Determining factors of cross-country dispersion in life satisfaction: evidence from Europe (Work in progress) Daphne Nicolitsas To be presented in Session 4.2 - Parents-Offspring relations and life satisfaction June 19, 2016 Abstract Life satisfaction scores appear pronouncedly negatively skewed in some countries - in general countries with high average life satisfaction - but much more uniformly distributed in other countries. The determinants of these cross-country differences in dispersion is the issue this paper investigates. Following the work of Hamermesh (2001) the hypothesis being tested is that dispersion is lower in countries in which the probability of a discrepancy between the outcomes of individuals lives and their expectations is narrow. A number of descriptive characteristics appear to be consistent with this hypothesis. A more formal test of this hypothesis is done by investigating the association between the difference of actual remuneration from the remuneration predicted by using observable individual characteristics (fitted income) with life satisfaction. The results so far suggest that the hypothesis put forward cannot be rejected JEL classification: I39, J17, J28, J31, M52 Keywords: life satisfaction; fairness; expectations 1 Introduction Across country differences in average life satisfaction are a familiar feature of cross-country studies on subjective well-being. The satisfied Danes and the not so satisfied citizens of Eastern European countries are by now almost clichés. Differences in per capita income are part of the explanation although the low average subjective well-being measure for France, lower than in the Czech Republic, cannot be attributed to this. 1 University of Crete; nikolitsa@uoc.gr. Support through grant KA4446 by the University of Crete is gratefully acknowledged. Participants at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Scottish Economists in April 2016 and at the Research Seminar Series at the Economics Department of Freie University in May 2016 provided useful comments on a slightly earlier version. 1 See, for example, Figure 2.2. in the World Happiness Report 2016, Vol. I. 1
Countries, however, differ in other aspects of life satisfaction besides the average score. Life satisfaction scores are pronouncedly negatively skewed in certain countries in general countries with high average life satisfaction but much more uniformly distributed in other countries. Explanations for the cross-country differences in the dispersion of life satisfaction is the issue this paper investigates. Starting from the premise that individuals assess their satisfaction from life by comparing outcomes with expectations (Kahneman, 1999) the hypothesis put forward here is that in countries in which the distribution of life satisfaction scores is negatively skewed, individuals are less dissatisfied with outcomes. This is so because their expectations are more frequently met but also because, in the absence of the perception of generalized unfair treatment, the probability that they will be treated fairly is higher. The framework is based on the work of Hamermesh (2001) and is presented in Section 2. The empirical analysis is conducted using the European Social Survey (ESS) database described in Section 3. Section 4 presents some descriptive information while Section 5 presents and discusses a more formal analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 2 Framework Hamermesh (2001) aims to show the existence or otherwise of a link from the inequality of earnings to the dispersion of job satisfaction. He argues that job satisfaction depends on workers expectations about earnings and working conditions. Depending on when expectations are formed and how swiftly these are revised, Hamermesh distinguishes between four hypotheses which he subsequently tests. The results suggest that workers job satisfaction is especially responsive to surprises in the returns to observable skills but less so to surprises in the returns to unobservables. In a separate strand of literature, Schwarze (2008) argues that individuals life satisfaction depends on ex ante income uncertainty. It is the above two strands of the literature that we aim to combine here. One way of modelling the determination of life satisfaction is to assume that the difference from average life satisfaction depends on the size of the discrepancy between expectations and realizations. Individuals for which realizations are worse than expectations are likely to be disappointed and exhibit lower than average life satisfaction than those for which realizations either match or exceed expectations [the asymmetry needs to be explained]. In a schematic way for individual i we have: S i S = f(r i E i ) (1) S satisfaction, S is average life satisfaction, R realized (actual) outcome, E expected outcome. Realizations and expectations concern a number of dimensions: activity status, earnings, health, social activity, family life. where f > 0 if R i < E i and f = 0 if R i > E i. 2
A substantive is the form of function f: a linear function would imply that satisfaction decreases at the same rate independently of the size of the discrepancy between realizations and expectations. If instead we assume that f is a quasi-concave function (f > 0) then we are assuming that satisfaction decreases at an increasing rate as the discrepancy between realizations and expectations increases. We further assume that the sensitivity of the reaction of satisfaction to the discrepancy depends on the extent to which the society is deemed to be fair - in effect this is a measure of ex ante income uncertainty. The way expectations are formed is also important - as a simplification, however, we will assume here that they are formed based by the observable skills (education, tenure) that one possesses. The role of family background will be investigated. 3 The European Social Survey The European Social Survey (ESS) is a cross-national survey of individuals aged 15 and over resident within private households. The survey is conducted every two years since 2002, and by 2014 had completed 7 rounds. The survey, however, is not longitudinal. While the sample of countries participating in the survey has not been constant over time, a sample of 16 countries is present in all 7 rounds. 