SWM. The impact of reducing pension generosity on schooling and inequality ECON. Miguel Sánchez-Romero 1,2 and Alexia Prskawetz 1,2
|
|
- Rosalyn Boyd
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 The impact of reducing pension generosity on schooling and inequality Miguel Sánchez-Romero 1,2 and Alexia Prskawetz 1,2 1 Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU) 2 Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Methods in Economics, Research Unit Economics, TU Wien, Austria 12th Global Meeting of the NTA Network, Mexico City, July SWM Economics ECON
2 Motivation: Expected reductions in the generosity of pension systems 100 Old age dependency ratio (in %) Japan Italy Finland Germany Portugal Sweden France Denmark Greece Latvia Estonia United Kingdom Belgium Spain Austria Netherlands EU28 Switzerland Slovenia Czech Republic OECD Hungary Norway Canada New Zealand Australia United States Poland Iceland Ireland Luxembourg Slovak Republic Israel Russian Federation Argentina Korea Chile China Turkey Brazil Mexico India South Africa Indonesia Saudi Arabia Year Figure 1: Old-age dependency ratio across OECD countries 2 / 18
3 Motivation: Expected reductions in the generosity of pension systems 100 Year 2050 Japan Italy Finland Germany Portugal Sweden France Denmark Greece Latvia Estonia United Kingdom Belgium Spain Austria Netherlands EU28 Switzerland Slovenia Czech Republic OECD Hungary Norway Canada New Zealand Australia United States Poland Iceland Ireland Luxembourg Slovak Republic Israel Russian Federation Argentina Korea Chile China Turkey Brazil Mexico India South Africa Indonesia Saudi Arabia Old age dependency ratio (in %) Figure 1: Old-age dependency ratio across OECD countries 2 / 18
4 Motivation: Increasing longevity gap across socio-economic groups Life expectancy at age 65 (years) Education High Low Year Figure 2: Life expectancy at age 65, US males Source: Own calculations. 3 / 18
5 Introduction Research interest: What is the impact of reducing the generosity of the pension system on inequality and schooling when individuals differ by longevity? Model: To study this problem, we propose an extension of Pestieau and Ponthiere (2016) by introducing heterogeneity in schooling effort 4 / 18
6 Individuals budget constraint First period: - stay unskilled (e u ) or become skilled worker (e s ) y(e s ) > y(e u ) - pay social security contributions τ y(e i ) - consumption c - save for retirement s c + s = (1 τ)y(e i ) (1) 5 / 18
7 Individuals budget constraint First period: - stay unskilled (e u) or become skilled workers (e s) y(e s) > y(e u) - pay social security contributions τy(e i ) - consumption c - save for retirement s c + s = (1 τ)y(e i ) (1) Second period: - For e i π(e i ) - consumption d s d = + f (ei, θ)y(ei ) Rπ(e i ) (2) where f (e i, θ) is the pension replacement rate f (e i, θ) = { ψ if ei = e u, ψ[1 θα(e s)] if e i = e s, (3) where α(e s) = y(e s ) y(e u ) y(e s ) is the relative income advantage of a skilled worker and θ represents the degree of progressivity 5 / 18
8 Replacement rate Replacement rate, f (e i, θ) 1 ψ Bismarckian θ = 0 θ > 0 Beveridgean θ = 1 y(e u) y(e s ) Labor income Figure 3: Stylized replacement rate function 6 / 18
9 Individuals preferences The preferences of an individual of type φ are described by the following utility function: V (e i ; φ) = u(c) φ e i + βπ(e i )u(d), (4) where φ R is the effort of attending school and differs across individuals (Oreopolous, 2007; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013; Le Garrec, 2015; Sánchez-Romero, d Albis and Prskawetz, 2016) 7 / 18
10 Individuals preferences The preferences of an individual of type φ are described by the following utility function: V (e i ; φ) = u(c) φ e i + βπ(e i )u(d), (4) where φ R is the effort of attending school and differs across individuals (Oreopolous, 2007; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013; Le Garrec, 2015; Sánchez-Romero, d Albis and Prskawetz, 2016) Assumption 1: The survival probability positively depends on being a skilled worker, with π(e s ) π(e u) = π > 0. 7 / 18
11 Individuals preferences The preferences of an individual of type φ are described by the following utility function: V (e i ; φ) = u(c) φ e i + βπ(e i )u(d), (4) where φ R is the effort of attending school and differs across individuals (Oreopolous, 2007; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013; Le Garrec, 2015; Sánchez-Romero, d Albis and Prskawetz, 2016) Assumption 1: The survival probability positively depends on being a skilled worker, with π(e s ) π(e u) = π > 0. Assumption 2: The elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is between zero and one; i.e. η = xu (x)/u(x) (0, 1) (Hall and Jones, 2007). 7 / 18
12 Individuals preferences The preferences of an individual of type φ are described by the following utility function: V (e i ; φ) = u(c) φ e i + βπ(e i )u(d), (4) where φ R is the effort of attending school and differs across individuals (Oreopolous, 2007; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013; Le Garrec, 2015; Sánchez-Romero, d Albis and Prskawetz, 2016) Assumption 1: The survival probability positively depends on being a skilled worker, with π(e s ) π(e u) = π > 0. Assumption 2: The elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is between zero and one; i.e. η = xu (x)/u(x) (0, 1) (Hall and Jones, 2007) Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that a marginal increase in the longevity gap leads to a marginal increase in the benefit of continued schooling. 7 / 18
