RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE REORGANISATION AND WINDING UP OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS

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1 RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE REORGANISATION AND WINDING UP OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS The Bank of Italy welcomes the opportunity offered by the European Commission to contribute to the review of the reorganisation and winding up directive (Directive 2001/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001, hereinafter the Directive ). In the light of the increasing integration of the European banking and financial market, and the possibility that episodes of instability could spread and bring about contagion to the European financial systems as a whole, the assessment of the suitability of European supervisory arrangements has to be deemed as a very important issue. One of the milestones of this assessment is the review of the Directive 2001/24. This legislative text aims at applying the principles of unity and universality of bankruptcy proceedings to a credit institution and its branches in other Member States, catering for the application of the rules and procedures of the home Member State to the whole entity. The Directive 2001/24/EC has been duly implemented in the Italian legal framework, through the amendment of the existing rules on reorganisation and winding up of banks laid down by the Italian Banking law (Legislative Decree 1 September 1993 n. 385). With reference to the questions provided by the Commission, please find here below the answers of the Bank of Italy. a) Investment firms and collective investment undertakings are not covered by EU Insolvency Regulation or the Directive. This may be seen as a gap in the EU legislation. Do you think that investment firms and collective investment undertakings should be covered by this or a separate directive? The Bank of Italy is of the opinion that the aforementioned gap could raise some concern regarding the level playing field among financial sectors and would favour broadening the scope of the Directive to include investment firms and asset management companies. Adoption of an ad hoc directive could also be considered. It may be worth mentioning that in the Italian legal framework investment firms and asset management companies are subject to Special Administration (the Italian procedure for reorganisation) and to Compulsory Administrative Liquidation (the Italian procedure for winding up) pursuant to articles 56 and 57 of the Consolidated Law on Finance (Legislative Decree 24 February 1998 n CLF). The relevant regulation mirrors that of the banking system, as laid down by the Italian banking law and makes reference to it for several aspects. The Bank of Italy is the authority responsible for both the management and the monitoring of the procedures for banks as well as the aforementioned financial institutions.

2 b) Are electronic money institutions covered by the legislation implementing the Directive in your country? Do you think that more clarity is needed for e-money institutions? Yes, electronic money institutions are covered. It could be useful to clarify that e-money institutions fall within the scope of application of the Directive on reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions. c) Article 5 requires host Member States' competent authorities to inform home competent authorities about the necessity of reorganization measures for branches within their territory. This Article only confers upon the host Member State a warning role and does not entrust the host authorities with additional responsibilities in terms of reorganization measures, which lie with the home Member State. Do you think that the wording of Article 5 may be unclear and that more clarity along the above lines is needed? How is this provision transposed into domestic law in your country? In our view the wording of article 5 of the Directive is sufficiently clear. We have implemented art. 5 in the Italian banking law almost literally. The provision may be improved, for instance, by setting a timeframe for the information to the home authorities. d) The exchange of information under the Directive (Articles 4 and 5) between supervisors and administrative or judicial authorities is an implicit exception to the duty of professional secrecy as laid down in Article 44 and seq. of Directive 2006/48/EC, but is not explicitly dealt with. Do you think that more clarity is needed regarding professional secrecy? How is this provision transposed into your country's law? In our opinion, provisions of articles from 44 to 50 of the Directive 2006/48/EC already lay down a comprehensive regime for exchange of information and professional secrecy, also as regards gateways, which may cover the instance of reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions. However, more clarity on professional secrecy could be advisable. Provisions of articles 4 and 5 of the Directive have been implemented in Italy almost literally (see art. 95-quater of the Italian banking law). e) Under Article 16(2), the claims of all creditors in different Member States shall be treated in the same way and accorded the same ranking as claims of an equivalent nature. It has been observed that the provision can give rise to problems in its application when there is no correspondence between claims in different Member States. Do you think that more clarity is needed regarding the equivalence of the nature of claims? No. In fact, providing more precise rules on the equivalence of claims would be a very demanding task. 2

