Government Pension I nvest ment Fund

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Material 3 April 7th, 2016 Government Pension I nvest ment Fund Summary Report of List ed Companies Survey about Institutional Investors Stewardship Activities. Purpose of the Survey The Government Pension Investment Fund, Japan (GPIF) conducted our first survey to JPX Nikkei Index 400 companies to evaluate stewardship activities of our external asset managers and to grasp real situation of constructive dialogues. As we stated in Summary Report of GPIF s Stewardship Activities in 2015 dated of 29 th January 2016, it is our intention to raise the standard of dialogues between institutional investors and Japanese companies.. Results of the Survey 260 companies out of 400 of the Index responded during 6 th and 22 nd of January 2016. i) Opinions and Requests to Stewardship Activities of Institutional Investors from Companies a. Approximately 60% of Companies of the Index which responded to our survey have recognized and appreciated the change of institutional investors regarding investors questions about business strategy and ESG (Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance) issues after the introduction of Japan s Stewardship Code. b. On the other hand, there are many companies which pointed out undesirable changes where investors increased formal questions and enforcement of meetings with top management to make their performance records. c. Also, companies complain of one-way propositions of investors without correct understanding of circumstances surrounding companies. d. Many companies suggest increased questions about capital policy and capital efficiency as both of desirable and undesirable changes of investors. e. Companies expect suggestions based on investors own experiences and insights. f. Constructive dialogues and long-term investments are expected by companies due to concerns about short-termism of institutional investors. ii) Evaluation by Companies about Stewardship Activities of GPIF s External Asset Managers a. There are many responses that companies appreciated insightful and useful dialogues with External Asset Managers of active investment.

iii) Opinions and Requests from Companies toward Asset Owners including GPIF a. Through Stewardship activities, it would be necessary for asset owners to motivate their asset managers to improve ground for securing and development of talented personnel so that external asset managers may execute constructive dialogues for mid-long term corporate value and sustainable growth. b. Companies expect direct dialogues with asset owners because they understand sharing thoughts through direct communication with not only asset managers but with asset owners is important. III. GPIF s Point of View <Engagement by Passive Managers> GPIF recognizes that it is especially important for passive managers to uphold their stewardship responsibilities because most of GPIF's domestic equity portfolio is managed passively. We think that effective engagement is possible even in the case of passive management by effectively narrowing down the number of companies with whom the manager engages. <Short-Termism> The survey suggests that companies have concerns about the undesirable effects of shorttermism on the part of investors. GPI F also has serious concerns about how shorttermism on the part of investors could cause companies to become short-sighted as well, hindering investment in innovation that could give them a competitive edge. That is why we place high value on mid- to long-term engagement in our evaluation of asset managers. We are also aware that some companies ask investors to avoid taking a short term view and hold their equities for a longer period. However, we do not believe there should be restrictions put on active managers' flexibility to buy and sell when they please. We recognize the important role of active managers in providing efficiency and discipline to the market through trading. We believe that the problem of investor short-termism is not related to how long investors hold a particular stock, but to how investors analyze companies. <Dialogue with Companies> GPIF will continue to monitor the stewardship activities of asset managers and asset owners, including GPIF, through questionnaires and direct hearings with companies. We would be pleased to meet directly with any companies who are interested in meeting with us to discuss their views or concerns. End

Summary Report of Listed Companies Survey bout Institutional Investors Stewardship Activities

Range of Market CapJPX Nikkei 400 vsresponded companies 30 25 20 15 10 5 Responded companies JPX Nikkei 400 0 1000 3000 5000 7000 9000 11000 13000 15000 17000 19000 21000 23000 25000 1 25000

2

3 NO 39% YES 61%

Business Strategy 2% Proxy Voting 1% Information about other companies 3% Cross shareholdings 3% CG report /CGcode 5% ESG 1% Others 12% Capital Efficiency/ Capital Policy 66% Corporate Governance 7% Percentage of total multiple answers to the same questions. 4

Active Active Passive Passive Global AM Global AM Japanese AM Japanese AM 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 Right hand graph is adjusted by the number of investee companies of each external asset manager as of end of 2015. However,if the number of investee companies is above 400, it is calculated by 400 instead. Classification of Active and Passive is determined bygpif s definition of Japanese equity funds. It includes multiple answers to the same question. 5

Compensation 6% Others Change of the 8% Articles of Incorporation 9% Capital Policy /Disposal of profit 10% Poison pills 17% Appointment of directors/ auditors 50% Percentage of total multiple answers to the same questions. 6

Active Active assive Passive Global AM Global AM anese AM Japanese AM 0 100 200 300 400 500 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1 Right hand graph is adjusted by the number of investee companies of each external asset manager as of end of 2015. However,if the number of investee companies is above 400, it is calculated by 400 instead. Classification of Active and Passive is determined bygpif s definition of Japanese equity funds. It includes multiple answers to the same question. 7

Mid-long term point of view 61.5 Deeper understanding of company's business 36.1 Constant dialogue (understanding each other) 23.8 Discussion and understanding of ESG/non financial issues of companies 7.8 Others 16.4 Nothing 4.1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 The ratio shown above includes multiple answers to the same questions. The number is the ratio to the all 8

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