ECON1980o: Health, Education and Development. Lecture 3 October 2, 2008
|
|
- Angelica Poole
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 ECON1980o: Health, Education and Development Lecture 3 October 2, 2008
2 Today s Class: Part I: Returns to health, in form of: Labor productivity Cognitive development (investment effects) Schooling attendance (investment effects) Big externalities Part II: Health production How much does health improve with income? Evidence from a natural experiment in South Africa
3 Part II: How do societies produce health? Why we care: Evidence that health status has high economic returns Also care about health as fundamental aspect of ind welfare What needed to increase health status of poorest countries? Most interventions pay for themselves, but what is most effective way, and when are interventions needed at all? Old-fashioned view: Income most direct way to produce health Empirical question: How does health improve with income?
4 Biggest challenge: How can we isolate changes in income that are not potentially driven by/influenced directly by health status? First possibility: Experiment (hand out money) PROGRESA in Mexico Complication: Tied to health components More realistic possibility: Natural experiment What kind of thing?
5 Non-experimental method #1: Natural experiment (NE) Natural experiment: An observational study of the effect of X on Y that relies on an incidence or setting in which exposure to X is quasi-random -- or as if random Idea: An NE is a set of conditions that determines quasirandom exposure to X To implement, need to find setting in which otherwise similar individuals were either exposed and not exposed to an income shock for a clearly identified reason Then, using data collected afterwards, compare average health among exposed (quasi-treatment group) to average health among unexposed ( quasi-control ) group in difference-in-difference framework (is change necessary?)
6 Comments on natural/ quasi experiments: Used to refer to situation that is not experimental but is as if it was Not a precise definition - refers to case where variation in X is good variation A Famous Example: London, 1854
7 John Snow and the case of the Broad Street pump Regular cholera epidemics in 19 th century London, not much known about disease contagion Widely believed to be caused by bad air (miasma) John Snow thought bad water was cause Experimental design would be to randomly give some people good water and some bad water but ethical problems with this (often the reason we need to come up with more creative approaches to identification)!
8 Soho Outbreak August/September 1854 Snow noticed that people closest to a specific source (Broad Street Pump) most likely to die Why doesn t this resolve air vs. water hypotheses? People closest to pump also breath the same air!
9 Snow s idea: Two water companies Lambeth and Southwark/Vauxhall served most of London In 1852 Lambeth moved its intake pipe upstream to a cleaner water source while S/V left its intake pipe downstream This move provided Snow with his natural experiment during the cholera outbreak of How so? He could compare S/V customers who live next door to Lambeth customers but get water from different place Why is next door important?
10 Why is this a natural experiment? Variation in water supply as if it had been randomly assigned, other factors ( air ) held constant How do you use this to estimate treatment effect of water on health? What is Y? What is X? What is Z? Can estimate treatment effect using difference in means Run regression of death on water source. What else? Distance to pump, whether drink water (or beer), etc.
11 Death rate from cholera in London by source of water Water Company Supplying the District Rate per 10,000 houses Southwark & 315 Vauxhall Lambeth 37 Rest of London 59 (adapted from Snow 1855, Table IX, presented in Freedman 2004)
12 Conditions for valid natural experiment To be internally valid, quasi-experimental source of variation (Z) (think of Z as an indicator variable akin to treatment assignment): 1. Must be correlated with X 2. Must be uncorrelated with error: Mechanism of assignment to treatment must be arguably arbitrary ( as if random, no selection) Z must not influence Y through channels other than X Which of these conditions is guaranteed with experimental data (in which Z is treatment assignment)?
13 Favorable conditions for natural experiment To ensure that Z uncorrelated with error, better if: Mechanism of assignment to treatment (source of water supply) arguably arbitrary ( as if random) -Knowledge of the details of the case is crucial Little sample selection bias. What do we mean by this? Exposed and unexposed similar baseline characteristics What does this imply? Relatively blind assignment (ex-post and ex-ante). What do we mean by this and why does this help?
14 How does Snow do on these? Arbitrary source of variation? A few houses are supplied by one Company and a few by the other, according to the decision of the owner or occupier at the time when the Water Companies were in active competition. Sample selection bias? In many cases a single house has a supply different from that on either side. Each company supplies both rich and poor, both large houses and small; there is not any difference either in the condition or occupation of the persons receiving the water of different Companies. Blind experiment? [people] were divided into two groups without their choice, and, in most cases, without their knowledge...