13 Optimal schooling and the proportion of skilled workers The optimal schooling decision satisfies e i = { e u if φ φ, e s if φ > φ, (5) where the parameter φ denotes the threshold utility cost of schooling for which an individual is indifferent between continuing unskilled and becoming a skilled worker i.e, V (e u ; φ ) = V (e s ; φ ), φ = u(c (e s )) u(c (e u)) + β[π(e s )u(d (e s )) π(e u)u(d (e u))]. (6) 8 / 18
14 Optimal schooling and the proportion of skilled workers The optimal schooling decision satisfies e i = { e u if φ φ, e s if φ > φ, (5) where the parameter φ denotes the threshold utility cost of schooling for which an individual is indifferent between continuing unskilled and becoming a skilled worker i.e, V (e u ; φ ) = V (e s ; φ ), φ = u(c (e s )) u(c (e u)) + β[π(e s )u(d (e s )) π(e u)u(d (e u))]. (6) Probability density function, g(φ) Proportion of skilled workers q := G ( φ) = φ g(x)dx skilled 0 φ unskilled Utility cost of schooling, φ Figure 4: Stylized probability density function of the utility cost of schooling 8 / 18
15 The implicit tax on work The impact of pensions on inequality Combining (1) and (2), the intertemporal budget constraint is c + Rπ(e i )d = (1 τ E (e i ))y(e i ) (7) 9 / 18
16 The implicit tax on work The impact of pensions on inequality Combining (1) and (2), the intertemporal budget constraint is c + Rπ(e i )d = (1 τ E (e i ))y(e i ) (7) Implicit tax on work the effective social security tax/subsidy rate on work, τ E (e i ), is given by: τ E (e i ) = τ f (e i, θ)rπ(e i ) (8) 9 / 18
17 The implicit tax on work The impact of pensions on inequality Combining (1) and (2), the intertemporal budget constraint is c + Rπ(e i )d = (1 τ E (e i ))y(e i ) (7) Implicit tax on work the effective social security tax/subsidy rate on work, τ E (e i ), is given by: τ E (e i ) = τ f (e i, θ)rπ(e i ). (8) Individuals with different educational attainment face different τ E (e i )!! 9 / 18
18 The implicit tax on work The difference in the effective social security tax rate between unskilled and skilled workers, τ (θ) = τ E (e u ) τ E (e s ), is with ε(e s ) = π(e s ) π(e u ) π(e s ). τ (θ) = ψπ(e s ) [ε(e s ) θα(e s )] R. (9) 10 / 18
19 The implicit tax on work The difference in the effective social security tax rate between unskilled and skilled workers, τ (θ) = τ E (e u ) τ E (e s ), is with ε(e s ) = π(e s ) π(e u ) π(e s ) τ (θ) = ψπ(e s ) [ε(e s ) θα(e s )] R (9) Proposition 1: Assuming a constant longevity across skill groups, π(e s ) = π(e u), a pension system with (a) a flat replacement (θ = 0) does not redistribute resources among skill groups (b) a progressive replacement rate (θ > 0) redistributes resources from skilled workers to unskilled workers 10 / 18
20 The implicit tax on work The difference in the effective social security tax rate between unskilled and skilled workers, τ (θ) = τ E (e u ) τ E (e s ), is with ε(e s ) = π(e s ) π(e u ) π(e s ). τ (θ) = ψπ(e s )α(e s ) [p θ] R (9) Proposition 1: Assuming a constant longevity across skill groups, π(e s ) = π(e u), a pension system with (a) a flat replacement (θ = 0) does not redistribute resources among skill groups (b) a progressive replacement rate (θ > 0) redistributes resources from skilled workers to unskilled workers Proposition 2: Assuming that π(e s ) > π(e u) and defining p = ε(e s ) α(e as the ratio of the s ) relative mortality to the relative income advantage of skilled workers, a pension system with (a) a flat replacement rate (θ = 0) transfers resources from short-lived and unskilled workers to long-lived and skilled workers (b) a progressive replacement rate (θ > 0) redistributes income (i) from skilled workers to unskilled workers when θ > p and (ii) from unskilled workers to skilled workers when θ < p 10 / 18
21 The implicit tax on work τ E ( ) p = ε(es ) α(es ) skilled (ε 1 ) implicit tax unskilled (ε 1 ) implicit subsidy p 1 Degree of progressivity, θ Figure 5: Effective social security tax/subsidy rate (τ E ) for each educational group by degree of progressivity (θ) 11 / 18
22 Impact of reducing the pension replacement rate on pension inequality To study the effect of a decrease in the replacement rate (ψ) on pension inequality, we calculate the sign of the derivative of Eq. (9) with respect to ψ { τ > 0 if θ > p = π(es )α(es ) (θ p) R (10) ψ < 0 if θ < p 12 / 18
23 Impact of reducing the pension replacement rate on pension inequality To study the effect of a decrease in the replacement rate (ψ) on pension inequality, we calculate the sign of the derivative of Eq. (9) with respect to ψ { τ > 0 if θ > p = π(es )α(es ) (θ p) R (10) ψ < 0 if θ < p τ E ( ) implicit tax Lower pension inequality p = ε(e s ) α(e s ) Higher pension inequality skilled (ψ 1 ) skilled (ψ 2 ) unskilled (ψ 1 ) unskilled (ψ 2 ) implicit subsidy p 1 θ Figure 6: Impact of a fall in the replacement rate (ψ 1 > ψ 2 ) on the effective social security tax/subsidy rate (τ E ) for each educational group by degree of progressivity (θ) 12 / 18
24 Impact of reducing the pension replacement rate on pension inequality Progressivity a Ex ante progressive relative mortality advantage of skilled workers p= relative income advantage of skilled workers a Ex ante regressive HUN LVA FIN SWE AUT POL TUR ITA FRA CHL SVN θ = p θ < p θ > p CZE NOR AUS DNK USA UK CAN NZL 0.0 SVK MEX Degree of progressivity, θ Figure 7: Empirical values of p = ε(e s)/α(e s) and θ for 21 selected OECD countries Source: Values obtained from OECD (2017), Murtin (2017), and authors calculations. 13 / 18