3 On the contrary, we believe that the framework designed by art. 10 h) and art of the Directive could be considered as a suitable solution in the light of the possible variability of claims conceived by national legislations. The evaluation of the equivalence has to be left to the body responsible for the assessment of the claims. f) The issue is raised as to whether the conflict of law rules and the carve out of Article dealing with set-off, proprietary rights, netting and repos, may give rise to implementation issues given current differences in wording between different Directives like the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive (2002/47/EC) and the Directive 2001/24/EC on the winding-up and reorganisation of credit institutions. Do you think that there are problems in the implementation of these provisions? Is there a need to insert harmonised definitions for these transactions in the Directive? The aforementioned conflict of law rules have been implemented literally in the Italian legislation. Harmonised definitions would be advisable (see also the answer to the next question). g) The Directive makes a distinction between two categories of exceptions to the general conflict of laws rule, which are different in scope. For certain contracts and rights, under article 20, the Directive requires the application of another law in the context of the proceeding. On the other hand, under article 21, creditor's rights "in rem" (his property rights) in respect of assets located in a Member State other than the one where the measures are adopted are protected from the effect of insolvency proceedings. One possible ambiguity arises in the field of covered bonds. Do you think that more clarity is needed regarding the conflict of laws rule to be applied in this case (general rule, article 20.c or article 21)? Title IV of Directive 2001/24 is the most complex part of the Directive. Main rules laid down in the Directive are the principles of unity and universality, which exclude opening secondary procedures and affirm the full jurisdiction of the law of the procedure (lex concursus) opened by the home Member State of the bank or insurance company. Nevertheless, the need to safeguard interests and rights has pushed for the introduction of exceptions to the principle of lex concursus. All these exceptions raise problems of coordination, because sometimes different criteria are laid down for determining the applicable law. Only in certain cases does the Directive establish a hierarchy of criteria; it mostly leaves the interpreter in doubt. In the case of covered bonds art. 21 should be applicable; if the financial instrument is held in a centralised deposit system, art. 24 is enforceable too; art. 20.c should not be applicable since the collateral of the covered bond is not directly represented by immovable properties or movable assets subject to registration, but by mortgages. For clarity sake, any possible provision on this topic should take into account that different contract schemes are possible and that different rules should apply if the financial instrument is issued and directly covered by a bank or issued by a bank and covered by a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Actually, the Italian rules on covered bonds lay down a scheme in which the bank transfers high quality assets to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which secures the bonds issued by the bank. In this scenario covered bonds owners won t suffer any consequences in the case of bank failure, thanks to the collateral provided by the SPV. 3

4 Problems related to exchange of information and proceedings h) For information purposes, the specific measures and procedures (such as name, competent authority, scope, content and effects) on the reorganisation measures and winding-up procedures covered by each national implementation of the Directive could be compiled in an informal manner. This could ease the communication between authorities and liquidators in different Member States. Do you think that such a list will helpfully improve the communication between authorities? Differently from the Council Regulation N. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, the Directive does not provide for annexes listing the various national reorganisation and winding up procedures. Similar annexes could be enclosed to the Directive, in order to provide for a useful nomenclature. However, it is questionable whether a mere list of proceedings would increase the awareness on the effects and characteristics of national procedures. A more effective solution might be the publication on the EU Commission s website of a stocktaking of national proceedings. Such a stocktaking could build upon the work already conducted by the Legal Committee of the European System of Central Banks, and should give a broad picture of the specific characteristics of the national procedures. In addition, it should be taken into consideration that the information on the effects of the procedure has to be made available to the host authorities in the context of the information mandated by art. 4 and art. 9.2 of the Directive. This could increase awareness of the relevant authorities on the characteristics and effects of the measures applied to the bank. i) There is no standardised form (like to the one used in Directive 2001/17/EC on reorganisation and winding-up of insurance undertakings) competent authorities may use for the publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. A unified form might also be developed with a view to helping the communication between competent authorities in different Member States and facilitating the information provided to known creditors. Do you think that such a standardised form would be necessary to improve information provision? The Directive provides for specific rules on the publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities of extracts from the decisions implementing reorganisation and winding up measures in art. 6 and 13 respectively. The Directive does not envisage any standardised form for such a publication. It should be mentioned that also the Directive on reorganisation and winding up of insurance undertakings does not provide for a specific form. In the insurance sector there is a decision of CEIOPS (Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors) about the use of a standardised form for such a publication. Similar solution could be foreseen for the banking sector. 4

