lending industry with access to IT - enforcement = Ex post State verification (solvency status) - IT = signal extraction technology

Basic Idea of the Paper In the model: Enforcement by the lending industry with access to IT - enforcement = Ex post State verification (solvency status) - IT = signal extraction technology Comparative Statics Exercise: IT progress Increase in signal precision (main channel) Reduction in transaction costs

Basic Idea of the Paper signal of solvency action or no action PRA, Investor PresentaGon, 2011 Q3

Preview of Results Better enforcement technology implies bt to to Median Med. HH Income l 6% Net Credit Card Charge-off Rate 7% Credit Card Inter (trend) 5% 6% 5% 1997 2000 2004 Year 4% 3% 1990 1993 1997 2000 2004 Year 4% 3% accounts for most puzzling development in cc-market *) premium in excess of approximate opportuni and net charge-off rate on c 1990 1993 1997 Year

Preview of Results Better enforcement technology implies bt to to Median Med. HH Income l 6% Net Credit Card Charge-off Rate 7% Credit Card Inter (trend) 5% 6% 5% 1997 2000 2004 Year 4% 3% 1990 1993 1997 2000 2004 Year 4% 3% *) premium in excess of approximate opportuni and net charge-off rate on c 1990 1993 1997 Year charge-off rate = (net) debt discharged / total debt

Model CONSUMERS Y- B First sub- period Y Second sub- period LENDERS

Model CONSUMERS distress shock d=0,1 (unobservable to lenders) Y- B First sub- period Y Second sub- period LENDERS

Model CONSUMERS distress shock d=0,1 (unobservable borrowing/ to lenders) consumption default at a penalty Y- B First sub- period Y Second sub- period LENDERS

Model CONSUMERS distress shock d=0,1 (unobservable borrowing/ to lenders) consumption default at a penalty monitoring - d=0: repay + penalty charge - d=1: no effect consumption Y- B First sub- period Y Second sub- period LENDERS

Model CONSUMERS distress shock d=0,1 (unobservable borrowing/ to lenders) consumption default at a penalty monitoring - d=0: repay + penalty charge - d=1: no effect consumption Y- B First sub- period Y Second sub- period LENDERS

Model CONSUMERS distress shock d=0,1 (unobservable borrowing/ to lenders) consumption default at a penalty monitoring - d=0: repay + penalty charge - d=1: no effect consumption Y- B First sub- period Y Second sub- period LENDERS

Model CONSUMERS distress shock d=0,1 (unobservable borrowing/ to lenders) consumption default at a penalty monitoring - d=0: repay + penalty charge - d=1: no effect consumption Y- B First sub- period Y Second sub- period LENDERS

Equilibrium Contracts Three types of equilibrium contracts

Equilibrium Contracts Three types of equilibrium contracts L L min(d = 1): Risk-free contracts (no default regardless of d)

Equilibrium Contracts Three types of equilibrium contracts L L min(d = 1): Risk-free contracts (no default regardless of d) L > L min(d = 1): Risky Contracts (positive probability of default) - L (L min (d = 1), L min (d = 0)]: Non-monitored contracts (default if d = 1 for all P (s)) - L > L min (d = 0): Monitored contracts (default if d = 1, or if d = 0 and P (s) < P )

Monitoring Strategies Two types of monitoring strategies for monitored contracts

Monitoring Strategies Two types of monitoring strategies for monitored contracts Full monitoring: P (s) = P for all s - prevents strategic default of non-distressed consumers - monitoring costs P p (do not depend on π)

Monitoring Strategies Two types of monitoring strategies for monitored contracts Full monitoring: P (s) = P for all s - prevents strategic default of non-distressed consumers - monitoring costs P p (do not depend on π) Selective monitoring: P (0) = P and P (1) < P - prevents strategic default of non-distressed consumers only for s = 0. - monitoring costs P P rob(d = 1, s = 0) + P (1) P rob(s = 1)

Monitoring Strategies Two types of monitoring strategies for monitored contracts Full monitoring: P (s) = P for all s - prevents strategic default of non-distressed consumers - monitoring costs P p (do not depend on π) Selective monitoring: P (0) = P and P (1) < P - prevents strategic default of non-distressed consumers only for s = 0. - monitoring costs P P rob(d = 1, s = 0) + P (1) P rob(s = 1) (decrease as π increases)

How Do Lenders Price Defaultable Debt R Selective Monitoring Premium + Strategic Default Premium Full Monitoring Premium Default Premium 0 risk-free non-monitored monitored L

How Does π Impact Pricing? I IC 0 risk-free non-monitored monitored L

How Does π Impact Pricing? I IT Progress π IC 0 risk-free non-monitored monitored L

Quantitative Extension Life-cycle environment (27 periods) Analytic model embedded within each period baseline period length (1 sub-period) = 1 year B endogenous Y stochastic E = (Y <.25Ȳ ) + medical bills + divorce + unwanted pregnancy Only medical shock assumed directly defaultable low φ

Model Accounts for Both Trends and Levels Credit Card Debt to to Median Med. HH Income 20% 6% Model Net Credit Card Charge-off Rate 7% Credit Card Interest Premium* 15% Data (trend) 5% 6% 5% 10% 5% 1990 1993 1997 2000 2004 Year 4% 3% 1990 1993 1997 2000 2004 Year 4% 3% *) premium in excess of approximate opportunity cost of funds and net charge-off rate on credit card debt 1990 1993 1997 2000 2004 Year - information precision x3 over the 90s - transaction cost declines by 20% (Berger, 2003)

