Citation: Michael Stolberg v. Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, 2018 ONLAT-REBBA 11025

Transcription

1 LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL Safety, Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario TRIBUNAL D APPEL EN MATIÈRE DE PERMIS Tribunaux de la sécurité, des appels en matière de permis et des normes Ontario Citation: Michael Stolberg v. Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, 2018 ONLAT-REBBA Date: File Number: Appeal from a Notice of Proposal by the Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, to Revoke Registration Between: Michael Stolberg -and- Appellant Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 Respondent INTERIM DECISION AND ORDER Adjudicator: Ted Crljenica, Vice-Chair Appearances: For the Appellant: For the Respondent: Justin M. Jakubiak, counsel Jonathan Miller and Robert Maxwell, counsel Place and date of hearing: Toronto, Ontario November 8, 2017

2 A. OVERVIEW REASONS FOR INTERIM DECISION AND ORDER [1] This appeal before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal ) is in relation to the appellant s appeal pursuant to section 14 of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30 Sch. C (the REBBA or the Act ) of a Notice of Proposal to Revoke a Licence issued by the Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act ( the respondent or the Registrar ) on November 18, [2] This appeal had been heard by the Tribunal in April On May 5, 2016, this Tribunal issued a decision allowing the appellant to retain his registration, subject to a number of conditions. The respondent appealed that order to the Divisional Court. On October 16, 2017, the court found the decision to be unreasonable and directed that the Tribunal hold a new hearing. [3] On October 19, 2017, the respondent issued an Immediate Suspension Order ( the 2017 suspension ) immediately suspending the appellant s registration. The new hearing commenced on November 8, [4] In support of the respondent s proposal to revoke the appellant s registration, the Registrar alleges that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant will not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty. The respondent s position arises from the appellant s theft of personal items from a home on October 20, 2015, while acting in his capacity as a real estate salesperson registered under the REBBA. [5] At the request of the parties, the only issue dealt with on the first day of the hearing was whether the 2017 suspension should be extended until the completion of this hearing. The respondent argued that the suspension should be continued until the conclusion of the hearing. The appellant argued that it should not be extended. Pending the release of the Tribunal s decision and order on this issue, I ordered that the suspension be extended until further order of this Tribunal. This is that decision and order. [6] For the reasons that follow, the suspension is extended until the completion of this hearing. B. THE BACKGROUND FACTS [7] The appellant first registered as a salesperson under the Act on June 9,

3 [8] On October 20, 2015, in advance of a showing of a residential property that was listed for sale, the appellant was alone in the home. Video cameras captured him going through the consumer s personal belongings, including drawers and shelving units. He was recorded stealing batteries from a storage unit and taking money from a piggy bank. [9] The appellant was charged with, and subsequently found guilty of, one count of theft under $5,000. [10] On November 18, 2015, the Registrar issued an Immediate Suspension Order (the 2015 suspension ) and a Proposal to Revoke a Licence (the 2015 proposal to revoke ). The appellant appealed the 2015 proposal to revoke. [11] The appellant admitted that he took the batteries and money from the piggy bank as alleged by the Registrar but he disputed the amount taken. He stated that it was only $20 whereas the registrar alleged that it was $200 - $300. This issue was not resolved as the parties agreed that the only issue to be addressed at the hearing was penalty. [12] A hearing was held on April 19, 2016 ( the first hearing ). By Reasons and Decision for Order issued on May 5, 2016, the Registrar was ordered by the Tribunal not to carry out the proposal to revoke the registration of the appellant, but made the appellant s registration subject to a number of conditions. [13] The respondent appealed the Tribunal s May 5, 2016 Order to Divisional Court. On October 12, 2017, the Divisional Court ruled that the Tribunal s decision was not reasonable and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for a new hearing: 2017 ONSC 5904 (CanLII). The court made no order regarding the status of the appellant s registration pending the new hearing. [14] On October 16, 2017, the respondent advised the Tribunal of the decision of the Divisional Court and asked the Tribunal to provide directions to the parties regarding the next steps to be taken. [15] On October 19, 2017, the respondent issued the 2017 immediate suspension order to the appellant. Counsel for the respondent explained that as the Divisional Court did not deal with the appellant s status pending the completion of the new hearing, the 2017 suspension was issued out of an abundance of caution. 3