5 As a general observation it is worth noting that there is no common drafting between art. 6 and art. 13 of the Directive. In case of amendment of the Directive, the use of a more consistent language should be considered. j) The submission of an extract from the administrative or judicial authorities decision for publication (articles 6 and 13) in order to facilitate the exercise of the appeal in good time is not subject to a specific deadline, but must be carried out at the earliest opportunity, which may lead to legal uncertainty. Do you think that a precise deadline for publication is needed to avoid legal uncertainty? The provision of a maximum time limit for the submission of the extract from the decision of the administrative or judicial authorities could be useful for the sake of legal certainty. k) There is no centralized system in place for the provision of information on opening reorganisation measures and winding-up proceedings. In order to achieve a greater degree of transparency across the EU, a contact point responsible for the publication of relevant information could be designated. Do you think that a centralized contact point is needed to ensure a greater degree of transparency? The potential benefit in terms of greater transparency at European level of a centralised point of information on the opening of the reorganisation and winding up proceedings could be further analysed. Do you think that there is benefit for improvement and concretisation of the provisions of the Directive regarding third countries branches? Is there a need to have only one proceeding for all third country branches of the same credit institutions? The Directive does not provide for a single proceeding in the case of reorganisation and winding up proceedings concerning EU branches of third country credit institutions. Where such credit institutions have branches in two or more Member States and one host authority decides to implement a reorganisation or winding-up measure, the Directive requires only a duty of information among the host authorities and an endeavour to coordinate their actions. Indeed the provision on coordination of actions is rather vague, considering that third country branches are considered more or less as separate legal entities from a legal perspective and their conditions could require different kind of interventions by the respective supervisors. Last but not least, it would be difficult to set out a leading criterion for the identification of the relevant national law and authority responsible for the single proceeding. 11. The Commission Communication on Deposit Guarantee Schemes identified two potential obstacles for the functioning of Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 5

6 a) Currently, the information obligations under the Directive (Articles 4, 5 and 9) do not refer to Deposit Guarantee Schemes. A winding-up or reorganisation of a credit institution usually triggers the payment of compensation to depositors under Directive 1994/19/EEC. The Deposit Guarantee Scheme would then subrogate to the rights of depositors against the credit institution. Consequently, the work of Deposit Guarantee Schemes would be facilitated if they were informed to the same extent as the competent authorities under the articles referred to above. Do you think that it would be useful to extend the scope of 'competent authorities' to Deposit Guarantee Schemes? No. The range of competent authorities is set by reference to the Directive 2000/12/EC, now Directive 2006/48/EC, and encompasses national authorities which are empowered by law or regulation to supervise credit institutions. The Bank of Italy believes that reasons of consistency with the use of such a legal term in the Community acquis suggest not to broaden the set of competent authorities. However, the provision for information flowing from the supervisory authorities to the deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) could be introduced in the Directive. Otherwise, it could be left to national rules and regulations or to agreements among EU DGS. The qualification of DGS as competent authorities has to be avoided. In Italy, according to art. 7.9 of the Italian banking law, the Bank of Italy can provide Italian DGS with the information they need for the discharge of their statutory duties. b) In some Member States, claims of the national Deposit Guarantee Scheme seem to have priority over claims of other creditors. This may lead to problems when a Deposit Guarantee Scheme from another Member State has to bear a part of the compensation and does not enjoy such a priority right. Does the legislation of your Member State provide such priority rights? Would it be useful to harmonise such rights throughout the EU? In Italy a DGS that reimburses depositors enjoys the subrogation in the right of each reimbursed depositor and, up to the refunded amount, has a priority in respect of the reimbursed depositor. There is no priority right of DGS over claims of other creditors in the distribution of the amount recovered by the liquidation procedure. We believe there is no need for harmonisation. Such a measure would impact on national sensitivities regarding priority rights in bankruptcy proceedings, without apparent benefit for the smooth functioning of winding-up measures. Further questions 12. Are there any further gaps, ambiguities or conflicts in the Directive on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions? Please provide detailed description of the relevant issues. No further issues have been identified. 6

