Credit and hiring. Vincenzo Quadrini University of Southern California, visiting EIEF Qi Sun University of Southern California.

Transcription

1 Credit and hiring Vincenzo Quadrini University of Southern California, visiting EIEF Qi Sun University of Southern California November 14, 2013

2 CREDIT AND EMPLOYMENT LINKS When credit is tight, employers lack the liquidity for investing and hiring: Credit Channel. When the supply of assets is low, the economy is in shortage of insurance instruments. Employers become more averse to risk and reduce hiring: Asset Channel. When credit is tight, employers face weaker bargaining conditions with workers. Bargaining channel. 1

3 THEORETICAL INTUITION Suppose that there are only two periods. No discounting. Period 1: The firm issues debt b and hires a worker. Period 2: Produces z and splits the net surplus with the worker: Wage = 1 2 (z b), Dividend = 1 2 (z b) The value of hiring a worker in period 1 is: b + 1 (z b) 2 2

4 RELATION TO THE LITERATURE Theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the importance of the bargaining channel for the Financial Structure of firms: Perotti & Spier (1993) Klasa, Maxwell & Ortiz-Molina (2009), Matsa (2010) Fewer studies have investigated the importance of the bargaining channel for the Hiring Decision of firms. 3

5 CREDIT CONDITIONS FINANCIAL STRUCTURE HIRING 4

6 MACRO vs. MICRO ANALYSIS Monacelli, Quadrini & Trigari (2011) Studies the importance of bargaining channel for aggregate dynamics. Representative firm with one worker. Aggregate shocks only. Model estimated using time series aggregate data. Quadrini & Sun (2013) Studies the importance of bargaining channel for firm dynamics. Multi-worker heterogeneous firms. Idiosyncratic shocks only. Model estimated using firm-level data. 5

7 MODEL Continuum of firms with production technology Y t = z t N t z t = idiosyncratic productivity; N t = number of employees Hiring is costly E t = new employees (hiring); Υ ( Et N t ) N t Υ(.) strictly increasing and convex. Employment evolves according to N t+1 = (1 λ t )N t + E t λ t = idiosyncratic separation 6

8 MODEL (continue) Firms issue non-contingent debt subject to the enforcement constraint q t B t+1 ξ t βe t S t+1 q t = price of debt B t+1 = debt issued at t and repaid at t + 1 S t+1 = firm s surplus (defined later) ξ t = idiosyncratic stochastic variable (access to credit) Budget constraint D t = dividends w t = wage B t + D t + w t N t + Υ ( Et N t ) N t = z t N t + q t B t+1 7

9 BARGAINING Equity value: V t (B t, N t ) = D t + βe t V t+1 (B t+1, N t+1 ) Worker value: W t (B t, N t ) = w t + (1 λ t )βe t W t+1 (B t+1, N t+1 ) + λ t βe t U t+1 Net surplus: S t (B t, N t ) = V t (B t, N t ) + (W t (B t, N t ) U t ) N t Optimal policies: max w t,d t,e t,b t+1 [ ( W t (B t, N t ) U t ) N t ] η V t (B t, N t ) 1 η, 8

10 BARGAINING OUTCOME Wages are determined so that workers receive a faction η of the surplus (W t (B t, N t ) U t ) N t = η S t (B t, N t ) V t (B t, N t ) = (1 η) S t (B t, N t ) Remaining policies (D t, E t, B t+1 ) maximize the surplus. 9

11 FINANCIAL AND HIRING DECISIONS { S t (B t, N t ) = max E t,b t+1 D t + w t N t u t N t + [ ( ) ] } Nt β 1 η + η(1 λ t ) E t S t+1 (B t+1, N t+1 ) N t+1 subject to: D t + w t N t = z t N t Υ ( Et N t q t B t+1 ξ t βe t S t+1 (B t+1, N t+1 ) N t+1 = (1 λ t )N t + E t ) N t + q t B t+1 B t 10

12 SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTION q t = β The interest rate is equal to the inter-temporal discount rate 11

13 Normalizing by N t { ) } s t (b t ) = max d t + w t u t + β (g t+1 ηe t E t s t+1 (b t+1 ) e t,b t+1 subject to: d t + w t = z t Υ(e t ) + βg t+1 b t+1 b t ξ t E t s t+1 (b t+1 ) b t+1 g t+1 = 1 λ t + e t. 12

14 LINEAR SURPLUS s t (b t ) = s t b t Proposition 1. If η > 0, the firm borrows up to the limit whenever e t > 0. If η = 0 the debt is undetermined. Proposition 2. If η = 0, the hiring decision e t is independent of b t+1. 13

15 Unattractive property of the model If the firm hires (E t > 0) the borrowing limit is always binding. However, firms hold a lot of cash and unused lines of credit. 14

16 Figure 6: Core Loans and Unused Commitments at Commercial Banks Quarterly Core unused commitments Core loans outstanding $ Trillions (a) Core Loans Outstanding and Unused Commitments 0 Quarterly HELOCs Credit cards Business $ Trillions (b) Composition of Unused Commitments Note: The black line in the top panel depicts the dollar amount of core unused commitments, and the dotted red line depicts the dollar amount of core loans outstanding at U.S. commercial banks. Core loan categories include C&I, real estate, and consumer loans. The bottom panel depicts the composition of unused commitments. All series are deflated by the GDP price deflator (2005 = 100). Shaded vertical bars represent NBER-dated recessions. 0 growth of unused commitments stepped down immediately with the emergence of financial market