Why Model Matches Trends? Benchmark Model Decomposition 90s 00s τ 90s π 90s (in % unless otherwise noted) π 00s τ 00s τ fit CC Debt to Med. Income 9.0 15.1 11.2 13.9 15.1 CC Charge-off Rate 3.5 5.4 5.5 4.1 4.1 Defaults (per 1000) 4.5 10.8 9.0 7.5 7.9 - fraction monitored 30 18 17 31 32 - fraction strategic 0.0 19 19 0 0 Frequency of Risky Cont. 21.4 36.6 35.7 31.3 31.1 - fraction fully monitored 100 1 0 100 100 - fraction sel. monitored 0 99 100 0 0 Discharge to Income 74 89 82 80 82 CC Interest Premium 6.5 4.4 6.1 5.3 4.6

Why Model Matches Levels? Standard model: 0 (d=0) Non distressed: No default (d=1) Distressed: No default Default L 1

Why Model Matches Levels? Our model: 0 (d=0) Non distressed: No default Default if not monitored No default if monitored (d=1) Distressed: No default Default L 1

Conclusions Complementary mechanism of IT-driven expansion of credit card lending departure motivated by: - prevalence of informal bankruptcy - involvement of lenders in debt collection Addresses Achilles heel of existing models

THE END

BACKUP SLIDES

Literature: Unsecured Credit and IT Adverse Selection and Ex-ante Role of IT Narajabad (2012), Athreya, Tam and Young (2008), Sanchez (2012) Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2011) Informal Bankruptcy Benjamin and Mateos-Planas (2011), Athreya, Sanchez, Tam and Young (2012), Chatterjee (2010) Standard Modeling Frameworks Livshits & MacGee and Tertilt (2006, 2010), Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2007), Athreya (2003) etc... define modeling issues / challenges

Lenders: Contract Assignment Choose K = (R, L) & P (s) to maximize subject to max V (K, P ) K,P EΠ(I, K, P ) λ δ(i, K, P )P (s)p rob(i) 0, I=(d,s) where I (d, s) and ex-post profit function Π(I, K, P ) given by { R max{b(i, K, P ), 0} if δ(i, K, P ) = 0 Π(I, K, P ) = L + L(1 + R)(1 d)p (s) if δ(i, K, P ) = 1

Consumers: Decision to Default Choose δ {0, 1} to maximize V (K, P ) E max [(1 δ)n(i, K, P ) + δd(i, K, P )] δ {0,1} where I = (d, s) and N( ) is indirect utility fcn. associated with repayment D( ) is indirect utility fcn. associated with default

Consumers: Indirect Utility from Repayment Under repayment, choose b, c, c to maximize N(I, K) max b L U(c, c ) subject to { c = Y B + b ρ(k, b) c = Y b de ρ(k, b) where I = (d, s) and ρ(k, b) = R max{b(i, K, P ), 0}/2

Consumers: Indirect Utility from Default Under default, choose b, c, c to maximize D(I, K, P ) max E IU(c, c ) L b 0 subject to { c = Y B + L + b c = (1 θ)y (1 φ)de b mx(d) where I = (d, s) and X(d) = (1 d)((θ θ)y + L(1 + R)) θy + RL s.t. d=0-consumer does not default if P = 1

Definition of Equilibrium Equilibrium is: indirect utility functions V ( ), N( ), D( ) and decision functions δ( ), b( ), K( ), P ( ) s.t. consistent with problems defined above.

Parameterization Calibrated independently: Y 6x6-Markov, E = 0.4, p =.1, φ =.25

Parameterization Calibrated independently: Y 6x6-Markov, E = 0.4, p =.1, φ =.25 Choose β, θ, θ, π, λ indebtedness for 2004: 15% charge-off rate for 2004: 5% discharge to income of bankruptcy filer in the 90s 3 fold increase in π centered around.5 λ =.3 to get regime switch around π =.5

Parameterization Calibrated independently: Y 6x6-Markov, E = 0.4, p =.1, φ =.25 Choose β, θ, θ, π, λ indebtedness for 2004: 15% charge-off rate for 2004: 5% discharge to income of bankruptcy filer in the 90s 3 fold increase in π centered around.5 λ =.3 to get regime switch around π =.5 Decline of transaction cost by 20% (consistent with Berger, 2003)

Direct Impact of IT-Based Solution In early 90s, GE capital developed PAYMENT; first comprehensive solution (Markuch et al., 1992) to direct collection resources: Markov model of evolution of delinquent debt as a function of possible actions taken by collectors systematic comparison of accounts treated vs non-treated - report 7-9% gain in overall effectiveness and improved borrower goodwill - explicit mention that most gains due to more frequent selection of no action - as for first implementation of this sort of system this is big number

Direct Impact of IT-Based Solution Banerjee (2001) directly looks at yield from litigation on cc-receivables: yield from litigation boosted from 24% to 40% by IT!

Direct Impact of IT-Based Solution Other industry studies report even higher numbers: PRA, major debt collection agency, reports 120% gain in debt recovered per dollar spent on collection over the years 1997-2004 (Annual Report, 2011) Trustmark National Bank, discussed adoption of Fair ISAAK debt collection system in late 90s: 35-58% gain on consumer receivables with same staff

Other Important Evidence In 90s all 3 major credit bureaus started offering collection scores, marketed to debt collection industry; this accounts for 7% of their revenue, which suggests: 1. these scores aid collection by segmenting/prioritizing debtors 2. segmentation and prioritization is of first order importance

Comparison to the Model IT progress rate in the ballpark of assumed numbers: in model 33% gain in efficiency, industry data report vary between 9%-120% Cost of monitoring on the high side, but not unreasonable: pre-payment GE spent $150 million on final write-offs $400 million - suggests 150/(400/.74)=.28 as upper bound on monitoring cost (we use.3) - aggregate costs also consistent with the model s implication: data: 350k*$50k*30% -2% x $800 billion on 5%x800 billion aggregate charge-offs