UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Transcription

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION Inquiry Regarding the Commission s ) Policy for Recovery of Income Tax Costs ) Docket No. PL REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OR REHEARING AND EXPEDITED ACTION OF DOMINION ENERGY, INC. Pursuant to section 19(a) of the Natural Gas Act ( NGA ) 1 and Rule 713 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission s ( FERC or the Commission ) Rules of Practice and Procedure, 2 Dominion Energy, Inc. ( Dominion ) submits this request for rehearing of FERC s March 15, 2018 Revised Policy Statement on Treatment of Income Taxes ( Revised Policy Statement ). 3 In a reversal of longstanding Commission policy, the Revised Policy Statement stated the Commission will no longer permit any interstate natural gas pipeline organized as a Master Limited Partnership ( MLP ) to recover an income tax allowance in [its] cost of service. 4 While the Commission s policy shift may be unreasonable in several regards, it is especially unjust as applied to the specific case of an MLP pipeline that is a subsidiary of a C-corporation. A C-corporation owning an MLP pipeline has the same ultimate tax liability as if the pipeline itself is a C-corporation. This is because the income from the MLP subsidiary pipeline is included in the calculation of the parent C-corporation s federal tax liability. Under the Commission s new policy, a pipeline organized as a C U.S.C. 717r(a) (2012) C.F.R (2016). 3 Inquiry Regarding the Commission s Policy for Recovery of Income Tax Costs, 162 FERC 61,227 (2018)(Hereinafter Revised Policy Statement ). 4 Id. at P 2.

2 corporation would recover a tax allowance, but the MLP pipeline subsidiary of the same C-corporation would not, despite the parent C-corporations owing similar tax liabilities in both cases. Accordingly, Dominion seeks clarification that the Commission s disallowance of the tax allowance for MLPs generally does not apply to the specific case of an MLP that is a subsidiary of a C-corporation. The Revised Policy Statement is not a product of reasoned decision-making. The Commission is an administrative agency charged with regulating natural gas pipelines. In the Revised Policy Statement, rather than reaching a decision backed by its own wellreasoned analysis, the Commission simply adopted as its own 5 the D.C. Circuit s assertion that an income tax allowance for MLP pipelines leads to a double recovery. 6 But it is the Commission, not the courts, that is the rate setting agency. Nor did the Commission take the D.C. Circuit up on its invitation for the Commission to demonstrate that there is no double recovery. 7 Accordingly, in failing to sufficiently justify its policy reversal, the Commission has surrendered its authority to the court and shirked its essential duty as an independent regulatory agency. Furthermore, as explained below, by depriving an MLP pipeline that is a subsidiary of a C-corporation of the income tax allowance, the Commission fails its responsibility under the NGA as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. The Commission s duty is to balance both consumer and investor interests by setting just and reasonable rates that do not impair the financial 5 Revised Policy Statement at P United Airlines, Inc. v. FERC, 827 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2016), on remand, SFPP, L.P., Opinion No C, 162 FERC 61,228 (2018) F.3d at 137 ( We [ ] remand for FERC to consider these or other mechanisms for which the Commission can demonstrate that there is no double recovery. ) 2

3 integrity of the companies it regulates. 8 The Revised Policy Statement has already impaired the financial integrity of the companies the Commission regulates, as evidenced by the drastic and immediate decline in the market value of MLPs with regulated pipeline subsidiaries. 9 Dominion estimates that in the ten trading days following the Commission s announcement, MLPs lost nearly $30 billion in market value. Dominion s analysis compares MLP values at market close on March 28, 2018 to market values at close on March 14, 2018 (the day prior to the Commission s announcement on March 15, 2018). Further negative impacts could materialize in the coming months. If the Commission s Revised Policy Statement is left unclarified, the MLP structure which Congress created to increase energy infrastructure investment may be abandoned. The Commission will have dictated the choice of entity, effectively mandating that pipelines be organized as C-corporations. In addition, much needed energy infrastructure investments made possible by MLP structured pipelines, like those which have benefited the nation and consumers over the past decade, will likely be materially reduced. Additionally, the Commission s failure to treat two pipeline subsidiaries of a C- corporation, one organized as an MLP and the other as a C-corporation, alike concerning the income tax allowance constitutes undue discrimination. A decision rendering the tax impermissible for any MLP pipeline, regardless of specific circumstances, is not the correct ruling on either factual or policy grounds. In this case, the Commission purports 8 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) ( Hope ); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). 9 See Appendix A which illustrates the fall for the Alerian MLP Index, the leading gauge of energy Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs), and also for Dominion companies. Because of the effect of the Commission s action on the financial markets, Dominion is filing this pleading well before the deadline for rehearing requests established by Rule 713. Dominion reserves the right to supplement this pleading. 3