15 What about external validity? Conditions that maximize EV: 1. Large scale: The experiment, too, was on the grandest scale. No fewer than three hundred thousand people of both sexes, of every age and occupation, and of every rank and station, from gentle folk down to the very poor 2. Universal: The pipes of each Company go down all the streets, and into nearly all the courts and alleys. But perhaps most important: 3. Lesson (fact that water carries disease) independent of time or place
16 Pluses and minuses of approach: Merits of natural experiments: Stronger on internal validity than observational studies that just control for observables Finding natural experiments often requires detailed knowledge of cases, which provides additional leverage for inferences Demerits of natural experiments Really clean natural experiments are rare External validity issues
17 Natural experiment: Pensions in South Africa Starting in 1991, South African government expanded coverage of pension system to Coloured & Blacks Large: 520 Rand/month = 2.5 X median income for Blacks Universal: All women above 60 & men above 65 eligible subject to loosely applied means test, irrespective of work history Most Blacks eligible, 85% of eligible people end up getting it Research question: How does family health respond to income? Research challenge: How does Case identify the effect of the pension with cross section data? (what is her NE?)
18 First: Why is this almost as good as an experiment? Unanticipated income shock Exogenous to individual behavior Why is it better than most experiments? Permanent income shock Explain? Why is it worse than an experiment?
19 Problem: Everybody (in same SES cat) reached Why a problem? Since eligible families poorer (extended families, more likely to be rural, poor), no obvious control group -- kids in pension families would have been in worse shape w/o pension Naïve solution: Look at changes over time Treatment group: Post-shock Control group: Pre-shock But: Need panel data, and always need to worry about time effects Cross-section solution: Quasi-control groups Which individuals were affected more than others within same income category?
20 Who can we use as a quasi-control group? Strategy 1: Compare in households with and without an eligible member Treatment group: Adults and children living with pensioner Control group: Adults and children not living with pensioner What is problem with this simplistic an approach? Problem: How do we separate effect of pension from effect of living with a pensioner? How do they solve it? Solution: Condition on having a person over 55 in household Explain what this does?
21 Specification: H + + E + ij = α β NP β 1 j 2 Does this work? What assumptions are necessary for this to be accurate estimate of effect of income on health? Problem: How do we separate effect of pension from effect of living with a young versus old pensioner? What else do they do? Solution A: Look at predicted variation in effect of pension across households (like what?) Solution B: Look at predicted variation in effect of pension within households (like what?) j u ij
22 Specification: Run separate regressions on two sub-samples: H E + ij = α β P β NP β 1 ij 2 j 3 j u ij for all households that pool income AND: H ij = λ P λ NP λ 1 ij 2 j 3 γ E + j ε ij for all households that do not pool income. What is P? What are the hypotheses regarding β 1, β 2, λ 1, λ 2? 1. β 1 ==0; β 2 >0 Explain? 2. λ 1 >0; λ 2 ==0 Explain?
23 Results: Adding an extra pensioner to household improves adult SRH by 0.5 points In households that pool income, this true for everyone (no difference in health effect between pensioners and non-pensioners). For instance, kids grow 5 cm higher (half year s growth) in families with pensioner in which income pooled In households that don t pool, only true for the pensioner s health (and higher 1.03 point increase) Interpretation? Money protects health status, but only if money received by individual or shared within the house Are you convinced?
24 Why did health respond to income? Possible mechanisms: 1. Help for people with disabilities Fact: People with physical limitations have increase in self-reported health if they live with a pensioner 2. Health investments Fact: Households with pensioner more likely to buy toilet 3. Ate better (positive income elasticity of calorie demand) Kids: Height-for-age also suggests nutrition channel 4. Higher self-esteem
25 Conclusions: (1) Getting extra R520 from the government improves health (2) Living with someone who gets R520/month gives you better health but only if income is pooled So (some) households and not just individuals produce health Discussion questions: Can we conclude that income matters for health? With what caveats? What other characteristics of the person who receives income likely to matter for health production?
26 Threats to external validity Characteristics of the population? Setting or context? Exact nature of the intervention? Outcome examined?
27 Backtracking What do we learn from Kremer/Miguel ( Illusion of sustainability ) experiment about type of health investments that are unlikely to improve with income?
28 Impacts of Deworming (Miguel and Kremer 2003) Substantial reduction in infection levels for treated, and very strong externality effects (2/3 total effect through externalities) How do they use social experiment to study willingness to pay for deworming drugs and what do they find?