2 on attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns using the same questionnaire in each country. 3 The survey collects information The questions to elicit the subjective well-being (SWB) measures are presented in Table 1. The survey contains data on two types of measures, following the classification introduced by Deaton and Stone (2013), evaluative and hedonic measures. Evaluative measures are based on individuals rankings of life satisfaction and happiness on a 0 to 10 scale with 0 being extremely dissatisfied (unhappy) and 10 being extremely satisfied (happy). Measures of job satisfaction and of satisfaction from the work-life balance achieved are also reported in Rounds 3-6. Hedonic measures, which have been used by inter alia, Kahneman et al. (2006), ask individuals about the length of time they have felt calm and relaxed, active and cheerful during the last one or two weeks. According to Deaton and Stone (2013) the two types of measure are associated with different types of income: evaluative measures are more closely related to permanent income while hedonic measures are more closely related to transitory measures of income. As the issue being investigated here is structural rather than conjunctural, we will be using the evaluative measures. [As am extemsion we will, however, also look at associations using the hedonic measures as we do not have measures of permanent income.] The survey also contains measures of income. In all rounds (non-equivalised household) income coded in intervals is available. However, this is usable only from Round 4 (2008) onwards: only from then do intervals correspond to country income deciles. Prior to 2005 intervals had not been adjusted for cross-country differences. In two rounds (Round 2 and Round 5), however, individual remuneration income (gross 4 of taxes and social security contributions) in absolute figures is also recorded. [Missing values do exist and the lack of 2 Table 12 provides information on the composition of the sample by round. 3 Information on methodological issues (e.g. sampling, sample sizes by country, dealing with non-response etc) can be found at the following link http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/index.html. 4 In Round 2 data on net pay has also been collected. 3
Table 1: The survey questions underlying the reported SWB measures Round Variable Question Evaluative measures All rounds Life satisfaction All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied Round 3 Life satisfaction How satisfied are you with how your life has turned out so far? Please use this card were 0 is labelled as Extremely dissatisfied and 10 as Extremely satisfied Round 3 Standard of living And how satisfied are you with your present standard of living? Please use this card were 0 is labelled as Extremely dissatisfied and 10 as Extremely satisfied All rounds Happiness Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? Please use this card were 0 is labelled as Extremely unhappy and 10 as Extremely happy Rounds 3,5,6 Job satisfaction All things considered, how satisfied are you with your present job? Please use this card were 0 is labelled as Extremely unsatisfied and 10 as Extremely satisfied Rounds 3,5,6 Work-life balance How satisfied are you with the balance between the time satisfaction you spend on your paid work and the time you spend on other aspects of your life? Please use this card were 0 is labelled as Extremely unsatisfied and 10 as Extremely satisfied Hedonic measures Rounds 3,6 Calmness Time in the last week felt calm and peaceful? Range of 1-4 with 1 labelled None or almost none of the time and 4 labelled All or almost all of the time Rounds 2,5 Calmness I have felt calm and relaxed in the last two weeks. Range of 1-6 with 1 labelled All of the time and 6 labelled At no time Rounds 2,5 Cheerful I have felt cheerful and in good spirits in the last two weeks. Range of 1-6 with 1 labelled All of the time and 6 labelled At no time Rounds 2,5 Active I have felt active and vigorous in the last two weeks. Range of 1-6 with 1 labelled All of the time and 6 labelled At no time Source: European Social Survey (ESS). 4
Table 2: ESS measures of whether justice is being served Variable Values Round Courts decisions are unduly influenced by political pressure Agreement 1-5 5 Courts protect rich & powerful over ordinary people Agreement 1-5 5 Frequency of impartial & fair court decisions Scale 0-10 5 Assessment of quality of courts job Scale 1-5 5 Courts treat eveyone the same Scale 0-10 6 Importance for democracy that courts treat all equally Scale 0-10 6 Source: European Social Survey (ESS). randomness in replies remains an issue.] Information is also available on the period covered by this pay (hourly, daily, monthly or annual income). Table 13 in the Appendix shows the number of observations, in Round 5, for which information on absolute remuneration levels is available in each country together with the number of all employed individuals. Respondents to the ESS survey are also asked whether they think the remuneration paid reflects the effort they put in the job. Finally, the ESS also contains information on whether individuals assess their household income as being adequate. As the focus on this paper is on the comparison between actual and expected outcomes and the feeling of injustice, the ESS database appears suitable since it contains information about individuals perceptions of courts effectiveness. These measures could proxy individuals views on fairness. Table 2 presents details on these variables. It is possible, as argued by Schwarze (2008), that well-being is influenced negatively by ex ante income uncertainty. Ex ante income uncertainty is likely to be higher when fair treatment is not prevalent. A separate measure of uncertainty is also included in the ESS database: individuals are asked to report whether they feel their current job is secure. 4 Descriptive information on the distribution of life satisfaction measures Differences in average life satisfaction are illustrated in Figure 1. These are by now well-known and the rankings of countries on this measure appear to remain relatively constant over time [reference]. What is less known is that substantial cross-country differences exist in the distribution of life satisfaction within each country. Figure 2 shows the distribution of life satisfaction in each country. The data refer to the 15 countries for which ESS data for 2014 are available. The countries have been organized in three groups according to the cumulative percentage of the population with a life satisfaction score of 7 or below. Countries with the lowest share of individuals with a score below 7 are in the top most row, countries with the highest share of individuals with a score below 7 are in the lowest row of the Figure. A feature that emerges from this 5