4 to issue only a policy statement. A policy statement is implemented in individual cases. The Commission must clarify that individual pipelines are free to demonstrate that they are entitled to an income tax allowance in individual rate cases. SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS In compliance with Rule 713(c)(1), Dominion specifies the following errors in the Revised Policy Statement: 1. The Commission failed to engage in reasoned decision-making in reversing its income tax allowance policy for MLPs. 2. The Commission failed its responsibility under the NGA and Hope to ensure that its regulatory actions do not impair the financial integrity of the companies it regulates. 3. The Commission s Revised Policy Statement is unduly discriminatory since it arbitrarily treats two similar pipeline subsidiaries of a C-corporation, one organized as an MLP and the other as a C-corporation, dissimilarly concerning the income tax allowance, despite each having similar tax liabilities. 4. The Commission failed to follow the Administrative Procedure Act s notice-andcomment rulemaking requirements when it issued a binding rule through a policy statement. STATEMENT OF ISSUES In compliance with Rule 713(c)(2), Dominion submits the following Statement of Issues: 1. Whether the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to engage in reasoned decision-making in reversing its income tax allowance policy for MLPs. See Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998). 2. Whether the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing its responsibility under the NGA and Hope to ensure that its regulatory actions do not impair the financial integrity of the companies it regulates. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) ( Hope ); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). 3. Whether the Commission s Revised Policy Statement is unduly discriminatory since it arbitrarily treats two similar pipeline subsidiaries of a C-corporation, one organized as an MLP and the other as a C-corporation, dissimilarly concerning the income tax allowance, despite each having similar tax liabilities. See Burinskas v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 4

5 4. Whether the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to follow the Administrative Procedure Act s notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements when it issued a binding rule through a policy statement. See Nat'l Min. Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2014). REQUEST FOR REHEARING For the reasons explained below, the Commission should rehear or clarify the Revised Policy Statement to state that an MLP pipeline that is a subsidiary of a C- corporation is still entitled to the tax allowance in its cost of service rates and that regulated entities retain the right to seek the tax allowance in individual proceedings. I. The Commission inappropriately surrendered its ratemaking authority to the D.C. Circuit, and as a result, has failed to justify its Revised Policy Statement with reasoned-decision making. Following the D.C. Circuit s remand in United Airlines, FERC revised its Policy Statement on Income Tax Allowances to explicitly disallow all MLPs from recovering an income tax allowance in its cost of service. In implementing this 180-degree change in its policies, however, FERC failed to engage in reasoned decision-making. 10 FERC fundamentally confuses the direction that the D.C. Circuit gave FERC it its remand opinion that FERC must demonstrate that there is no double recovery of taxes for partnership pipelines 11 and instead interprets it as a legally-mandated fact, i.e., that the fundamental premise of United Airlines [is] that an income tax allowance for MLP pipelines leads to a double recovery. 12 In doing so, FERC surrenders its Congressionally-mandated regulatory authority to the D.C. Circuit. FERC cannot 10 See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) F.3d at Revised Policy Statement at P 23. 5

