Box 7 LABOUR MARKET IN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS This box provides an overview of differences in adjustments in the and the since the beginning of the global financial crisis. It presents some stylised facts on a number of key indicators, including the unemployment rate, the labour force participation rate and labour cost developments. Unemployment and employment trends In the two years following the start of the economic crisis in 27, the in the deteriorated very quickly and the pace of adjustment was more substantial than in the (see Chart A). Labour hoarding practices in s during the initial phase of the crisis contributed to mitigating employment adjustment (see Chart B), as firms showed a widespread preference for forms of internal flexibility, such as cutting overtime and making use of short-time working schemes. Over recent years, however, unemployment rates in the two regions have diverged substantially, reflecting significant differences in real GDP growth. Since mid-2, employment growth has turned positive and the unemployment rate has decreased markedly in the. In the, the opposite has been observed. As a result, the gap between the two unemployment rates has increased continuously. In June 213 the unemployment rate for the was 12.1% and that for the was 7.6%. In the initial phase of the crisis the statistical relationship between economic growth and the unemployment rate in the deviated significantly from its longer-term trend. This was owing to a strong reliance on short-time working schemes in some countries. However, subsequent aggregate unemployment developments in the started to be more broadly in line with typical patterns, meaning that unemployment became more sensitive to changes in real GDP after the initial period of labour hoarding, and weak August 213 67
Chart A Unemployment rate Chart B Employment and real GDP growth (percentage of the labour force; seasonally adjusted data; monthly data) (year-on-year percentage changes; quarterly data) employment real GDP US employment US real GDP 13 13 12 12 3 3 11 9 8 7 6 11 9 8 7 6 2 1-1 -2-3 - 2 1-1 -2-3 - - - 27 28 29 2 211 212-6 27 28 29 2 211 212-6 economic activity was increasingly reflected in a higher unemployment rate. By contrast, in the, the stronger adjustment in the initial phase of the crisis and the stronger rebound in employment once economic growth resumed were more in line with historical patterns. Unemployment breakdown by age and duration Younger workers have been particularly hit by the crisis in both regions, but in the, unlike in the, the youth unemployment rate has been declining (see Chart C). Developments in the unemployment rates in the and the classified by age cohorts ( youth and above 2 years ) follow a broadly similar trend to the total unemployment rate. Overall, the youth unemployment rate in the increased on average from 1.% in 27 to 23.9% in June 213, while in the it increased from.6% to 16.3%. In the, the share of those unemployed for more than a year initially decreased, but since 29 this trend has reversed (see Chart D). The initial fall partly reflected the rise in short-term unemployment at the beginning of the crisis. In the, by contrast, the crisis initially resulted in a large increase in the share of long-term unemployed. This rise could be linked to an extension of the duration of unemployment benefit introduced in 28, which increased incentives for individuals to remain unemployed. According to IMF estimates, structural unemployment (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment NAIRU) in the stood at.1% in 212, up from 7.% in 27. In the, the increase in structural unemployment was smaller over the same period (6.1% in 212, up from.% in 27). These differences imply that a large part of the rise in unemployment is structural, while in the it is interpreted as being mostly cyclical. Based on these 68 August 213
Chart C Unemployment rate breakdown by age Chart D Share of long-term unemployment (relative to the labour force; seasonally adjusted data; monthly data) (relative to total unemployment; annual data) youth youth 2 year olds and above 2 year olds and above unemployed for more than a year unemployed for more than a year unemployed for more than 27 weeks 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 27 28 29 2 211 212 27 28 29 2 211 212 Note: The youth unemployment rate refers to 1-2 year olds in the and to 16-2 year olds in the. Sources: OECD, Eurostat and BLS. Note: The share of long-term unemployment is defined in the as those that are unemployed for over 27 weeks or more than one year relative to the total unemployed, and in the as those that are unemployed for more than a year relative to the total unemployed. estimates, since 27 almost two-thirds of the rise in the unemployment rate is thus considered to be structural in the, compared with one-third in the. Labour force participation developments The difference in unemployment developments relative to the also reflects very different developments in participation (see Chart E). One of the most notable features of the crisis is that the participation rate increased in the. This reflected the ongoing trend of rising female participation in the (see Chart F). By contrast, in the, the participation rate declined significantly between 27 and 212. Over the period 2-12, the decline in the participation rate contributed significantly to the fall in the unemployment rate in the. At the same time, the rising participation rate in the explains part of the rise in the unemployment rate. Assuming that, in both the and the, the labour force participation ratios had remained unchanged compared with 27 and that the difference to the actual ratios had been fully reflected in the number of unemployed, the US unemployment rate in 212 would have been higher than that of the. The diverging participation rates between the and the indicate that there has been a significant amount of slack in the that has not been fully captured by unemployment rate developments. August 213 69
Chart E Total labour force participation rate (relative to the 1/16 years and over populations) Chart F Female labour force participation rate (relative to the 1/16 years and over female populations) 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 27 2 212 Note: The labour force participation rate was computed for the 1 years and over population for the and the 16 years and over population for the. 27 2 212 Labour cost developments Between the first quarter of 27 and the first quarter of 213, unit labour costs in business sectors grew significantly more in the than in the (see Charts G and H). Chart G Unit labour cost developments in the business sector (Q1 27 = ; quarterly data) Chart H Unit labour cost developments in the US non-farm business sector (Q1 27 = ; quarterly data) unit labour costs labour productivity per hour worked hourly compensation per employee unit labour costs labour productivity per hour worked hourly compensation per employee 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 27 28 29 2 211 212 Sources: Eurostat and calculations. Note: Business sector in the is defined as the total economy, excluding public administration and defence; compulsory social security; education; human health and social work activities. 9 27 28 29 2 211 212 Source: BLS. 9 7 August 213
These developments mainly reflected lower hourly labour productivity growth in the, but also somewhat higher growth in hourly compensation per employee than in the. Major labour hoarding in the initial phase of the crisis and a lack of adequate restructuring in a context of contracting economic activity, weighed on the labour productivity growth performance of the. At the same time, in the, wage developments closely followed labour productivity performance, whereas in the wage growth was decoupled from productivity developments. To sum up, there are several factors behind the different performances of the s in both regions since the beginning of the crisis. Overall, the more flexible in the led to faster and stronger adjustments to the initial downward shocks and was coupled with more moderate unit labour cost developments than in the. This, in turn, may have contributed to facilitating economic adjustment and restructuring and may have been one reason why, since 2, economic activity has begun to develop significantly more favourably in the than in the. Beyond the need for strengthening structural reforms in the to boost competition and productivity, this highlights the need for reforms to ensure that wages respond more flexibly and appropriately to labour productivity and employment developments in the future. August 213 71