29 Estimating Deworming Social Effects Experimental design means that exogenous number of social links were in early treatment (Group 1, Group 2) schools, conditional on number of links in all program schools Test whether this changes adoption, knowledge, beliefs 1678 Parent Questionnaires in two survey rounds (Table 1) 10.2 total links, 4.4 to own school, 3.0 nonprogram schools, 2.8 links to program schools (not own), 1.9 to early treatment schools 3164 Pupil Questionnaires in two rounds (Table 1)
30 Econometric identification strategy Expected private benefits from deworming are a function of the number of early treatment links (N E ), total social links (N), cost-sharing (C), and household characteristics (Z): (4) Pr( T ij =1) = Φ E λ N + N λ + γc + Z θ + ε } { 1 ij ij 2 j ij ij Identification issues: Validate randomization (Table 2) Infection social effects likely to be small Pupil transfers, stability of social networks
31 Parent Social Effect Estimates Early treatment social links lead to lower takeup (Table 3) Even weak social links are influential (Table 4) Parents with more education have particularly large effects Parents learn deworming drugs are not effective (Table 6)
32 Conclusions from social learning Social learning may lead to less adoption of a new health technology when treatment externalities are large Self-defined reference groups have major impact on behavior Experimental, non-experimental estimates very different evidence for large positive omitted variable bias Large subsidies may be needed to boost adoption Child-to-child public health programs focusing on teens are likely to be particularly effective
33 Policy implications Increasing popularity of sustainability Local ownership Cost recovery Education Why? Failure of many projects after donors leave ideological commitment to a more participatory and empowering approach to development policy Contrast with standard public finance approach: fund activities with positive externalities indefinitely, in order to overcome market failure and free-riding Leads to changes in what kinds of projects are financed: Microfinance Water Public health
34 Other Factors Affecting Take-up Traditional view is that worms are benign Immediate and salient side effects (e.g., vomiting), but diffuse health benefits over the months following treatment Many other health shocks (e.g., malaria) further complicates the signal-extraction problem
35 Questions What are important policy implications from this study in your views? Do you agree with interpretation that exposure to drugs reduced take-up because people learned about true private return to deworming drug? What evidence convincing/unconvincing? Was take-up possibly low among those with many links just because they need the drug less? (what evidence against this) Examples of communities that have created institutions that encourage sustainable contribution to public goods, but paper suggests that this can t be imposed from outside only happens if it evolves from within community. Do you agree? Is it something particular about worms or would same thing have happened with other contagious diseases such as vaccinations?
RANDOMIZED TRIALS Technical Track Session II Sergio Urzua University of Maryland
RANDOMIZED TRIALS Technical Track Session II Sergio Urzua University of Maryland Randomized trials o Evidence about counterfactuals often generated by randomized trials or experiments o Medical trials
More informationDevelopment Economics: Microeconomic issues and Policy Models
MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 14.771 Development Economics: Microeconomic issues and Policy Models Fall 2008 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.
More informationQuasi-Experimental Methods. Technical Track
Quasi-Experimental Methods Technical Track East Asia Regional Impact Evaluation Workshop Seoul, South Korea Joost de Laat, World Bank Randomized Assignment IE Methods Toolbox Discontinuity Design Difference-in-
More informationPoverty and Witch Killing
Poverty and Witch Killing Review of Economic Studies 2005 Edward Miguel October 24, 2013 Introduction General observation: Poverty and violence go hand in hand. Strong negative relationship between economic
More informationSession III Differences in Differences (Dif- and Panel Data
Session III Differences in Differences (Dif- in-dif) and Panel Data Christel Vermeersch March 2007 Human Development Network Middle East and North Africa Region Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund Structure
More informationChetty, Looney, and Kroft Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence Amy Finkelstein E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates
LECTURE: TAX SALIENCE AND BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 Papers: Chetty, Looney, and Kroft Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence Amy Finkelstein E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax
More informationLABOR SUPPLY RESPONSES TO TAXES AND TRANSFERS: PART I (BASIC APPROACHES) Henrik Jacobsen Kleven London School of Economics
LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSES TO TAXES AND TRANSFERS: PART I (BASIC APPROACHES) Henrik Jacobsen Kleven London School of Economics Lecture Notes for MSc Public Finance (EC426): Lent 2013 AGENDA Efficiency cost
More informationDIFFERENCE DIFFERENCES
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES & PANEL DATA Technical Track Session III Céline Ferré The World Bank Structure of this session 1 When do we use Differences-in- Differences? (Diff-in-Diff or DD) 2 Estimation
More informationEmpirical Tools of Public Economics. Part-2
Empirical Tools of Public Economics Part-2 Outline 3.1. Correlation vs. Causality 3.2. Ideal case: Randomized Trials 3.3. Reality: Observational Data Observational data: Data generated by individual behavior
More informationPlanning Sample Size for Randomized Evaluations Esther Duflo J-PAL
Planning Sample Size for Randomized Evaluations Esther Duflo J-PAL povertyactionlab.org Planning Sample Size for Randomized Evaluations General question: How large does the sample need to be to credibly
More informationAnatomy of Welfare Reform:
Anatomy of Welfare Reform: Announcement and Implementation Effects Richard Blundell, Marco Francesconi, Wilbert van der Klaauw UCL and IFS Essex New York Fed 27 January 2010 UC Berkeley Blundell/Francesconi/van
More informationSteve Monahan. Discussion of Using earnings forecasts to simultaneously estimate firm-specific cost of equity and long-term growth
Steve Monahan Discussion of Using earnings forecasts to simultaneously estimate firm-specific cost of equity and long-term growth E 0 [r] and E 0 [g] are Important Businesses are institutional arrangements
More informationTAXES, TRANSFERS, AND LABOR SUPPLY. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven London School of Economics. Lecture Notes for PhD Public Finance (EC426): Lent Term 2012
TAXES, TRANSFERS, AND LABOR SUPPLY Henrik Jacobsen Kleven London School of Economics Lecture Notes for PhD Public Finance (EC426): Lent Term 2012 AGENDA Why care about labor supply responses to taxes and
More informationThe following box outlines the basic steps in economic analysis. The last
4 The Groundwork for Economic Analysis 11 The following box outlines the basic steps in economic analysis. The last three are often given most attention in how to guidelines and this is understandable
More informationObesity, Disability, and Movement onto the DI Rolls
Obesity, Disability, and Movement onto the DI Rolls John Cawley Cornell University Richard V. Burkhauser Cornell University Prepared for the Sixth Annual Conference of Retirement Research Consortium The
More informationDo Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?