6 abdicate its regulatory responsibility to support its decision on remand by merely accepting as fact the concerns raised by the court. Federal agencies are tasked with setting regulatory policy, and a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. 13 Agencies, far more than courts, have the expertise and experience necessary to implement[] policy decisions in a technical and complex area. 14 The Supreme Court has explained the judicial preference for not dictating agency responses on remand, particularly in cases, such as here, in which an agency decision is invalidated as arbitrary and capricious as a result of incomplete reasoning. 15 Indeed, in United Airlines, the D.C. Circuit recognized this preference, holding only that FERC has not provided sufficient justification for its conclusion that there is no double recovery of taxes for [MLPs] receiving a tax allowance. 16 On remand, FERC is thus merely required to provide a reasoned basis for its policy. 17 This is not the first time that the D.C. Circuit has sought further justification from the Commission for granting the tax allowance to a partnership. In 2004, the D.C. Circuit questioned the Commission s grant of a tax allowance to a partnership and remanded the 13 Securities and Exchange Comm n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 14 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2718 (2015) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984)); see also United Airlines, 827 F.3d at 127. ( In reviewing FERC s orders, we are particularly deferential to the Commission s expertise with respect to ratemaking issues. ) (quoting ExxonMobil v. FERC, 487 F.3d 945, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 15 See Nat l Ass n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, (2007); see also id. at 658 (explaining that the failure to allow the agency to determine whether it can justify reaching the same result without a different or better explanation erroneously deprive[s] the Agency of its usual administrative avenue for explaining and reconciling the arguably contradictory rationales that sometimes appear in the course of lengthy and complex administrative decisions. ). 16 United Airlines, 827 F.3d at Id. at 137. Significantly, the D.C. Circuit explicitly acknowledges in its opinion that it may be reasonable for FERC to grant a tax allowance to partnership pipelines. Id. at

7 issue to the Commission. 18 In response to the remand, rather than deny the tax allowance, the Commission justified why the tax allowance was just and reasonable, a justification which the D.C. Circuit found to be sufficient. 19 There is no reason the Commission, in responding to the United Airlines remand, could not have done what it did before and provided sufficient justification for the tax allowance. On this remand, however, FERC reversed its position and issued its Revised Policy Statement barring MLPs from recovering an income tax allowance in its cost of service. To support its conclusion, FERC adopts, without explanation, the fundamental premise of United Airlines that an income tax allowance for MLP pipelines leads to a double recovery. 20 This assumes, without justification, the very premise FERC is instructed to examine on remand. Tellingly, FERC repeatedly relies on the court s discussion in United Airlines to support many of its underlying factual or legal conclusions. 21 This substitution of the court s analysis for its own does not satisfy the requirement that FERC engage in reasoned decision making, and is contrary to the fundamental principles of administrative law. 18 BP West Coast Products, LLC v. FERC, 374 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 19 ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. FERC, 487 F.3d 945 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 20 Revised Policy Statement at P For example, FERC cites the United Airlines for the conclusion that MLPs and similar pass-through entities do not incur income taxes at the entity level, and that [t]he DCF methodology determines the pre-tax investor return required to attract investment. Given [this]..., permitting an MLP to recover both an income tax allowance and a DCF ROE leads to a double recovery of the MLP s income tax costs. Revised Policy Statement at P 9 (emphasis added) (quoting United Airlines, 827 F.3d at 136). 7

8 II. By depriving an MLP pipeline that is a subsidiary of a C-corporation of the income tax allowance, the Commission fails to strike Hope s required balance of consumer and investor interests. a. Hope requires FERC to not impair the financial integrity of the companies it regulates through its regulatory actions. The Commission has a dual responsibility under the NGA: to ensure that interstate natural gas pipeline rates are just and reasonable and also to ensure that its regulatory actions do not impair the financial integrity of the companies it regulates. 22 Meeting this dual responsibility requires a balancing of interests that the United States Supreme Court articulated in Hope. In Hope, the Supreme Court held that the Commission has an obligation to ensure that pipelines regulated under the NGA have an opportunity to earn a rate of return that is sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital. 23 That rate analysis is to be based upon the end result, not the method used to achieve the just and reasonable rate. 24 This end-result test requires a balancing of investor and consumer interests. Financial integrity is the cornerstone of how Hope defines the legitimate investor interest. As the Supreme Court explained: From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. 25 In Jersey Central, the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded a Commission order issued under parallel provisions of the Federal Power Act for failing to consider the 22 Hope, 320 U.S. at 603; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S U.S. at Id. at 602; see also Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ( Jersey Central ) U.S. at

