At a cost-minimizing input mix, the MRTS (ratio of marginal products) must equal the ratio of factor prices, or. f r

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "At a cost-minimizing input mix, the MRTS (ratio of marginal products) must equal the ratio of factor prices, or. f r"

Transcription

1 ECON 311 NAME: KEY Fall Quarter, 2011 Prof. Hamilton Final Exam 200 points 1. (30 points). A firm in Los Angeles produes rubber gaskets using labor, L, and apital, K, aording to a prodution funtion Q = f(l,k). The wage rate for labor is w and the rental rate for apital is r. (a) Write out (or desribe in words) the ondition whih must hold at a ost-minimizing input mix. Briefly provide intuition on why this must be so. Show this outome on a diagram. K K US K C Q = Q 0 L US L C L At a ost-minimizing input mix, the MRTS (ratio of marginal produts) must equal the ratio of fator pries, or fl w f r K fl fk This implies that the marginal produt per dollar is equated aross eah fator of prodution,. w r fl fk If this were not the ase (say if ) then the firm ould lower its osts by alloating less w r dollars to the less produtive fator (apital) and more dollars to the more produtive fator (labor). (b) Suppose the firm an produe rubber gaskets in Mexio. The rental rate on apital is the same in Mexio as it is in Los Angeles, but the wage rate in Mexio is 10 times lower than in Los Angeles (i.e., r M = r LA and w M < w LA ). Show on your diagram how the ost-minimizing input mix differs for Mexio and Los Angeles for a given level of output.

2 2. (30 points). A onsumer derives utility uxy (, ) from onsuming two goods (X and Y) whose pries are P X and P Y. She has a fixed inome of $I. Draw a 2-panel diagram that shows demands for eah good, X* and Y*, at an initial level of pries and inome in the upper panel and a point on the demand funtion for X* at the initial prie level in the lower panel. Suppose the prie of good X dereases from P 0 X to P 1 X < P 0 X. Carefully label the inome effet and substitution effet of the prie hange for good X in the upper panel of your diagram. In the lower panel of your diagram, draw the ordinary demand urve and the ompensated demand urve assoiated with eah indifferene urve. Carefully label the regions in the lower panel of your diagram that represent ompensating variation, equivalent variation, and the hange in onsumer surplus. Y I = P x 0 X + P y Y I = P x 1 X + P y Y U 1 U 0 SE IE X 0 * = X 0 * X $/X P x 0 P x 1 X * (Px, Py*, I*) X (Px, Py*, U 0 *) X 0 * = X 0 * X Compensating variation (CV) is the yellow-shaded region, the hange in onsumer surplus is the sum of the yellow-shaded region and the blue-shaded region.

3 3. (20 points). TRUE, FALSE, EXPLAIN. For eah of the following, state whether you think the answer is true or false, then bak up your answer with a brief 1-2 sentene disussion. (a) (10 points) Andy has the utility funtion U 4X 2 Y. Andy likes the bundle (X,Y) = (2,4) twie as muh as the bundle (1,1) FALSE. Utility funtions are ordinal, not ardinal, and this means the atual utility value assoiated with any bundle is meaningless. Andy prefers (2,4) to (1,1), beause U(2,4) = 12 is greater than U(1,1) = 6, but we annot say he prefers the bundle twie as muh. (b) (10 points) The indifferene urves for an individual with rational preferenes annot interset. Support your answer with a diagram. TRUE. Interseting indifferene urves are not onsistent with rational preferenes. To see this, onsider the following figure. In the figure, there is more of both X and Y at point C than at point B. Therefore C is preferred to B by non-satiation. However, by the definition of indifferene urve U 1, B ~ A, and by the definition of indifferene urve U 2, C ~ A. Therefore, by transitivity, B ~ C whih ontradits rational preferenes. Y A B C U 2 U 1 X* Quantity of X

4 4. (50 points) A firm produes in an industry with the prodution funtion Q K L where input pries for apital and labor are given by r = $1 and w = $2, respetively. (a) (20 points) Find the supply funtion, Q(p), in the ase where both inputs are variable inputs. Firm s Problem (FP): min. C = wl + rk s.t. Q K L = 2L + K + [Q - K L 0.5 ] FOC: (1) d /dl = 2 - L -0.5 = 0 (2) d /dk = 1 - K -0.5 = 0 (3) d /d = Q - K L 0.5 = 0 From (1), (2) (K/L) 0.5 = 2 K = 4L whih means the firm should employ 4 times as muh Capital as Labor inputs at the ost-minimizing input mix. Substituting K =4L into the prodution funtion, we find Q = (4L) L 0.5 = 2L L 0.5 Q = 3L 0.5 => L*(y) = (Q/3) 2 K* = 4L* K*(y) = 4(Q/3) 2 The ost funtion is: (Q) = 2L*(y) + K*(y) = 2(Q/3) 2 + 4(Q/3) 2 = 6(Q/3) 2 => (Q) = (2/3)Q 2 Supply solves the profit maximization problem for the ompetitive firm: = pq (2/3)Q 2 FOC: =p 4/3Q = 0 => Q(p) = 3p/4

5 (b) (10 points) Does this prodution funtion exhibit inreasing, dereasing, or onstant returns to sale? Suppose we started with K=1 and L=1 and then quadrupled the use of eah fator. Would output quadruple? With K=1, L=1: Q = = 2. With K = L = 4: Q = = 4 Output doubles with a fourfold inrease in both fators, so the prodution funtion is haraterized by dereasing returns to sale. () (10 points) Suppose that the market prie is p = $20. Find the optimal output level, Q*. Calulate the firm s average ost at Q* and the equilibrium profit level in a ompetitive market. AC = (Q)/Q = 2Q/3 = 2(15)/3 = $10 If p = $20, Q* = 3(20)/4 => Q* = 15 units Profit, in equilibrium, is: * = 20(15) (2/3)(15) 2 = 15[20 2(15)/3] => * = $150 (d) (10 points) Provide a diagram that shows marginal ost, average ost, the market prie, and profit. Shade the region that represents profit. $/Q P* =$20 MC profit AC AC* = 10 Q* =15 Quantity (Q)