1 / 23 Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy? Journal of Finance, 2014 Mark T. Leary 1 and Michael R. Roberts 2 1 Olin Business School Washington University 2 The Wharton School University of
More informationPlanning Sample Size for Randomized Evaluations
Planning Sample Size for Randomized Evaluations Jed Friedman, World Bank SIEF Regional Impact Evaluation Workshop Beijing, China July 2009 Adapted from slides by Esther Duflo, J-PAL Planning Sample Size
More informationEconomics 270c. Development Economics Lecture 11 April 3, 2007
Economics 270c Development Economics Lecture 11 April 3, 2007 Lecture 1: Global patterns of economic growth and development (1/16) The political economy of development Lecture 2: Inequality and growth
More informationBusiness fluctuations in an evolving network economy
Business fluctuations in an evolving network economy Mauro Gallegati*, Domenico Delli Gatti, Bruce Greenwald,** Joseph Stiglitz** *. Introduction Asymmetric information theory deeply affected economic
More informationThe Effect of Interventions to Reduce Fertility on Economic Growth. Quamrul Ashraf Ashley Lester David N. Weil. Brown University.
The Effect of Interventions to Reduce Fertility on Economic Growth Quamrul Ashraf Ashley Lester David N. Weil Brown University December 2007 Goal: analyze quantitatively the economic effects of interventions
More informationHow do families decide? LECTURE 13 ABHIJIT BANERJEE AND ESTHER DUFLO
How do families decide? 14.73 LECTURE 13 ABHIJIT BANERJEE AND ESTHER DUFLO We have seen in the previous lecture that families appear to be quite in control of their fertility decision But when we say families
More informationPART 4 - ARMENIA: SUBJECTIVE POVERTY IN 2006
PART 4 - ARMENIA: SUBJECTIVE POVERTY IN 2006 CHAPTER 11: SUBJECTIVE POVERTY AND LIVING CONDITIONS ASSESSMENT Poverty can be considered as both an objective and subjective assessment. Poverty estimates
More informationIntegrating Simulation and Experimental Approaches to Evaluate Impacts of SCTs: Evidence from Lesotho
Integrating Simulation and Experimental Approaches to Evaluate Impacts of SCTs: Evidence from Lesotho J Edward Taylor, Anubhab Gupta, Mateusz Filipski, Karen Thome, Benjamin Davis, Luca Pellerano and Ousmane
More informationEmpirical Approaches in Public Finance. Hilary Hoynes EC230. Outline of Lecture:
Lecture: Empirical Approaches in Public Finance Hilary Hoynes hwhoynes@ucdavis.edu EC230 Outline of Lecture: 1. Statement of canonical problem a. Challenges for causal identification 2. Non-experimental
More informationMeasuring Impact. Impact Evaluation Methods for Policymakers. Sebastian Martinez. The World Bank
Impact Evaluation Measuring Impact Impact Evaluation Methods for Policymakers Sebastian Martinez The World Bank Note: slides by Sebastian Martinez. The content of this presentation reflects the views of
More information14.74 Lecture 13: Inside the household: How are decisions made within the household?
14.74 Lecture 13: Inside the household: How are decisions made within the household? Prof. Esther Duflo March 11, 2011 Until now, we have always assumed that the household was maximizing utility like an
More informationLECTURE: MEDICAID HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 OUTLINE OF LECTURE: 1. Overview of Medicaid. 2. Medicaid expansions
LECTURE: MEDICAID HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 OUTLINE OF LECTURE: 1. Overview of Medicaid 2. Medicaid expansions 3. Economic outcomes with Medicaid expansions 4. Crowd-out: Cutler and Gruber QJE 1996
More informationLabor Economics Field Exam Spring 2014
Labor Economics Field Exam Spring 2014 Instructions You have 4 hours to complete this exam. This is a closed book examination. No written materials are allowed. You can use a calculator. THE EXAM IS COMPOSED
More informationDepression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk-Taking?
Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk-Taking? October 19, 2009 Ulrike Malmendier, UC Berkeley (joint work with Stefan Nagel, Stanford) 1 The Tale of Depression Babies I don t know
More informationHow did medicaid expansions affect labor supply and welfare enrollment? Evidence from the early 2000s
Agirdas Health Economics Review (2016) 6:12 DOI 10.1186/s13561-016-0089-3 RESEARCH Open Access How did medicaid expansions affect labor supply and welfare enrollment? Evidence from the early 2000s Cagdas
More informationPlease put only your student ID number and not your name on each of three blue books and start each question in a new blue book.
2017 EC782 final. Prof. Ellis Please put only your student ID number and not your name on each of three blue books and start each question in a new blue book. Section I. Answer any two of the following
More informationApplied Economics. Quasi-experiments: Instrumental Variables and Regresion Discontinuity. Department of Economics Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Applied Economics Quasi-experiments: Instrumental Variables and Regresion Discontinuity Department of Economics Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Policy evaluation with quasi-experiments In a quasi-experiment
More informationThe model is estimated including a fixed effect for each family (u i ). The estimated model was:
1. In a 1996 article, Mark Wilhelm examined whether parents bequests are altruistic. 1 According to the altruistic model of bequests, a parent with several children would leave larger bequests to children
More informationCASE STUDY 2: EXPANDING CREDIT ACCESS
CASE STUDY 2: EXPANDING CREDIT ACCESS Why Randomize? This case study is based on Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions To Estimate the Impacts, by Dean Karlan (Yale) and Jonathan Zinman
More informationPrinciples Of Impact Evaluation And Randomized Trials Craig McIntosh UCSD. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, June
Principles Of Impact Evaluation And Randomized Trials Craig McIntosh UCSD Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, June 12 2013. Why are we here? What is the impact of the intervention? o What is the impact of
More informationMeasuring and Monitoring Health Equity
Group de Análisis para el Desarrollo Measuring and Monitoring Health Equity Martín Valdivia Dakha, Bangladesh May 2005 Basic ideas for monitoring health equity: What do we need? In operational terms, we
More informationOverview of Econometric Approaches of Policy Evaluation. Xiaodong Gong
Overview of Econometric Approaches of Policy Evaluation Xiaodong Gong Structure of the talk The definition of policy evaluation in this literature; The Identification problem of policy evaluation; Introduction
More informationAnswers to Chapter 10 Review Questions
Answers to Chapter 10 Review Questions 10.1. Explain why peak end evaluation causes duration neglect. With peak end evaluation an event is remembered solely according to instant utility at particular points
More informationWhat determines government spending multipliers?
What determines government spending multipliers? Paper by Giancarlo Corsetti, André Meier and Gernot J. Müller Presented by Michele Andreolli 12 May 2014 Outline Overview Empirical strategy Results Remarks
More informationEconomics 345 Applied Econometrics
Economics 345 Applied Econometrics Problem Set 4--Solutions Prof: Martin Farnham Problem sets in this course are ungraded. An answer key will be posted on the course website within a few days of the release
More informationPeer Effects in Retirement Decisions
Peer Effects in Retirement Decisions Mario Meier 1 & Andrea Weber 2 1 University of Mannheim 2 Vienna University of Economics and Business, CEPR, IZA Meier & Weber (2016) Peers in Retirement 1 / 35 Motivation
More informationEstimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach
Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach Gianluca Benigno 1 Andrew Foerster 2 Christopher Otrok 3 Alessandro Rebucci 4 1 London School of Economics and
More informationEvaluation Design: Assignment of Treatment
Evaluation Design: Assignment of Treatment Megha Pradhan Policy and Training Manager, J-PAL South Asia Kathmandu, Nepal 29 March 2017 What can be randomized? Access : We can choose which people will be
More informationPotential Pilot Problems. Charles M. Jones Columbia Business School December 2014
Potential Pilot Problems Charles M. Jones Columbia Business School December 2014 1 The popular view about equity markets 2 Trading certainly looks different today 20 th century 21 st century Automation
More informationDelivering Justice to the Poor
Delivering Justice to the Poor Theory and Experimental Evidence from Liberia Justin Sandefur 1 Bilal Siddiqi 2 1 Center for Global Development 2 World Bank Justin Sandefur, Bilal Siddiqi Delivering Justice
More informationFE570 Financial Markets and Trading. Stevens Institute of Technology
FE570 Financial Markets and Trading Lecture 6. Volatility Models and (Ref. Joel Hasbrouck - Empirical Market Microstructure ) Steve Yang Stevens Institute of Technology 10/02/2012 Outline 1 Volatility