17 Does the bargaining channel work when firms accumulate liquidity? 16

18 FINANCIAL DISTRESS The borrowing constraint at time t is b t+1 ξ t E t s t+1 (b t+1 ). When the firm enters t + 1, the constraint may be violated if b t+1 > ξ t+1 s t+1 (b t+1 ). In this case the firm is forced to pay back part of the loan before it can access the equity market or retain earnings. This requires the firm to access alternative sources of funds with (distress) cost: ( 2. ϕ t+1 (b t+1 ) = κ b t+1 bt+1) 17

19 FIRM PROBLEM { ) } s t (b t ) = max d t + w t u t + β (g t+1 ηe t E t s t+1 (b t+1 ) e t,b t+1 subject to: d t + w t = z t Υ(e t ) + βg t+1 b t+1 b t ϕ t (b t ) ξ t E t s t+1 (b t+1 ) b t+1 g t+1 = 1 λ + e t, 18

20 Slope of the surplus functions s t (b t ) b t = 1 ϕ t(b t ). Therefore, s t (b t ) = s t b t ϕ t (b t ) 19

21 MODEL WITHOUT FINANCIAL DISTRESS Borrowing limit Marginal benefit of debt Marginal cost of debt Debt

22 MODEL WITH FINANCIAL DISTRESS Borrowing limit Marginal cost of debt Marginal benefit of debt Debt

23 MODEL WITH FINANCIAL DISTRESS Borrowing limit Marginal cost of debt Marginal benefit of debt Debt

24 MODEL WITH FINANCIAL DISTRESS Borrowing limit Marginal cost of debt Marginal benefit of debt Debt

25 STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION Simulated Methods of Moments Two data sets: Compustat annual files. Capital IQ database. Excluded: financial firms and utilities with SIC codes and ; firms with SIC codes greater than 9000; firms with some missing value. All variables are winsorized at 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. Nominal variables are deflated by the Consumer Price Index. Balanced panel of 1,508 firms over 9 years, from 2002 to

26 Target Moments Observed Simulated Mean( unused t credit t ) Std( unused t credit ) t Std( employ t ) Std( sales t ) Std( credit t ) Autocor( unused t 1 credit ) t Autocor( employ t 1 ) Autocor( sales t 1 ) Autocor( credit t 1 ) Cor( unused t credit, employ t ) t Cor( unused t credit, sales it ) t Cor( unused t credit, credit it ) t Cor( employ t, sales it ) Cor( employ t, credit it ) Cor( sales t, credit it )

27 Estimated Parameters Persistence productivity shock, ρ z Volatility productivity shock, σ z Persistence credit shock, ρ ξ Volatility credit shock, σ ξ Persistence separation shock, ρ λ Volatility separation shock, σ λ Financial distress cost, κ Workers bargaining power, η Hiring cost, φ Average separation, λ Unemployment flow, ū 0.452

28 THE ROLE OF EACH SHOCK 27

29 Observed Benchmark Credit Productivity Separation Model Shock Shock Shock Mean( unused t credit t ) Std( unused t credit ) t Std( employ t ) Std( sales t ) Std( credit t ) Autocor( unused t 1 credit ) t Autocor( employ t 1 ) Autocor( sales t 1 ) Autocor( credit t 1 ) Cor( unused t credit, employ t ) t Cor( unused t credit, sales it ) t Cor( unused t credit, credit it ) t Cor( employ t, sales it ) Cor( employ t, credit it ) Cor( sales t, credit it )

30 ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL APPROACH 29

31 Optimality condition for hiring without financial distress β [ ] (1 η)e t s t+1 + ηgb t+1b t gt+1 N = Υ ( ) gt+1 N 1 + λ 30

32 LINEARIZED OPTIMALITY CONDITION g N t+1 = α c + α s E t s t+1 + α b b t + α g (η) g B t+1 where α s = α b = α g (η) = (1 η)γ(g N 1 + λ)g N [ηγ(g N 1 + λ)/g N + η(1 γ) + (1 η)(1 γ)(1 + ξ)/ξ]bg B, ηγ(g N 1 + λ) [ηγ(g N 1 + λ)/g N + η(1 γ) + (1 η)(1 γ)(1 + ξ)/ξ]b, ηγ(g N 1 + λ) [ηγ(g N 1 + λ)/g N + η(1 γ) + (1 η)(1 γ)(1 + ξ)/ξ]g B 31

33 TESTING HYPOTHESIS The sensitivity of employment to credit increases with the bargaining power of workers. 32

34 EMPIRICAL EQUATION employ it = β 1 union cic,t debt it + β 2 union cic,t + β 3 debt it + β 4 leverage it 1 + β 5 log(employ it 1 ) + β 6 Q it + β 7 cashflow it + ν i + τ t + ε it 33

35 Unionization Rate High Low union cic,t debt it (0.089) union cic,t (0.058) debt it (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) leverage it (0.019) (0.029) (0.027) log(employ t 1 ) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) Q it (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) cashflow it (0.026) (0.046) (0.033) Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Adjusted R Observation 12,173 5,877 6,296