6 5. (40 points). Suppose Mark Jaobs and Prada ompete in a Cournot duopoly market for handbags. Consumers onsider Mark Jaobs and Prada handbags to be perfet substitutes and inverse demand for handbags is P = 1,200 2Q, where Q = q M + q P is the total quantity of handbags produed by both firms. Suppose Mark Jaobs has the ost funtion (q M ) = 100q M and Prada has the ost funtion (q P ) = 200q P. (a) (15 points) Calulate the reation funtions, q M R and q P R. Mark Jaob s Profit: M = [1200 2q M 2q P ]q M 100q M FOC: d M /dq M = q M 2q P 100 = 0 Reation funtion: q R M = q P Prada's Profit: P = [1200 2q M 2q P ]q P 200q P FOC: d P /dq P = q M 4q P 200 = 0 Reation funtion: q R P = q M (b) (10 points) Show the equilibrium quantity of handbags produed by eah firm as the intersetion of two reation funtions on a graph. q M 500 q P R 275 q M * =200 Cournot equilibrium q M R q P * = q P

7 () (15 points) Find the equilibrium quantity of handbags produed in a Cournot duopoly. What is the market prie of handbags in a Cournot duopoly? Cournot equilibrium is the intersetion of the reation funtions. q M = [ q M ] = q M => (3/4)q M = 150 => q M * = 200 Plugging this bak into Prada's reation funtion: q P = q M = (200) => q P * = 150 Market prie: P* = Q* = (q M * + q P *) = (350) => P* = $500 Mark Jaob s Profit: M *= $500(200) 100(200) => M *= $80,000 Prada's Profit: P *= $500(150) 200(150) => M *= $45, (30 points) Pete Rose is seen to plae an all-or-nothing $100,000 bet on the Raiders to win the AFC West in 2011; that is, if the Raiders win the AFC West, Pete Rose wins $100,000 and if the Raiders do not win the AFC West, Pete will lose $100,000). If Pete has a logarithmi utility-of-wealth funtion, um ( ) ln( m), and his urrent wealth is $1,000,000, what must he believe is the minimum probability that the Raider win the AFC West? (Round all answers to 2 deimal plaes.) Pete must reeive greater expeted utility from the bet than his utility level from not plaing any bet at all. If he does not bet, his utility is: um ( ) ln(1, 000, 000) If Pete bets, he will have either $1,100,000 or $900,000 in wealth, depending on the outome of the bet. His expeted utility is: Eum ( ( )) p ln(1,100, 000) (1 p) ln(900, 000) p (1 p) p Beause Pete is seen to make the bet, Pete must believe that p > 13.82, or p>0.55. THE END. HAVE A GOOD WINTER BREAK!

Problem Set 8 Topic BI: Externalities. a) What is the profit-maximizing level of output?

Problem Set 8 Topic BI: Externalities. a) What is the profit-maximizing level of output? Problem Set 8 Topi BI: Externalities 1. Suppose that a polluting firm s private osts are given by TC(x) = 4x + (1/100)x 2. Eah unit of output the firm produes results in external osts (pollution osts)

More information

ECON 311 Winter Quarter, 2010 NAME: KEY Prof. Hamilton

ECON 311 Winter Quarter, 2010 NAME: KEY Prof. Hamilton ECON 311 Winter Quarter, 2010 NAME: KEY Prof. Hamilton FINAL EXAM 200 points 1. (30 points). A firm produces rubber gaskets using labor, L, and capital, K, according to a production function Q = f(l,k).

More information

Economics 2202 (Section 05) Macroeconomic Theory Practice Problem Set 3 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Fall 2014

Economics 2202 (Section 05) Macroeconomic Theory Practice Problem Set 3 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Fall 2014 Department of Eonomis Boston College Eonomis 2202 (Setion 05) Maroeonomi Theory Pratie Problem Set 3 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Fall 2014 1. Interation of Consumption Tax and Wage Tax.

More information

Importantly, note that prices are not functions of the expenditure on advertising that firm 1 makes during the first period.

Importantly, note that prices are not functions of the expenditure on advertising that firm 1 makes during the first period. ECONS 44 STRATEGY AND GAME THEORY HOMEWORK #4 ANSWER KEY Exerise - Chapter 6 Watson Solving by bakward indution:. We start from the seond stage of the game where both firms ompete in pries. Sine market

More information

Economics 602 Macroeconomic Theory and Policy Problem Set 4 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Summer 2010

Economics 602 Macroeconomic Theory and Policy Problem Set 4 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Summer 2010 Department of Applied Eonomis Johns Hopkins University Eonomis 6 Maroeonomi Theory and Poliy Prolem Set 4 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Summer Optimal Choie in the Consumption-Savings Model

More information

IS-LM model. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo Macro refresh course Economics PhD 2012/13

IS-LM model. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo Macro refresh course Economics PhD 2012/13 IS-LM model Giovanni Di Bartolomeo giovanni.dibartolomeo@uniroma.it Note: These leture notes are inomplete without having attended letures IS Curve Giovanni Di Bartolomeo giovanni.dibartolomeo@uniroma.it

More information

Econ 455 Answers - Problem Set Consider a small country (Belgium) with the following demand and supply curves for cloth:

