Quantitative Tightening
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1 Quantitative Tightening Vadim Elenev Johns Hopkins Carey Miguel Faria-e-Castro FRB St. Louis Daniel L. Greenwald MIT Sloan January 5, 2019, ASSA/AEA Atlanta The views expressed on this paper do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System. 0 / 20
2 Introduction
3 Motivation Monetary policy normalization in the US Interest rate lift-off (conventional) Balance sheet unwinding (unconventional) We ask the following questions: When, which, and how much? What if there is a new crisis? What if there are political constraints? 1 / 20
4 What we do and how We study these questions by doing the following: Model of (un)conventional monetary policy 1. TANK w/ rich mortgage setting 2. Endogenous refinancing decisions and mortgage duration 3. Crisis = worsening of issuance frictions Quantitative analysis of normalization scenarios 1. Early unwinding 2. Late unwinding 3. New crisis in 2019Q2 4. QE4 and institutional constraints 2 / 20
5 Results Unwinding later Enables housing, consumption boom All fine if there is no new crisis Political constraints more likely to bind crisis might be worse Unwinding earlier Has mild short-run costs Provides room for QE4 Precautionary benefits of unwinding soon after exiting ZLB. 3 / 20
6 Background: Mortgage Spreads
7 Mortgage Spreads and Issuance Frictions Log OPUC (%) Date Log Gross Issuance Ratio Relationship between originations and orig. costs changes after crisis. 4 / 20
8 Mortgage Spreads and Issuance Frictions, cont d Data motivates functional form for issuance costs of the type 1 + Cost t = exp {β t,0 + β t,1 log GIR t } = η t GIR ψt t η t, ψ t rise during periods of financial stress Details on data/analysis Embed this relationship in a GE model with realistic mortgages QE moderates private GIR, issuance costs Reduced-form way of capturing QE effects 5 / 20
9 Model
10 Demographics and Preferences Discrete time t = 0, 1,... Borrowing = impatient borrowers j = b, patient savers j = s Borrowers take out realistic mortgages Savers issue mortgages subject to frictions Preferences over numeraire, housing, labor [ U j t = E t βj t k=0 log C j t+k + ξ log Hj t 1+k η j (N j t+k )1+ϕ 1 + ϕ ] 6 / 20
11 Borrowers take out realistic mortgages Long-term fixed-rate nominal mortgage w/ costly prepayment Family Construct: continuum of members i [0, 1] in borrower hh Prepaying allows member i to (i) optimize over house size h t, (ii) optimize over mortgage size m t, (iii) reset interest rate r t subject to iid cost κ i,t Γ (rebated lump-sum back to borrowers) = endogenous prepayment rate ρ t + {}}{{}}{ ρ t = F ( rate incentive t, cash-out motive t ) + New (and only new) mortgages subject to LTV constraint Full Borrower Problem 7 / 20
12 Savers originate mortgages subject to frictions New mortgages l t tranched: l t of PO strips, r t l t of IO strips Origination + securitization subject to a cost (rebated lump-sum) Saver assets: Ψ S t (l t ) = η ( ) m,t l 1+ψ m t 1 + ψ m l, η m,t AR(1) ss 1. PO strips m s t traded at price q m t with payoff Zt m = }{{} ν + (1 ν)ρ t }{{} + (1 ν)(1 ρ t)qt m }{{} sched. principal unsched. principal value of future payments 2. IO strips x s t traded at price q a t with payoff Zt a = }{{} 1 + (1 ν)(1 ρ t)qt a }{{} sched. interest value of future payments 3. One-period nominal treasury debt b s t at price q t, payoff equal to 1 Savers otherwise identical to the RA in a standard NK model. 8 / 20