Figure 1: Average life satisfaction across countries (2014) Figure is that in countries in the top row of Figure 2, which are countries with high average life satisfaction scores, the distribution of life satisfaction is very negatively skewed. The first issue we address when trying to investigate the above cross-country differences is whether this is a conjunctural phenomenon. It appears that this is not the case; Figure 5 in the Appendix shows that cross-country differences in the distribution of life satisfaction according to the 2004 ESS data is very similar to the picture for 2014. The second issue has to do with composition effects. More specifically, we seek to establish whether cross-country differences in the distribution of life satisfaction reflect differences in the tightness of the labour market or differences in per capita income. In order to investigate whether the increased concentration of individuals at the higher end of the life satisfaction distribution in, for example, Norway is due to the very low unemployment rate there we look at the distribution of life satisfaction only for employed individuals. Figure 3 shows the data. The picture that emerges is similar to that of Figure 2 which presented the distribution for the population as a whole. As life satisfaction and household income are positively related (see, inter alia, Deaton, 2011) a possible reason behind Figure 2 is that countries with a negatively skewed distribution of life satisfaction are, in general, higher income countries. Differences in per capita income could not, however, explain why, for example, the distribution of life satisfaction in Germany is less negatively skewed than in Finland nor why the distribution of life satisfaction in France or Ireland is less negatively skewed than in Poland. 5 While comparisons of the life 5 Data on per capita income per country are presented in Table 14 in the Appendix. Furthermore, Section A in the Appendix shows the income deciles in each country. These are the thresholds used for the income intervals in the ESS questionnaire for Round 7 (2014). 6
Figure 2: Distribution of life satisfaction scores (2014) Figure 3: Distribution of life satisfaction scores (2014)- Employed individuals only 7
satisfaction of individuals with the same level of income across countries is not possible, Table 3 shows average life satisfaction by decile in each country. The figures clearly suggest that average life satisfaction increases with income and that the cross-country dispersion in average life satisfaction is lowest for the highest income deciles. However, the difference in average life satisfaction between the highest and the lowest income deciles is highest for countries with lower average life satisfaction. Table 4 presents the percentage of individuals with a score below or equal to 7 in each income decile in each country. However, in contrast to the average life satisfaction measure here the coefficient of variation appears to be highest for the high income groups. Table 3: Average life satisfaction by income decile, 2014 Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average (10)-(1) AT 6.6 7.2 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.7 8.0 7.6 7.5 8.3 7.3 1.7 BE 6.7 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.7 8.0 7.4 1.3 CH 7.4 7.1 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.4 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.1 1.0 CZ 5.6 6.1 6.0 6.3 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.8 7.5 6.5 1.9 DE 6.2 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 7.3 2.0 DK 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.7 8.8 8.8 0.8 FI 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.9 7.9 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.4 8.4 8.4 1.2 FR 5.3 5.3 6.0 6.4 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.7 7.5 2.4 IE 6.7 6.6 6.9 7.2 7.1 7.4 7.2 7.4 7.5 8.1 7.9 1.4 NL 6.7 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.6 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.1 1.4 NO 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.8 8.2 8.1 8.3 8.2 8.2 0.8 PL 6.1 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.8 7.2 7.1 7.5 7.3 7.8 7.9 1.7 SE 7.3 7.1 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.4 8.2 1.1 SI 5.3 5.7 6.1 6.4 6.9 7.1 6.9 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.7 2.2 Std. dev. 0.85 0.75 0.68 0.64 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.46 0.55 0.37 0.58 0.50 Coef.Variation 0.13 0.11 0.096 0.089 0.076 0.069 0.068 0.060 0.070 0.046 0.073 0.33 Source: ESS, 2014 The cross-country dispersion in life satisfaction appears to be less pronounced for youth. Table 5 shows the percentage of individuals with a score below or equal to 7 by age group. It is clear that countries differences with respect to the distribution of life satisfaction scores exists for each age group. However, differences are less pronounced for younger age groups as witnessed by the fact that the coefficient of variation of the % of individuals with a score or equal to 7 is lower for these groups. This appears to be consistent with the view that young individuals have not been disillusioned. Admittedly, this difference across age groups could also arise for other reasons: earnings of youth are probably more compressed both within and between countries. We turn next to see whether we can find associations between life satisfaction and first, the extent to 8