Econ 455 Answers - Problem Set Consider a small country (Belgium) with the following demand and supply curves for cloth: Spring 000 Eon 455 Harvey Lapan Eon 455 Answers - Problem Set 4 1. Consider a small ountry (Belgium) with the following demand and supply urves for loth: Supply = 3P ; Demand = 60 3P Assume Belgium an

More information

Economics 325 Intermediate Macroeconomic Analysis Practice Problem Set 1 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Spring 2011

Economics 325 Intermediate Macroeconomic Analysis Practice Problem Set 1 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Spring 2011 Department of Eonomis Universit of Marland Eonomis 35 Intermediate Maroeonomi Analsis Pratie Problem Set Suggested Solutions Professor Sanja Chugh Spring 0. Partial Derivatives. For eah of the following

More information

Lecture 7: The Theory of Demand. Where does demand come from? What factors influence choice? A simple model of choice

Lecture 7: The Theory of Demand. Where does demand come from? What factors influence choice? A simple model of choice Leture : The Theory of Demand Leture : The he Theory of Demand Readings: Chapter 9 Where does demand ome from? Sarity enourages rational deision-maing over household onsumption hoies. Rational hoie leads

More information

ECON 311 Fall Quarter, 2009 NAME: Prof. Hamilton. FINAL EXAM 200 points

ECON 311 Fall Quarter, 2009 NAME: Prof. Hamilton. FINAL EXAM 200 points ECON 311 Fall Quarter, 2009 NAME: Prof. Hamilton FINAL EXAM 200 points 1. (30 points). Consider two ways for the government to collect tax revenue: a sales tax of on clothes, or an income tax. If you currently

More information

Historical Cost Accual cash outlay when the produce was purchased. Use mainly for tax purposes and SEC filings.

Historical Cost Accual cash outlay when the produce was purchased. Use mainly for tax purposes and SEC filings. Historia Cost Aua ash outay hen the produe as purhased. Use mainy for tax purposes and SEC fiings. Current Costs Amount that oud be paid under prevaiing market onditions. Repaement ost The amount it takes

More information

CONSUMPTION-LABOR FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 19, (aka CONSUMPTION-LEISURE FRAMEWORK) THE THREE MACRO (AGGREGATE) MARKETS. The Three Macro Markets

CONSUMPTION-LABOR FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 19, (aka CONSUMPTION-LEISURE FRAMEWORK) THE THREE MACRO (AGGREGATE) MARKETS. The Three Macro Markets CONSUMPTION-LABOR FRAMEWORK (aka CONSUMPTION-LEISURE FRAMEWORK) SEPTEMBER 19, 2011 The Three Maro Markets THE THREE MACRO (AGGREGATE) MARKETS Goods Markets P Labor Markets Finanial/Capital/Savings/Asset

More information

CONSUMPTION-LEISURE FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 THE THREE MACRO (AGGREGATE) MARKETS. The Three Macro Markets. Goods Markets.

CONSUMPTION-LEISURE FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 THE THREE MACRO (AGGREGATE) MARKETS. The Three Macro Markets. Goods Markets. CONSUMPTION-LEISURE FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 The Three Maro Markets THE THREE MACRO (AGGREGATE) MARKETS Goods Markets P Labor Markets Capital/Savings/Funds/Asset Markets interest rate labor Will put

More information

Asymmetric Integration *

Asymmetric Integration * Fung and Shneider, International Journal of Applied Eonomis, (, September 005, 8-0 8 Asymmetri Integration * K.C. Fung and Patriia Higino Shneider University of California, Santa Cruz and Mount Holyoke

More information

Output and Expenditure

Output and Expenditure 2 Output and Expenditure We begin with stati models of the real eonomy at the aggregate level, abstrating from money, pries, international linkages and eonomi growth. Our ausal perspetive depends on what

More information

Econ 110: Introduction to Economic Theory. 10th Class 2/11/11

Econ 110: Introduction to Economic Theory. 10th Class 2/11/11 Econ 110: Introduction to Economic Theory 10th Class 2/11/11 go over practice problems second of three lectures on producer theory Last time we showed the first type of constraint operating on the firm:

More information

Licensing and Patent Protection

Licensing and Patent Protection Kennesaw State University DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University Faulty Publiations 00 Liensing and Patent Protetion Arijit Mukherjee University of Nottingham Aniruddha Baghi Kennesaw State University,

More information

Class Notes: Week 6. Multinomial Outcomes

Class Notes: Week 6. Multinomial Outcomes Ronald Hek Class Notes: Week 6 1 Class Notes: Week 6 Multinomial Outomes For the next ouple of weeks or so, we will look at models where there are more than two ategories of outomes. Multinomial logisti

More information

This article attempts to narrow the gap between

This article attempts to narrow the gap between Evan F. Koenig Senior Eonomist and Poliy Advisor Rethinking the IS in IS LM: Adapting Keynesian Tools to Non-Keynesian Eonomies Part 1 This artile attempts to narrow the gap between two maroeonomi paradigms

More information

TOTAL PART 1 / 50 TOTAL PART 2 / 50

TOTAL PART 1 / 50 TOTAL PART 2 / 50 Department of Eonomis University of Maryland Eonomis 35 Intermediate Maroeonomi Analysis Midterm Exam Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Fall 009 NAME: Eah problem s total number of points is shown

More information

Economics 001 Principles of Microeconomics

Economics 001 Principles of Microeconomics Eonomis 001 riniples of Miroeonomis Leture 9 household hoie budgets indifferene urves MRS demand again rofessor Arik Levinson Moving from point B to point A, right and down the (straight line) demand urve

More information

Market Size, Trade, and Productivity Melitz and Ottaviano. Felix Bausch

Market Size, Trade, and Productivity Melitz and Ottaviano. Felix Bausch Market Size, Trade, and Produtivity Meitz and Ottaviano Feix Baush 06.07.2012 Overview 1. Genera features of the mode 2. The osed eonomy 3. The open eonomy two ountries 4. Trade iberaization shemes 5.