More informationUsing Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings
Using Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings Raj Chetty, Harvard and NBER John N. Friedman, Harvard and NBER Emmanuel Saez, UC Berkeley and NBER April
More informationPotential impacts of climate change on $2-a-day poverty and child mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia
1 Potential impacts of climate change on $2-a-day poverty and child mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia Prepared by Edward Anderson Research Fellow Overseas Development Institute 2 Potential
More informationSocial Networks and the Decision to Insure: Evidence from Randomized Experiments in China. University of Michigan
Social Networks and the Decision to Insure: Evidence from Randomized Experiments in China Jing Cai University of Michigan October 5, 2012 Social Networks & Insurance Demand 1 / 32 Overview Introducing
More informationECON 4245 ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM
ECON 4245 ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM Course content Why do firms exist? And why do some firms cease to exist? How are firms financed? How are firms managed? These questions are analysed by using various models
More informationUniversity of Victoria. Economics 325 Public Economics SOLUTIONS
University of Victoria Economics 325 Public Economics SOLUTIONS Martin Farnham Problem Set #5 Note: Answer each question as clearly and concisely as possible. Use of diagrams, where appropriate, is strongly
More informationON THE ASSET ALLOCATION OF A DEFAULT PENSION FUND
ON THE ASSET ALLOCATION OF A DEFAULT PENSION FUND Magnus Dahlquist 1 Ofer Setty 2 Roine Vestman 3 1 Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR 2 Tel Aviv University 3 Stockholm University and Swedish House
More informationFree riding and rebates for residential energy efficiency upgrades - A multi-country contingent valuation experiment
Free riding and rebates for residential energy efficiency upgrades - A multi-country contingent valuation experiment Mark Olsthoorn, Joachim Schleich, Xavier Gassmann, Corinne Faure ECEEE Summer Study
More informationA Minimum Income Standard for London Matt Padley
A Minimum Income Standard for London 2017 Matt Padley December 2017 About Trust for London Trust for London is the largest independent charitable foundation funding work which tackles poverty and inequality
More informationMarket failure Redistribution- Tax or subsidy Restrict or mandate private sale or purchase Public provision Public financing of private provision
8/04/2015 2:42 PM Public Finance Four Questions: o When should governments intervene?! Market failure- problem that causes an outcome that does not maximize efficiency. Increase size of the pie. " If a
More informationUnconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Lending Relationships
Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Lending Relationships Christophe Cahn 1 Anne Duquerroy 1 William Mullins 2 1 Banque de France 2 University of Maryland BdF-BdI Workshop - June 9, 2017 1 / 43 Motivation
More informationSpecial Evaluation Study. MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2000 Sector Performance and Client Welfare September 2012
Special Evaluation Study MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2000 Sector Performance and Client Welfare September 2012 Independent Evaluation Department, ADB Binh Nguyen 04 September 2014 Scope of Evaluation
More informationPublic Pensions. Economics 325 Martin Farnham
Public Pensions Economics 325 Martin Farnham Why Pensions? Typically people work between the ages of about 20 and 65. Younger people depend on parents to support them Older people depend on accumulated
More informationDoes Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development? Matthias Doepke (Northwestern) Michèle Tertilt (Mannheim)
Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development? Matthias Doepke (Northwestern) Michèle Tertilt (Mannheim) Evidence Evidence : Evidence : Evidence : Evidence : : Evidence : : Evidence : : Evidence
More informationOptimal Taxation : (c) Optimal Income Taxation
Optimal Taxation : (c) Optimal Income Taxation Optimal income taxation is quite a different problem than optimal commodity taxation. In optimal commodity taxation the issue was which commodities to tax,
More informationTOPICS IN MACROECONOMICS: MODELLING INFORMATION, LEARNING AND EXPECTATIONS LECTURE NOTES. Lucas Island Model
TOPICS IN MACROECONOMICS: MODELLING INFORMATION, LEARNING AND EXPECTATIONS LECTURE NOTES KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK Lucas Island Model The Lucas Island model appeared in a series of papers in the early 970s
More informationUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Economics 134 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Spring 2018 Professor Christina Romer LECTURE 24
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Economics 134 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Spring 2018 Professor Christina Romer LECTURE 24 I. OVERVIEW A. Framework B. Topics POLICY RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL CRISES APRIL 23, 2018 II.
