The Santiago Compliance Index 2013

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Benchmarking Series January 2014 The Santiago Compliance Index 2013 Rating governance standards of sovereign wealth funds Santiago Compliance Assessments covering sovereign wealth funds rated in this report can be obtained directly from GeoEconomica or from Thomson Reuters and S&P Capital IQ distribution platforms. GeoEconomica Contact Tel.: +41 (0)22 341 47 78 info@geoeconomica.com GeoEconomica Benchmarking Series SCI January 2014 I 1

The Santiago Principles In 2008, 26 sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from 23 countries, representing roughly US$3.2 billion in assets under management, agreed on the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) for SWFs, known as the Santiago Principles. The Santiago Principles comprise 24 individual principles and subprinciples, ranging from broad policy issues, such as mandates, investment policies, accountability arrangements; the roles and relationships between owners, supervisors and operational management; financial information such as the disclosure of rates of return, asset allocations, benchmarks, funding and withdrawal arrangements; to aspects of a more technical nature, such as accounting standards, audit arrangements, risk management and rules of engagement with service providers. Each of the principles is accompanied by a commentary, providing further guidance for the interpretation of its intended meaning. The Principles commit their signatories to basic and consistent standards of good governance, transparency and accountability, while allowing room to reconcile the diverging mandates and regulatory traditions of their signatories. They constitute a voluntary code of principles and as such are not legally binding under national or international law. They are rather part of a growing international body of soft norms around which the expectations of financial market participants and regulators converge. The Santiago Principles leave substantial room for interpretation. Our assessments are therefore informed by the Principles overall ambition to increase the transparency standards of the SWF industry at large. They are also informed by industry best practices with regard to reporting and disclosure policies. The appendix provides an overview of how we transformed the standards of the Santiago Principles into performance indicators to base our assessment. The information on which the individual assessments have been based is limited to accessible official documentation provided by SWFs as of 30 September 2013. They do not take into account information that is not in the public sphere. The individual assessments apply the comply or explain approach, a trademark of corporate governance in the United Kingdom. It is based on the assumption that a specific principle may not apply to the operating realities of a signatory of a code. In line with the comply or explain approach, we have sought to identify and assess a fund s explanation of why that standard does or should not apply. Published in its third edition, the Santiago Compliance Index has become an essential instrument for financial market participants, regulators and policymakers to develop a more nuanced and granular perspective on the transparency, accountability and good governance arrangements of SWFs. The Santiago Compliance Index 2013: Mixed performance across signatories The Santiago Compliance Index 2013 GeoEconomica s Santiago Compliance Index rates SWFs against the standards set by each of the 24 principles. The Index is the most accurate independent assessment of the application of the Santiago Principles, and as such represents a robust reference point for judging a SWF s overall commitment to good governance, transparency and accountability practices. The 2013 version of the Santiago Compliance Index updates previous ratings. The Santiago Compliance Index 2013 documents that the Principles core mission to commit each signatory to uniformly high governance and transparency standards has not yet been accomplished, although important progress has been made. The overall compliance ratio across all SWFs rated is around 70 percent. Five years after the Principles adoption, a number of SWFs must still effect a profound policy shift to elevate overall compliance levels. The Index provides evidence that a fund s association to the Principles does not necessarily indicate GeoEconomica Benchmarking Series SCI January 2014 I 2