More information

Say you have $X today and can earn an annual interest rate r by investing it. Let FV denote the future value of your investment and t = time.

Say you have $X today and can earn an annual interest rate r by investing it. Let FV denote the future value of your investment and t = time. Same as with Labor Supply, maximizing utility in the ontext of intertemporal hoies is IDEN- TICAL to what we ve been doing, just with a different budget onstraint. Present and Future Value Say you have

More information

FOREST CITY INDUSTRIAL PARK FIN AN CIAL RETURNS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FOREST CITY INDUSTRIAL PARK FIN AN CIAL RETURNS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOREST CITY INDUSTRIAL PARK FIN AN CIAL RETURNS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The City of London is engagedl in industrial land development for the sole purpose of fostering eonomi growth. The dynamis of industrial

More information

Contending with Risk Selection in Competitive Health Insurance Markets

Contending with Risk Selection in Competitive Health Insurance Markets This paper is prepared for presentation at the leture, Sikness Fund Compensation and Risk Seletion at the annual meeting of the Verein für Soialpolitik, Bonn, Germany September 29, 2005. September 19,

More information

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES. No MARKET SIZE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND INCOME INEQUALITY. Kristian Behrens, Dmitry Pokrovsky and Evgeny Zhelobodko

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES. No MARKET SIZE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND INCOME INEQUALITY. Kristian Behrens, Dmitry Pokrovsky and Evgeny Zhelobodko DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES No. 9831 MARKET SIZE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND INCOME INEQUALITY Kristian Behrens, Dmitry Pokrovsky and Evgeny Zhelobodko INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS ABCD www.epr.org

More information

Open Math in Economics MA National Convention 2017 For each question, E) NOTA indicates that none of the above answers is correct.

Open Math in Economics MA National Convention 2017 For each question, E) NOTA indicates that none of the above answers is correct. For each question, E) NOTA indicates that none of the above answers is correct. For questions 1 through 13: Consider a market with a single firm. We will try to help that firm maximize its profits. The

More information

GS/ECON 5010 Answers to Assignment 3 November 2005

GS/ECON 5010 Answers to Assignment 3 November 2005 GS/ECON 5010 Answers to Assignment November 005 Q1. What are the market price, and aggregate quantity sold, in long run equilibrium in a perfectly competitive market for which the demand function has the

More information

Dynamic Pricing of Di erentiated Products

Dynamic Pricing of Di erentiated Products Dynami Priing of Di erentiated Produts Rossitsa Kotseva and Nikolaos Vettas August 6, 006 Abstrat We examine the dynami priing deision of a rm faing random demand while selling a xed stok of two di erentiated

More information

Microeconomics I - Midterm

Microeconomics I - Midterm Microeconomics I - Midterm Undergraduate Degree in Business Administration and Economics April 11, 2013-2 hours Catarina Reis Marta Francisco, Francisca Rebelo, João Sousa Please answer each group in a

More information

CHAPTER 9 BUDGETARY PLANNING SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS BY STUDY OBJECTIVES AND BLOOM S TAXONOMY. True-False Statements. Multiple Choice Questions

CHAPTER 9 BUDGETARY PLANNING SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS BY STUDY OBJECTIVES AND BLOOM S TAXONOMY. True-False Statements. Multiple Choice Questions HTER 9 BUDGETARY PLANNING SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS BY STUDY OBJETIVES AND BLOOM S TAXONOMY Item SO BT Item SO BT Item SO BT Item SO BT 4 6 6 6 1 11. 11. 114. 11. 116. 117. 118. 119. 10. 11. 1. 1. 14. 1. 16.

More information

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of the Credit Channel

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of the Credit Channel Optimal Monetary Poliy in a Model of the Credit Channel Fiorella De Fiore European Central Bank Oreste Tristani y European Central Bank 9 July 8 Preliminary and Inomplete Abstrat We onsider a simple extension

More information

ARTICLE IN PRESS. Journal of Health Economics xxx (2011) xxx xxx. Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect. Journal of Health Economics

ARTICLE IN PRESS. Journal of Health Economics xxx (2011) xxx xxx. Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect. Journal of Health Economics Journal of Health Eonomis xxx (20) xxx xxx Contents lists available at SiVerse SieneDiret Journal of Health Eonomis j ourna l ho me page: www.elsevier.om/loate/eonbase Optimal publi rationing and prie

More information

Market Power Rents and Climate Change Mitigation. A Rationale for Export Taxes on Coal? Philipp M. Richter, Roman Mendelevitch, Frank Jotzo

Market Power Rents and Climate Change Mitigation. A Rationale for Export Taxes on Coal? Philipp M. Richter, Roman Mendelevitch, Frank Jotzo Market Power Rents and Climate Change Mitigation A Rationale for Export Taxes on Coal? Philipp M. Rihter, Roman Mendelevith, Frank Jotzo Roman Mendelevith 9 th Trans-Atlanti Infraday, FERC, Washington

More information

0NDERZOEKSRAPPORT NR TAXES, DEBT AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES C. VAN HULLE. Wettelijk Depot : D/1986/2376/4

0NDERZOEKSRAPPORT NR TAXES, DEBT AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES C. VAN HULLE. Wettelijk Depot : D/1986/2376/4 0NDERZOEKSRAPPORT NR. 8603 TAXES, DEBT AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES BY C. VAN HULLE Wettelijk Depot : D/1986/2376/4 TAXES, DEBT AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES Muh lending and borrowing is indiret : finanial

