SAUDI ARABIA. Annex I: Banks

Similar documents
KOREA (as of April 2014) Annex I: Banks

MEXICO. Annex I: Banks

SOUTH AFRICA (as of April 2014) Annex I: Banks

BRAZIL (as of April 2014) Annex I: Banks

Canada Credit Rating Action Plan

UK Action Plan to reduce reliance on CRA Ratings

Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings

Samba Financial Group Basel III - Pillar 3 Disclosure Report. September 2017 PUBLIC

Samba Financial Group Basel III - Pillar 3 Disclosure Report. March 2018 PUBLIC

TABLE 2: CAPITAL STRUCTURE - September 30, 2018

TABLE 2: CAPITAL STRUCTURE - December 31, 2015

Information on Capital Structure, Liquidity Coverage and Leverage Ratios as per Basel-III Framework as at June 30, 2016

Samba Financial Group Basel III - Pillar 3 Disclosure Report. June 2018 PUBLIC

TABLE 2: CAPITAL STRUCTURE - March 31, 2016

Progress in the Implementation of G20/FSB Recommendations June 2012

Basel II Pillar 3- Qualitative Disclosure

FSB- G20 - MONITORING PROGRESS Saudi Arabia September 2010 [For Publication in March 2011]

Comments on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision s Consultative Document Revisions to the Standardised Approach for credit risk

Basel II and Financial Stability: Singapore s Experience

Otkritie Capital International Limited. Pillar 3 disclosures for the year ended 31 December,

Basel III: Strategic and Operational Impacts

EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate General Internal Market and Services. FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS Securities markets

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Ninth progress report on adoption of the Basel regulatory framework

Emerging from the Crisis Building a Stronger International Financial System

TABLE 2: CAPITAL STRUCTURE - September 30, 2017

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) /.. of XXX

Basel III Pillar 3 Disclosures. 30 June 2018

Otkritie Capital International Limited. Pillar 3 disclosures for the year ended 31 December,

Samba Financial Group Basel III - Pillar 3 Disclosure Report. December 2017 PUBLIC

ICS Consultation Document - Responses to Comments on Asset Concentration & Credit Risks (Sections )

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on the supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Discussion Paper. The Use of Credit Ratings by Financial Intermediaries Article 5(a) of the CRA Regulation

BASEL 3 COMMON DISCLOSURE TEMPLATES. as at 31 December 2017

BASEL III Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)

1. Scope of Application

BASEL III - CAPITAL STRUCTURE 31 March 2017

BASEL III PILLAR 3 ANNUAL DISCLOSURES YEAR-2015

BASEL III Quantitative Disclosures

Deutsche Bank welcomes the opportunity to provide comments on the above consultation.

January 11, Japanese Bankers Association

TABLE 2: CAPITAL STRUCTURE - June 30, 2018

Revisions to the Standardised Approach for credit risk

SCOPE AND APPLICATION

GUIDANCE NOTE PILLAR 2 IN JERSEY

3. In accordance with Article 14(5) of the Rules of procedure of the EBA, the Board of Supervisors has adopted this opinion.

Objectives. How Much Capital Is Enough. Capital Adequacy. Cost of holding capital

Samba Financial Group Basel III - Pillar 3 Disclosure Report. September 2018 PUBLIC

TABLE 2: CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Basel III Pillar III. Qualitative & Quantitative Disclosures. December 31, 2017

AB SEB bankas Capital Adequacy and Risk Management Report (Pillar 3) 2017

BASEL III Quantitative Disclosures

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. Bank executives are in a difficult position. On the one hand their shareholders require an attractive

Pillar 3 Disclosure (UK)

Supervisory Statement SS10/18 Securitisation: General requirements and capital framework. November 2018

Lombard Odier Group Pillar 3 Disclosures at 30 June 2018

November 28, FSB Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (29 August 2013) (the Policy Framework ) 1

Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability

PRA RULEBOOK CRR FIRMS INSTRUMENT 2013

TABLE 2: CAPITAL STRUCTURE - December 2013

Ali Alaraibi Financial & Regulatory Reporting Officer. BNP Paribas Head-Office teams: Group Finacne /Supervisory Affairs

AS SEB Pank Capital Adequacy and Risk Management Report AS SEB Pank Capital Adequacy and Risk Management Report (Pillar 3) 2017

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) No /.. of XXX

Citigroup Global Markets Limited Pillar 3 Disclosures

Capital Requirements Directive IV Framework Introduction to Regulatory Capital and Liquidity. Allen & Overy Client Briefing Paper 1 January 2014

RBI/ /167 DBR.No.BP.BC.43/ / December 01, 2016

BASEL III Quantitative Disclosures

as at 30 June 2016 Basel 3 common disclosure templates

Morgan Stanley International Limited Group

Supervisory Statement SS8/16 Ring-fenced bodies (RFBs) December (Updating February 2017)

CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK (ASIA) CORPORATION LIMITED. Regulatory Disclosures For the year ended 31 December 2017 (Unaudited)

Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures 2014

Response to discussion paper of the Basel Committee on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures

Regulatory Capital Pillar 3 Disclosures

BERMUDA MONETARY AUTHORITY

DFSA Outreach Session. 3 May 2017

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) No /.. of

Official Journal of the European Union

African Bank Holdings Limited and African Bank Limited. Quarterly Public Pillar III Disclosures

Proportionality in banking regulation

PILLAR-3 DISCLOSURE March 2018

African Bank Holdings Limited and African Bank Limited

Deutsche Bank. Pillar 3 Report as of March 31, 2018

The Use of IFRS for Prudential and Regulatory Purposes

Supervisory Statement SS8/16 Ring-fenced bodies (RFBs)

GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF COUNTRY RISK

OTC Derivatives Compliance Calendar

Isabelle Vaillant Director of Regulation. European Institute of Financial Regulation (EIFR) 23 Septembre 2016

Royal Bank of Canada. Pillar 3 Report

BERMUDA MONETARY AUTHORITY BASEL III FOR BERMUDA BANKS NOVEMBER 2017 RULE UPDATE

Pillar III Disclosure Report as at 31 st December 2016

Financial Stability Board holds inaugural meeting in Basel

AS SEB banka Capital Adequacy and Risk Management Report 2016

Morgan Stanley International Limited Group

1 of 27 SAR (000) Quantitative Disclosures under Pillar III of Basel III for December 31, 2015

Guidance Note: Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) Credit Unions with Total Assets Greater than $1 Billion.

EBA/CP/2013/33 30 July Consultation Paper

New package of banking reforms

Supplementary Notes on the Financial Statements (continued)

Santander response to the European Commission s Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies

Transcription:

SAUDI ARABIA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency SAMA Annex I: Banks Capital Market Authority changes in inter standards) inter 1. Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations (Principle I) Based on the findings from the stock-taking exercise, please describe the areas identified as needing change and those areas considered priorities, as well as the steps authorities intend to take to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations. In addition, authorities should describe the incentives put in place for market participants to develop their own independent credit assessment processes. Examples of incentives might include disclosure requirements relating to credit risk assessment practices or articulating clear supervisory expectations of the extent to which firms should perform their own due diligence before making lending decisions. a) Remove references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to banks. SAMA There are no references in Law. Only references in Regulations arise from Basel standards. - 1

changes in inter standards) inter b) Develop alternative standards of credit assessment, where needed, for the purpose of replacing references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to banks. SAMA SAMA will revise its regulations when changes are made by the Basel Committee. - 2. Reducing market reliance on CRA ratings (Principle II) a) Enhance supervisory processes and procedures to assess the adequacy of banks own credit assessment processes and incentivise market participants to develop internal risk management capabilities. b) Require or incentivise market participants to disclose information about their internal credit risk assessment processes. SAMA - Supervisory meeting with Banks to discuss banks own systems for Credit risk assessment. - Inspections of Banks systems and processes. SAMA - Basel Pillar III disclosure standards introduced. - Inter Accounting Standards applied. - SAMA has encouraged banks to strengthen disclosures to the market. Done On-going Done On-going

changes in inter standards) inter 3.2 Prudential supervision of banks (Principle III.2) a) Enhance supervisory oversight of banks to ensure they develop adequate internal credit assessment processes that avoid mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings (differentiating where appropriate between banks subject to the internal ratings-based (IRB), Standardised Approach of other capital regime). b) Revise CRA ratings in other prudential supervisory policies (e.g. relating to liquidity requirements) to reduce reliance on CRA ratings. SAMA - All banks are required to have their own loan classification and internal Credit Rating Systems. - Banks to have IRB systems in place when size of portfolios justify. - SAMA supervises the development of IRB systems in the banks in formal meetings. SAMA - Currently, SAMA Laws and Regulations on Liquidity have no reference to CRA Rating. - SAMA has introduced Basel Liquidity Rules (LCR and NSFR) which have references to credit ratings. Changes by SAMA will follow changes made by the Basel Committee. Done On-going None On-going

Annex II: Central bank operations changes in inter standards) inter 3. Application of the basic principles to particular financial market activities (Principle III) Based on the findings from the stock-taking exercise, please describe the areas identified as needing changes, including which areas are considered priorities, and the steps authorities intend to take to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in central bank policies and operations. 3.1 Central bank operations (Principle III.1) a) Reduce reliance on CRA ratings in central bank policies (such as investments, asset management frameworks, and conventional and unconventional operations), including the decision to accept or reject an instrument as collateral or for outright purchase and in determining haircuts. SAMA For the time being SAMA s investments in bonds (Government & Corporate) and deposit placements require rated instruments besides other internal guidelines.

changes in inter standards) inter b) Adjust policies for imposing risk control measures (including haircuts) on financial instruments to align with the FSB Principles on CRA ratings. See response on Attachment 1. c) Develop the central bank s internal credit risk assessment capabilities and use of alternative measures of creditworthiness. See response on Attachment 1.