13 Firms and Government Continuum of intermediate producers Linear production function Y t = A tn t Rotemberg frictions standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve Monetary policy MP Details Conventional: Set short rate following Taylor rule with ZLB Unconventional: Purchase fraction f QE t Consolidated government budget constraint [0, 1) of new originations T t + q t B G t + Net QE Income t = G + Π 1 t Bt 1 G Lump-sum taxes grow slowly when gov t debt above steady state 9 / 20
14 Market Clearing New Originations: Housing: χh B t + (1 χ) h S t = 1 χρ t m t = l t = l,s t + ft QE l t POs: (1 χ)m S t + m G t = χm t IOs: (1 χ)x S t + x G t = χx t Treasuries: (1 χ)b S t = B G t Labor: χn B t + (1 χ)n s t = N t Final goods: χc B t + (1 χ)c S t + δp h t + G = Y t 10 / 20
15 Model Features Four aggregate shocks: {TFP t, MP t, Origination t, QE t } Refinancing Incentive t Interest incentive t + Cash-out incentive t State- and history-dependent effects of monetary policy State dependence of MP QE works by stabilizing r t q m t + q a t r t = η m,t [ ρ t m t (1 f QE ρ ss m ss ] ψ m t ) r t, refinancing, borrower (current) income, GDP 11 / 20
16 Quantitative Analysis: Monetary Policy Normalization
17 Design of the Experiment Combine model and US data to study monetary policy normalization 1. Given the commitment to an interest rate rule, what are the effects of different balance sheet normalization plans? 2. Do these different plans matter should the US economy experience a new financial crisis? 3. Do these different plans matter if the Fed wants to engage in new asset purchases during a new crisis? 12 / 20
18 Our approach 1. Calibrate the model to the US Calibration 2. Estimate the state of the US economy in 2015Q4 Details and Data 3. Use that state as a starting point to study counterfactual scenarios Benchmark, unwinding starts in 2017Q4 Early unwinding, starting in 2015Q4 Late unwinding, starting in 2020Q4 Unexpected crisis in 2019Q2 QE4 in response to unexpected crisis 13 / 20
19 Policy Normalization: Benchmark Study nonlinear transitions from state in 2015Q4 s.t.: No exogenous shocks from this point onwards Interest rate normalization follows Taylor Rule subject to ZLB QE normalization follows the September 2017 FOMC instructions 1. Maintenance regime in 2015Q4-2017Q4, purchases are such that m G t = m G max where mmax G is the size of MBS holdings as of 2015Q4 2. Reinvestments subject to growing caps from 2017Q3 onwards Alternative Scenarios: 1. Early unwinding, reinvestment caps start in 2015Q4 2. Late unwinding, reinvestment caps start in 2020Q3 14 / 20
20 Policy Normalization Scenarios 1.1 Fed MBS Portfolio 3.5 FFR % of max portfolio % Annual Benchmark Early Unwinding Late Unwinding / 20
21 Policy Normalization Base Early Late Other vars. 16 / 20
22 Policy Normalization: Unexpected Crisis in 2019Q Base Early Late -10 Other vars. 17 / 20
23 Policy Normalization: QE4 and Political Constraints Base Early Late -10 Other vars. 18 / 20
24 Policy Normalization: QE4 and Political Constraints Benchmark Early Unwinding Late Unwinding r t +1.69pp +0.64pp +3.35pp p h t 8.74% 3.25% 16.49% C B t 3.88% 1.68% 8.48% 19 / 20
25 Conclusion
26 Conclusion Unwinding later: everything fine if there is no new crisis Political constraints more likely to bind crisis might be worse Unwinding earlier has mild short-run costs, makes room for QE4 Next steps: Further explore feedback between unwinding and refinancing How does this affect interaction between conventional and unconventional MP? Cash-out vs rate refis 20 / 20
27 Appendix
28 Mortgage Spreads and Issuance Frictions How much of the variation in OPUCs can be explained by mortgage origination? log OPUC t = β s,0 + β s,1 log GIR t + ɛ t, s {pre, post} GIR t = Mortgages t (1 Prepayment t ) Mortgages t 1 Mortgages t 1 Sample β s,0 β s,1 Adj. R 2 N Pre (to 2008 Q2) (0.185) (0.065) Post (since 2008 Q3) (0.853) (0.262) pre is 1994 Q Q2, post is 2008 Q Q1 back