sufficient commitment to good governance and transparency. Funds still need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to obtain an accurate indication of their commitment to the standards the Principles seek to promote. Top performers: Consistently convincing governance and disclosure practices Petroleum Fund of Timor-Leste. Some deficits include inconclusive information about the consequences of a fund s operations on the domestic economy (Principle 3); minor inconsistencies with regard to governance arrangements as outlined by the Principles (Principles 6 to 9); and inadequate attention to the quality of self-assessments of compliance with the Principles (Principle 24). We note that a group of six SWFs achieve a Santiago Compliance Rating of at least 80/100, and as such are considered compliant with the Principles. This group comprises the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global; the New Zealand Superannuation Fund; the Australian Future Fund; the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund of Chile and the country s Pension Reserve Fund; the Alaska Permanent Fund; and the The midfield: Inconclusive representation of governance standards and/or financial disclosure policies The nine funds in the midfield, scoring from 50/100 to 79/100 in the compliance ratings, show a fragmented commitment to the Principles. They are rated as Exhibit 1 Santiago Compliance Index 2013" Norway - Government Pension Fund Global! New Zealand - Superannuation Fund! Australia - Future Fund! Chile - E/S Stabilization Fund and Pension Reserve Fund! US/Alaska - Alaska Permanent Fund! Timor-Leste - Petroleum Fund! Singapore - Temasek Holdings! Canada - Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund! Azerbaijan - State Oil Fund! Singapore - GIC! Trinidad and Tobago - Heritage and Stabilization Fund! China - China Investment Corporation! Korea - Korea Investmenty Corporation! United Arab Emirates - Abu Dhabi Investment Authority! Kuwait - Kuwait Investment Authority! Russia - National Wealth Fund and Reserve Fund! Botswana - Pula Fund! Mexico - Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund! Qatar - Qatar Investment Authority! Bahrain - Future Generations Reserve Fund! 94%! 92%! 90%! 85%! 83%! 81%! 79%! 77%! 71%! 69%! 65%! 61%! 58%! 53%! 52%! 46%! 44%! 39%! 31%! 24%! 0%! 20%! 40%! 60%! 80%! 100%! Santiago Compliance Ratings 2013! GeoEconomica Benchmarking Series SCI January 2014 I 3

partially compliant. The main features preventing their higher rating include inconclusive representation of governance arrangements and competing lines of accountability; inconclusive discussion of the role of the owner (the government) in setting a fund s objective; limited competencies for supervisory boards; and/or the compromised independence of operational management. We also note fragmented financial disclosure policies. Some partially compliant funds fail to discuss their financial performance on an annual basis and, most importantly, fail to discuss that performance conclusively in reference to benchmarks. Some report on spending and withdrawal arrangements but remain silent on cash flow on an annual basis. Underperformers: Lacking consistent commitment We conclude that the five funds scoring below 50/100 are not compliant with the benchmarks set by the Santiago Principles. They display a limited commitment to the Principles public disclosure and governance standards. Not rated: Profoundly deficient disclosure policies and/or fundamentally challenged policy orientation We excluded a number of signatories from our rating. Some face fundamental policy challenges that prohibit them from constructively and regularly interacting with financial markets or caused their investment mandate to be substantially revised. Others make too little information accessible to allow a credible rating. The Irish National Pension Reserve Fund was transformed into the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund in the summer of 2013 with a focus on Irish domestic assets. The Libya Investment Authority remains subjected to an international asset freeze programme regime, based on UN Security Council resolutions. Equatorial Guinea s Fund for Future Generations and the Iranian Oil Stabilization Fund provide little to no publicly accessible information. We will provide ratings for these and other entities once they return to the markets or make information more publicly accessible. We note that the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, who supervises the Russian National Wealth Fund and the Reserve Fund, provides substantial and timely information about the Funds asset values and cash flows. But it fails to provide consistent information about a range of technical aspects of fund management, as required by the Principles. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) is one of the fastest growing SWF amongst its peers. It is also one of the most activist and extrovert funds, with major positions in prime assets. But it fails to provide conclusive information about its mandate, finances, accountability and governance arrangements. QIA could substantially enhance its position as an established financial market participant if it made a bold move towards embracing and implementing substantial parts of the Principles. GeoEconomica Benchmarking Series SCI January 2014 I 4