Annex III: Insurance/Reinsurance Companies 1 1. Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations (Principle I) changes in inter standards) inter Based on the findings from the stock-taking exercise, please describe the areas identified as needing change and those areas considered priorities, as well as the steps authorities intend to take to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations. In addition, authorities should describe the incentives put in place for market participants to develop their own independent credit assessment processes. Examples of incentives might include disclosure requirements relating to credit risk assessment practices or articulating clear supervisory expectations of the extent to which firms should perform their own due diligence before making lending or investment decisions. 1 Answers in this section should relate to the prudential regulation of insurance companies and reinsurance companies. Laws and regulations relating to insurance companies in their capacity as institutional investors should be included in the section entitled

changes in inter standards) inter a) Remove references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to insurance/reinsurance companies. SAMA References to CRA s are present in the Implementing Regulations and the Regulation of Reinsurance Activities. End of 2014 These references will be updated in line with SAMA s upcoming planned review of its Regulations, which will be conducted over the year 2014. The consultation and feedback processes required for any amendments to the Regulations means it is most practical to bundle together updates into the next regular review in 2014. Full account will be taken of any new inter standards agreed including reducing reliance on credit rating agency (CRA) ratings.

b) Develop alternative standards of credit assessment, where needed, for the purpose of replacing references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to insurance/reinsurance companies. SAMA 2. Reducing market reliance on CRA ratings (Principle II) a) Enhance supervisory processes and procedures to assess the adequacy of insurers /reinsurers own credit assessment processes and incentivise market participants to develop internal risk management capabilities. b) Require or incentivise market participants to disclose information about their internal credit risk assessment processes. SAMA changes in inter standards) SAMA will take on board approaches and standards of credit assessment developed in much larger and better resourced inter regulators, and/or the Inter Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) The insurance industry in Saudi Arabia is relatively immature, having only started in 2008. The intention therefore would be to follow best practices developed in mature markets after giving those a reasonable length of time in place to judge their costeffectiveness and efficiency. SAMA As above. As above. inter Two years after the IAIS has published appropriate guidance. Two years after the successful introduction of such processes in more developed markets.

Annex IV: Investment Funds Management (including collective investment schemes, alternative investment schemes, occupational retirement schemes) 1. Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations (Principle I) changes in inter standards) completion date inter Based on the findings from the stock-taking exercise, please describe the areas identified as needing change and those areas considered priorities, as well as the steps authorities intend to take to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations. In addition, authorities should describe the incentives put in place for market participants to develop their own independent credit assessment processes. Examples of incentives might include disclosure requirements relating to credit risk assessment practices. a) Remove references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations for investment funds management. b) Develop alternative standards of credit assessment, where needed, for the purpose of replacing references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations for investment funds management. None There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to Investment Fund Management.

2. Reducing market reliance on CRA ratings (Principle II) a) Enhance supervisory processes and procedures to assess the adequacy of market participants own credit assessment processes. changes in inter standards). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to The has in place different procedures to assess the adequacy of market participants own credit assessment processes. 3. Application of the basic principles to particular financial market activities (Principle III.3) completion date inter a) Establish, as appropriate, supervisory review of internal limits and investment policies of investment managers and institutional investors. a. Insurance companies (in their capacity as institutional investors). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to Furthermore, insurance companies are not regulated by the as they operate under the umbrella of SAMA and thus any required changes would be under their jurisdiction. See SAMA comments in Annex III.

completion date changes in inter standards) inter b. Investment managers (i.e. mangers of collective investment schemes). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to c. Alternative investment managers (e.g. hedge funds, endowments). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to d. Managers of occupational retirement schemes. b) Require changes to internal limits and investment policies. a. Insurance companies (in their capacity as institutional investors). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to Furthermore, insurance companies are not regulated by the as they operate under the umbrella of SAMA and thus any required changes would be under their jurisdiction. See SAMA comments on Annex III.

completion date changes in inter standards) inter b. Investment managers (i.e. mangers of collective investment schemes). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to c. Alternative investment managers (e.g. hedge funds, endowments). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to d. Managers of occupational retirement schemes. c) Incentivise compliance with the CRA Principles. a. Insurance companies (in their capacity as institutional investors). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to Furthermore, insurance companies are not regulated by the as they operate under the umbrella of SAMA and thus any required changes would be under their jurisdiction. See SAMA comments in Annex III.

b. Investment managers (i.e. mangers of collective investment schemes). c. Alternative investment managers (e.g. hedge funds, endowments). d. Managers of occupational retirement schemes. changes in inter standards) There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to completion date inter d) Strengthen supervisory oversight to assess whether investments managers and institutional investors have made changes to the role that CRA ratings play in investment mandates, thresholds and triggers.

completion date changes in inter standards) inter a. Insurance companies (in their capacity as institutional investors). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to Furthermore, insurance companies are not regulated by the as they operate under the umbrella of SAMA and thus any required changes would be under their jurisdiction. See SAMA comments in Annex III. b. Investment managers (i.e. mangers of collective investment schemes). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to c. Alternative investment managers (e.g. hedge funds, endowments). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to d. Managers of occupational retirement schemes.