7 OVERVIEW OF ISSUES RELATED TO THE TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL GROUPS IN CRISIS SITUATION / UNDER REORGANISATION Is the scope of the Directive 2001/24/EC too narrow? Should extension of the scope to banking groups be considered in order to keep pace with market developments? Yes, the scope is too narrow. The provision of rules on reorganisation and winding-up of banking group is important in the light of recent market developments. However, the extension to banking groups of the principles laid down in the current Directive may prove difficult, considering that the parent bank and its subsidiaries in other Member States are different entities from a legal standpoint. As a consequence, they are fully subject to the principle of the nationality of jurisdiction. That said, we strongly support legal solutions which could improve crisis management of pan- European banking groups. To this aim, the following arrangements could be envisaged: 1) the possibility to extend the proceedings to other entities of the group under given conditions; 2) providing a coordination of reorganisation and winding-up procedures involving companies belonging to the same group; 3) the possibility to appoint the same bodies responsible for the proceedings affecting different group s entities (see below the answer to question C a., on the case of the Italian legislation on reorganisation and winding-up of banking groups). Is the ability to transfer assets from the parent to the subsidiary or vice-versa necessary in crisis situations? Should it be facilitated and if so how? Asset transfer within the group could be helpful in crisis situation. However, it is a very sensitive issue that should be carefully assessed. As a general view, we are of the opinion that such a possibility should be allowed when the restoration of the group s soundness is viable and provided that appropriate measures are envisaged for safeguarding the interests of potentially impaired stakeholders (i.e. minority shareholders and creditors). One could imagine a specific framework for the reorganisation and winding-up of the parent bank and its subsidiaries, which could allow for the transfer of assets or collateral among the entities belonging to the group. This transfer should be aimed at resolving the crisis under the supervision of the relevant supervisory authorities. Such a solution would require to lay down a legal framework for EU banking groups, which entails the enhanced role and responsibility of the parent bank, the definition of the group interest, the conditions against which such an interest can overcome the individual companies interest and possible protection of relevant stakeholders, the possibility to derogate to the observance of prudential requirements on a solo basis. A. Banking law and regulatory responsibilities of the competent authorities 7

8 a. Do banking laws pose limits on transactions that might be considered disadvantageous or detrimental for a credit institution, with the result that they will either be considered null and void or capable of triggering supervisory action? There are no limits in the banking law. However, according to art. 67 of Italian bankruptcy law, some transactions, detrimental to creditors and carried out during the so-called suspect period, may be revoked by the liquidator in case of insolvency. b. Are competent authorities empowered or obliged to prevent or prohibit intra-group transactions: i) in going concern situations? ii) in crisis situations? iii) in crisis situations if transactions are deemed detrimental to the subsidiary/parent? i) No. ii) No. iii) No. Some limits have been established by Bank of Italy as regards the granting of credit by a bank to subjects connected with or having shareholding exceeding predefined limits. In August 2007 the Bank of Italy has launched a public consultation concerning a proposal of reform of the current rules on this area. c. Even if competent authorities of the home and the host Member States agree to the asset transfer in the context of a crisis, can competent authorities according to national rules be held liable for any deterioration of the situation? No specific rules are laid down on this topic. The issue is very complex, broadly speaking. It depends on whether the supervisory authority has to give a formal authorisation; in this case, the general principles on the liability of authorities can be applied. d. Is it for judicial authorities or competent authorities to deem whether a transaction is detrimental to a credit institution? Are the detrimental transactions precisely defined by law (or case law)? Yes, courts can deem whether a transaction is detrimental to a credit institution, in case of lawsuits. Except for what is laid down by company law rules, there are no other specific rules dealing with this topic; case law basically regards transactions between banks and non-financial firms. e. Does national law require intra-group transfers to take place on an arms' length basis (i.e. under market conditions)? See answer to question B. f. Are there other legal impediments in national financial legislation/regulation or specific requirements preventing subsidiaries transferring assets to the parent (or vice versa)? No. 8