9 impact the Commission s order had on the investor interest in maintaining financial integrity and access to capital markets. 26 The Commission had ignored testimony offered by the utility to show that the company was in actual financial distress. 27 The D.C. Circuit held that the Commission had committed plain legal error for failing even to acknowledge that the utility raised a Hope financial integrity issue. 28 The D.C. Circuit ordered the Commission to consider the information related to financial integrity offered by the utility and the impact of the Commission s actions on the utility s financial position before making a rate determination. Hope and Jersey Central demonstrate that the Commission must strike a balance between consumer and investor interests and that it is not just the consumer that has to be protected investors require protection too. The Revised Policy Statement fails to adequately strike that balance and in fact, impairs the financial integrity of MLP pipelines, especially in the specific case of an MLP pipeline that is a subsidiary of a C- corporation. b. The Revised Policy Statement has severely impaired the financial integrity of MLP pipelines as evidenced by the dramatic decline in market value of publically-traded MLPs. The Commission s elimination of the income tax allowance for MLPs produced real, adverse consequences for the financial integrity of MLP pipelines. Following the Commission s decision regarding the Revised Policy Statement, the values of publiclytraded MLP equity securities dropped precipitously a material and direct consequence F.2d at Id. 28 Id. 9

10 of the Commission s action against MLPs. 29 In the ten trading days following the Commission s announcement of the Revised Policy Statement, Dominion estimates that publicly-traded MLP General Partner and Limited Partner equity securities lost, in aggregate, nearly $30 billion in market value. 30 Dominion, a C-corporation and general partner of Dominion Energy Midstream Partners, L.P., an MLP, lost nearly $3.7 billion of market capitalization during that time period while Dominion Energy Midstream Partners, L.P., owner of several interstate natural gas pipelines, lost over $700 million of market capitalization, or 40 percent. The precipitous decline in value of pipeline securities is a further demonstration that the Commission has failed to meet the Hope standard. When the value of a pipeline s publicly traded equity security drops significantly, as it has done for MLPs and their C-corporation owners, the financial integrity of the enterprise can be severely impaired in multiple ways. The Commission must consider the financial impact on regulated entities in any decision. III. The Revised Policy Statement may cause a costly, industry-wide restructuring in which the MLP structure is altogether abandoned. The Revised Policy Statement will deprive MLP pipelines owned by C- corporations despite having income tax liability of the income tax allowance, thus causing them to under-collect their cost of service. Accordingly, many owners of these pipelines may be compelled to restructure the MLP subsidiaries as C-corporations in order to collect their full cost of service. As a result, over time, pipelines organized as 29 Stephen Cunningham, et al., Pipeline Stocks Plunge After FERC Kills Key Income-Tax Allowance. Bloomberg (Mar. 15, 2018), 30 Dominion s analysis compares MLP values at market close on March 28, 2018 to market values at close on March 14,