More information

Research Article The Real Causes of Inflation

Research Article The Real Causes of Inflation Current Researh Journal of Eonomi Theory 7(1): 1-10, 2015 ISSN: 2042-4841, e-issn: 2042-485X 2015 Maxwell Sientifi Publiation Corp. Submitted: Otober 12, 2014 Aepted: January 27, 2015 Published: May 20,

More information

Source versus Residence Based Taxation with International Mergers and Acquisitions

Source versus Residence Based Taxation with International Mergers and Acquisitions Soure versus Residene Based Taxation with International Mergers and Aquisitions Johannes Beker Clemens Fuest CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2854 CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE NOVEMBER 2009 An eletroni version of

More information

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of the Credit Channel

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of the Credit Channel Optimal Monetary Poliy in a Model of the Credit Channel Fiorella De Fiore y European Central Bank Oreste Tristani z European Central Bank 9 September 2008 First draft Abstrat We onsider a simple extension

More information

Bidding for network size

Bidding for network size MPRA Munih Personal RePE Arhive Bidding for network size Renaud Fouart and Jana Friedrihsen Humboldt University, Berlin, BERA and BCCP, DIW, Berlin, Humboldt University, Berlin, BERA and BCCP 21 June 2016

More information

Indicate the answer choice that best completes the statement or answers the question.

Indicate the answer choice that best completes the statement or answers the question. Indiate the answer hoie that best ompletes the statement or answers the question. Find the unit rate of 18 teaspoons for 3 ups. a) 6 teaspoons/up b) 15 teaspoons/up ) 54 teaspoons/up d) 18 teaspoons/up

More information

Economics 431 Final Exam 200 Points. Answer each of the questions below. Round off values to one decimal place where necessary.

Economics 431 Final Exam 200 Points. Answer each of the questions below. Round off values to one decimal place where necessary. Fall 009 Name KEY Economics 431 Final Exam 00 Points Answer each of the questions below. Round off values to one decimal place where necessary. Question 1. Think (30 points) In an ideal socialist system,

More information

14.02 Principles of Macroeconomics Quiz # 1, Answers

14.02 Principles of Macroeconomics Quiz # 1, Answers 4. Priniples of Maroeonois Quiz #, Answers Part I.. False. The GDP deflator is the ratio of noinal to real GDP it is a easure of the overall prie level of the eonoy. The CPI is the ost of a given list

More information

Strategic Dynamic Sourcing from Competing Suppliers: The Value of Commitment

Strategic Dynamic Sourcing from Competing Suppliers: The Value of Commitment Strategi Dynami Souring from Competing Suppliers: The Value of Commitment Cuihong Li Laurens G. Debo Shool of Business, University of Connetiut, Storrs, CT0669 Tepper Shool of Business, Carnegie Mellon

More information

(0.50, 2.75) (0,3) Equivalent Variation Compensating Variation

(0.50, 2.75) (0,3) Equivalent Variation Compensating Variation 1. c(w 1, w 2, y) is the firm s cost function for processing y transactions when the wage of factor 1 is w 1 and the wage of factor 2 is w 2. Find the cost functions for the following firms: (10 Points)

More information

The Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Mix in a Financially Heterogeneous Monetary Union

The Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Mix in a Financially Heterogeneous Monetary Union The Optimal Monetary and Fisal Poliy Mix in a Finanially Heterogeneous Monetary Union Jakob Palek y February 4, 5 Abstrat Reent work on nanial fritions in New Keynesian models suggest that there is a sizable

More information

GS/ECON 5010 section B Answers to Assignment 3 November 2012

GS/ECON 5010 section B Answers to Assignment 3 November 2012 GS/ECON 5010 section B Answers to Assignment 3 November 01 Q1. What is the profit function, and the long run supply function, f a perfectly competitive firm with a production function f(x 1, x ) = ln x

More information

Title: Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, and Asymmetric Outcomes * Authors: Stanley S. Reynolds Bart J. Wilson

Title: Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, and Asymmetric Outcomes * Authors: Stanley S. Reynolds Bart J. Wilson Title: Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Unertainty, and Asymmetri Outomes * Authors: Stanley S. Reynolds Bart J. Wilson Department of Eonomis Eonomi Siene Laboratory College of Business & Publi Admin.

More information

Intermediating Auctioneers

Intermediating Auctioneers Intermediating Autioneers Yuelan Chen Department of Eonomis The University of Melbourne September 10, 2007 Abstrat Aution theory almost exlusively assumes that the autioneer and the owner or the buyer)

More information

Clipping Coupons: Redemption of Offers with Forward-Looking Consumers

Clipping Coupons: Redemption of Offers with Forward-Looking Consumers Clipping Coupons: Redemption of Offers with Forward-Looking Consumers Kissan Joseph Oksana Loginova Marh 6, 2019 Abstrat Consumer redemption behavior pertaining to oupons, gift ertifiates, produt sampling,

More information

Economics of Strategy (ECON 4550) Maymester 2015 Game Theoretic Models of Oligopoly

Economics of Strategy (ECON 4550) Maymester 2015 Game Theoretic Models of Oligopoly Eonomis of trategy (ECN 55) Maymester 5 Game Theoreti Models of ligooly Reading: The Right Game: Use Game Theory to hae trategy (ECN 55 Courseak, Page 5) and Partsometer Priing (ECN 55 Courseak, Page )

More information

Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger. Revised: November 1993

Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger. Revised: November 1993 Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas* Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger Northwestern University The University of Wisonsin and NBER by Revised: November 1993

More information

Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica

Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica Centre de Referènia en Eonomia Analítia Barelona Eonomis Working Paper Series Working Paper nº 229 Priing ylial goods Ramon Caminal July, 2005 Priing ylial goods Ramon Caminal Institut danàlisi Eonòmia,