9 B. Company law a. Do provisions of company law prohibit intra group transactions that might be disadvantageous or detrimental for a parent or subsidiary? To what extent is a banking group's interest a lawful objective (i.e. the group interest for a particular transaction may outweigh the interest of the parent or subsidiary)? No. In specific transactions, Italian legislation implicitly allows group-wide interest to outweigh an individual interest of a subsidiary. According to art of the Italian Civil code the parent company can be held liable towards the subsidiary s creditors and shareholders who suffered a loss or a damage, unless losses or damages are covered by the benefits deriving from the belonging to the group or by specific compensations. b. Could the conclusion of a contract or the adoption of a decision which may prove detrimental to the subsidiary be challenged and reversed? By whom? Under what circumstances? Yes, different tools are provided. According to art. art. 67 of Italian Bankruptcy law, transactions detrimental to creditors and carried out during the so-called suspect period may be reversed by the receiver in case of insolvency of the subsidiary ( revocation actions ). Furthermore, the shareholder or the creditor of the company who suffered a damage or loss can ask the parent company for a compensation according to the rules implicit in the art of Civil code (see reply to question A). c. In which circumstances, where asset transfers take place with the parent undertaking or other related parties, may the management body of a subsidiary be held responsible? According to art. 2497, any person who has a part in the activity or the act that caused the loss or damage can be held responsible within the limits of his own benefit. This provision could apply to the management body of a subsidiary, too. d. In the case of asset transfers in the interest of the group, is the parent undertaking required, under national law, to guarantee obligations of the subsidiaries vis-à-vis creditors? No. See answer to question A. C. Insolvency law a. According to national law, is it presently possible to initiate a joint insolvency (reorganisation or winding-up) proceeding that includes all or a part of a financial group? When: (i) both the parent and subsidiary are insolvent? (ii) the parent is solvent and the subsidiary is insolvent? (iii) the parent is insolvent and the subsidiary is solvent? 9

10 No. The crisis proceedings concerning the group entities are separate proceedings. The law provides for the coordination among the various proceedings (e.g., the appointment of the same governing bodies), but there are not joint proceedings actually. The Italian banking law provides specific rules for reorganisation and winding up of banking groups (see articles from 98 to 105), which refer to the parent undertaking and to the companies belonging to the group separately. As for reorganisation, the Italian banking law (see art. 98) provides that special administration could be applicable to the parent undertaking in the presence of the conditions laid down in art. 70 (i.e. serious administrative irregularities or serious violations of laws, regulations or bylaws governing the bank s activity; serious capital losses; a specific request by the administrative bodies or an extraordinary general meeting of the bank); where there are serious non-fulfilment in the activity of direction and coordination, in particular regarding the implementation of the instructions issued by the Bank of Italy in the interest of the group stability; where a company belonging to the banking group has been subjected to one of the crisis procedures provided for by the law and the financial or operational equilibrium of the group could be seriously affected. The special administrators of the parent undertaking, after consulting the oversight committee and subject to authorisation by the Bank of Italy, may remove or replace some or all of the directors of the companies belonging to the group for the purpose of making necessary changes in management policy. They may also request the aforementioned companies to provide figures, information and any other elements which may be useful in the performance of their duties. The special administrators of the parent undertaking may request to the Bank of Italy the special administration or compulsory administrative liquidation for the companies belonging to the group. They may also request a judicial declaration of insolvency of the companies belonging to the group. The same persons may be appointed to more than one of the bodies responsible for the special administration or compulsory administrative liquidation of companies belonging to the same group, where this is considered likely to facilitate the procedures. As for liquidation proceeding, the Italian banking law provides that compulsory administrative liquidation could be applicable to the parent undertaking in case of the exceptionally seriousness of administrative irregularities, of the violations of laws, regulations or bylaws, of the expected capital losses; of the non-fulfilment in the activity of direction and coordination in the above mentioned regard. Where the parent undertaking has been subjected to compulsory administrative liquidation, such a proceedings will apply to the group companies which a Court has declared to be insolvent. If group entities have already been subjected to judicial crisis procedures according to bankruptcy law, such procedures have to be converted in the special banking crisis procedures provided for in the Italian banking law The parent undertaking s liquidators may ask the Bank of Italy the compulsory administrative liquidation for other group entities. They may also request a judicial finding of insolvency of the companies belonging to the group. 10