11 MLPs would become rare or potentially non-existent. The likelihood of this outcome the Commission s action as a death knell for the MLP pipeline was roundly predicted by industry experts in the wake of the announcement of the Revised Policy Statement and was further evidenced by the resulting nearly $30 billion loss in market capitalization of MLP equity securities. Morgan Stanley s Midstream MLP & C-Corp Analyst Tom Abrams said that With market weakness, the entire concept of using an MLP as a funding source for the sponsor has broken down. 31 Similarly, Steven Fleishman, Managing Director and Senior Utilities Analyst at Wolfe Research concluded that The merits of the MLP structure are now questionable for interstate pipes. 32 If the industry experts are correct, the Revised Policy Statement will drive an industry-wide restructuring at great expense and may have a pervasive impact not only on the companies providing the service, but on the downstream beneficiaries of pipeline infrastructure. The Commission should not favor one form of organization over another, especially not when Congress, to encourage infrastructure development, specifically established the form of organization which the Commission would be disfavoring. a. The Commission s Effective Dismantling of the MLP structure Through the Revised Policy Statement Contravenes the Will of Congress. If the pipeline industry abandons the MLP structure due to the Commission s denial of the income tax allowance, as predicted by industry experts, the Commission will have contravened Congress s intent in creating the MLP structure in the first place. As explained in comments previously submitted by the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America ( INGAA ) in this proceeding, Congress created the MLP 31 Tom Abrams, et al., Morgan Stanley, FERC Follow Up, Midstream Energy at 3 (Mar. 21, 2018). 32 Steve Fleishman, et al., Wolfe Research, Divided Airlines FERC acts on taxes, Midstream at 1 (Mar. 15, 2018). 11

12 structure to incentivize investment in the development of oil and natural gas transportation infrastructure critical to both the nation s energy security and economy. 33 The MLP structure facilitates the building of pipelines by lowering the cost of obtaining investor cash by allowing would-be developers to attract new investors investors who would typically invest in more traditional corporations instead of pipelines, but will invest in pipeline development only due to the MLP structure. If the Commission eliminates the income tax allowance for MLPs and the structure is accordingly abandoned, the Commission will be thwarting Congress s express goal. b. The Revised Policy Statement will likely reduce the large scale energy infrastructure investments which the MLP structure enabled. Over the past decade the MLP structure has enabled vast infrastructure investments, including investments in critical energy infrastructure projects, providing the public with a multitude of benefits. For example, in October 2014 Dominion created an MLP, Dominion Energy Midstream Partners, as a cost-of-capital advantaged financing vehicle to support the over $10,000,000,000 of projected capital investment in needed energy infrastructure. MLP-enabled projects completed in the past decade have allowed newly abundant supplies of gas to reach the market, thus driving down the price of gas for all consumers. In addition, the MLP-enabled pipeline projects themselves have employed thousands of construction workers and permanent employees and generate significant tax 33 Comments of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America at & n.34 (Mar. 8, 2017) (citing SFPP, L.P., Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC 61,121 at PP 257, 265 (2011) (explaining that the legislative history emphasizes that the tax incentives Congress provided MLPs have important practical financial consequences, including certain tax advantages particularly due to the avoidance of the double taxation of corporate earnings and the tax deferrals derived from allocation of income and losses among the partners, and stating that [t]he Commission again concludes that Congress intended to encourage pipeline investment by authorizing tax incentives for MLPs. To achieve this, it is appropriate to grant regulated MLPs an income tax allowance and equalize the return of the MLP and the corporation at the entity level. )). 12

13 revenue. MLP-enabled projects providing transport for the newly abundant gas to natural gas fired power plants have resulted in drastically reduced CO2 emissions. MLP-enabled projects helped the U.S.: decrease its reliance on energy imports from unstable regions; become a net exporter of gas; improve the trade balance; and make U.S. produced gas available for export which may displace other nations needs to rely on unfriendly sources of energy. Due to the Commission s Revised Policy Statement, these vast MLP-enabled infrastructure investments and the resulting multitude of benefits experienced by pipeline customers and the nation over the past decade are unlikely to be replicated, as predicted by Shneur Gershuni, UBS Energy Analyst, who recently warned that [g]oing forward, there is risk that fewer new pipelines will be built due to lower returns absent the tax allowance. 34 IV. The Revised Policy Statement unduly discriminates by treating two similar pipeline subsidiaries of a C-corporation, one organized as an MLP and the other as a C-corporation, dissimilarly. The Revised Policy Statement is unduly discriminatory since it arbitrarily treats two similar pipeline subsidiaries of a C-corporation, one organized as an MLP and the other as a C-corporation, dissimilarly concerning the income tax allowance, despite each having similar tax liabilities. 35 The Revised Policy Statement is discriminatory something the financial markets realized immediately and sold their holdings in MLP equity securities accordingly. Investors do not want to own entities being unduly 34 Shneur Z. Gershuni, et al., UBS, Top Questions Post the FERC NOPR, Master Limited Partnerships at 1 (Mar. 22, 2018). 35 Burinskas v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir.1966). See also CBS Corp., 663 F.3d at 165 ( patently inconsistent applications of agency standards to similar situations are by definition arbitrary (quoting S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2002)); Zhao, 265 F.3d at 95 ( application of agency standards in a plainly inconsistent manner across similar situations evinces such a lack of rationality as to be arbitrary and capricious. ) (citing Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1991)). 13