25 Impact of reducing the pension replacement rate on education To study the impact of a decrease in ψ on education, we differentiate the proportion of skilled workers, q, with respect to ψ [ q ψ = g( φ)u (c τ (e s ))y(e s ) ψ + (Φ 1) τ ] E (e u), (11) ψ with Φ = u (c (e u ))y(e u ) u (c (e s ))y(e s ) 14 / 18
26 Impact of reducing the pension replacement rate on education To study the impact of a decrease in ψ on education, we differentiate the proportion of skilled workers, q, with respect to ψ [ q ψ = g( φ)u (c τ (e s ))y(e s ) ψ + (Φ 1) τ ] E (e u), (11) ψ with Φ = u (c (e u ))y(e u ) u (c (e s ))y(e s ) Less skilled workers More skilled workers Less skilled workers More skilled workers τe ( ) skilled (ε 1 ) τe ( ) skilled (ε 1 ) implicit tax implicit tax unskilled (ε 1 ) unskilled (ε 1 ) implicit subsidy p 1 θ implicit subsidy p 1 θ (a) Case: Φ < 1 (b) Case: Φ > 1 Figure 8: Impact of a reduction in the replacement rate on the proportion of skilled wokers by degree of progressivity of the pension system (θ) 14 / 18
27 Impact of reducing the pension replacement rate on education Impact of a fall in the replacement rate Impact of a fall in the replacement rate Less skilled workers Less skilled workers relative mortality advantage of skilled workers p= relative income advantage of skilled workers More skilled workers SWE HUN LVA FIN AUT POL TUR ITA FRA CHL SVN DNK USA NOR CZE CAN AUS UK NZL relative mortality advantage of skilled workers p= relative income advantage of skilled workers More skilled workers SWE HUN LVA FIN AUT POL TUR ITA FRA CHL SVN DNK USA NOR CZE CAN AUS UK NZL 0.0 SVK MEX 0.0 SVK MEX Degree of progressivity, θ Degree of progressivity, θ (a) Relative risk aversion = 0.5 Φ < 1 (b) Relative risk aversion = 1.5 Φ > 1 Figure 9: Impact of a reduction in the replacement rate on the proportion of skilled workers by degree of progressivity of the pension system (θ) in 21 selected OECD countries Source: OECD (2017), Murtin (2017), and authors calculations. Calculations done assuming each period lasts forty years, a power marginal utility function u (x) = x γ, where γ is the relative risk aversion coefficient, a constant annual real interest rate of 3 percent, a productivity growth rate of 1.5 percent, and a subjective discount factor of 1 percent. 15 / 18
28 The combined effect of a reduction in pension generosity More skilled workers & lower pension inequality Less skilled workers & higher pension inequality τe ( ) τe ( ) implicit tax Less skilled workers & lower pension inequality More skilled workers & higher pension inequality implicit tax Less skilled workers & lower pension inequality More skilled workers & higher pension inequality implicit subsidy p 1 θ implicit subsidy p 1 θ (a) Case: Φ < 1 (b) Case: Φ > 1 Figure 10: Impact of a reduction in the replacement rate (ψ) on the proportion of skilled workers (q) and on pension inequality ( τ ) by degree of progressivity of the pension system (θ) 16 / 18
29 The combined effect of a reduction in the pension generosity More skilled workers & lower pension inequality Less skilled workers & higher pension inequality τe ( ) τe ( ) implicit tax Less skilled workers & lower pension inequality More skilled workers & higher pension inequality implicit tax Less skilled workers & lower pension inequality More skilled workers & higher pension inequality implicit subsidy p 1 θ implicit subsidy p 1 θ (a) Case: Φ < 1 (b) Case: Φ > 1 Figure 10: Impact of a reduction in the replacement rate (ψ) on the proportion of skilled workers (q) and on pension inequality ( τ ) by degree of progressivity of the pension system (θ) If we pursue avoiding pension inequality, then a reduction in the generosity of the pension system will lead to an ambiguous result on the number of skilled workers 16 / 18
30 The combined effect of a reduction in pension generosity Impact of a fall in the replacement rate θ = p Impact of a fall in the replacement rate Less skilled workers and lower inequality Less skilled workers and lower inequality θ = p relative mortality advantage of skilled workers p= relative income advantage of skilled workers More skilled workers and lower inequality More skilled workers and higher inequality HUN CZE LVA FIN SVN NOR AUS SWE CHL DNK UK FRA USA AUT CAN NZL POL TUR ITA relative mortality advantage of skilled workers p= relative income advantage of skilled workers Less skilled workers and higher inequality More skilled workers and higher inequality HUN CZE LVA FIN SVN NOR AUS SWE CHL DNK UK FRA USA AUT CAN NZL POL TUR ITA 0.0 SVK MEX 0.0 SVK MEX Degree of progressivity, θ (a) Relative risk aversion = 0.5 Φ < Degree of progressivity, θ (b) Relative risk aversion = 1.5 Φ > 1 Figure 11: Impact of a reduction in the replacement rate (ψ) on the proportion of skilled workers (q) and on pension inequality ( τ ) by degree of progressivity of the pension system (θ) in 21 selected OECD countries Source: See figs. 7 and / 18
31 Conclusions We have developed a model for analyzing the impact of a reduction in the generosity of the pension system on inequality and schooling Within this framework we study the impact of a reduction in the generosity of the pension system on schooling and inequality when there exists differential mortality across groups We show that when there exists ex ante mortality differences, it is necessary to introduce a progressive pension system to avoid that pension system becomes regressive 18 / 18