Annex V: Collateral Policies for Central Counterparties (CCPs) (Not applicable as there is NO central counterparty in the KSA) changes in inter standards) inter Based on the findings from the stock-taking exercise, please describe the areas identified as needing change and those areas considered priorities, as well as the steps authorities intend to take to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations. In addition, authorities should describe the incentives put in place for market participants to develop their own independent credit assessment processes. Examples of incentives might include disclosure requirements relating to credit risk assessment practices or articulating clear supervisory expectations of the extent to which CCPs should perform their own due diligence. 1. Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations (Principle I) a) Remove references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to collateral policies for CCPs.

b) Develop alternative standards of credit assessment, where necessary, for the purpose of replacing references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to collateral policies for CCPs. 2. Reducing market reliance on CRA ratings (Principle II) a) Enhance supervisory processes and procedures to assess the adequacy of CCPs own credit assessment processes. changes in inter standards) 3. Application of the basic principles to particular financial market activities (Principle III) 3.1 Central counterparties and private sector margin agreements (Principle III.4a) a) Conduct stress tests or estimate the procyclical effect, on the overall margin requirements for the CCP participants, of a sudden downgrade of the credit ratings of some widely used securities. b) Assess the reliance on credit ratings in the investment policy of the CCP. c) Review private sector margin agreements to ensure compliance with the Principle. inter

changes in inter standards) inter d) Require changes to private sector margin agreements. e) Incentivise compliance with the CRA Principles.

Annex VI: Securities Issuance (debt and equity, whether public issuance or private placement), including assetbacked securities and corporate debt changes in inter standards) inter Based on the findings from the stock-taking exercise, please describe the areas identified as needing change and those areas considered priorities, as well as the steps authorities intend to take to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations. In addition, authorities should describe the incentives put in place for market participants to develop their own independent credit assessment processes. Examples of incentives might include disclosure requirements relating to credit risk assessment practices. 1. Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations (Principle I) a) Remove references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations related to securities issuance. b) Develop alternative standards of credit assessment, where necessary, for the purpose of replacing references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to securities issuance. None There is no need for any steps to be taken as there is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to securities issuance.

2. Reducing market reliance on CRA ratings (Principle II) a) Enhance supervisory processes and procedures to assess the adequacy of market participants own credit assessment processes. changes in inter standards). There is no reference to CRA ratings in laws and regulations pertaining to securities issuance. 3. Application of the basic principles to particular financial market activities (Principle III) 3.1 Central counterparties and private sector margin agreements (Principle III.5a) a) Review the role of credit rating in disclosures by There is no need for any steps to be taken issuers of securities. as all securities issuance in SA do not require ratings. b) Reduce the role of credit ratings in disclosures by issuers of securities (list the steps to take). inter

Annex VII: Securities Firms (broker-dealers) Milestones to be met (e.g. changes in inter standards) inter Based on the findings from the stock-taking exercise, please describe the areas identified as needing change and those areas considered priorities, as well as the steps authorities intend to take to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations. In addition, authorities should describe the incentives put in place for market participants to develop their own independent credit assessment processes. 1. Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in laws and regulations (Principle I) a) Remove references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to securities firms. b) Develop alternative standards of credit assessment, where necessary, for the purpose of replacing references to CRA ratings in laws and regulations relating to securities firms. None The Prudential Rules (PRs), published by for regulating capital adequacy of the securities firms, require the conduct of an internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) in line with the Basel Committee recommendations. In the absence of mandatory reliance on credit ratings, the securities firms are to develop and use sound risk management techniques in monitoring credit This requirement is contained under Pillar 2 of the PRs which is to be enforced in early 2014.

2. Reducing market reliance on CRA ratings (Principle II) a) Enhance supervisory processes and procedures to assess the adequacy of securities firms own credit assessment processes. Milestones to be met (e.g. changes in inter standards) assessments process. The supervisory process and procedures have been enhanced to include (from early 2014) the review and evaluation of a securities firms own credit assessment submission. These credit assessment submissions will be based on an internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) to be conducted by the securities firms. inter This is to be completed by early 2014 upon enforcing the Pillar 2 of the PRs, as stated in 1b) above.