4 [16] On October 26, 2017, the respondent requested that a hearing date be scheduled.1 C. THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED [17] Pursuant to section 15 of the Act, the issue to be decided following the first day of hearing is whether it is in the public interest to extend the 2017 suspension. D. THE TEST TO BE APPLIED [18] In support of his position that the 2017 suspension not be extended, the appellant proposed conditions with which he is prepared to abide by pending completion of the hearing. The respondent opposed the appellant s position and submitted that the suspension should be extended until the completion of this appeal with or without conditions. [19] The appellant submitted that the test to be applied is as set out in RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, 1994 CanLII 117. The respondent did not disagree and based his submissions on the same criteria. [20] Pursuant to the test in RJR MacDonald, the three issues to be considered are: a. Is there a serious issue to be tried? b. If the suspension is extended, will the appellant suffer irreparable harm? c. The balance of convenience which party will suffer the greater harm from the extension or non-extension of the suspension? [21] The parties relied on the Tribunal s decision of Cudley Corner Child Care Centre Vaughn 2015 CanLII (Ont LAT) as the basis for the application of the test in RJR MacDonald. In that case, the Director, Child Care and Early Years Act, 2014 ordered the appellant child care centre to suspend its operations. By motion before the Tribunal, 1 Section 15(2) of the Act provides that an immediate suspension remains in effect for 15 days following receipt of a written request for hearing. The appellant s 2017 request for a hearing is dated October 26, However, section 14(2) of the Act requires that a written request for hearing must be received within 15 days after the Registrar s notice of proposal. As the notice of proposal was issued in 2015, on its face, the appellant s written request for hearing is outside of the 15 day period. It appears that the Act does not contemplate a time line based on a matter being remitted back to the Tribunal by an appellate court. The parties did not address this gap in the legislation in argument. 4

5 the child care centre sought an order staying the suspension until the completion of the hearing. The Tribunal applied the test in RJR MacDonald to grant the order sought. [22] The Tribunal is not given explicit authority under the Child Care and Early Years Act, 2014, S.O. 2014, c. 11, Sched. 1, to make an interim order staying the director s suspension order. The Tribunal found its authority to make such an order in section 2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act R.S.O chap. s 22 ( SPPA ), pursuant to which the Tribunal is directed to seek a just resolution of matters before it. The Tribunal ruled that in the absence of a stay pending completion of the hearing, justice would be denied. [23] Under s. 15(3)(b) of the REBBA, the Tribunal is given explicit authority to make an order extending the suspension until the completion of the hearing. Section 15 in its entirety reads: 15 (1) If the registrar proposes to suspend or revoke a registration under section 14 and if the registrar considers it in the public interest to do so, the registrar may by order temporarily suspend the registration. (2) An order under subsection (1) takes effect immediately. (3) If a hearing is requested under section 14, (a) the order expires 15 days after the written request for a hearing is received by the Tribunal; or (b) the Tribunal may extend the time of expiration until the hearing is concluded, if a hearing is commenced within the 15-day period referred to in clause (a). (4) Despite subsection (3), if it is satisfied that the conduct of the registrant has delayed the commencement of the hearing, the Tribunal may extend the time of the expiration for the order, (a) until the hearing commences; and (b) once the hearing commences, until the hearing is concluded. [24] Neither s. 15(3)(b) nor any other section of the Act specifies the test to be applied by the Tribunal under this section. As the respondent s authority to make the suspension order is based on the public interest, it is the Tribunal s determination that the same test applies to its authority under s. 15(3)(b). [25] It is also the Tribunal s view that a determination of whether it is in the public interest to extend the suspension does not require a weighing of the public interest against the impact of the suspension on the appellant. However, if I am incorrect on this point, I have also conducted an analysis based on the RJR-MacDonald test. 5