More informationValue of a Life: Compensation and Regulation of Asbestos and other Work Hazards
Value of a Life: Compensation and Regulation of Asbestos and other Work Hazards Health and safety issues in the workplace are another setting where externalities can arise. Firms can invest in safety for
More information5 Steps To Planning Success :
5 Steps To Planning Success : Developing and Testing New Strategies for Reaching Young Adults Aileen Heinberg Angela Hung Arie Kapteyn Annamaria Lusardi Joanne K. Yoong With DC Plans, Starting Early Can
More informationCore methodology I: Sector analysis of MDG determinants
UNDP UN-DESA UN-ESCAP Core methodology I: Sector analysis of MDG determinants Rob Vos (UN-DESA/DPAD) Presentation prepared for the inception and training workshop of the project Assessing Development Strategies
More informationGreen Giving and Demand for Environmental Quality: Evidence from the Giving and Volunteering Surveys. Debra K. Israel* Indiana State University
Green Giving and Demand for Environmental Quality: Evidence from the Giving and Volunteering Surveys Debra K. Israel* Indiana State University Working Paper * The author would like to thank Indiana State
More informationECONOMIC ANALYSIS. A. Short-Term Effects on Income Poverty and Vulnerability
Social Protection Support Project (RRP PHI 43407-01) ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1. The Social Protection Support Project will support expansion and implementation of two programs that are emerging as central pillars
More informationHomework: (Due Wed) Chapter 10: #5, 22, 42
Announcements: Discussion today is review for midterm, no credit. You may attend more than one discussion section. Bring 2 sheets of notes and calculator to midterm. We will provide Scantron form. Homework:
More informationOne in Five Americans Could Not Afford to Pay an Unexpected Medical Bill Without Accumulating Some Debt
One in Five Americans Could Not Afford to Pay an Unexpected Medical Bill Without Accumulating Some Debt A Majority Believe Receiving a Large Medical Bill that they Can t Afford is Just as Bad as Being
More informationDoes Participation in Microfinance Programs Improve Household Incomes: Empirical Evidence From Makueni District, Kenya.
AAAE Conference proceedings (2007) 405-410 Does Participation in Microfinance Programs Improve Household Incomes: Empirical Evidence From Makueni District, Kenya. Joy M Kiiru, John Mburu, Klaus Flohberg
More information1. Help you get started writing your second year paper and job market paper.
Course Goals 1. Help you get started writing your second year paper and job market paper. 2. Introduce you to macro literatures with a strong empirical component and the datasets used in these literatures.
More informationCost Benefit Analysis. April 15, 2018
Cost Benefit Analysis April 15, 2018 Comparing the social value of different policy projects Policy makers can only implement a limited number of projects. n order to implement those with highest social
More informationWealth Inequality Reading Summary by Danqing Yin, Oct 8, 2018
Summary of Keister & Moller 2000 This review summarized wealth inequality in the form of net worth. Authors examined empirical evidence of wealth accumulation and distribution, presented estimates of trends
More informationCh In other countries the replacement rate is often higher. In the Netherlands it is over 90%. This means that after taxes Dutch workers receive
Ch. 13 1 About Social Security o Social Security is formally called the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, Disability Insurance Trust Fund (OASDI). o It was created as part of the New Deal and was designed in
More informationTopic 11: Disability Insurance
Topic 11: Disability Insurance Nathaniel Hendren Harvard Spring, 2018 Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Disability Insurance Spring, 2018 1 / 63 Disability Insurance Disability insurance in the US is one of
More informationDIME WORKSHOP OCTOBER 13-17, 2014 LISBON, PORTUGAL
DIME WORKSHOP OCTOBER 13-17, 2014 LISBON, PORTUGAL Non-experimental Methods Arndt Reichert October 14, 2014 DIME, World Bank What we know so far We want to isolate the causal effect ( impact ) of our interventions
More informationDrought and Informal Insurance Groups: A Randomised Intervention of Index based Rainfall Insurance in Rural Ethiopia
Drought and Informal Insurance Groups: A Randomised Intervention of Index based Rainfall Insurance in Rural Ethiopia Guush Berhane, Daniel Clarke, Stefan Dercon, Ruth Vargas Hill and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse
More informationFinancial Liberalization and Neighbor Coordination
Financial Liberalization and Neighbor Coordination Arvind Magesan and Jordi Mondria January 31, 2011 Abstract In this paper we study the economic and strategic incentives for a country to financially liberalize
More informationUniversal Basic Income
Universal Basic Income The case for UBI in Developed vs Developing Countries Maitreesh Ghatak London School of Economics November 24, 2017 Universal Basic Income Three dimensions Cash transfers (not in-kind,
More informationPublic spending on health care: how are different criteria related? a second opinion
Health Policy 53 (2000) 61 67 www.elsevier.com/locate/healthpol Letter to the Editor Public spending on health care: how are different criteria related? a second opinion William Jack 1 The World Bank,
More informationEcon 219B Psychology and Economics: Applications (Lecture 6)
Econ 219B Psychology and Economics: Applications (Lecture 6) Stefano DellaVigna February 28, 2007 Outline 1. Reference Dependence: Disposition Effect 2. Reference Dependence: Equity Premium 3. Reference