11 Where there has been a judicial finding of insolvency, the liquidators of the parent undertaking are responsible for challenging transactions with other group companies which are deemed to be detrimental to the parent undertaking, according to the Bankruptcy law ( revocation actions ). b. What are the conditions for these situations? Do they imply fully-fledged insolvency proceedings or merely procedural steps to ensure e.g. proper exchange of information? Please see the previous answer. c. Do your answers differ if the subsidiary is situated in a different jurisdiction to the parent? Yes. National rules on banking group crisis are not applicable in other jurisdictions. d. Who or which organization/authority may decide to treat financial group members jointly in insolvency or crisis management in your country? As previously stated, there are no joint proceedings. The decision to open reorganisation or winding up proceedings for the parent undertaking and for the entities belonging to the group is taken by the Minister of the Economy and Finance, acting on a proposal from the Bank of Italy. e. Is it presently possible in your Member State to appoint one insolvency representative, administrator to all members of a financial group involved into the proceedings? What are the conditions for this? Does this differ depending on whether the group is domestically located or cross-border? Yes. Art. 130 of the Italian Banking law provides that the same persons could be appointed as members of the bodies responsible of the special administration or of the compulsory administrative liquidation of the companies belonging to the same group, where this is deemed useful for a better coordination of the proceedings. Yes, because this provision is only applicable to the parent undertaking and to the companies belonging to the group which are incorporated in Italy. f. Can a single reorganization plan be implemented in your Member State for: (i) the whole financial group if it is domestic? (ii) the whole financial group if it has cross-border subsidiaries? Yes, in both cases. In the second case a strong coordination with the competent supervisory authorities is needed. g. Are intra group transactions (e.g. asset transfers) taking place before the commencement of insolvency proceedings treated differently from transactions with unrelated parties in the Member States' insolvency legislation, in particular with regard to provisions for the avoidance of transactions? 11

12 Yes. According to art. 99 of Italian Banking law, the intra group transactions can be reversed following the procedure of avoidance laid down in art. 67 of Bankruptcy law ( revocation actions ); art. 99 of Italian Banking law set a longer suspect period than that taken into account by art. 67 of Bankruptcy law. h. What are the present rules for intra group financing after the commencement of reorganisation and winding-up proceedings? Under what circumstances can the assets of the solvent financial group member be used to finance the operation of the insolvent member? There are not specific rules in this case. During the reorganisation proceeding the special administrator can ask the controlling shareholder to inject funds in order to restore the soundness of the troubled institution. This could be done in the context of a reorganisation plan. For the purpose of mitigating possible reputational effects, controlling shareholders can give financial support to the insolvent company in order to allow the latter to fulfil all its obligations. i. Is it presently possible in your Member State to extend liability to other members of the group that are not included in the insolvency proceedings? Under which conditions? The question is ambiguous. More clarity is needed about the meaning of liability. Art of the Civil Code provides that the company responsible for direction or coordination is directly liable towards shareholders of the controlled company for detriment to profitability or to share value and towards creditors for loss of capital integrity, where such detriment and loss are consequences of the discharge of direction or coordination power not in line with the principle of sound company management. j. Is consolidation or pooling of assets of group members under reorganisation or winding-up proceedings possible in your Member State? What are the conditions for consolidation or pooling of assets for: (i) Financial groups operating domestically? (ii) Financial groups operating cross-border? No. The consolidation or pooling of assets is not allowed in the Italian legislation. D. Crisis management and reorganisation of banking groups 18. According to national law, to what extent are competent authorities involved in the reorganisation process (e.g. consultation from judicial authorities before deciding on the implementation of reorganisation measures). Under which circumstances (e.g. suspension of payments)? The reorganisation and winding up proceedings start with a decree of the Minister of the Economy and Finance, acting on a proposal from the Bank of Italy. 12

13 The Bank of Italy is also responsible for supervising all banking and financial intermediaries proceedings. Furthermore, Bank of Italy has to grant specific authorizations for specific transactions carried out by the bodies governing the proceedings. 19. In addition to the problems raised above, are there other issues relating to crisis management and reorganisation of financial groups in the EU which require particular attention? No. 20. For reference and in order to be able to contact the respondent in case of a need for clarification or further discussion, please provide the following data for the Commission. Name of person completing the questionnaire LIBERATO INTONTI; DOMENICO PICCOLANTONIO Country ITALY Name of organisation BANK OF ITALY Type of organisation (e.g. government, representative organisation, financial supervisor, financial institutions etc.) CENTRAL BANK AND PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISOR Address VIA NAZIONALE 91 ROMA Telephone ; address liberato.intonti@bancaditalia.it ; domenico.piccolantonio@bancaditalia.it 21. Do you agree to have your responses published on the Commission's websites? Yes 13