6 E. ANALYSIS OF THE RJR-MacDonald TEST a. Is There a Serious Issue to be Tried? [26] The parties agree that there is a serious issue to be tried. That issue is whether the appellant s past conduct affords reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty. Thus, I will consider the remaining two factors under RJR MacDonald test - irreparable harm and balance of convenience. b. Will the Appellant Suffer Irreparable Harm if the Suspension is Extended? i. Evidence and Submissions on Irreparable Harm. [27] The appellant submitted that he will suffer irreparable harm if the suspension is extended as: a. He will have lost his only means of livelihood; b. The suspension will negatively affect his reputation among real estate brokers and salespeople, as well as with the consumer public. [28] On the issue of irreparable harm, the respondent submitted: a. The appellant did not testify or provide evidence by way of affidavit. Thus, there is no evidence before the Tribunal of his financial circumstances or the repercussions the suspension will have on his reputation; b. The appellant remained under suspension pursuant to the 2015 suspension pending completion of the hearing. He has not offered any evidence as to what impact that suspension had on his financial circumstances or reputation, or that it caused irreparable harm; and In any event, financial hardship cannot constitute irreparable harm for the purpose of the RJR-MacDonald test. 6

7 ii Analysis on the Issue of Irreparable Harm [29] It is my determination that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the appellant will suffer irreparable harm if the suspension is extended until the completion of the hearing. [30] The appellant s position is that if the suspension is not lifted, he will be deprived of his livelihood. A suspension will clearly deprive him of the opportunity to work as a real estate salesperson but as he has provided no evidence, it is not known if he has other sources of income or his financial situation. Although it is reasonable to conclude that the suspension will have some financial impact on the appellant, in the absence of evidence, I cannot conclude that this impact reaches the level of irreparable harm. [31] Further, as pointed out by the respondent, the appellant remained under suspension pending the completion of the first hearing. That suspension may or may not have caused him financial hardship and/or harmed his reputation. The Tribunal is not prepared to assume that it did. If it did, it is up to the appellant to provide the Tribunal with such evidence. [32] I accept that a suspension will, to some extent, harm the appellant financially and harm his reputation. However, harm in itself is not sufficient to meet the RJR-MacDonald test. The appellant must show that the harm is irreparable. In the absence of evidence, the appellant has failed to establish irreparable financial harm or irreparable harm to his reputation. [33] In conclusion on the issue of irreparable harm, it is my determination that the appellant has not established that he will suffer irreparable financial harm or irreparable harm to his reputation if the suspension is extended until the completion of this hearing. Thus, it is not necessary for me to consider the respondent s submission that financial harm, of any degree, cannot constitute irreparable harm. [34] As the three parts of the RJR-MacDonald test are conjunctive, the appellant cannot succeed on this test. However, I will consider the parties submissions on the balance of convenience as the evidence presented and submissions made by the parties on the third part of the RJR-MacDonald test apply to the issue of the public interest under s. 15 of the Act. c. Does the Balance of Convenience Favour Extending or Not Extending the Suspension? i. Submissions on the Balance of Convenience 7

8 [35] The appellant submitted that due to changes in his circumstances since the events of October 2015, there is little risk that he will steal again. Thus, it is his position that he will suffer greater harm if the suspension is extended than the respondent will suffer if it is not. He submitted: a. The theft he committed in October 2015 was an isolated incident. Prior to the theft, he had been a registered salesperson for seven years without incident; b. He is aware of the severity of the misconduct which he described as a huge breach of trust ; c. The theft resulted in a criminal conviction and he successfully served the period of probation to which he was sentenced. He knows that if he steals again he will be looking at jail time. d. During the 17-month period that elapsed between the lifting of the first suspension in May 2016 and the 2017 suspension order, he has complied with all of the conditions imposed by this Tribunal and has had no issues ; e. His conduct was a result of mental health issues. He has taken corrective measures since the October 15, 2015 theft, referencing the counselling that was in evidence at the first hearing. [36] Through his counsel, the appellant undertook to continue to abide by the conditions imposed by this Tribunal in May 2016 that were not determined by the Divisional Court to be unreasonable, as well as two other, more stringent conditions: a. He will not enter any privately owned or occupied homes for showings or open houses. He will only enter and show newly constructed homes being sold on spec i.e. - by the builder or developer; b. He will carry with him a GPS tracker any time he leaves his home to ensure compliance with condition (a); [37] He also submitted that the broker of record for whom he currently works will monitor his activities as a real estate salesperson. [38] By way of evidence, one of the conditions imposed by this Tribunal when it reinstated the appellant s registration in May 2016 was that he maintain a log with the addresses of all properties he attends, the date and time of his attendance, and the name and contact number of either the client(s) and/or registrant who either accompanied him or who was 8