More informationRandomized Evaluation Start to finish
TRANSLATING RESEARCH INTO ACTION Randomized Evaluation Start to finish Nava Ashraf Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab povertyactionlab.org 1 Course Overview 1. Why evaluate? What is 2. Outcomes, indicators
More informationMarginal Benefit Incidence of Pubic Health Spending: Evidence from Indonesian sub-national data
Marginal Benefit Incidence of Pubic Health Spending: Evidence from Indonesian sub-national data Ioana Kruse Menno Pradhan Robert Sparrow The 2010 IRDES Workshop on Applied Health Economics and Policy Evaluation
More informationPPI ALERT November 2011
PPI ALERT November 2011 50+ and Worried about Today and Tomorrow Older Americans Express Concerns about the State of the Economy and their Current and Future Financial Well-being In late August, 2011,
More informationInternational Trade: Lecture 3
International Trade: Lecture 3 Alexander Tarasov Higher School of Economics Fall 2016 Alexander Tarasov (Higher School of Economics) International Trade (Lecture 3) Fall 2016 1 / 36 The Krugman model (Krugman
More informationLecture 13 Price discrimination and Entry. Bronwyn H. Hall Economics 220C, UC Berkeley Spring 2005
Lecture 13 Price discrimination and Entry Bronwyn H. Hall Economics 220C, UC Berkeley Spring 2005 Outline Leslie Broadway theatre pricing Empirical models of entry Spring 2005 Economics 220C 2 Leslie 2004
More informationCross Atlantic Differences in Estimating Dynamic Training Effects
Cross Atlantic Differences in Estimating Dynamic Training Effects John C. Ham, University of Maryland, National University of Singapore, IFAU, IFS, IZA and IRP Per Johannson, Uppsala University, IFAU,
More informationFinancial Education. Debt Repayment of Young Adults
Introduction and Debt Repayment of Young Adults Alexandra Brown 1 J. Michael Collins 2 Maximilian Schmeiser 1 Carly Urban 3 1 Federal Reserve Board 2 University of Wisconsin-Madison 3 Department of Agricultural
More informationEcon 551 Government Finance: Revenues Winter 2018
Econ 551 Government Finance: Revenues Winter 2018 Given by Kevin Milligan Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia Lecture 3: Excess Burden ECON 551: Lecture 3 1 of 28 Agenda: 1. Definition
More informationExploiting spatial and temporal difference in rollout Panel analysis. Elisabeth Sadoulet AERC Mombasa, May Rollout 1
Exploiting spatial and temporal difference in rollout Panel analysis Elisabeth Sadoulet AERC Mombasa, May 2009 Rollout 1 Extension of the double difference method. Performance y Obs.1 gets the program
More informationInside the Household
Inside the Household Spring 2016 Inside the Household Outline for Today I model II Evidence on : Lundberg, Pollak and Wales III Evidence on : Duflo IV Cooperative models V Noncooperative models VI Evidence
More informationFINAL REPORT AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF PROGRESA CASH PAYMENTS ON PRIVATE INTER-HOUSEHOLD TRANSFERS. Graciela Teruel Benjamin Davis
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FINAL REPORT AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF PROGRESA CASH PAYMENTS ON PRIVATE INTER-HOUSEHOLD TRANSFERS Graciela Teruel Benjamin Davis International Food Policy
More informationthe effect of microcredit on standards of living in bangladesh shafin fattah, princeton university (2014)
the effect of microcredit on standards of living in bangladesh shafin fattah, princeton university (2014) abstract This paper asks a simple question: do microcredit programs positively affect the standard
More informationThe Vasicek adjustment to beta estimates in the Capital Asset Pricing Model
The Vasicek adjustment to beta estimates in the Capital Asset Pricing Model 17 June 2013 Contents 1. Preparation of this report... 1 2. Executive summary... 2 3. Issue and evaluation approach... 4 3.1.
More informationAn overview of social pensions by Stephen Kidd
DEVELOPMENT An overview of social pensions by Stephen Kidd New Zealand s Minister of Finance, when arguing for his country s universal pension The ability to retire in a degree of personal comfort, without
More informationEvaluating Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Social Experiment
Evaluating Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Social Experiment Jonneke Bolhaar, Nadine Ketel, Bas van der Klaauw ===== FIRST DRAFT, PRELIMINARY ===== Abstract We investigate the implications
More informationIn the previous session we learned about the various categories of Risk in agriculture. Of course the whole point of talking about risk in this
In the previous session we learned about the various categories of Risk in agriculture. Of course the whole point of talking about risk in this educational series is so that we can talk about managing
More informationThe Cost of Compromise: Impact of the Estate Tax
The Cost of Compromise: Impact of the 2011-2012 Estate Tax Antony Davies, Ph.D December, 2010 A Study by the American Family Business Foundation Executive Summary On December 18, 2010, President Obama
More informationPoverty Traps and Social Protection
Christopher B. Barrett Michael R. Carter Munenobu Ikegami Cornell University and University of Wisconsin-Madison May 12, 2008 presentation Introduction 1 Multiple equilibrium (ME) poverty traps command
More informationIs Extended Family in Low-Income Countries. Altruistically Linked? Evidences from Bangladesh
Is Extended Family in Low-Income Countries Altruistically Linked? Evidences from Bangladesh Cheolsung Park ecspc@nus.edu.sg Fax: +65-775-2646 Department of Economics National University of Singapore 1
More information