which individuals perceive the society they live in as fair and second, the extent to which remuneration received differs from remuneration expected. Table 4: % of individuals with a life satisfaction of 7 or below by income decile, 2014 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Denmark (DK) 24.6 26.8 25.8 24.3 22.2 19.3 15.3 15.0 8.4 8.7 Switzerland (CH) 37.0 46.7 30.8 27.2 24.2 19.1 23.8 16.8 17.1 20.7 Norway (NO) 43.9 40.5 33.3 28.5 29.2 29.6 19.8 24.6 20.4 18.4 Finland (FI) 41.6 37.3 42.8 28.9 27.2 21.9 19.8 23.7 12.5 12.6 Netherlands (NL) 59.0 52.8 53.7 51.5 42.2 38.6 29.0 25.9 22.6 17.2 Sweden (SE) 46.2 44.9 42.2 33.6 36.4 35.1 33.8 29.2 20.7 19.9 Germany (DE) 63.3 56.6 53.7 46.6 41.5 40.2 38.7 36.0 26.1 17.4 Belgium (BE) 57.7 49.2 50.0 50.3 52.6 38.7 37.9 32.7 31.1 24.8 Austria (AT) 59.2 50.2 50.3 49.1 45.4 39.5 29.3 30.5 40.0 22.2 Poland (PL) 64.4 59.3 58.9 56.3 55.1 44.6 47.5 44.4 48.9 28.3 Ireland (IE) 61.2 58.6 57.1 54.1 54.0 42.5 47.1 42.7 39.0 33.3 Slovenia (SI) 77.9 74.2 68.0 66.4 55.3 52.1 50.5 40.6 37.3 46.7 France (FR) 72.9 70.2 70.7 65.5 59.4 60.7 54.7 50.0 39.6 38.7 Czech Rep. (CZ) 74.6 64.5 65.1 69.0 61.7 56.7 53.2 57.6 56.0 36.7 St. dev. 15.4 12.9 13.8 15.5 13.6 12.9 13.4 12.4 14.0 10.8 Coef.Variation 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.47 0.44 Source: ESS, 2014 5 Analysis 5.1 Fairness in general We start from the issue of fairness. In order to test the hypothesis that life satisfaction is higher when individuals feel they are or will be treated more fairly, we use the information in the ESS database which pertains to the perception of fairness. As indicated in Section 3 the ESS contains data on how individuals view the reward of justice in the country they are residing, whether they are being fairly treated and appropriately paid. Unfortunately, these variables are not available in every round. Most of these variables are available for Round 5 (see Table 2) and this is the Round we use in the estimates below. Figure 4 presents the distribution for the variable that shows disagreement with the view that the courts protect the rich and powerful. Individuals views are coded on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 corresponding to Strong agreement and 5 with Strong disagreement. 9
Table 5: % of individuals with a life satisfaction of 7 or below by age group, 2014 Age groups 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-74 75+ Denmark (DK) 10.7 21.5 20.4 19.8 19.0 15.4 14.5 17.2 Switzerland (CH) 22.8 30.7 28.2 29.4 26.8 19.0 22.8 23.8 Norway (NO) 29.4 35.3 31.1 31.1 27.6 27.5 21.2 32.6 Finland (FI) 26.8 33.3 25.2 29.5 25.9 22.7 26.2 25.1 Netherlands (NL) 37.7 37.8 34.6 36.8 42.2 38.8 35.5 44.1 Sweden (SE) 30.7 37.9 34.5 31.3 30.4 25.8 26.2 32.5 Germany (DE) 36.5 39.8 41.2 39.4 45.7 42.2 37.1 35.4 Belgium (BE) 27.6 41.8 41.5 45.6 40.9 40.3 43.2 39.7 Austria (AT) 17.5 37.3 45.1 49.5 45.5 42.9 46.6 49.1 Poland (PL) 47.9 43.2 42.1 51.0 59.8 63.9 54.3 54.5 Ireland (IE) 39.3 58.4 53.5 55.8 58.3 53.3 48.8 47.1 Slovenia (SI) 37.9 54.5 49.1 56.4 70.6 62.3 60.2 66.7 France (FR) 37.1 50.9 60.5 61.7 63.7 61.1 61.8 60.7 Czech Rep.(CZ) 47.9 48.7 59.9 59.9 69.1 66.1 61.7 67.7 Estonia (EE) 42.1 55.6 50.8 64.9 74.8 66.9 74.3 71.4 St. dev. 10.6 10.2 12.2 14.1 18.4 18.2 17.9 17.1 Coef. Variation 32.3 24.5 29.7 32.0 39.4 42.2 42.4 38.4 Source: ESS, 2014 10
Figure 4: Disagreement with the view that courts protect rich & powerful In order to simplify the analysis somewhat I have aggregated the life satisfaction variable into 4 categories from the original 11 categories; the first category includes scores 0 to 5, the second category includes score 6 and 7, the third category corresponds to score 8 and the last two scores to category 4. The main features of the picture do not change significantly although some of the detail is lost; Table 6 shows the distribution of the grouped variable by country. Table 7 shows the marginal effects from estimating the determinants of life satisfaction. The focus is here on two variables: the assessment on whether the pay received is appropriate and the view on the impartiality of the courts. The estimated equations also include the following variables that typically appear in life satisfaction equations: age, age squared, gender, marital status, years of education, health condition, social activity. The coefficients on these variables are as expected: age is U shaped (although age is not always significant), men are less satisfied, married individuals have a higher life satisfaction and so do individuals with higher social activity than their peers and finally education does not appear to make much of a difference in satisfaction once all other variables have been included. The equations also include information on the decile of household income the individual belongs to, the feeling about the adequacy of household income as well as an indication of the ease of borrowing money. These variables are in most cases significant and with the expected signs. The appropriateness of pay variable ranges from 1 to 5. A value of one (five) indicates that the individual strongly agrees (strongly disagrees) with the view that conditional on effort and achievement the 11
Table 6: Distribution of life satisfaction on an aggregated scale, 20100 Country 1 (0-5) 2 (6-7) 3 (8) 4 (9-10) DK 5.7 14.2 27.8 52.4 CH 7.7 17.5 29.7 45.1 NO 9.1 20.2 31.7 39.0 FI 8.0 18.0 35.8 38.3 NL 7.7 25.8 41.7 24.8 SE 10.4 18.6 32.5 38.4 DE 23.1 24.1 27.0 25.8 BE 11.3 28.8 35.0 24.9 PL 24.4 24.7 25.6 25.3 IE 32.9 28.6 21.4 17.1 CZ 33.7 30.6 23.0 12.7 FR 36.1 28.6 20.2 15.0 SI 27.3 22.7 25.6 24.3 EE 32.6 28.0 21.4 17.9 Source: ESS, 2010. pay received is appropriate. The variable has been used in the regression as 5 separate dummy variables (with one dummy - the one corresponding to plain agreement - used as the reference group) each corresponding to a different degree of agreement. The impartiality of courts variable, as already mentioned above, also ranges from 1 to 5. However, I use this variable as a continuous variable in the estimated equations. The marginal effects (with standard errors in brackets) reported in Table 7 show the probability of being included in the first and last category respectively of the aggregated life satisfaction variable if the independent variable takes the value 1 (for the variable showing the different levels of appropriateness of pay) and for a one unit increase in the value of the impartiality of courts variable. Marginal effects in bold are significant at either the 1, 5 or 10% level. The impact of one unit change in the courts variable seems to substantially increase the probability of being in the high category in most countries; Finland, Greece and Slovenia are exceptions in that this variable is not significant. Furthermore, the impact appears to be greater in countries in which the % of individuals in the highest category appears to be the largest while the largest impact regarding the lowest categories are found in France and Poland. Turning to the appropriateness of pay variable it appears to be the case that dissatisfaction with pay is an important component of life satisfaction in countries with low level of life satisfaction. 12