9 present at the property. The log was entered into evidence in support of his submission that he complied with this condition. [39] The appellant relied on an affidavit from Catherine Johnson, broker of record for Your Choice Realty Corp. where he has been working, in support of his submission that his circumstances have changed since October Ms. Johnson deposed that the appellant has learned from what he has gone through since October 2015, that he has demonstrated clear remorse for his actions and that his conduct was a result of mental health issues. She also deposed that to the best of her knowledge, the appellant has worked diligently to deal with the mental health issues which resulted in the conduct in issue. [40] Additionally, he relied on a letter dated February 8, 2016 from David Feder, a social worker from whom the appellant was receiving counselling prior to the time of the first hearing. This letter was in evidence in the first hearing. In his letter, Mr. Feder indicated that the appellant has made progress in his treatment of specified issues that had an impact on his presenting issues, i.e. - stealing. [41] In his response, the respondent argued that the balance of convenience favours the suspension being extended until the completion of the hearing, as follows: a. That the REBBA is consumer protection legislation: paragraphs 12, 40 and 46 of the Divisional Court s reasons and the public should not be exposed to the risk that the appellant might steal again; b. The suspension issued by the Registrar created a rebuttable presumption that the suspension should remain in place; c. The theft from the home in October, 2015 was not an isolated incident; d. The Tribunal should consider that the Divisional Court characterized the appellant s misconduct as a serious invasion of the homeowners privacy, and very deliberate and intrusive... that is relevant to the consideration of remedy and the assessment of the risk of further acts of dishonesty and lack of integrity. e. The conditions proposed by the appellant do not reduce the risk to the public as: i. The Divisional Court found that the conditions imposed by this Tribunal in the first hearing that are dependent on the appellant s honesty are 9

10 unreasonable and that the same concern exists with the conditions suggested by the appellant on this motion; ii. A GPS tracking system is not the type of condition that the Tribunal is able to impose under the REBBA; iii. There is no evidence that Ms. Johnson is prepared to monitor and enforce the new conditions proposed by the appellant. ii Analysis on the Issue of the Balance of Convenience [42] I agree with the respondent that the balance of convenience favours the suspension remaining in place. [43] I will begin by emphasizing that the Act is consumer protection legislation and the issue to be decided on the balance of convenience is between the appellant and the consumer public, whose interests are represented by the respondent. [44] There is very little evidence before the Tribunal at this stage to support the submission that the appellant s circumstances have changed to such an extent that there is little risk of him engaging in another serious breach of trust by stealing from a consumer s home or invading their privacy by going through their personal belongings. [45] Contrary to the appellant s submission that the theft of October, 2015 was an isolated incident, it was not. Mr. Feder, in his letter of February 8, 2016, indicated that the appellant acknowledged that he has engaged in stealing at various times in his life items such as chocolate bars and small items of food. [46] There is no expert medical evidence to support the submission that the appellant s conduct was a result of a mental health condition, nor was there any evidence of the specifics of an alleged condition. The only evidence that speaks to this issue was a bald statement in Ms. Johnson s affidavit to the effect that the appellant has worked diligently to deal with the mental health issues that resulted in his conduct. There is no mention of the nature of the condition, what steps the appellant has taken to deal with the issues or the extent of Ms. Johnson s personal knowledge versus what she has been told by the appellant. [47] As for the submission that the appellant has continued with counselling, his legal counsel offered to have the appellant testify that he has continued with counselling. Counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no benefit to him testifying on this 10