32 Conclusions We have developed a model for analyzing the impact of a reduction in the generosity of the pension system on inequality and schooling Within this framework we study the impact of a reduction in the generosity of the pension system on schooling and inequality when there exists differential mortality across groups We show that when there exists ex ante mortality differences, it is necessary to introduce a progressive pension system to avoid that pension system becomes regressive 18 / 18
33 Conclusions We have developed a model for analyzing the impact of a reduction in the generosity of the pension system on inequality and schooling Within this framework we study the impact of a reduction in the generosity of the pension system on schooling and inequality when there exists differential mortality across groups We show that when there exists ex ante mortality differences, it is necessary to introduce a progressive pension system to avoid that the pension system becomes regressive 18 / 18
34 Thank you! We would like to thank David de la Croix, Michael Freiberger, Bernhard Hammer, Michael Kuhn, Ronald Lee, Klaus Prettner,Timo Trimborn, Stefan Wrzaczek for valuable comments. This project has also received fundings from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) under Grant no / 18
35 US OAI pension system (DB-II) Replacement rate, ψ(p) p:= y:= Pension earnings or Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) Average Labor Income y/6 y 2y p (or AIME) Figure 12: Old-Age Insurance replacement rate in the US Note: AIME is calculated as 1/12 of the mean of the 35 highest labor incomes over the working life, measured in real terms. 18 / 18
36 The impact of an increase in π and in α e on the implicit tax on work skilled (α 2 ) τe ( ) skilled (ε 1 ) τe ( ) skilled (α 1 ) implicit tax skilled (ε 2 ) implicit tax unskilled (ε 2 ) unskilled (ε 1 ) unskilled (α 1 ) unskilled (α 2 ) implicit subsidy ε 1 ε 2 1 α 1 α 1 θ implicit subsidy ε 1 α 2 ε 1 α 1 1 θ (a) Increasing longevity gap (ε 1 < ε 2 ) (b) Increasing income gap (α 1 < α 2 ) Figure 13: Effective social security tax/subsidy rate (τ E ) for each educational group by degree of progressivity (θ) 18 / 18
Public Pension Spending Trends and Outlook in Emerging Europe. Benedict Clements Fiscal Affairs Department International Monetary Fund March 2013
Public Pension Spending Trends and Outlook in Emerging Europe Benedict Clements Fiscal Affairs Department International Monetary Fund March 13 Plan of Presentation I. Trends and drivers of public pension
More informationThe Challenge of Public Pension Reform in Advanced and Emerging Economies
The Challenge of Public Pension Reform in Advanced and Emerging Economies Mauricio Soto Fiscal Affairs Department International Monetary Fund January 212 The views expressed herein are those of the author
More informationCorrigendum. OECD Pensions Outlook 2012 DOI: ISBN (print) ISBN (PDF) OECD 2012
OECD Pensions Outlook 2012 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/9789264169401-en ISBN 978-92-64-16939-5 (print) ISBN 978-92-64-16940-1 (PDF) OECD 2012 Corrigendum Page 21: Figure 1.1. Average annual real net investment
More informationCorrigendum. Page 41, Table 1.A1.1. Details of pension reforms, September 2013-September 2015 : Columns on Portugal should read as follows:
Pensions at a Glance: OECD and G Indicators DOI: http://dx.doi.org/.787/pension_glance-5-en ISBN 9789644636 (print) ISBN 97896444443 (PDF) OECD 5 Corrigendum Page 4, Table.A.. Details of pension reforms,
More informationEarnings related schemes: Design, options and experience. Edward Whitehouse
Earnings related schemes: Design, options and experience Edward Whitehouse Retirement-income systems: goal Primary objective ensuring older people have a decent standard of living in retirement Two interpretations
More informationIncome support for older persons in the Republic of Korea : a perspective of older persons
ESCAP Regional Consultation Incheon, Republic of Korea Income support for older persons in the Republic of Korea : a perspective of older persons Soo-Wan Kim (Kangnam University) 1 I. Introduction This
More informationThe Challenge of Public Pension Reform
The Challenge of Public Pension Reform Baoping Shang Fiscal Affairs Department International Monetary Fund May 4, 212 This presentation represents the views of the author and should not be attributed to
More informationCOVERAGE OF PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND MAIN TRENDS IN THE PENSIONS INDUSTRY IN THE OECD
COVERAGE OF PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND MAIN TRENDS IN THE PENSIONS INDUSTRY IN THE OECD Fafo Pension Forum Oslo, 16 November 2012 Stéphanie Payet OECD Financial Affairs Division Structure of the Presentation
More informationTHE TAX SYSTEM IN BELGIUM COMPARED TO OTHER OECD COUNTRIES
THE TAX SYSTEM IN BELGIUM COMPARED TO OTHER OECD COUNTRIES TOWARDS A WELL-BALANCED FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM IN BELGIUM Bert Brys, Ph.D. 14 October 2013 Senior Tax Economist Centre for Tax Policy and Administration
More informationCan employment be increased only at the cost of more inequality?