Table 7: Marginal effects fom an ordered probit of aggregated life satisfaction Country Courts Given effort and achievements, pay is appropriate Agree Neither agree Disagree Disagree strongly nor disagree strongly DK-1-0.0067 (0.0031) -0.0143 (0.0114) 0.0160 (0.0090) 0.0012 (0.0075) -0.0116 (0.0119) DK-4 0.0399 (0.0176) 0.0857 (0.0666) -0.0958 (0.0499) -0.0069 (0.0445) 0.0691 (0.0699) CH-1-0.0090 (0.0053) -0.0273 (0.0185) 0.0103 (0.0172) 0.0196 (0.0145) 0.0266 (0.0365) CH-4 0.0266 (0.0156) 0.0810 (0.0540) -0.0304 (0.0505) -0.0583 (0.0421) -0.0789 (0.1080) NO-1-0.0101 (0.0052) -0.0406 (0.0213) 0.0225 (0.0116) -0.0022 (0.0110) 0.0150 (0.0232) NO-4 0.0316 (0.0159) 0.1267 (0.0655) -0.0703 (0.0365) 0.0068 (0.0342) -0.0470 (0.0723) FI-1-0.0037 (0.0033) -0.0294 (0.0146) 0.0321 (0.0101) 0.0284 (0.0087) -0.0061 (0.0164) FI-4 0.0159 (0.0140) 0.1256 (0.0591) -0.1369 (0.0384) -0.1211 (0.0333) 0.0259 (0.0701) NL-1-0.0107 (0.0042) -0.0100 (0.0127) -0.0038 (0.0088) -0.0019 (0.0078) -0.0255 (0.0212) NL-4 0.0445 (0.0155) 0.0419 (0.0526) 0.0158 (0.0367) 0.0080 (0.0324) 0.1066 (0.0855) SE-1-0.0145 (0.0060) 0.0298 (0.0239) 0.0223 (0.0139) 0.0296 (0.0136) 0.0436 (0.0246) SE-4 0.0398 (0.0158) -0.0819 (0.0656) -0.0613 (0.0379) -0.0814 (0.0364) -0.1198 (0.0660) DE-1-0.0149 (0.0082) 0.0119 (0.0385) 0.0509 (0.0209) 0.0289 (0.0209) 0.0972 (0.0286) DE-4 0.0176 (0.0097) -0.0140 (0.0454) -0.0601 (0.0246) -0.0341 (0.0245) -0.1147 (0.0337) UK-1-0.0208 (0.0087) -0.0422 (0.0361) 0.0466 (0.0277) 0.0658 (0.0214) 0.0971 (0.0422) UK-4 0.0254 (0.0105) 0.0516 (0.0442) -0.0570 (0.0337) -0.0805 (0.0258) -0.1187 (0.0516) IE-1-0.0354 (0.0144) -0.0774 (0.0514) 0.1765 (0.0381) 0.0868 (0.0451) 0.0661 (0.0771) IE-4 0.0246 (0.0098) 0.0537 (0.0355) -0.1224 (0.0283) -0.0602 (0.0311) -0.0458 (0.0536) CZ-1-0.0415 (0.0137) -0.0539 (0.0651) -0.0361 (0.0330) -0.0259 (0.0378) 0.0343 (0.0538) CZ-4 0.0224 (0.0076) 0.0292 (0.0355) 0.0195 (0.0180) 0.0140 (0.0206) -0.0186 (0.0292) FR-1-0.0239 (0.0132) -0.0437 (0.0539) 0.1191 (0.0368) 0.0724 (0.0326) 0.1042 (0.0526) FR-4 0.0143 (0.0079) 0.0261 (0.0324) -0.0713 (0.0225) -0.0433 (0.0195) -0.0624 (0.0315) GR-1 0.0107 (0.0181) 0.0899 (0.0977) 0.0574 (0.0465) 0.1214 (0.0497) 0.1592 (0.0783) GR-4-0.0037 (0.0064) -0.0315 (0.0341) -0.0201 (0.0161) -0.0426 (0.0183) -0.0558 (0.0276) PL-1-0.0381 (0.0125) -0.1595 (0.1020) 0.0657 (0.0335) 0.1262 (0.0291) 0.1199 (0.0463) PL-4 0.0405 (0.0132) 0.1696 (0.1081) -0.0698 (0.0355) -0.1342 (0.0300) -0.1275 (0.0486) EE-1-0.0302 (0.0121) -0.0307 (0.0604) 0.0803 (0.0311) 0.0698 (0.0295) 0.0711 (0.0567) EE-4 0.0229 (0.0092) 0.0232 (0.0457) -0.0607 (0.0237) -0.0528 (0.0226) -0.0538 (0.0429) SI-1 0.0162 (0.0169) -0.0720 (0.0910) -0.0306 (0.0411) 0.1269 (0.0389) 0.0546 (0.0798) SI-4-0.0162 (0.0169) 0.0719 (0.0903) 0.0306 (0.0411) -0.1267 (0.0395) -0.0545 (0.0796) The equations also include the variables: age, age 2, health status, social activity intensity, years of education, household income deciles, adequacy of household income, ability to borrow. Effects in bold suggest significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 13
5.2 Discrepancy between actual and expected remuneration We next turn to the other measure of the discrepancy between expectations and outcomes. As, already mentioned, we first proxy the expected pay with the fitted variable of a typical earnings equation. Table 8 presents estimates of the earnings equations estimated. The estimates are based on data for 2010 (Round 5) of the ESS survey for all countries except Norway and the UK for which the regression performance on the basis of data for 2010 was very poor and the data for 2004 (for both the wage and the following life satisfaction regression) have been used instead. The fitted values from these regressions are used to proxy the wages expected by each individual.
Table 8: Wage regressions Dependent variable: log of gross earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) Variables CH NO FI NL SE DE BE PL IE UK SI FR CZ EE GR Age 0.044** 0.083*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.141*** 0.036* 0.054*** 0.013-0.015 0.050* 0.028* 0.028* 0.006 0.012 (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.044) (0.021) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) Age 2-0.000** - - - - - -0.000 - -0.000 0.000 - -0.000* - -0.000-0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Men 0.426*** 0.244*** 0.179*** 0.304*** 0.141*** 0.361*** 0.267*** 0.290*** 0.270* 0.343* 0.260*** 0.192*** 0.203*** 0.325*** 0.093 (0.065) (0.046) (0.035) (0.047) (0.027) (0.066) (0.050) (0.054) (0.128) (0.143) (0.058) (0.042) (0.034) (0.064) (0.061) Establishment size - 1 to 10 emp. reference group 10-24 0.080-0.051 0.058 0.110 0.033 0.118 0.123 0.102 0.233-0.246 0.139 0.086-0.015 0.217** -0.042 (0.079) (0.062) (0.043) (0.068) (0.040) (0.123) (0.076) (0.085) (0.164) (0.238) (0.108) (0.056) (0.044) (0.071) (0.078) 25-99 -0.016 0.052 0.135** 0.167** 0.094** 0.366** 0.090 0.077 0.367* 0.019 0.229** 0.121* 0.012 0.231** 0.020 (0.084) (0.060) (0.044) (0.063) (0.035) (0.116) (0.069) (0.071) (0.169) (0.221) (0.083) (0.052) (0.045) (0.071) (0.089) 100-499 0.192 0.067 0.108** 0.241*** 0.115** 0.477*** 0.104* 0.102* 0.485** -0.017 0.061 0.190*** 0.082 0.414*** 0.091 (0.105) (0.066) (0.053) (0.068) (0.041) (0.114) (0.071) (0.074) (0.172) (0.222) (0.085) (0.057) (0.051) (0.089) (0.141) 500+ 0.299* 0.066 0.254*** 0.237** 0.243*** 0.359** 0.166* 0.328*** 0.260-0.169 0.090 0.106* 0.094 0.435* 0.295* (0.134) (0.072) (0.061) (0.076) (0.045) (0.114) (0.080) (0.092) (0.218) (0.227) (0.090) (0.063) (0.064) (0.169) (0.147) Type of organization - private sector co. reference group Government 0.071-0.147 0.042-0.136-0.074-0.018 0.176 0.041 0.080-0.059-0.045-0.098 0.133*** (0.102) (0.077) (0.093) (0.038) (0.114) (0.086) (0.113) (0.250) (0.110) (0.065) (0.060) (0.091) (0.100) Continued on Next Page...