11 point as it is a non-factor and that the Tribunal should proceed on the basis that there is no evidence that the appellant has or has not continued with counselling. Had the appellant led evidence that he has continued with counselling, without expert evidence to indicate that such counselling has reduced the risk of him again stealing from consumers, such evidence is of little value to the Tribunal. [48] Further, Mr. Feder s letter falls far short of convincing this Tribunal that the theft was a result of the appellant s presenting issues or that the counselling has mitigated the risk arising from those presenting issues. Based on the evidence presented at this stage, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the appellant is not a risk to engage in the same type of conduct that led to this proceeding. [49] Turning now to the conditions proposed by the appellant, he suggested a condition that in his capacity as a real estate salesperson, he not enter the home of a consumer for the purpose of conducting a showing or an open house. This proposal would allow the appellant to continue to work in the real estate industry by only being allowed to enter new homes being sold on spec i.e. - by builders or developers. [50] The second condition he proposed is the means by which the first proposed condition would be enforced. He proposed that every time he leaves his home, he carry with him a GPS tracking device. The premise is that the GPS would disclose the appellant s whereabouts and therefore disclose whether he entered a home owned by someone other than a builder or developer. [51] I will deal first with the second condition. I agree with the respondent that this is not the type of condition contemplated by the REBBA and the Tribunal is not prepared to order the imposition of this condition. The Act refers to appropriate conditions. The appellant did not provide the Tribunal with any authority to suggest that this is an appropriate condition, consistent with the intent and purpose of the statutory scheme. Although there is always a first time for everything, it is the view of this Tribunal that this licensing/registration statute does not clothe the licensing authority or this Tribunal with the ability to enforce its conditions by restricting a registrant s freedom of movement and/or to be placed under electronic surveillance. The fact that the appellant is prepared to abide by such an extreme restriction on his freedom is not determinative. This Tribunal does not consider this an acceptable means of regulating licensees under the REBBA. 11

12 [52] In any event, compliance would be dependent on the appellant having an activated GPS device on him every time he leaves his home. This is dependent on the appellant s integrity and honesty, which will be discussed below. [53] Returning to the condition that the appellant only be allowed to enter homes being sold on spec, he submitted that the broker of record for whom he works would monitor his compliance. That is not her evidence. In her affidavit, she only undertook to, keep in place the same restrictions and requirements that were previously in place. She did not comment on the extent to which she is willing, or able, to enforce the condition that the appellant only enter homes being sold on spec. [54] Thus, compliance with the first condition proposed by the appellant would be based solely on the appellant s integrity and honesty. The Divisional Court found the condition restricting the appellant s access to homes and that he maintain the aforementioned log to be unreasonable, in large part, because it was dependent on the his integrity and honesty, and ordered a new hearing. The evidence before the Tribunal at this stage is no stronger than that which led the Divisional Court to make its determination. Thus, the conditions suggested by the appellant do not assist him in his position that the suspension should not be extended. [55] As for the appellant s submission that there has been a change in his circumstances such that there is little risk that he will again steal from consumers, there is little evidence, if any to support this. His counsel s statement that the appellant will not steal again because he knows that he will go to jail if he does is not evidence. Without an opportunity to hear from the appellant directly, the Tribunal cannot gauge what he knows or believes in regard to his conduct. [56] Thus, the crux of the evidence before the Tribunal at this stage is: a. The appellant stole money from a piggy bank and batteries from a consumer s home he was inspecting in his capacity as a salesperson; b. He has stolen other items such as chocolate bars and small quantities of food; c. Mr. Feder s letter from February 2016 in which it was indicated that the appellant has made progress in dealing with matters that had an impact on his presenting issues, i.e. - stealing. 12

13 d. A log of properties created by the appellant pursuant to the conditions imposed after the first hearing, which may or may not be complete or accurate and about which the Tribunal does not have any evidence from the appellant. [57] On the facts before the Tribunal at this stage, there is no evidence that anything has changed in the appellant s life or character. The Tribunal concludes that there still exists a risk to the consumer public that the appellant will steal again if the suspension is not extended. Against this there is some degree of harm to the appellant if the suspension is extended, but not irreparable harm. The balance of convenience favours the public interest over that of the appellant, thus favouring extending the immediate suspension until the completion of this hearing. d. Conclusion on the RJR-MacDonald Test [58] Based on the evidence before it on the first day of the hearing, it is the conclusion of the Tribunal that on the RJR-MacDonald test, the suspension should be extended until the completion of the hearing. F. THE PUBLIC INTEREST TEST [59] As indicated earlier, it is the view of the Tribunal that the correct test on whether to extend the suspension is a question of whether it is in the public interest to do so without balancing the public interest against that of the appellant. It is also the Tribunal s view that the onus is on the respondent to establish that the extension is in the public interest. The Tribunal disagrees with the respondent s position that the issuance of the suspension creates a rebuttable presumption that the suspension should remain in place. [60] This conclusion is based on the fact that the immediate suspension expires unless extended by the Tribunal. As it is the respondent who issued the suspension and who seeks its extension, it is the respondent who is in a position to explain to the Tribunal why it is in the public interest for the suspension to be extended. If the legislature intended that there be a rebuttable presumption that the suspension be extended, it seems that the Act would have provided that it remain in place until the completion of the hearing unless the Tribunal terminates it. [61] Further, the respondent knows why he issued the suspension. If he did not bear an evidentiary burden to obtain an extension, an appellant would be in the very difficult position of having to rebut allegations of fact about which he or she may have no knowledge, and having to prove why the respondent is incorrect that the public interest 13