Can employment be increased only at the cost of more inequality? Engines for More and Better Jobs in Europe ZEW Conference, Mannheim April 2013 Torben M Andersen Aarhus University Policy questions How
More informationEntrepreneurship at a Glance 2018 Highlights
Entrepreneurship at a Glance 218 Highlights OECD Entrepreneurship at a Glance Highlights 218 SDD 1 October 218 List of figures ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS STATISTICS DATABASES 218 UPDATE 2 1. New enterprise
More informationRevenue Statistics Tax revenue trends in the OECD
Revenue Statistics 2017 Tax revenue trends in the OECD OECD 2017 The OECD freely authorises the use of this material for non-commercial purposes, provided that suitable acknowledgment of the source and
More informationCapital Access Index 2006 Gauging Entrepreneurial Access to Capital
Capital Access Index 2006 Gauging Entrepreneurial Access to Capital Max = 10 9.0 Hong Kong 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 40 Source: Milken Institute United Kingdom U.S. India China Brazil Russia
More informationFDI drops 18% in 2017 as corporate restructurings decline
FDI IN FIGURES April 2018 FDI drops 18% in 2017 as corporate restructurings decline Global FDI flows decreased by 18% to USD 1 411 billion in 2017 compared to 2016. In the fourth quarter of 2017, FDI flows
More informationPENSIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES: INDICATORS AND DEVELOPMENTS
PENSIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES: INDICATORS AND DEVELOPMENTS Marius Lüske Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, OECD Lisbon, 28.09.2018 Marius.LUSKE@oecd.org www.oecd.org/els OUTLINE Talk based
More informationApproach to Employment Injury (EI) compensation benefits in the EU and OECD
Approach to (EI) compensation benefits in the EU and OECD The benefits of protection can be divided in three main groups. The cash benefits include disability pensions, survivor's pensions and other short-
More informationRESILIENCE IN A TIME OF HIGH DEBT
RESILIENCE IN A TIME OF HIGH DEBT PRE-RELEASE OF THE SPECIAL CHAPTER OF THE OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (To Be Released on 28th November at 11.00am CET) Paris, 23th November 2017 www.oecd.org/economy/economicoutlook.htm
More informationeducation (captured by the school leaving age), household income (measured on a ten-point
A Web-Appendix A.1 Information on data sources Individual level responses on benefit morale, tax morale, age, sex, marital status, children, education (captured by the school leaving age), household income
More informationaxia Axia Economics Civil-service pension schemes Edward Whitehouse Civil-Service World Bank core course Washington DC, April 2016
Public Disclosure Authorized Civil-Service Civil-service pension schemes Public Disclosure Authorized Edward Whitehouse Public Disclosure Authorized World Bank core course Washington DC, April 2016 axia
More informationReporting practices for domestic and total debt securities
Last updated: 27 November 2017 Reporting practices for domestic and total debt securities While the BIS debt securities statistics are in principle harmonised with the recommendations in the Handbook on
More informationGLOBAL TRENDS IN PENSION POLICIES AND REGULATIONS
GLOBAL TRENDS IN PENSION POLICIES AND REGULATIONS Pablo Antolin Principal economist and Head OECD Private Pensions Unit, Deputy Head OECD Financial Affairs Division Structure of the talk 1. A global snapshot
More informationRedistributive effects of pension schemes if individuals differ by life expectancy
Redistributive effects of pension schemes if individuals differ by life expectancy Miguel Sánchez-Romero 1,3, Ronald D. Lee 2 and Alexia Prskawetz 1,3 1 Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU) 2 University
More informationLONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF PUBLIC PENSION EXPENDITURE
7. FINANCES OF RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF PUBLIC PENSION EXPENDITURE Key results Public spending on pensions has been on the rise in most OECD countries for the past decades, as
More informationPensions Incentives to Retire
Pensions at a Glance 2011 Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries OECD 2011 I PART I Chapter 3 Pensions Incentives to Retire Individuals decisions about work and retirement depend on the financial
More informationThe OECD s Society at a Glance Simon Chapple OECD ELS/SPD Villa Vigoni, Italy, 9-11 th March 2011
The OECD s Society at a Glance 2 Simon Chapple OECD ELS/SPD Villa Vigoni, Italy, 9- th March 2 Reconceptualisation for 2: Internal reasons OECD growth from 3 to 34 countries Other major economies (e.g.
More informationInsurance Markets in Figures
Insurance Markets in Figures June 2018 Most countries experienced a positive premium growth in life and/or non-life insurance in 2017 Preliminary data for 2017 show an increase in life and/or non-life
More informationSources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2016
FISCAL FACT No. 517 July, 2016 Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2016 By Kyle Pomerleau Director of Federal Projects Kevin Adams Research Assistant Key Findings OECD countries rely heavily on
More informationPensions at a Glance: Europe and Central Asia
Pensions at a Glance: Europe and Central Asia Edward Whitehouse Head of Pension-Policy Analysis Social Policy division OECD European Commission/ World Bank conference Reforming Pension Systems in Europe
More informationPension Fund Investment and Regulation - An International Perspective and Implications for China s Pension System
Pension Fund Investment and Regulation - An International Perspective and Implications for China s Pension System Yu-Wei Hu, Fiona Stewart and Juan Yermo Financial Affairs Division OECD, Paris OECD/IOPS
More informationPrimary Health Care Needs-Based Resource Allocation through Financing of Health Regions
Primary Health Care Needs-Based Resource Allocation through Financing of Health Regions 26th PCSI Conference 17 th September 2010 A Lourenço, A Bicó, S Olim, M Reis, A Ferreira www.acss.min-saude.pt Ref::ACSS\GGV\AOE
More informationIMPLICATIONS OF LOW PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH FOR DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
IMPLICATIONS OF LOW PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH FOR DEBT SUSTAINABILITY Neil R. Mehrotra Brown University Peterson Institute for International Economics November 9th, 2017 1 / 13 PUBLIC DEBT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
More informationFinancial wealth of private households worldwide
Economic Research Financial wealth of private households worldwide Munich, October 217 Recovery in turbulent times Assets and liabilities of private households worldwide in EUR trillion and annualrate
More informationExtract from Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising
Extract from Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (2011) James J. Heckman University of Chicago AEA Continuing Education Program ASSA Course: Microeconomics of Life Course Inequality San Francisco,