More information

State of New Mexico Participation Agreement for Deferred Compensation Plan

State of New Mexico Participation Agreement for Deferred Compensation Plan State of New Mexio Partiipation Agreement for Deferred Compensation Plan DC-4068 (06/2016) For help, please all 1-866-827-6639 www.newmexio457d.om 1 Things to Remember Please print Payroll Center/Plan

More information

The effect of oil price shocks on economic growth (Case Study; Selected Oil Exporting Countries)

The effect of oil price shocks on economic growth (Case Study; Selected Oil Exporting Countries) Tehnial Journal of Engineering and Applied Sienes Available online at www.tjeas.om 2013 TJEAS Journal-2013-3-17/2118-2122 ISSN 2051-0853 2013 TJEAS The effet of oil prie shoks on eonomi growth (Case Study;

More information

EC Intermediate Microeconomic Theory

EC Intermediate Microeconomic Theory EC 311 - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory Lecture: Cost of Production Cont. Bekah Selby rebekahs@uoregon.edu May 5, 2014 Selby EC 311 - Lectures May 5, 2014 1 / 23 Review A firm faces several types of

More information

AP Macro Economics Review

AP Macro Economics Review AP Maro Eonomis Review Prodution Possibility Curve Capital goods Capital goods P r i e B2 B Pe B C upply 2 A Market Equilibrium W Consumer goods F emand E Consumer goods A hange in emand versus a hange

More information

Microeconomics 2nd Period Exam Solution Topics

Microeconomics 2nd Period Exam Solution Topics Microeconomics 2nd Period Exam Solution Topics Group I Suppose a representative firm in a perfectly competitive, constant-cost industry has a cost function: T C(q) = 2q 2 + 100q + 100 (a) If market demand

More information

max x + y s.t. y + px = m

max x + y s.t. y + px = m 1 Consumer s surplus Consider a household that consumes power, denoted by x, and money, denoted by y. A given bundle (x, y), provides the household with a level of happiness, or utility given by U(x, y)

More information

EconS 301 Intermediate Microeconomics Review Session #4

EconS 301 Intermediate Microeconomics Review Session #4 EconS 301 Intermediate Microeconomics Review Session #4 1. Suppose a person's utility for leisure (L) and consumption () can be expressed as U L and this person has no non-labor income. a) Assuming a wage

More information

Economics II - Exercise Session, December 3, Suggested Solution

Economics II - Exercise Session, December 3, Suggested Solution Economics II - Exercise Session, December 3, 008 - Suggested Solution Problem 1: A firm is on a competitive market, i.e. takes price of the output as given. Production function is given b f(x 1, x ) =

More information

Imagine barriers between you and other buyers or sellers: legal, spatial, social, or temporal

Imagine barriers between you and other buyers or sellers: legal, spatial, social, or temporal Deentralized Trade Imagine barriers between you and other buyers or sellers: legal, spatial, soial, or temporal These barriers redue the set of goods you an trade, and this redues welfare in some sense

More information

Value Added Tax (Flat-rate Valuation of Supplies of Fuel for Private Use) Order 2013

Value Added Tax (Flat-rate Valuation of Supplies of Fuel for Private Use) Order 2013 Index VALUE ADDED TAX (FLAT-RATE VALUATION OF SUPPLIES OF FUEL FOR PRIVATE USE) ORDER 2013 Index Artile Page 1 Title... 3 2 Commenement... 3 3 Flat-rate basis of valuation of supplies of fuel for private

More information

Lecture 6 International Trade Theory 1/2008 The Specific Factor Model Kornkarun Kungpanidchakul, Ph.D

Lecture 6 International Trade Theory 1/2008 The Specific Factor Model Kornkarun Kungpanidchakul, Ph.D Leture 6 International Trade Theory 1/2008 The Seii Fator Model Kornkarun Kunganidhakul, Ph.D The seii ator model is one o the attemt to imrove the Heksher- Ohlin model by removing the assumtion that both

More information

Honors General Exam PART 1: MICROECONOMICS. Solutions. Harvard University April 2013

Honors General Exam PART 1: MICROECONOMICS. Solutions. Harvard University April 2013 Honors General Exam Solutions Harvard University April 201 PART 1: MICROECONOMICS Question 1 The Cookie Monster gets a job as an analyst at Goldman Sachs. He used to like cookies, but now Cookie Monster

More information

Econ 101A Final exam May 14, 2013.

Econ 101A Final exam May 14, 2013. Econ 101A Final exam May 14, 2013. Do not turn the page until instructed to. Do not forget to write Problems 1 in the first Blue Book and Problems 2, 3 and 4 in the second Blue Book. 1 Econ 101A Final

More information

Study on Rural Microfinance System s Defects and Risk Control Based on Operational Mode

Study on Rural Microfinance System s Defects and Risk Control Based on Operational Mode International Business and Management Vol. 10, No. 2, 2015, pp. 43-47 DOI:10.3968/6807 ISSN 1923-841X [Print] ISSN 1923-8428 [Online] www.sanada.net www.sanada.org Study on Rural Mirofinane System s Defets

More information

Ecn Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis November 13, 2008 Professor John Parman. Midterm 2

Ecn Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis November 13, 2008 Professor John Parman. Midterm 2 Ecn 100 - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis November 13, 2008 Professor John Parman Midterm 2 You have until 6pm to complete the exam, be certain to use your time wisely.