14 favours extending the suspension. In cases in which an appellant has denied the allegations against him or her, he or she may not have any information with which to rebut the allegations. In such instances, if there was a rebuttable presumption that the suspension be extended, it would put such an appellant in an impossible position. [62] Turning now to the test itself, the respondent bears the evidentiary burden to present evidence that it is in the public interest that the suspension be extended. Consequently, the appellant is provided an opportunity to present evidence and submissions to show that it is not necessary to extend the suspension to protect the public. [63] Here, the appellant does not deny the allegations against him. He has admitted that while engaged in his capacity as a real estate salesperson, he went through the home owner s personal belongings and that he stole money and batteries. [64] Thus, it is the view of the Tribunal that without evidence of changes in the appellant s circumstances the suspension should be extended until the completion of this hearing. To repeat the facts set out above in the analysis of the RJR-MacDonald test: a. On October 20, 2015, the appellant stole money and batteries from a consumer s home and searched through their personal belongings while he was in the home in his capacity as a real estate salesperson. b. The appellant s conduct of October 20, 2015 was not an isolated event; c. The appellant has not presented any evidence that might explain why he engaged in the invasion of the home owner s privacy and stole items; d. There is no evidence as to what effect any counselling the appellant has received has had on whatever motivated him to engage in such egregious conduct. e. The conditions proposed by the appellant are not reasonable and in any event do not alleviate the risk to the public. [65] Based on the evidentiary record that exists as of the first day of hearing, I find that it is in the public interest to extend the suspension until the completion of the hearing due to the risk that the conduct in question will recur. 14

15 G. PROCEDURAL MATTER [66] The first hearing was conducted under Tribunal file 9924/REBBA. The new hearing ordered by the Divisional Court will continue in file. H. ORDER [67] The suspension issued by the Registrar on October 19, 2017 is extended until the completion of this hearing. [68] On consent, the hearing will continue on April 23, 24 and 25, 2018 at the Tribunal s Offices at 20 Dundas Street West, 5 th Floor, Toronto, Ontario commencing at 9:30 a.m. on all days. [69] As I did not hear any evidence, I am not seized of these matters, should I be unable to continue the hearing on the continuation dates. [70] Due to the amount of time that has lapsed since the 2015 hearing, the respondent is ordered to provide to the appellant and the Tribunal any additional material upon which he intends to rely at the continuation of the hearing, to be received no later than January 31, [71] If there is any additional material upon which the appellant intends to rely at the continuation of the hearing, he is ordered to provide it to the respondent and to the Tribunal, to be received no later than March 21, [72] This hearing shall continue under Tribunal file, and all communications directed to the Tribunal shall bear this file number. LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL Released: January 24, 2018 Ted Crljenica, Vice-Chair 15

16 Notice of Hearing Information The hearing will follow the procedures set out in the Tribunal s Rules of Practice and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22. Please note: documents filed after the deadlines listed above may not be considered by the adjudicator hearing the matter. If you do not attend the hearing, the Tribunal may make a decision in your absence and you will not be entitled to any further notice in the proceeding. The hearing will be open to the public and the documents submitted by the parties may be made available to the public unless the Tribunal orders otherwise. Non-compliance with the Tribunal s orders or directions may result in further procedural orders or directions, including the dismissal of the application. If the parties reach an agreement on the issue(s) in dispute, the appellant shall immediately advise the Tribunal in writing. If you require an accommodation to participate in a Tribunal proceeding, or, information about the Tribunal's processes, including its Rules of Practice, please contact the Tribunal by phone at or toll-free at If you are using a TTY device you can call us at or TTY toll-free at For the Tribunal s Accessibility Policy, please see our website at Pour obtenir des services en français veuillez communiquer avec le Tribunal au (416)