More informationLow employment among the 50+ population in Hungary
Low employment among the + population in Hungary The role of incentives, health and cognitive capacities Janos Divenyi (Central European University) and Gabor Kezdi (Central European University and IE-CRSHAS)
More informationREFORMING PENSION SYSTEMS: THE OECD EXPERIENCE
REFORMING PENSION SYSTEMS: THE OECD EXPERIENCE IX Forum Nacional de Seguro de Vida e Previdencia Privada 12 June 2018, São Paulo Jessica Mosher, Policy Analyst, Private Pensions Unit of the Financial Affairs
More informationSlovak Competitiveness: Fundamentals, Indicators and Challenges
Copyright rests with the author Slovak Competitiveness: Fundamentals, Indicators and Challenges Presentation by Mark De Broeck European Department, IMF Seminar Organized by the European Commission November
More informationPROGRESSIVITY IN TAX DESIGN. Michael Keen International Monetary Fund
PROGRESSIVITY IN TAX DESIGN Michael Keen International Monetary Fund The 5th IMF-Japan High-Level Tax Conference for Asian Countries Tokyo, April 21, 2014 CONTEXT Inequality has been increasing 0.55 0.5
More informationSources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2018
FISCAL FACT No. 581 Mar. 2018 Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2018 Amir El-Sibaie Analyst Key Findings In 2015, OECD countries relied heavily on consumption taxes, such as the value-added tax,
More informationDouble Tax Treaties. Necessity of Declaration on Tax Beneficial Ownership In case of capital gains tax. DTA Country Withholding Tax Rates (%)
Double Tax Treaties DTA Country Withholding Tax Rates (%) Albania 0 0 5/10 1 No No No Armenia 5/10 9 0 5/10 1 Yes 2 No Yes Australia 10 0 15 No No No Austria 0 0 10 No No No Azerbaijan 8 0 8 Yes No Yes
More informationSources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2017
FISCAL FACT No. 558 Aug. 2017 Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2017 Amir El-Sibaie Analyst Key Findings: OECD countries rely heavily on consumption taxes, such as the value-added tax, and social
More informationOutline of Presentation. I. Trends in Revenue Mobilization. II. Measuring Tax Gap. III. IMF s Approach RA-GAP
Outline of Presentation I. Trends in Revenue Mobilization II. Measuring Tax Gap III. IMF s Approach RA-GAP 2 TRENDS IN REVENUE MOBILIZATION 3 I. Trends in Revenue Mobilization VAT revenues CIT Revenues
More informationEFFICIENCY OF EDUCATION EXPENDITURE IN OECD COUNTRIES
EFFICIENCY OF EDUCATION EXPENDITURE IN OECD COUNTRIES MIROSLAV HUŽVÁR, ZUZANA RIGOVÁ Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Faculty of Economics, Department of Quantitative Methods and Information Systems,
More informationStronger growth, but risks loom large
OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Stronger growth, but risks loom large Ángel Gurría OECD Secretary-General Álvaro S. Pereira OECD Chief Economist ad interim Paris, 3 May Global growth will be around 4% Investment
More informationTrade and Development Board Sixty-first session. Geneva, September 2014
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT Trade and Development Board Sixty-first session Geneva, 15 26 September 2014 Item 3: High-level segment Tackling inequality through trade and development:
More informationSTOXX EMERGING MARKETS INDICES. UNDERSTANDA RULES-BA EMERGING MARK TRANSPARENT SIMPLE
STOXX Limited STOXX EMERGING MARKETS INDICES. EMERGING MARK RULES-BA TRANSPARENT UNDERSTANDA SIMPLE MARKET CLASSIF INTRODUCTION. Many investors are seeking to embrace emerging market investments, because
More informationMINIMUM WAGES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES: BACK TO THE FUTURE?
Paris, 20 October 2017 MINIMUM WAGES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES: BACK TO THE FUTURE? Andrea Garnero Economist Employment, Labour and Social Affairs OECD A widespread (but heterogenous) wage setting institution
More informationMMGPI 2016 Outcomes. Dr David Knox Senior Partner, Mercer
Editions 2016 Top 3 Rankings MMGPI 2016 Outcomes Dr David Knox Senior Partner, Mercer Every retirement system is different! Insurance Private Public Pensions DC Indexation Assets RETIREMENT INCOME SYSTEMS
More informationRecommendation of the Council on Tax Avoidance and Evasion
Recommendation of the Council on Tax Avoidance and Evasion OECD Legal Instruments This document is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. It reproduces an OECD Legal Instrument
More informationIntroduction to Public Finance
Introduction to Public Finance Lecture 2: Functions and size of the welfare state. Retirement, unemployment protection, health care, etc. Welfare expenditures, aging problem. 1 Outline of the lecture Basic
More informationOutlook Overview: OECD Countries UN LINK Conference, Bangkok October, 2009
Outlook Overview: OECD Countries UN LINK Conference, Bangkok 26 28 October, 2009 Dave Turner OECD, Economics Department OECD Outlook: Outline 1. Recovery underway but will probably be slow 2. Risks and
More informationPrivate pensions. A growing role. Who has a private pension?
Private pensions A growing role Private pensions play an important and growing role in providing for old age in OECD countries. In 11 of them Australia, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico, Norway, Poland,
More informationBETTER POLICIES FOR A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
BETTER POLICIES FOR A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY Rintaro Tamaki Deputy Secretary-General, OECD International Forum for Sustainable Asia and the Pacific (ISAP)1 Yokohama, July 1 Four
More informationGuide to Treatment of Withholding Tax Rates. January 2018
Guide to Treatment of Withholding Tax Rates Contents 1. Introduction 1 1.1. Aims of the Guide 1 1.2. Withholding Tax Definition 1 1.3. Double Taxation Treaties 1 1.4. Information Sources 1 1.5. Guide Upkeep
More informationTAXATION OF TRUSTS IN ISRAEL. An Opportunity For Foreign Residents. Dr. Avi Nov
TAXATION OF TRUSTS IN ISRAEL An Opportunity For Foreign Residents Dr. Avi Nov Short Bio Dr. Avi Nov is an Israeli lawyer who represents taxpayers, individuals and entities. Areas of Practice: Tax Law,
More informationPromoting Industrialisation in SADC through Quality Infrastructure SADC Industrialisation Week 2017
Promoting Industrialisation in SADC through Quality Infrastructure SADC Industrialisation Week 2017 Iza Lejárraga, Head of Investment Policy Linkages Unit Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
More informationLA SOSTENIBILITÀ E L ADEGUATEZZA DEI SISTEMI PENSIONISTICI NEI PAESI OCSE
LA SOSTENIBILITÀ E L ADEGUATEZZA DEI SISTEMI PENSIONISTICI NEI PAESI OCSE Anna Cristina D ADDIO Social Policy Division, OECD http://www.oecd.org/els/social/pensions CONFERENZA FINALE del progetto IESS
More informationIndicator B3 How much public and private investment in education is there?
Education at a Glance 2014 OECD indicators 2014 Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators For more information on Education at a Glance 2014 and to access the full set of Indicators, visit www.oecd.org/edu/eag.htm.