Table 8: Wage regressions (continued) Dependent variable: log of gross earnings Variables CH NO FI NL SE DE BE PL IE UK SI FR CZ EE GR Other public -0.200-0.004-0.193-0.194* -0.034-0.117 0.027 0.052-0.057-0.071 0.073 sector 0.179*** 0.168** (0.125) (0.051) (0.077) (0.052) (0.099) (0.082) (0.114) (0.184) (0.094) (0.076) (0.064) (0.121) (0.121) SOE 0.020-0.124-0.042-0.012 0.171-0.097-0.092-0.351-0.011 0.108* -0.144* -0.097-0.008 (0.135) (0.063) (0.103) (0.107) (0.148) (0.092) (0.100) (0.317) (0.074) (0.072) (0.064) (0.117) (0.118) Selfemployed 0.065-0.115* - -0.048 0.181-0.137 0.293** 0.271-0.022-0.101 0.196** -0.277-0.033 0.268** (0.126) (0.058) (0.083) (0.055) (0.109) (0.105) (0.111) (0.580) (0.138) (0.111) (0.069) (0.162) (0.084) Other 0.003-0.022 0.038-0.052-0.242-0.194-0.297* 0.204-0.048-0.398* -0.141-0.231-0.068 (0.228) (0.079) (0.111) (0.078) (0.240) (0.143) (0.131) (0.359) (0.259) (0.176) (0.096) (0.160) (0.238) Marital status - married reference group Not married 0.022 0.066-0.027-0.021-0.014 0.053 0.034 0.047-0.015 0.057-0.091-0.012-0.052 0.077-0.024 (0.064) (0.041) (0.032) (0.044) (0.025) (0.074) (0.051) (0.052) (0.126) (0.131) (0.056) (0.035) (0.031) (0.055) (0.057) No of supervisees 0.007* 0.001 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.005** 0.005** 0.009** 0.001-0.000 (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) Experiernce 0.008* 0.005* 0.003 0.000 0.010* 0.006* 0.011*** 0.012 0.009* 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.014*** (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) Constant 6.704*** 8.676*** 6.689*** 6.088*** 6.433*** 3.265*** 6.519*** 4.730*** 9.254*** 10.242*** 5.763*** 6.323*** 5.819*** 5.730*** 6.242*** (0.353) (0.568) (0.204) (0.273) (0.175) (0.500) (0.341) (0.338) (0.728) (1.424) (0.458) (0.251) (0.243) (0.335) (0.453) Obs. 396 688 630 424 683 313 412 471 234 308 310 623 528 528 447 Continued on Next Page...
Table 8: Wage regressions (continued) Dependent variable: log of gross earnings Variables CH NO FI NL SE DE BE PL IE UK SI FR CZ EE GR Adj. R 2 0.501 0.405 0.520 0.511 0.543 0.554 0.482 0.461 0.370 0.321 0.569 0.476 0.405 0.390 0.271 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p<0.10
In line with extended Mincerian earnings functions in the literature the estimates of the wage regressions in Table 8 include variables capturing the degree of education (highest level of education completed) and to tenure (number of years of working experience). The estimated equation captures the age-earnings profile using the age and age squared variables. In addition given the differences in earnings across sectors and occupations the regressions include sectoral and occupational dummies and indicators of the extent of supervisory roles. As in some countries, marriage allowance increases earnings a dummy for marital status has been included. Data have not been pooled as coefficients differ significantly across countries [formal test] although results are as anticipated. Using the fitted values from these regressions we calculate the discrepancy between the actual value and the fitted wage. A positive value would suggest that the wage is higher than that expected on the basis of observable characteristics and vice versa. [Care has to be taken given that conjunctural factors, not least due to the crisis, might impact on the results for that year.] The discrepancy thus calculated is then introduced as an explanatory variable in ordered probit regressions on life satisfaction. Tables 9-11 show the coefficient estimates and marginal effects from these equations (in fact this is a single table that refers to different countries, note the UK is missing for the time being). The marginal effects refer to the relative probability of being in the first or the last category of the aggregated measure of life satisfaction. What comes out from the estimates is that the discrepancy between the wage and the fitted wage, in other words the returns to unobservable characteristics, appears to be significant in those countries in which the low levels of life satisfaction have a higher concentration (Germany, Poland, Slovenia, France, Estonia). The sign suggests that when the outcome is higher than the expected value the probability of being at the lower end of the aggregated life satisfaction measure is depressed while the likelihood of being at the high end of the aggregated life satisfaction measure increases. On the other hand, when the outcome is worse than the expected value (i.e. wage discrepancy is negative) then this increases the probability of being in the lowest level of the aggregated life satisfaction measure and decreases the probability of being in the highest level of the aggregated life satisfaction measure. [But the theory assumption of asymmetry is not being tested!]