29 State Dependent Effects of Monetary Policy 20 Median CPR After Decline in Mortgage Rate 2nd Decile Rate Incentive 8th Decile Rate Incentive Steady State CPR 15 CPR Quarters After Rate Decrease
30 Borrower Problem s.t. max Ut j Ct b,hb t,nb t,m t,h t,κ t C b t + ρ t pt h (ht,b ht 1) b }{{} + δpt h h t 1 +T t + ( Ψ B t (κ t ) Ψ B t ( ) ) }{{}}{{} New houses Maintenance Rebated refi cost = w t N b t }{{} Labor income m,b t [ Π 1 t (xt 1 b + νmt 1) b + ρ t }{{} Mtge payments θ LTV p h t h b t mt b = ρ t mt + (1 ρ t )(1 ν)π 1 t mt 1 b xt b = ρ t rt mt + (1 ρ t )(1 ν)π 1 t xt 1 b ] mt,b Πt 1 (1 ν)mt 1 b }{{} New borrowing back
31 Conventional and Unconventional MP Conventional: Taylor Rule subject to the ZLB 1 [ ] [ ρi ( ) φπ ( ) ] 1 ρi φy 1 = max q t 0, 1 Πt Yt mp t q t 1 q Π Ȳ Unconventional MP: Fed buys fraction f QE t m G t x G t = f QE t = f QE t l t + (1 ν)(1 ρ t )Π 1 t mt 1 G of newly issued PO & IO r t l t + (1 ν)(1 ρ t )Π 1 t xt 1 G where Net income follows Back f QE t = QE t QE t log QE t = ρ QE log QE t 1 + σ QE ε QE t Net QE Income t = Π 1 t (Z m t m G t 1 + Z a t x G t 1) (q m t m G t + q a t x G t )
32 Calibration Back Parameter Description Value Target Demographics and Preferences 0.45 Avg χ Fraction of borrowers share w/ neg fixed income pos, SCF βs Discount factor savers Avg level of federal funds rate βb Discount factor borrowers Value of housing to income of 8.89 ϕ Frisch elasticity 1 Standard ξ Housing preference parameter 0.25 Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011) ηb Borrower labor disutility Nt b = 0.33 ηs Saver labor disutility 8.28 Nt s = 0.33 Production ε Micro elasticity of substitution varieties 6 20% markup in SS across ζ Rotemberg Menu Cost Prices adjust once every five quarters Government Ḡ SS Govt. Spending 0.2 Y 20% for the US B g SS Govt. Debt 0.14 Y Avg. maturity of 20 months, 70% of GDP Π Trend Inflation % for the US φπ Taylor rule: Inflation 1.5 Standard φy Taylor rule: Output 0.5/4 Standard ρi Taylor rule: Smoothing 0.8 Standard φτ Fiscal Rule 0.01 Faria-e-Castro (2018) Housing and Mortgages θ LTV Maximum LTV at origination 0.80 Max LTV for GSE conforming loans ν Contractual duration of mortgages Standard δ Maintenance cost of housing % annual, standard H Total stock of housing 1 Normalization sκ SD of prepayment shock Greenwald (2018) µκ Mean of prepayment cost shock ρss = ηm,ss Mean financial friction Annual. mortgage spread of 2% φm Elasticity of Ψ to originations 2.5 Shock Parameters ρa Persistence of TFP 0.90 Standard σa SD of TFP Innovations 0.01 Standard ρi Persistence of nominal rate 0.80 Standard ρr Persistence of MP Shock 0.80 Standard σr SD of MP Shock Innovations Standard ρqe Persistence of QE 0.75 Estimated σqe SD of QE Innovations 1 Normalization ρη Persistence of financial shock 0.75 ση SD of financial shock Innovations 1 Normalization
33 Estimating the state of the US economy in Standard state space methods Use Kalman Filter to estimate paths for states 2000Q1-2015Q4 Four exogenous shocks {ε a t, ε r t, ε m t, ε QE t } T t=0 Four observables 1. (Detrended) PCE consumption 2. 3-month treasury bill rate 3. Share of mortgages owned by the Fed 4. Real mortgage growth back
34 Data: Observables Nominal Interest Rate Fed Share of Mortgages pp annual % % Aggregate Consumption % Mortgage Growth
35 Smoothed Exogenous Processes back
36 Policy Normalization Back
37 Policy Normalization: Unexpected Crisis in 2019Q Back
38 Policy Normalization: QE4 and Political Constraints Back
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