More informationSummary of key findings
1 VAT/GST treatment of cross-border services: 2017 survey Supplies of e-services to consumers (B2C) (see footnote 1) Supplies of e-services to businesses (B2B) 1(a). Is a non-resident 1(b). If there is
More informationTHE BENEFITS OF EXPANDING THE ROLE OF WOMEN AND YOUTH IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
G7 International Forum for Empowering Women and Youth in the Agriculture and Food Systems THE BENEFITS OF EXPANDING THE ROLE OF WOMEN AND YOUTH IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES Randall S. Jones Head, Japan/Korea
More informationMajor Trends in Pension Reforms. Ambrogio Rinaldi Director, COVIP, Italy Chair, OECD Working Party on Private Pensions
Major Trends in Pension Reforms Ambrogio Rinaldi Director, COVIP, Italy Chair, OECD Working Party on Private Pensions 6th Global Pension & Savings Conference the World Bank - Washington, DC April 2-3,
More informationStatistical Annex. Sources and definitions
Statistical Annex Sources and definitions Most of the statistics shown in these tables can also be found in two other (paper or electronic) publication and data repository, as follows: The annual edition
More informationPension Markets. Pension fund assets hit record USD 20.1 trillion in 2011 but investment performance weakens IN THIS ISSUE. September 2012, Issue 9
Pension Markets September 2012, Issue 9 IN THIS ISSUE PERFORMANCE OF PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT RATE OF RETURN PAGE 2 PENSION FUND WEALTH PAGE 3 INDUSTRY STRUCTURE PAGE 5 TRENDS IN PENSION FUND ASSETS PAGE
More information17 January 2019 Japan Laurence Boone OECD Chief Economist
Fiscal challenges and inclusive growth in ageing societies 17 January 219 Japan Laurence Boone OECD Chief Economist G2 populations are ageing rapidly Expected life expectancy at age 65 198 215 26 Japan
More information8-Jun-06 Personal Income Top Marginal Tax Rate,
8-Jun-06 Personal Income Top Marginal Tax Rate, 1975-2005 2005 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 Australia 47% 47% 47% 47% 47% 47% 47% 47% 47% 47% 47% 48% 49% 49% Austria
More informationIMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE. 6th IMF-Japan High-Level Tax Conference For Asian Countries Tokyo; April 7, 2015
IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE 6th IMF-Japan High-Level Tax Conference For Asian Countries Tokyo; April 7, 2015 Outline Measurement and trends Some key methods and issues Managing compliance Supporting compliance
More informationFinancing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2018
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2018 an oecd scoreboard Highlights Background information Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2018 contributes to filling the knowledge gap in SME finance trends and conditions.
More informationTAX REFORM TRENDS IN OECD COUNTRIES
TAX REFORM TRENDS IN OECD COUNTRIES INTRODUCTION Over the last two decades almost all OECD countries have made major structural changes to their tax systems. In the case of the personal and corporate income
More informationEQUITY REPORTING & WITHHOLDING. Updated May 2016
EQUITY REPORTING & WITHHOLDING Updated May 2016 When you exercise stock options or have RSUs lapse, there may be tax implications in any country in which you worked for P&G during the period from the
More informationInternational Statistical Release
International Statistical Release This release and additional tables of international statistics are available on efama s website (www.efama.org). Worldwide Regulated Open-ended Fund Assets and Flows Trends
More informationHOW MUCH REDISTRIBUTION DO WELFARE STATES ACHIEVE? THE ROLE OF CASH TRANSFERS AND HOUSEHOLD TAXES
David Paul Carr Mediakoo HOW MUCH REDISTRIBUTION DO WELFARE STATES ACHIEVE? THE ROLE OF CASH TRANSFERS AND HOUSEHOLD TAXES MICHAEL FÖRSTER* AND PETER WHITEFORD** Introduction Government policies in all
More informationPlan: Reform Strategy - Bermuda Experience. Caribbean Conference on Health lhfinancing Initiatives
National Health Plan: Evidence & Reform Strategy - Bermuda Experience Caribbean Conference on Health lhfinancing i Initiatives J Attride-Stirling, PhD Chief Executive Officer 23 rd November 2011 Overview
More informationDoes One Law Fit All? Cross-Country Evidence on Okun s Law
Does One Law Fit All? Cross-Country Evidence on Okun s Law Laurence Ball Johns Hopkins University Global Labor Markets Workshop Paris, September 1-2, 2016 1 What the paper does and why Provides estimates
More informationTAXATION (IMPLEMENTATION) (CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS) (AMENDMENT OF REGULATIONS No. 3) (JERSEY) ORDER 2017
Taxation (Implementation) (Convention on Mutual Regulations No. 3) (Jersey) Order 2017 Article 1 TAXATION (IMPLEMENTATION) (CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS) (AMENDMENT OF
More informationSources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2014
FISCAL FACT Nov. 2014 No. 443 Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2014 By Kyle Pomerleau Economist Key Findings OECD countries rely heavily on consumption taxes, such as the value added tax, and
More informationREVERSE MORTGAGES: A TOOL TO IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE ELDERLY? A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
REVERSE MORTGAGES: A TOOL TO IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE ELDERLY? A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE Anna Cristina D ADDIO (OECD, Social Policy Division) http://www.oecd.org/els/public-pensions/ ICPM-CRR Discussion
More informationStatistical annex. Sources and definitions
Statistical annex Sources and definitions Most of the statistics shown in these tables can be found as well in several other (paper or electronic) publications or references, as follows: the annual edition
More informationBurden of Taxation: International Comparisons
Burden of Taxation: International Comparisons Standard Note: SN/EP/3235 Last updated: 15 October 2008 Author: Bryn Morgan Economic Policy & Statistics Section This note presents data comparing the national
More informationPREDICTING VEHICLE SALES FROM GDP