More information

On the Welfare Benefits of an International Currency

On the Welfare Benefits of an International Currency On the Welfare Benefits of an International Curreny Prakash Kannan Researh Department International Monetary Fund Otober 2006 Abstrat Is it benefiial for a ountry s urreny to be used internationally? And,

More information

Solutions to Assignment #2

Solutions to Assignment #2 ECON 20 (Fall 207) Department of Economics, SFU Prof. Christoph Lülfesmann exam). Solutions to Assignment #2 (My suggested solutions are usually more detailed than required in an I. Short Problems. The

More information

that internalizes the constraint by solving to remove the y variable. 1. Using the substitution method, determine the utility function U( x)

that internalizes the constraint by solving to remove the y variable. 1. Using the substitution method, determine the utility function U( x) For the next two questions, the consumer s utility U( x, y) 3x y 4xy depends on the consumption of two goods x and y. Assume the consumer selects x and y to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint

More information

Derivations: LR and SR Profit Maximization

Derivations: LR and SR Profit Maximization Derivations: LR and SR rofit Maximization Econ 50 - Lecture 5 February 5, 06 Consider the production function f(l, K) = L 4 K 4 This firm can purchase labor and capital at prices and r per unit; it can

More information

Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions

Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions Sequential Prourement Autions and Their Effet on Investment Deisions Gonzalo isternas Niolás Figueroa November 2007 Abstrat In this paper we haraterize the optimal prourement mehanism and the investment

More information

THE ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR CHILD ALLOWANCES: ALTRUISM, EXCHANGE OR VALUE OF INDEPENDENCE?

THE ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR CHILD ALLOWANCES: ALTRUISM, EXCHANGE OR VALUE OF INDEPENDENCE? THE EONOMI MOTIVES FOR HILD ALLOWANES: ALTRUISM, EXHANGE OR VALUE OF INDEPENDENE? Lisa Farrell*, Paul Frijters** and Mihael A. Shields* * Department of Eonomis, University of Melbourne, Australia ** Tinbergen

More information

INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, NIRMA UNIVERSITY MBA (FT)- I (Batch ) : Term III (End Term Exam)

INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, NIRMA UNIVERSITY MBA (FT)- I (Batch ) : Term III (End Term Exam) INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, NIRMA UNIVERSITY MBA (FT)- I (Batch 2015-2017) : Term III (End Term Exam) Course : Managerial Economics Maximum Marks: 100 Date: 06-08-2015 Duration: 1 Hour Close Book Exam Instructions:

More information

Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection

Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection Publi Setor Rationing and Private Setor Seletion Simona Grassi Faulty of Business and Eonomis Institut d Eonomie et de Management de la Santé Université de Lausanne simona.grassi@unil.h Ching-to Albert

More information

Economics Honors Exam 2009 Solutions: Microeconomics, Questions 1-2

Economics Honors Exam 2009 Solutions: Microeconomics, Questions 1-2 Economics Honors Exam 2009 Solutions: Microeconomics, Questions 1-2 Question 1 (Microeconomics, 30 points). A ticket to a newly staged opera is on sale through sealed-bid auction. There are three bidders,

More information

Answer Key. q C. Firm i s profit-maximization problem (PMP) is given by. }{{} i + γ(a q i q j c)q Firm j s profit

Answer Key. q C. Firm i s profit-maximization problem (PMP) is given by. }{{} i + γ(a q i q j c)q Firm j s profit Homework #5 - Econ 57 (Due on /30) Answer Key. Consider a Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demand curve p(q) = a q, where q denotes aggregate output. Both firms have a common constant marginal cost

More information

AUDITING COST OVERRUN CLAIMS *

AUDITING COST OVERRUN CLAIMS * AUDITING COST OVERRUN CLAIMS * David Pérez-Castrillo # University of Copenhagen & Universitat Autònoma de Barelona Niolas Riedinger ENSAE, Paris Abstrat: We onsider a ost-reimbursement or a ost-sharing

More information

Microeconomics I - Seminar #9, April 17, Suggested Solution

Microeconomics I - Seminar #9, April 17, Suggested Solution Microeconomics I - Seminar #9, April 17, 009 - Suggested Solution Problem 1: (Bertrand competition). Total cost function of two firms selling computers is T C 1 = T C = 15q. If these two firms compete

More information

PROBLEM SET 3 SOLUTIONS. 1. Question 1

PROBLEM SET 3 SOLUTIONS. 1. Question 1 PROBLEM SET 3 SOLUTIONS RICH LANGFORD 1.1. Recall that 1. Question 1 CV = E(P x,, U) E(,, U) = By the envelope theorem, we know that E p dp. E(p,, U) p = (h x, h y, p,, U) p = p (ph x + h y + λ(u u(h x,

More information

Econ 101A Final exam Th 15 December. Do not turn the page until instructed to.

Econ 101A Final exam Th 15 December. Do not turn the page until instructed to. Econ 101A Final exam Th 15 December. Do not turn the page until instructed to. 1 Econ 101A Final Exam Th 15 December. Please solve Problem 1, 2, and 3 in the first blue book and Problems 4 and 5 in the

More information

Consumer s Surplus. Molly W. Dahl Georgetown University Econ 101 Spring 2009

Consumer s Surplus. Molly W. Dahl Georgetown University Econ 101 Spring 2009 Consumer s Surplus Molly W. Dahl Georgetown University Econ 101 Spring 2009 1 Inverse Demand Functions Taking quantity demanded as given and then asking what the price must be describes the inverse demand

More information

1. Suppose a production process is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function f(v 1, v 2 ) = v 1 1/2 v 2 3/2.

1. Suppose a production process is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function f(v 1, v 2 ) = v 1 1/2 v 2 3/2. 1. Suppose a production process is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function f(v 1, v 2 ) = v 1 1/2 v 2 3/2. a. Write an expression for the marginal product of v 1. Does the marginal product of v

More information

Carbon leakage: a mechanism design approach

Carbon leakage: a mechanism design approach Carbon leakage: a mehanism design approah Lassi Ahlvik and Matti Liski Otober 5, 2017 Abstrat Polluting firms often press poliy makers to offer ompensations or roll bak regulations by threatening to reloate.

More information

Pauline is considering becoming a member of a CD club, which offers discounts on CDs. There is a membership fee of 100 but then each CD is only 10.