Table 9: Aggregated life satisfaction: Coefficient estimates & marginal effects from ordered probit estimates Variable Denmark Norway Finland Netherlands Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Men 0.225-0.0192 0.0814 0.0183-0.0026 0.00625-0.159 0.0142-0.0560-0.147 0.0111-0.0431 Age -0.0227 0.00193-0.0082-0.0501 0.00709-0.0171 0.0322-0.00287 0.0113-0.00788 0.000598-0.00232 Age 2 0.000371 0 0.000134 0.000646 0 0.00022-0.0003 0-0.00011 0.000148 0 Number of years of education (9-12 years reference group) 9 years 0.158-0.0135 0.0571 0.466-0.0661 0.159 0.141-0.0125 0.0494-0.126 0.00954-0.0371 12 < y < 16-0.0558 0.00476-0.0202-0.0627 0.00888-0.0214-0.0456 0.00407-0.0161-0.0168 0.00127-0.00495 y > 16 0.125-0.0107 0.0453-0.141 0.0200-0.0482 0.0398-0.00355 0.0140-0.0453 0.00344-0.0134 Health status (Fair health is the reference group) V. good 0.549-0.0468 0.198 0.388-0.0549 0.132 0.410-0.0366 0.144 0.111-0.00845 0.0329 Good -0.261 0.0223-0.0944-0.314 0.0445-0.107-0.543 0.0484-0.191-0.950 0.0721-0.280 Bad -0.574 0.0490-0.207-0.295 0.0418-0.101-1.677 0.149-0.591-0.0555 0.00421-0.0164 V. bad -0.962 0.0820-0.348-6.0376 0.855-2.0574-1.353 0.121-0.477 Extent of social activity compared to peers (same as peers is the reference group) Much less -0.465 0.0397-0.168-0.866 0.123-0.295-0.308 0.0274-0.108-0.456 0.0346-0.134 Less -0.174 0.0149-0.0630-0.211 0.0299-0.0718-0.270 0.0241-0.0953-0.234 0.0178-0.0691 More 0.0122-0.00104 0.00442 0.219-0.0311 0.0747-0.156 0.0140-0.0552 0.0567-0.0043 0.0167 Much more 0.838-0.0715 0.303 0.621-0.0880 0.211-0.0319 0.00285-0.0112 0.172-0.0130 0.0507 Wage diff. -0.129 0.0111-0.0469-0.00818 0.00116-0.00279 0.199-0.0177 0.0700 0.167-0.0127 0.0493 The marginal effects concern the probability of being in the first or fourth category respectively.) Coefficients in bold indicate significance at 1, 5 or 10% level.)
Table 10: Aggregated life satisfaction: Coefficient estimates & marginal effects from ordered probit estimates Variable Sweden Germany Poland Ireland Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Men 0.00414-0.00047 0.00143-0.0764 0.0152-0.0238-0.290 0.0763-0.0822 0.110-0.0314 0.0164 Age -0.0203 0.00232-0.007-0.0514 0.0102-0.0160-0.0814 0.0214-0.0231-0.118 0.0337-0.0177 Age 2 0.000298 0 0.000102 0.000633-0.00013 0.000197 0.000995-0.00026 0.000283 0.00152-0.00044 0.000228 Number of years of education (9-12 years reference group) 9 years -0.103 0.0117-0.0354 0.353-0.0704 0.110-0.829 0.218-0.235-0.23 0.0671-0.0352 12 < y < 16-0.168 0.0192-0.0580 0.975-0.194 0.303 0.0152-0.004 0.00431 0.687-0.196 0.103 > 16y -0.0675 0.00771-0.0233 0.928-0.185 0.289 0.223-0.0588 0.0634 1.209-0.345 0.181 Health status (Fair health is the reference group) V. good 0.632-0.0722 0.218 0.442-0.0881 0.138 0.390-0.103 0.111 0.608-0.174 0.0910 Good -0.383 0.0437-0.132-0.416 0.0828-0.129-0.292 0.0768-0.0828-0.140 0.0400-0.0209 Bad -0.22 0.0251-0.0758-0.660 0.131-0.205-0.28 0.0745-0.0803 0.149-0.0425 0.0223 V. bad 0.0701-0.008 0.0242-1.129 0.225-0.351-5.740 1.512-1.630-4.557 1.301-0.682 Extent of social activity compared to peers (same as peers is the reference group) Much less -0.509 0.0581-0.175-0.168 0.0335-0.0524-0.111 0.0293-0.0316-0.287 0.0821-0.04301 Less -0.266 0.0304-0.0917-0.0874 0.0174-0.0272 0.0567-0.0149 0.0161-0.101 0.0290-0.0152 More -0.0276 0.00315-0.00951 0.0779-0.0155 0.0242 0.134-0.0353 0.0380 0.520-0.148 0.0778 Much more 0.340-0.0388 0.117 0.110-0.0220 0.0343 0.00831-0.00219 0.00236 1.908-0.545 0.286 Wage discrepancy 0.110-0.0125 0.0378 0.417-0.0831 0.130 0.502-0.132 0.143-0.127 0.0362-0.0191 The marginal effects concern the probability of being in the first or fourth category respectively. Coefficients in bold indicate significance at 1, 5 or 10% level.