UMTRI--6 FEBRUARY PREDICTING VEHICLE SALES FROM GDP IN 8 COUNTRIES: - MICHAEL SIVAK PREDICTING VEHICLE SALES FROM GDP IN 8 COUNTRIES: - Michael Sivak The University of Michigan Transportation Research
More informationBULGARIAN TRADE WITH EU IN THE PERIOD JANUARY - APRIL 2017 (PRELIMINARY DATA)
BULGARIAN TRADE WITH EU IN THE PERIOD JANUARY - APRIL 2017 (PRELIMINARY DATA) In the period January - April 2017 Bulgarian exports to the EU increased by 8.6% 2016 and amounted to 10 418.6 Million BGN
More informationBULGARIAN TRADE WITH EU IN THE PERIOD JANUARY - MAY 2017 (PRELIMINARY DATA)
BULGARIAN TRADE WITH EU IN THE PERIOD JANUARY - MAY 2017 (PRELIMINARY DATA) In the period January - May 2017 Bulgarian exports to the EU increased by 10.8% 2016 and added up to 13 283.0 Million BGN (Annex,
More informationInternational Statistical Release
International Statistical Release This release and additional tables of international statistics are available on efama s website (www.efama.org). wide Regulated Open-ended Fund Assets and Flows Trends
More information2013 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION AND THIRD POST-PROGRAM MONITORING DISCUSSIONS
August 2013 IMF Country Report No. 13/257 ICELAND 2013 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION AND THIRD POST-PROGRAM MONITORING DISCUSSIONS Selected Issues This paper on Iceland was prepared by a staff team of the International
More informationRecommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle
Recommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle OECD Legal Instruments This document is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. It reproduces
More informationSources of Government Revenue across the OECD, 2015
FISCAL FACT Apr. 2015 No. 465 Sources of Government Revenue across the OECD, 2015 By Kyle Pomerleau Economist Key Findings OECD countries rely heavily on consumption taxes, such as the value added tax,
More informationThe Case for Fundamental Tax Reform: Overview of the Current Tax System
The Case for Fundamental Tax Reform: Overview of the Current Tax System Sources of Federal Receipts Projected for 2016 Excise Taxes 2.9% Estate & Gift Taxes 0.6% Corporate Income Taxes 9.8% Other Taxes
More informationAlternative measures of well-being
Alternative measures of well-being Marco Mira d Ercole marco.mira@oecd.org OECD Social Policy Division www.oecd.org/els/social Joint work of the OECD Economics Department, the OECD Employment, Labour and
More informationCurrent Challenges in Revenue Mobilization: Improving Tax Compliance. CEPAL Regional Tax Seminar March 10, 2015
Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization: Improving Tax Compliance CEPAL Regional Tax Seminar March 10, 2015 Outline Recent trends in tax compliance Understanding and addressing noncompliance The hard-to-tax
More informationThe Agenda for Structural Reform in Europe
The Agenda for Structural Reform in Europe Antonio Fatás INSEAD Abstract: This paper reviews, from a macroeconomic point of view, the agenda for structural reforms in Europe. Structural reforms have been
More informationHEALTH LABOUR MARKET TRENDS IN OECD COUNTRIES
HEALTH LABOUR MARKET TRENDS IN OECD COUNTRIES Michael Schoenstein, OECD Health Division 3 rd Global Health Workforce Alliance Forum Recife, 11 November 2013 Main health labour market issues in OECD countries
More informationRev. Proc Implementation of Nonresident Alien Deposit Interest Regulations
Rev. Proc. 2012-24 Implementation of Nonresident Alien Deposit Interest Regulations SECTION 1. PURPOSE Sections 1.6049-4(b)(5) and 1.6049-8 of the Income Tax Regulations, as revised by TD 9584, require
More informationAging, the Future of Work and Sustainability of Pension System
Aging, the Future of Work and Sustainability of Pension System WKÖ & Salzburg Global Seminar Event Dénes Kucsera Agenda Austria Vienna, Austria November 5, 2015 Introduction Increasing pressure on the
More informationOECD releases first annual peer review report on Action 5
5 December 2017 Global Tax Alert OECD releases first annual peer review report on Action 5 EY Global Tax Alert Library Access both online and pdf versions of all EY Global Tax Alerts. Copy into your web
More informationHealth Systems Efficiency after the Crisis in the OECD
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics Health Systems Efficiency after the Crisis in the OECD
More informationActuarial Supply & Demand. By i.e. muhanna. i.e. muhanna Page 1 of
By i.e. muhanna i.e. muhanna Page 1 of 8 040506 Additional Perspectives Measuring actuarial supply and demand in terms of GDP is indeed a valid basis for setting the actuarial density of a country and
More informationGrowth in OECD Unit Labour Costs slows to 0.4% in the third quarter of 2016
Growth in OECD Unit Labour Costs slows to.4% in the third quarter of 26 Growth in unit labour costs (ULCs) in the OECD area slowed to.4% in the third quarter of 26 (compared with.6% in the previous quarter)
More informationLondon School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Affording Our Future Conference Wellington, December, 2012
How and why has health system spending grown and how does the system need to adapt to remain sustainable in the face of long term health conditions? Nicholas Mays London School of Hygiene and Tropical
More informationWays to increase employment
Ways to increase employment Iceland Luxembourg Spain Canada Italy Norway Denmark Germany Portugal Ireland Japan Belgium Switzerland Austria Slovenia United States New Zealand Finland France Netherlands
More informationChapter 8.C Agricultural Production Targeting
Chapter 8.C Agricultural Production Targeting Zekarias Hussein, Robert A. McDougall, Badri Narayanan G., Iman Haqiqi 8.C.1 Background Agricultural production targeting is a procedure applied to certain
More information10% 10% 15% 15% Caseload: WE. 15% Caseload: SS 10% 10% 15%
Percentchangeincaseload 15% 10% 5% 0% 5% 10% 15% Caseload: AO 0 1 2 3 4 5 Percentchangein caseload 15% 10% 5% 0% 5% 10% 15% Caseload: NC 0 1 2 3 4 5 Years Years Percentchangein caseload 15% 10% 5% 0% 5%
More informationInternational Statistical Release
International Statistical Release This release and additional tables of international statistics are available on efama s website (www.efama.org). Worldwide Investment Fund Assets and Flows Trends in the
More information