Appendix: Standards of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) also known as the Santiago Principles and related performance indicators GAPP Standard Indicator GAPP 1 Legal framework Legal basis and/or founding charter are disclosed. GAPP 2 Policy purpose The policy purpose of the fund is disclosed. Inconsistent policy purposes may receive a noncompliant rating as a consequence. GAPP 3 Coordination with domestic fiscal and monetary authorities Disclosure of processes that ensure coordination with domestic fiscal and monetary authorities. Alternatively, an explanation of why the fund s activities do not have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications is required. GAPP 4 Source of funding/ withdrawal and spending Policies, rules, procedures or arrangements for the fund s funding, withdrawal and spending operations on behalf of the government should be clearly set out and consistent with the fund s policy purpose. Industry best practice also includes the annual reporting of the amount of inflows and withdrawals, if applicable. GAPP 5 Statistical data reported to the owner Description of procedures that ensure statistical data pertaining to the fund are reported on a timely basis to the owner. GAPP 6 Governance framework Holistic description of the fund s governance framework and identification of entities within that framework. Compliance with Principle 6 needs to be assessed in the context of Principles 7 to 9. GAPP 7 Role of the owner Disclosure of regulations that ensure the fund s owner sets the objectives, appoints the members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercises oversight over the SWF s operations. GAPP 8 Role of the governing body(ies) Disclosure of regulations that ensure the fund s governing body(ies) has(have) a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions, including setting the fund s strategy and accountability arrangements. GAPP 9 Operational management Disclosure of regulations that provide the mandate for operational management, including reference to responsibilities and accountability arrangements. GeoEconomica Benchmarking Series SCI January 2014 I 5

GAPP 10 Accountability Disclosure of accountability arrangements linking the fund to its political constituency and institutions. GAPP 11 Annual report and accounting Publication of annual reports and commitment to an international or national accounting standard. GAPP 12 Auditing Disclosure of audited financial statements. GAPP 13 Professional and ethical standards Disclosure of professional and ethical standards. GAPP 14 Third parties Disclosure of rules and procedures for dealing with third parties. GAPP 15 Regulatory and disclosure requirements in host countries Description of arrangements that ensure regulatory and disclosure requirements in host countries are complied with. GAPP 16 Operational management independence Disclosure of processes and policies that ensure operational management is independent from the owner of the fund. GAPP 17 Disclosure of relevant financial information Disclosure of asset allocation, benchmarks where relevant, rates of return over appropriate historical periods. GAPP 18 Investment policy Description of a conclusive investment policy. GAPP 19 Disclosure of non-financial and economic considerations Disclosure and discussion of factors beyond economic and financial considerations that drive investment decisions. GAPP 20 Privileged information or inappropriate government influence Disclosure of rules and regulations that prevent the fund from benefitting from privileged information or inappropriate government influence. GAPP 21 Ownership rights Adequate description of the approach to executing shareholder rights. GAPP 22 Risk management framework Description of the risk management framework. GAPP 23 Investment performance and benchmarks Disclosure of investment performance and performance benchmarks. GAPP 24 Implementation of Santiago Principles Description of the process to regularly review compliance with the Santiago Principles by or on behalf of the SWF. Disclosure of a Santiago compliance selfassessment. Source: GeoEconomica GeoEconomica Benchmarking Series SCI January 2014 I 6

About GeoEconomica is an independent macro-trend and political risk rating and research firm. Contact GeoEconomica Geneva Office 4, Chemin des Papillons 1216 Cointrin Geneva Switzerland info@geoeconomica.com Tel.: +41 (0)22 341 47 78 THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY GEOECONOMICA FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE OR CONTAIN AN OFFER OR INVITATION TO SUBSCRIBE FOR OR ACQUIRE ANY SECURITIES. DUE TO THE TIMELY NATURE OF THIS REPORT, THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MAY NOT HAVE BEEN VERIFIED AND IS BASED ON THE OPINION OF THE ANALYST. WE DO NOT PURPORT THIS DOCUMENT TO BE ENTIRELY ACCURATE AND DO NOT GUARANTEE IT IS A COMPLETE STATEMENT OR SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE DATA. ANY OPINIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE STATEMENTS OF OUR JUDGEMENTS AS OF THE DATE OF PUBLICATION AND ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION IS PROHIBITED. THE DATA AND RATIOS ABOVE RESULT FROM GEOECONOMICA S OWN CALCULATIONS, DRAWING ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SOURCES, AND REFLECT GEOECONOMICA S INDEPENDENT VIEW ON THE TIMELINESS, COVERAGE, ACCURACY, CREDIBILITY AND USABILITY OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION. 2013 GEOECONOMICA GeoEconomica Benchmarking Series SCI January 2014 I 7