Pauline is considering becoming a member of a CD club, which offers discounts on CDs. There is a membership fee of 100 but then each CD is only 10. Problem 1 (20 points) Pauline loves music. Her income is 300. Let x1 denote the quantity of CDs she buys and x2 the quantity of other goods. She has a positive marginal utility for CDs and other goods

More information

There are 10 questions on this exam. These 10 questions are independent of each other.

There are 10 questions on this exam. These 10 questions are independent of each other. Economics 21: Microeconomics (Summer 2002) Final Exam Professor Andreas Bentz instructions You can obtain a total of 160 points on this exam. Read each question carefully before answering it. Do not use

More information

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MYOPIA AND THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND CAPITAL TAXATION ON LABOR SUPPLY. Louis Kaplow

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MYOPIA AND THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND CAPITAL TAXATION ON LABOR SUPPLY. Louis Kaplow NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MYOPIA AND THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND CAPITAL TAXATION ON LABOR SUPPLY Louis Kaplow Working Paper 45 http://www.nber.org/papers/w45 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

More information

Trade Scopes across Destinations: Evidence from Chinese Firm

Trade Scopes across Destinations: Evidence from Chinese Firm MPRA Munih Personal RePE Arhive Trade Sopes aross Destinations: Evidene from Chinese Firm Zhuang Miao and Yifan Li MGill University 15 Marh 2017 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenhen.de/80863/ MPRA Paper

More information

(e) No matter what prices Sarah faces, the amount of money she needs to purchase a bundle indifferent to A must be (higher, lower) than the

(e) No matter what prices Sarah faces, the amount of money she needs to purchase a bundle indifferent to A must be (higher, lower) than the (e) No matter what prices Sarah faces, the amount of money she needs to purchase a bundle indifferent to A must be (higher, lower) than the amount she needs to purchase a bundle indifferent to B 145 (2)

More information

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS eonomis.eu.hu Deriving the Taylor Priniple when the Central Bank Supplies Money by Max Gillman 1, Ceri Davies 2 and Mihal Kejak 3 2012/13 1 Department of Eonomis,

More information

Write your name: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON Department of Economics

Write your name: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON Department of Economics Write your name: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON Department of Economics Economics 200, Fall 2008 Instructor: Scott First Hour Examination ***Use Brief Answers (making the key points) & Label All Graphs Completely

More information

Ecological Tax Reforms and the. Environment: A Note

Ecological Tax Reforms and the. Environment: A Note Publishe in: Bulletin of Eonomi Researh 50.1997, pp. 83-89 Eologial Tax Reforms an the Environment: A Note Ronnie Shöb University of Munih JEL lassifiation: H21, Q28 Aress: Ronnie Shöb Department of Eonomis

More information

Tax-loss Selling and the Turn-of-the-Year Effect: New Evidence from Norway 1

Tax-loss Selling and the Turn-of-the-Year Effect: New Evidence from Norway 1 Tax-loss Selling and the Turn-of-the-Year Effet: New Evidene from Norway 1 Qinglei Dai Universidade Nova de Lisboa July 2007 1 Aknowledgement: I would like to thank Kristian Rydqvist at Binghamton University,

More information

2- Demand and Engel Curves derive from consumer optimal choice problem: = PL

2- Demand and Engel Curves derive from consumer optimal choice problem: = PL Correction opics -he values of the utility function have no meaning. he only relevant property is how it orders the bundles. Utility is an ordinal measure rather than a cardinal one. herefore any positive

More information

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Principles of Microeconomics Final Exam Wednesday, October 10th, 2007

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Principles of Microeconomics Final Exam Wednesday, October 10th, 2007 Page 1 of 7 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics Final Exam Wednesday, October 10th, 2007 Last Name (Please print): First Name: MIT ID Number:

More information

Consumers cannot afford all the goods and services they desire. Consumers are limited by their income and the prices of goods.

Consumers cannot afford all the goods and services they desire. Consumers are limited by their income and the prices of goods. Budget Constraint: Review Consumers cannot afford all the goods and services they desire. Consumers are limited by their income and the prices of goods. Model Assumption: Consumers spend all their income

More information

AS/ECON 2350 S2 N Answers to Mid term Exam July time : 1 hour. Do all 4 questions. All count equally.

AS/ECON 2350 S2 N Answers to Mid term Exam July time : 1 hour. Do all 4 questions. All count equally. AS/ECON 2350 S2 N Answers to Mid term Exam July 2017 time : 1 hour Do all 4 questions. All count equally. Q1. Monopoly is inefficient because the monopoly s owner makes high profits, and the monopoly s

More information

The greatest common factor of two numbers (x and y) is defined as the largest factor that can be evenly divided into each number (x and y).

The greatest common factor of two numbers (x and y) is defined as the largest factor that can be evenly divided into each number (x and y). In Grade 10, ou learned man was of fatoring: 1. GCF fatoring. Differene of Squares fatoring. Simple trinomial fatoring 4. Comple trinomial fatoring Fatoring Review This is a review of these methods of

More information

T R A D E A N D I N D U S T R I A L P O L I C Y S T R A T E G I E S

T R A D E A N D I N D U S T R I A L P O L I C Y S T R A T E G I E S Working Paper 1-2004 A Dynami Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model for South Afria: Extending the Stati IFPRI Model James Thurlow T R A D E A N D I N D U S T R I A L P O L I C Y S T R A T E G I E

More information

Forward Contracts and Collusion in the Electricity Markets

Forward Contracts and Collusion in the Electricity Markets Forward Contrats and Collusion in the Eletriity Markets Yanhua Zhang y University of Toulouse Otober 006 Abstrat European ompetition authorities intend to mitigate market power in eletriity markets by

More information