Table 11: Aggregated life satisfaction: Coefficient estimates & marginal effects from ordered probit estimates Variable Slovenia France Czech Republic Estonia Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Coef. ME (1) ME (4) Men 0.0843-0.0252 0.0224 0.116-0.0396 0.0240-0.236 0.0732-0.0442 0.106-0.0320 0.0228 Age 0.0382-0.0114 0.0101-0.0662 0.0226-0.0137-0.0060 0.0019-0.0011-0.0195 0.0059-0.0042 Age 2-0.0005 0.0001-0.0001 0.0008-0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002-0.0001 0.0000 Number of years of education (9-12 years reference group) 9 years -0.171 0.0511-0.0454-0.0890 0.0303-0.0184-0.338 0.105-0.0633 0.122-0.0369 0.0263 12 < y < 16 0.359-0.107 0.0953 0.211-0.0719 0.0436 0.2735-0.0847 0.0511 0.258-0.0781 0.0556 > 16y 0.348-0.104 0.0922 0.176-0.0601 0.0364 0.344-0.106 0.0642 0.4202-0.127 0.0906 Health status (Fair health is the reference group) V. good 0.378-0.113 0.100 0.416-0.142 0.0861 0.447-0.138 0.0835 0.731-0.221 0.158 Good -0.314 0.0937-0.0833-0.124 0.0424-0.0257-0.599 0.186-0.1129-0.461 0.1406-0.0994 Bad 0.304-0.0907 0.0806-0.982 0.335-0.203-0.412 0.128-0.0770-1.478 0.447-0.31 V. bad 0.335-0.100 0.0888-5.0252 1.713-1.038-5.163 1.600-0.965 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) Extent of social activity compared to peers (same as peers is the reference group) Much less -0.0878 0.0262-0.0233-0.404 0.138-0.0835-0.560 0.174-0.105-0.256 0.0774-0.0551 Less -0.0802 0.0239-0.0213-0.237 0.0809-0.0490 0.0596-0.0185 0.0111-0.202 0.0613-0.0437 More 0.0437-0.0131 0.0116 0.0342-0.0117 0.0071 0.567-0.176 0.106-0.204 0.0616-0.0439 Much more 0.0168-0.0050 0.0045 0.403-0.137 0.0834 0.837-0.2592 0.156-0.155 0.0470-0.0335 Wage discrepancy 0.565-0.169 0.150 0.236-0.0804 0.0488-0.0568 0.0176-0.0106 0.191-0.0578 0.0412 The marginal effects concern the probability of being in the first or fourth category respectively. Coefficients in bold indicate significance at 1, 5 or 10% level.
6 Summary & Conclusions Cross-country differences in the distribution of life satisfaction are such that in some countries only very few individuals have a score below the median on the life satisfaction rating ladder. In other countries, however, the life satisfaction scores appear much more evenly distributed across the ladder. A potential explanation for these cross-country differences is that in countries in which individuals expect to be treated fairly they are not disappointed by outcomes. The reverse is true in countries in which justice is not always being served. The results suggest that it is in countries in which there is a perception of lack of fairness that individuals life satisfaction is especially responsive to deviations between actual and expected remuneration. 7 References Deaton, A. (2011), The financial crisis and the well-being of Americans, Oxford Economic Papers, 64:1, pp 1-26. Deaton, A. and Stone, A.A. (2013), Two happiness puzzles, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 103(3): 591597. ESS Rounds 1-7 : Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway data for ESS ERIC. Data Archive and distributor of ESS Hamermesh, D. (2001), The changing distribution of job satisfaction, Journal of Human Resources, 36(1):1-30. Helliwell, J., Layard, R., & Sachs, J. (2016), World Happiness Report 2016, Update (Vol. I). New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Kahneman, D. (1986), Objective happiness in Kahneman, D., E. Diener, N. Schwarz (eds.) Well-being: the foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Kahneman, D., A.B. Krueger, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, A.A. Stone (2006), Would you be happier if you were richer?, CEPS Working Paper No. 125. Schwarze, J. (2008), Subjective measures of economic well-being and the influence of income uncertainty, IZA DP. No. 3720. UN (2016), World Happiness Report, Vol. I.
Appendices Figure 5: Distribution of life satisfaction scores (2014) Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Details on the ESS database Distribution of life satisfaction in other years Income per capita
Figure 6: Income deciles in each country (2014)
Table 12: EU Countries participating in each survey round and sample size Country Round1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Austria 2,257 2,256 2,405 1,795 Belgium 1,899 1,778 1,798 1,760 1,704 1,869 1,769 Bulgaria 1,400 2,230 2,434 2,460 Switzerland 2,040 2,141 1,804 1,819 1,506 1,493 1,532 Cyprus 995 1,215 1,083 1,116 Czech Republic 1,360 3,026 2,018 2,386 2,009 2,148 Germany 2,919 2,870 2,916 2,751 3,031 2,958 3,045 Denmark 1,506 1,487 1,505 1,610 1,576 1,650 1,502 Estonia 1,989 1,517 1,661 1,793 2,380 2,051 Spain 1,729 1,663 1,876 2,576 1,885 1,889 Finland 2,000 2,022 1,896 2,195 1,878 2,197 2,087 France 1,503 1,806 1,986 2,073 1,728 1,968 1,917 UK 2,052 1,897 2,394 2,352 2,422 2,286 Greece 2,566 2,406 2,072 2,715 Hungary 1,685 1,498 1,518 1,544 1,561 2,014 Ireland 2,046 2,286 1,800 1,764 2,576 2,628 2,390 Italy 1,207 960 Lithuania 1,677 2,109 Luxembourg 1,552 1,635 Latvia 1,980 Netherlands 2,364 1,881 1,889 1,778 1,829 1,845 1,919 Norway 2,036 1,760 1,750 1,549 1,548 1,624 1,436 Poland 2,110 1,716 1,721 1,619 1,751 1,898 1,615 Portugal 1,511 2,052 2,222 2,367 2,150 2,151 Romania 2,146 Sweden 1,999 1,948 1,927 1,830 1,497 1,847 1,791 Slovenia 1,519 1,442 1,476 1,286 1,403 1,257 1,225 Slovakia 1,512 1,766 1,810 1,856 1,847
Table 13: Number of individuals with gross pay information & number of employed in Round 5 Country Pay information Employed available indivisuals Belgium 537 867 Bulgaria 562 915 Switzerland 590 920 Cyprus 311 553 Czech Republic 655 1,215 Germany 1,094 1,594 Denmark 758 876 Estonia 574 879 Spain 602 924 Finland 774 910 France 764 882 UK 882 1,199 Greece 558 1,061 Hungary 522 755 Ireland 853 961 Lithuania 398 616 Netherlands 614 1,026 Norway 892 984 Poland 557 887 Portugal 288 820 Sweden 786 853 Slovenia 361 655 Slovakia 462 834
Table 14: Per capita income in 2014, PPP Country Income Norway 67,100 Switzerland 59,160 Netherlands 48,860 Germany 47,460 Austria 47,380 Sweden 46,870 Denmark 46,850 Belgium 44,090 Ireland 42,830 Finland 40,630 France 40,100 United Kingdom 39,500 Slovenia 30,360 Czech Rep. 28,740 Estonia 27,490 Greece 27,050 Source: World Bank Databank.