14 discriminated against by the Commission that are not allowed to recover their full cost of service. V. The Revised Policy Statement should not preclude pipelines from seeking a tax allowance. While the Commission states that it has promulgated only a policy statement, the plain language amounts to a rule. 36 Policy statements are not binding and must be implemented in individual proceedings, and in such proceedings, the agency must support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued. 37 Moreover, the SFPP proceeding that spawned the Revised Policy Statement was an individual oil pipeline s case. If the Commission wishes to make this policy statement enforceable and preclude pipelines organized as MLPs from seeking the income tax allowance, it should not have issued a policy statement, but a binding rule, which can only be accomplished by adhering to the Administrative Procedure Act s notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. 38 The Revised Policy Statement is a result of a notice of inquiry, not a notice of proposed rulemaking and accordingly cannot preclude different results in individual proceedings. Under Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, the pipeline has a right to propose rates and has the burden to demonstrate that those rates are just and reasonable. 39 Therefore, the Commission must allow pipelines the opportunity to develop an evidentiary record, 36 Revised Policy Statement at P 2 ( [T]he Commission... will no longer permit MLPs to recover an income tax allowance in their cost of service. ) 37 Nat'l Min. Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 38 Id. at 250 (citing 5 U.S.C. 553) U.S.C. 717c(e). Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 76 FERC 61,022, at p. 61,098 (1996), aff d on reh g, 80 FERC 61,070 (1997), petition for review denied sub nom., Complex" Consol. Edison Co. of NY, Inc., v. FERC, 165 F.3d 992, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 14

15 which would be based on the pipelines individual circumstances, demonstrating that they are entitled to an income tax allowance. Failure to permit pipelines to exercise that fundamental Section 4 right would violate the NGA. VI. Dominion requests that the Commission act on this request by April 15, Dominion respectfully requests that the Commission grant the request for rehearing by April 15, 2018 due to the acute and immediate impact the Revised Policy Statement has had on pipelines organized as MLPs and their investors. 15

16 CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, the Commission should grant the request for rehearing and confirm that the Commission s disallowance of the tax allowance for MLPs generally does not apply to the specific case of an MLP pipeline that is a subsidiary of a C-corporation. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Carlos M. Brown Carlos M. Brown Vice President and General Counsel Dominion Energy, Inc. 120 Tredegar Street Richmond, VA Carlos.M.Brown@dom.com Paul Korman Philip W. Mone Van Ness Feldman, LLP 1050 Thomas Jefferson St NW Seventh Floor Washington, DC (202) pik@vnf.com pwm@vnf.com Dated: March 30, 2018 Attorneys for Dominion Energy, Inc. 16

17 ALERIAN MLP INDEX (AMZ) March 14, 2018 through March 28, 2018 Appendix A DOMINION ENERGY (D) March 14, 2018 through March 28, 2018 Source: Yahoo! Finance (downloaded March 30, 2018) Source: Yahoo! Finance (downloaded March 30, 2018) DOMINION ENERGY MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LP (DM) March 14, 2018 through March 28, 2018 Source: Yahoo! Finance (downloaded March 30, 2018) 17

18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in this proceeding. Dated at Washington, DC this 30 th day of March /s/ Barbara Deathe Barbara Deathe, Paralegal Van Ness Feldman, LLP 1050 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW Washington, DC

19 Document Content(s) Dominion Request for Rehearing PL17-1 ( ).PDF